How the attack works
Every OCI user can change or reset their own Console password without a policy. Resetting it for somebody else is an administrative action with two routes. In IAM policy terms it is the API operation CreateOrResetUIPassword, which needs USER_UPDATE and USER_UIPASS_RESET and therefore the manage users verb in the tenancy. In tenancies with identity domains, administrator roles do the same without any policy: Oracle documents that the user manager and the help desk administrator can reset passwords, reset authentication factors and generate bypass codes, for all users of the domain or for the users of selected groups.
That makes a routine help desk task a takeover path. Whoever holds one of these rights over a member of the Administrators group, or over a holder of an administrator role, sets a password they know and signs in as that account. Where the "Security Policy for OCI Console" is at Oracle's defaults a password alone does not open the Console, which is why this event matters most together with a factor reset or a bypass code for the same user. The Audit log records the IAM control plane event com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.CreateOrResetPassword, and identity domains write the event id admin.user.password.reset.success to data.additionalDetails.eventId for a reset initiated by an administrator. Resets and changes that users perform on their own account have other ids (admin.me.password.reset.success, admin.me.password.change.success).
Collection: ship the _Audit log group of the root compartment (subcompartments included) and of any compartment that holds an identity domain to the SIEM through a service connector and a stream, and include the home region. Tenancies without identity domains produce only the control plane event.
What an attacker needs
- A principal with
manage usersin the tenancy, or the user manager or help desk administrator role with the target user in scope (Oracle documents password resets for both), or a broader role that manages the domain's users, such as the identity domain administrator. - To use the new password in the Console where MFA is enforced: the ability to reset the target's authentication factors or to issue a bypass code, which the user manager and help desk administrator roles include.
Impact
Interactive access as the target user. On a member of Administrators that is the whole tenancy, on an identity domain administrator the whole domain. The owner's previous password stops working, so the change is noticed quickly on accounts in daily use and can go unnoticed on dormant, break-glass and service users.
Detection rules
OCI User Password Reset by an Administrator
Detects the identity domain event admin.user.password.reset.success, which Oracle documents for a password reset initiated by an administrator, and the IAM control plane operation CreateOrResetPassword. The same API operation serves users who reset their own password and administrators who create the initial password of a new user, so expect the control plane event for those as well and compare the caller with the target user (data.resourceName) in triage. Self-service resets in identity domains use the id admin.me.password.reset.success and are not matched.
title: OCI User Password Reset by an Administrator
id: 8457b594-8b5b-48e8-b98d-669fd0319b56
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the identity domain event admin.user.password.reset.success, which
Oracle documents for a password reset initiated by an administrator, and the
IAM control plane operation CreateOrResetPassword. The same API operation
serves users who reset their own password and administrators who create the
initial password of a new user, so expect the control plane event for those
as well and compare the caller with the target user (data.resourceName) in
triage. Self-service resets in identity domains use the id
admin.me.password.reset.success and are not matched.
references:
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/api-getstarted/usingauditeventapis.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en/learn/generating-iam-reports-from-oci-audit/index.html
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: oci
service: audit
detection:
selection_identity_domain:
data.additionalDetails.eventId: admin.user.password.reset.success
selection_control_plane:
eventType: com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.CreateOrResetPassword
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Help desk resets for users who forgot their password, and new user onboarding, where the same control plane operation creates the initial password. Expect regular volume; alert without exception when the target is a member of Administrators, holds an administrator role or is a break-glass account.
- Users resetting their own password through the IAM API, which uses the same operation as the control plane selection.
level: medium
False positives
- Help desk resets for users who forgot their password, and new user onboarding, where the same control plane operation creates the initial password. Expect regular volume; alert without exception when the target is a member of Administrators, holds an administrator role or is a break-glass account.
- Users resetting their own password through the IAM API, which uses the same operation as the control plane selection.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Password reset and bypass code issued for the same user, then a sign-in of that user
Where the Console requires MFA, a reset password alone does not open it. The takeover needs a second step on the same account, a bypass code, and ends with a sign-in. A password reset and a bypass code for one user by the same administrator, followed by a sign-in of that user, is the whole takeover path in three ordinary identity domain events.
