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Administrator Password Reset Used for Account Takeover detection rules

An attacker with a password administration role resets another user's password, typically an administrator or a user who owns privileged applications, and signs in as that user.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
High
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID audit logs
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1098Account Manipulation
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
A role allowed to reset the target's password, and a target account that is cloud-managed or covered by password writeback.
Impact
Sign-in as the target account with all its roles and ownerships, which for privileged accounts can lead to full tenant takeover.
Response
Have a trusted administrator reset the password again, revoke the sessions and remove every authentication method registered after the first reset.
Mitigation
Require phishing-resistant MFA for all administrators, and use role-assignable groups so lower-tier administrators cannot reset privileged accounts.
Audit activities
Reset passwordReset password (by admin)Reset user password

How the attack works

Several Microsoft Entra roles can reset passwords: Password Administrator, Helpdesk Administrator, Authentication Administrator and User Administrator for limited sets of users, and Privileged Authentication Administrator and Global Administrator for everyone (as can the deprecated Partner Tier2 Support role). An attacker who obtains one of these roles resets the password of a more valuable account, such as a Global Administrator, an owner of a privileged application or an Azure subscription owner, and then signs in with the new password. If the target has no MFA method, or the attacker can also register one, the takeover is complete.

Admin resets are logged by Core Directory (Reset password) and, when performed through the password reset service, by Self-service Password Management (Reset password (by admin)); the Microsoft 365 unified audit log names the same operation Reset user password. The event identifies the actor in InitiatedBy and the account in TargetResources, but not whether the account is privileged: that has to be checked against role assignments.

What an attacker needs

  • A compromised identity with a role allowed to reset the target's password, or an application with equivalent permissions.
  • A cloud-managed target account, or password writeback for synchronized accounts.

Impact

Sign-in as the target account with all its roles and ownerships. Resets of privileged accounts can lead to full tenant takeover; resets of application or subscription owners lead to the resources they control.

Detection rules

Administrator Reset a User's Password

Detects a password reset performed by an administrator or application on another account. Reset password (Core Directory) and Reset password (by admin) (Self-service Password Management) are the names in Microsoft's Entra audit activity reference. Reset user password is the name of the same operation in the Microsoft 365 unified audit log (Purview) and is kept for pipelines that carry that name. The self-service activity Reset password (self-service) is not included. Prioritize resets of accounts that hold privileged roles or own privileged applications.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Administrator Reset a User's Password
id: 6f0951d4-cffd-4177-8d22-df9d94bd5055
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a password reset performed by an administrator or application on
  another account. Reset password (Core Directory) and Reset password (by
  admin) (Self-service Password Management) are the names in Microsoft's Entra
  audit activity reference. Reset user password is the name of the same
  operation in the Microsoft 365 unified audit log (Purview) and is kept for
  pipelines that carry that name. The self-service activity Reset password
  (self-service) is not included. Prioritize resets of accounts that hold
  privileged roles or own privileged applications.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName:
      - Reset password
      - Reset password (by admin)
      - Reset user password
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Help desk resets for locked-out users; enrich the alert with the target's role assignments (for example a watchlist of privileged accounts) and alert on privileged targets only if volume is high.
  - The Core Directory entry of a self-service reset, if your tenant records one; compare InitiatedBy with the target account and filter events where they are the same user.
level: medium

False positives

  • Help desk resets for locked-out users; enrich the alert with the target's role assignments (for example a watchlist of privileged accounts) and alert on privileged targets only if volume is high.
  • The Core Directory entry of a self-service reset, if your tenant records one; compare InitiatedBy with the target account and filter events where they are the same user.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Disabled account enabled and its password reset by an administrator shortly after

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

A dormant or disabled account that still holds roles or ownerships is a quiet way in: the attacker enables it, sets a password they know and signs in as an account nobody watches. Both changes are routine on their own, but on one account within minutes they are the pattern of an account being brought back for an attacker.

  1. Audit log, category UserManagement: Enable account, with the account in TargetResources and the actor in InitiatedBy.
  2. Within the next 60 minutes: Reset password or Reset password (by admin) for the same account.
  3. Raise the priority when the same actor made both changes, and when the account holds a role, owns applications or has not signed in for months.
  4. Check the sign-in log for the first sign-in of the account after the reset and its address.

EventsEnable accountReset passwordReset password (by admin)

LimitsA returning employee is enabled and given a new password in exactly this way, so match the pair to an HR or help desk record. Whether the account holds roles has to come from your own data. The 60 minutes are a starting point.

Password reset by an administrator, then a new authentication method on the same account

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsNeeds a baseline

A new password alone does not get an attacker past MFA. The takeover is complete once they register a method of their own on the account. A method registered on the account soon after an administrator reset its password, from an address the user never used, is that second step.

  1. Audit log: Reset password or Reset password (by admin), with the account in TargetResources and the actor in InitiatedBy.
  2. Audit log, within the next 24 hours: User registered security info by the same account, or Admin registered security info with the account as target.
  3. Compare the ipAddress of the user in InitiatedBy of the registration with the addresses the account used before the reset.
  4. Alert, and raise the priority when the account holds a privileged role or the reset was made by an actor who does not usually reset passwords.

EventsReset passwordReset password (by admin)User registered security infoAdmin registered security info

LimitsUsers who were locked out and had their password reset often register a new phone right afterwards, so the address and the actor carry the signal. Methods registered after the window are missed. The 24 hours are a starting point.

Triage

  • Check whether the target account (TargetResources) holds privileged roles, owns applications or holds Azure roles; prioritize those resets.
  • Confirm the actor (InitiatedBy) and a help desk ticket; resets by service principals or outside working hours need an explanation.
  • Review the target's sign-ins and MFA registrations right after the reset.
  • If unauthorized, reset the password again, revoke sessions, review the target's activity and investigate the actor.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Take the target account back. Have a trusted administrator reset the password again, revoke the sessions and remove every authentication method registered after the first reset.
  2. Revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of the identity that performed the reset, and remove its password administration role. If an application did it, disable its service principal.
  3. Review what was done as the target after the reset. Look at its roles, the applications it owns and its Azure subscriptions for new credentials, role assignments and policy changes, and undo them.
  4. Give the new credentials to the real owner through a channel you have verified, not through the mailbox of the account.
  5. Search the audit log for other resets by the same actor in the period and handle each target in the same way.

Mitigation

  • Require phishing-resistant MFA for all administrators so that a new password alone is not enough to sign in.
  • Use role-assignable groups and restricted management administrative units to stop lower-tier administrators from resetting privileged accounts.
  • Keep Privileged Authentication Administrator and Global Administrator to a few PIM-managed accounts.

Frequently asked questions

Does the event say whether the reset account is privileged?

No. It names the actor in InitiatedBy and the account in TargetResources, but not the roles of that account. Check the target against role assignments, application ownership and Azure roles, or enrich the alert with a watchlist of privileged accounts.

Can a Helpdesk Administrator reset the password of a Global Administrator?

No. Password Administrator, Helpdesk Administrator, Authentication Administrator and User Administrator can reset passwords for limited sets of users only. Those sets can still include a user who owns a privileged application or an Azure subscription, and such a reset leads to the resources that user controls.

Are self-service password resets included?

The activity `Reset password (self-service)` is not included. Some tenants may record a Core Directory entry for a self-service reset as well. Compare InitiatedBy with the target account and filter the events where both are the same user.

Is a new password enough for the attacker to sign in?

Only if nothing else is required. If the target has no MFA method, or the attacker can also register one, the takeover is complete. Where administrators must use phishing-resistant MFA, a new password alone is not enough to sign in.

References

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