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RODC Password Replication Policy Changed detection rules

The password replication policy decides whose credentials a read-only domain controller, or the Microsoft Entra Kerberos server object, may hold. Widening it puts privileged accounts within reach of whoever controls that object.

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
High
Log source
Windows Security event log
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1098Account Manipulation
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Write access to the computer object of an RODC or of the Microsoft Entra Kerberos server, or the right to change the two RODC password replication groups.
Impact
Credentials of privileged accounts become available to a branch office server or to the cloud service behind the Kerberos server object, which leads to control of the domain.
Response
Restore the allowed and denied lists, and reset the passwords of the accounts whose credentials the RODC obtained while the policy was widened.
Mitigation
Keep the default members of the Denied RODC Password Replication Group, and allow only the users and computers of the site an RODC serves.
Event IDs
47284732475647335136

How the attack works

A read-only domain controller (RODC) is built for sites that are less secure than a datacenter. It holds no passwords except those its password replication policy allows it to cache. The policy is stored on the RODC's computer account in two attributes: msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup lists the users, computers and groups whose passwords may be cached, and msDS-NeverRevealGroup lists those whose passwords may not. By default the allowed list holds the Allowed RODC Password Replication Group, which has no members, and the denied list holds the Denied RODC Password Replication Group together with Administrators and the operator groups. The denied group contains Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, the krbtgt account and other privileged principals, and a denial takes precedence over an allowance. Each RODC also has its own krbtgt account, so that the tickets it issues are separated from those of the writable domain controllers.

These limits are what keep the loss of an RODC from becoming the loss of the domain. An attacker who can change the policy removes them. Adding a privileged account or a wide group to the allowed list, or to the Allowed RODC Password Replication Group, and taking privileged principals out of the denied list or the denied group, lets the RODC obtain those credentials. Whoever controls the RODC, its computer account or its krbtgt key then reaches accounts that were out of bounds. Microsoft Defender for Identity describes a related technique, the Kerberos key list attack, in which stolen credentials of an RODC's krbtgt account are used to obtain the long-term secret of a targeted account.

The same policy protects a second object. When Microsoft Entra Kerberos is enabled, a computer object named AzureADKerberos is created in the Domain Controllers OU. It appears as an RODC, is not tied to a server, and is used by Microsoft Entra ID to generate ticket-granting tickets for the domain. Its default policy keeps high-privilege accounts out, and Microsoft advises against relaxing it because of possible attack paths from Microsoft Entra ID to Active Directory. Domain controllers log a change of either attribute as event 5136 and a change of the two groups as events 4732 and 4733.

What an attacker needs

  • Write access to the computer object of an RODC or of the Microsoft Entra Kerberos server, or the right to change the membership of the Allowed or the Denied RODC Password Replication Group.
  • For the step that follows, control of that RODC or of its credentials. For the Microsoft Entra Kerberos server object, that is control on the Microsoft Entra ID side.

Impact

Credentials of privileged accounts become available to a server that was designed not to hold them, or to the cloud service that issues tickets through the Kerberos server object. A compromise of a branch office server, or of the Microsoft Entra tenant, then leads to administrative control of the domain. Nothing changes on the privileged accounts themselves, so the widened policy also serves as a quiet way back in.

Detection rules

Member Added to the Allowed RODC Password Replication Group

Detects a member added to the Allowed RODC Password Replication Group, matched on its well-known RID 571 so that a renamed or localized group is covered. The group is on the allowed list of the password replication policy of every read-only domain controller by default, and Microsoft describes it as a group whose members can have their passwords replicated to all RODCs in the domain. It has no members by default. A member added here becomes cacheable on every RODC at once, without any change to an RODC object, unless the member is also covered by the denied list. The member is in MemberSid and MemberName. The rule cannot judge how privileged the member is. Requires Audit Security Group Management.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Member Added to the Allowed RODC Password Replication Group
id: 3ca38ec7-e541-45ef-a86e-6edd211afe7c
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a member added to the Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,
  matched on its well-known RID 571 so that a renamed or localized group is
  covered. The group is on the allowed list of the password replication
  policy of every read-only domain controller by default, and Microsoft
  describes it as a group whose members can have their passwords replicated
  to all RODCs in the domain. It has no members by default. A member added
  here becomes cacheable on every RODC at once, without any change to an
  RODC object, unless the member is also covered by the denied list. The
  member is in MemberSid and MemberName. The rule cannot judge how privileged
  the member is. Requires Audit Security Group Management.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-groups
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4732
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4728
      - 4732
      - 4756
    TargetSid|endswith: '-571'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Organizations that use this group for the staff of their branch offices add members as routine. Baseline who is added and by whom, and review every member that is an administrator, a service account or a group that covers most users.
level: medium

False positives

  • Organizations that use this group for the staff of their branch offices add members as routine. Baseline who is added and by whom, and review every member that is an administrator, a service account or a group that covers most users.