- The Audit log records
admin.user.password.reset.successindata.additionalDetails.eventId. Keep the target indata.additionalDetails.adminResourceName(the Target column of Oracle's audit report query), the actor indata.additionalDetails.actorNameand the domain indata.additionalDetails.domainDisplayName. - Within 60 minutes the same actor creates a bypass code for the same target:
sso.bypasscode.create.successwith the samedata.additionalDetails.adminResourceName. - Within the next 60 minutes the Audit log records
sso.session.create.successwith the target asdata.additionalDetails.actorNamein the same domain. - Compare
data.additionalDetails.clientIpof the sign-in with theclientIpof the reset and with the addresses the target signed in from in the previous 30 days. A sign-in from the actor's address, or from one the target never used, is the case to act on.
Eventsadmin.user.password.reset.successsso.bypasscode.create.successsso.session.create.success
LimitsA help desk call from a user who lost both the password and the phone produces the same three events, so confirm with the user through a separate channel. Oracle's report query gives the target only as a column, so check with one test reset that the target and the sign-in name have the same form. Tenancies without identity domains have no bypass code event. The windows are starting points.
Triage
- Identify the actor (data.additionalDetails.actorName or data.identity.principalName) and the target user. For the control plane event the target is in data.resourceName; for the identity domain event Oracle's report query selects data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName as the target.
- Check whether the target is a member of Administrators, holds an administrator role or is a break-glass or service account.
- Look for a bypass code (sso.bypasscode.create.success), a deleted TOTP device or a factor reset for the same user close to the reset, and for sign-ins of that user afterwards, including their source address.
- Confirm the reset with the target user or the help desk ticket through a separate channel.
- If not approved, reset the password again together with the owner, remove credentials and factors added since the event, and review what the account did.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Take the account back together with its owner. Set a new password, revoke bypass codes and enroll the second factor again, so that neither the attacker's password nor a factor the attacker set up remains.
- Delete API keys, auth tokens and customer secret keys that were added to the account after the reset.
- Contain the account that performed the reset. Reset its credentials and remove its user manager or help desk administrator role, or its
manage usersright, until its owner is verified. - Review what the target account did after the reset and undo it, with priority on group memberships, policies, identity providers and credentials for other users.
- Check whether the same actor reset the passwords of other users, and confirm that later sign-ins of the target account come from its owner.
Mitigation
- Scope user manager and help desk administrator roles to selected groups that contain no administrators, and let only identity domain administrators handle resets for privileged accounts.
- Keep
manage usersin the tenancy to a small group, and separate credential operations from tenancy administration as Oracle's security policy examples show. - Keep the "Security Policy for OCI Console" at Oracle's security defaults so that a password reset alone does not open the Console.
- Review who can reset passwords for members of Administrators and for break-glass accounts, and alert on every reset of those accounts.
Frequently asked questions
How do I tell an administrator reset from a user resetting their own password?
In identity domains the event id differs. A reset initiated by an administrator is `admin.user.password.reset.success`. Resets and changes that users perform on their own account are `admin.me.password.reset.success` and `admin.me.password.change.success`. The control plane event `CreateOrResetPassword` serves both cases, so compare the caller with the target user there.
Is a reset password enough to sign in to the Console?
Not where the "Security Policy for OCI Console" is at Oracle's defaults, because a password alone does not open the Console there. The reset matters most together with a factor reset or a bypass code for the same user, and the user manager and help desk administrator roles can do both. Look for those events close to the reset.
Why does the control plane event also fire for new users?
The same API operation creates the initial password of a new user and serves users who reset their own password through the IAM API. Expect the event during onboarding and help desk work. Alert without exception when the target is a member of Administrators, holds an administrator role or is a break-glass account.
On which accounts does a malicious reset stay unnoticed the longest?
On dormant, break-glass and service users. The owner's previous password stops working after the reset, so on an account in daily use the owner notices quickly. An account that nobody signs in to gives no such signal, which is why every reset of those accounts needs confirmation.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098: Account Manipulation
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Details for IAM with Identity Domains (CreateOrResetUIPassword permissions)
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Understanding administrator roles
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Services that produce events, IAM credentials event types
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Using the Audit Event APIs (identity domain event ids)
- Oracle: Generate IAM reports from OCI Audit (identity domain event ids in Audit)
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Working with API keys (who can manage other users' credentials)
- IAM Identity Domains REST API: AuditEvent attributes (clientIp)
- Oracle Cloud Guard: Detector recipe reference (IAM User UI password created or reset)