Member Removed From the Denied RODC Password Replication Group

Detects a member removed from the Denied RODC Password Replication Group (event 4733), matched on its well-known RID 572. Passwords of the members of this group cannot be replicated to any read-only domain controller, and the group takes precedence over the allowed group. By default it contains Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, Group Policy Creator Owners, Cert Publishers, the domain controller groups and the krbtgt account. Microsoft recommends not removing these members and notes that removing them can create a security vulnerability, because the group is what keeps the passwords of highly privileged accounts off the RODCs. The member that was removed is in MemberSid and MemberName. The group is a domain local group, so the removal is logged as event 4733. Requires Audit Security Group Management.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Member Removed From the Denied RODC Password Replication Group
id: 8aa101b4-8cde-442b-9567-349c0b65b7f8
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a member removed from the Denied RODC Password Replication Group
  (event 4733), matched on its well-known RID 572. Passwords of the members
  of this group cannot be replicated to any read-only domain controller, and
  the group takes precedence over the allowed group. By default it contains
  Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, Group Policy Creator
  Owners, Cert Publishers, the domain controller groups and the krbtgt
  account. Microsoft recommends not removing these members and notes that
  removing them can create a security vulnerability, because the group is
  what keeps the passwords of highly privileged accounts off the RODCs.
  The member that was removed is in MemberSid and MemberName. The group is a
  domain local group, so the removal is logged as event 4733. Requires Audit
  Security Group Management.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/services-hub/microsoft-engage-center/health/remediation-steps-ad/review-the-removal-of-default-members-from-the-denied-rodc-password-replication-group
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-groups
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4733
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4733
    TargetSid|endswith: '-572'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - The removal of an account that an administrator had added to the group in addition to the default members. A removal of a default member has no routine reason.
level: high

False positives

  • The removal of an account that an administrator had added to the group in addition to the default members. A removal of a default member has no routine reason.

RODC Password Replication Policy Widened

Detects the two directory changes that widen the password replication policy of a read-only domain controller: a value added to msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup, which lists the users, computers and groups whose passwords may be cached on the RODC, and a value removed from msDS-NeverRevealGroup, which lists those whose passwords may not (event 5136). Both attributes are on the computer object of the RODC. The Microsoft Entra Kerberos server object (CN=AzureADKerberos in the Domain Controllers OU) appears as an RODC and carries the same attributes. Microsoft advises against relaxing its policy, so a match on that object deserves the highest priority. The principal that was added or removed is in AttributeValue and the RODC in ObjectDN. The rule cannot judge how privileged the principal is, and the setup of a new RODC writes the policy once. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL that audits writes to these attributes on the domain controller objects.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: RODC Password Replication Policy Widened
id: f0e96756-0b7d-423f-a4d8-25719ea93e02
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the two directory changes that widen the password replication
  policy of a read-only domain controller: a value added to
  msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup, which lists the users, computers and groups
  whose passwords may be cached on the RODC, and a value removed from
  msDS-NeverRevealGroup, which lists those whose passwords may not (event
  5136). Both attributes are on the computer object of the RODC. The
  Microsoft Entra Kerberos server object (CN=AzureADKerberos in the Domain
  Controllers OU) appears as an RODC and carries the same attributes.
  Microsoft advises against relaxing its policy, so a match on that object
  deserves the highest priority. The principal that was added or removed is
  in AttributeValue and the RODC in ObjectDN. The rule cannot judge how
  privileged the principal is, and the setup of a new RODC writes the policy
  once. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL that audits
  writes to these attributes on the domain controller objects.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-msds-revealondemandgroup
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-msds-neverrevealgroup
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/active-directory/rodc-replicates-passwords-grant-incorrect-permissions
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/hybrid-cloud-kerberos-trust
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection_allowed_list_extended:
    EventID: 5136
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup
    OperationType:
      - '%%14674'
      - 'Value Added'
  selection_denied_list_reduced:
    EventID: 5136
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: msDS-NeverRevealGroup
    OperationType:
      - '%%14675'
      - 'Value Deleted'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - The installation of a new RODC, or the first setup of Microsoft Entra Kerberos, which write the policy once, and a planned change that allows the staff group of a site. Match the event to the change record and check how privileged the principal in AttributeValue is.
  - A value that is replaced logs Value Deleted and Value Added together. Read both events of the operation before judging a removal from the denied list.
level: high

False positives

  • The installation of a new RODC, or the first setup of Microsoft Entra Kerberos, which write the policy once, and a planned change that allows the staff group of a site. Match the event to the change record and check how privileged the principal in AttributeValue is.
  • A value that is replaced logs Value Deleted and Value Added together. Read both events of the operation before judging a removal from the denied list.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

RODC password replication policy widened and narrowed again shortly after

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

An attacker who needs the policy only long enough to obtain one credential adds a principal, lets the RODC obtain the password and removes the principal again, so that a later review of the policy shows nothing. An addition and a removal of the same principal on the same list within a short time is rarely administration.

  1. A principal is allowed: event 5136 with AttributeLDAPDisplayName msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup and OperationType Value Added, or event 4732 for the group whose TargetSid ends in -571. Keep ObjectDN and AttributeValue, or TargetSid and MemberSid.
  2. Within 24 hours the same principal is removed again: event 5136 on the same ObjectDN with the same AttributeValue and OperationType Value Deleted, or event 4733 with the same TargetSid and MemberSid.
  3. Apply the same logic in reverse to the denied side: a value deleted from msDS-NeverRevealGroup, or a member removed from the group whose TargetSid ends in -572, that is added back shortly after.
  4. For the time between the two events, list the accounts whose passwords the RODC obtained and review their sign-ins.

Events513647324733

LimitsAn administrator who corrects a mistake produces the same pair of events. A change of an existing value also logs Value Deleted and Value Added, in the opposite order. The 24 hours are a starting point. Credentials that were obtained in between stay valid after the policy is restored, so the finding calls for password resets.

Triage

  • Read which object was changed (ObjectDN), which list (AttributeLDAPDisplayName), whether a value was added or removed (OperationType) and the principal concerned (AttributeValue). For the group events, read the group (TargetSid) and the member (MemberSid, MemberName).
  • Decide how privileged the principal is. A privileged account, a group that contains privileged accounts, or a group that covers most users is the serious case.
  • Check whether the object is an RODC of a real site or the AzureADKerberos object. A change to the latter has no routine reason.
  • Identify who made the change (SubjectUserName, SubjectLogonId) and match it to a change record, such as the setup of a new RODC.
  • List the accounts whose passwords the RODC has cached since the change. repadmin /prp view with the reveal option shows them.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Restore the policy. Remove the added principals from the allowed list and from the Allowed RODC Password Replication Group, and put the removed principals back on the denied list and into the denied group.
  2. Reset the passwords of the accounts whose credentials the RODC obtained while the policy was widened, privileged accounts first. Restoring the policy does not take back what was already cached.
  3. If the RODC, its computer account or its krbtgt account may be under an attacker's control, take the RODC out of service and rebuild it, which also replaces its krbtgt account.
  4. Disable or reset the account that changed the policy and remove its write access to the domain controller objects and the two groups.
  5. For the AzureADKerberos object, review the privileged activity in the Microsoft Entra tenant as well, because that is where the object is used.

Mitigation

  • Keep the default members of the Denied RODC Password Replication Group. Microsoft recommends not removing them.
  • Allow only the users and computers of the site an RODC serves, through a dedicated group, and never a privileged account, a privileged group or a group as wide as Domain Users.
  • Review the allowed and denied lists of every RODC and of the AzureADKerberos object on a schedule, and do not relax the policy of the Kerberos server object.
  • Limit write access to RODC computer objects and to the membership of the two password replication groups to Tier 0 administrators.
  • Add an auditing entry for writes to msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup and msDS-NeverRevealGroup on the domain controller objects, and enable Audit Directory Service Changes and Audit Security Group Management on all domain controllers.

Frequently asked questions

Why can an RODC not obtain the passwords of domain administrators by default?

The Denied RODC Password Replication Group is on the denied list of every RODC and contains Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, the krbtgt account and other privileged principals. A denial takes precedence over an allowance, so these accounts stay out even when a group they belong to is allowed.

What is the AzureADKerberos object and why does its policy matter?

It is a computer object that Microsoft Entra Kerberos creates in the Domain Controllers OU. It appears as a read-only domain controller without a server behind it, and Microsoft Entra ID uses it to generate ticket-granting tickets for the domain. Microsoft advises against relaxing its password replication policy because of possible attack paths from Microsoft Entra ID to Active Directory.

Do these rules show an RODC obtaining a password?

No. They report a change of the policy that decides which passwords an RODC may obtain. To see which credentials an RODC holds, read its list of revealed accounts, for example with repadmin and its password replication policy view. Reset the passwords of accounts that should not be on that list.

Is every change of the allowed list an attack?

No. Setting up an RODC writes the policy once, and organizations with branch offices add staff to the allowed group as routine. What matters is who was added or removed. A privileged account or a very wide group on the allowed side, or anything taken off the denied side, is never routine.

References

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