How the attack works
Restricted management administrative units exist to protect sensitive objects, such as the accounts of executives. Users, devices and security groups placed in such a unit can only be changed by administrators who hold a role scoped to that unit. Everyone else is blocked from changing the properties of the member, deleting it, resetting its password or changing the owners and members of a group in the unit, and that includes Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator at tenant scope. Applications are blocked as well, because Microsoft Graph application permissions do not apply to members of the unit.
The same protection works for an attacker. Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator cannot change the members, but they manage the units: they create them, add and remove members and assign roles scoped to them, also to themselves. An attacker who holds one of these roles puts an account they control into a restricted unit. When the intrusion is found, the usual containment steps fail on that account until someone finds the unit and removes the account from it. Research published by Datadog Security Labs on September 16, 2024 describes this use as sticky persistence. The opposite action is just as useful to an attacker: taking a protected account out of its unit makes it resettable again, and assigning a role scoped to the unit gives control of the protected accounts.
Microsoft documents the audit activities for all of these steps, and the rules on this page read them: Add administrative unit with the detail IsMemberManagementRestricted, Add member to restricted management administrative unit, Remove member from restricted management administrative unit and the two activities for a role scoped over such a unit. The restricted setting is chosen when the unit is created and cannot be changed afterwards.
What an attacker needs
- Control of an identity with the Global Administrator or Privileged Role Administrator role. Microsoft names these two roles as the ones that manage restricted management administrative units.
- An account to protect: one the attacker created or one they have taken over.
Impact
An attacker-controlled account that administrators cannot reset, disable or delete in the usual way, which delays containment while the account keeps its access. A role scoped to a restricted unit gives control of the protected members, for example the right to reset the password of an executive. Removing a member from its unit strips the protection the organization relied on for that account.
Detection rules
Member Added to or Removed From a Restricted Management Administrative Unit
Detects a membership change of a restricted management administrative unit. Microsoft documents two audit activities for it in the AdministrativeUnit category: "Add member to restricted management administrative unit" and "Remove member from restricted management administrative unit". An added user, device or security group can from then on only be changed by administrators with a role scoped to the unit, so an attacker's account that is added becomes hard to reset, disable or delete. A removed member loses that protection and can again be changed by tenant-level administrators and by help desk roles, which is the step before a protected account is taken over. The member and the unit are in TargetResources and the actor is in InitiatedBy.
title: Member Added to or Removed From a Restricted Management Administrative Unit
id: 179041bf-2c5a-4a53-ad2e-2f1710406fab
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a membership change of a restricted management administrative unit.
Microsoft documents two audit activities for it in the AdministrativeUnit
category: "Add member to restricted management administrative unit" and
"Remove member from restricted management administrative unit". An added
user, device or security group can from then on only be changed by
administrators with a role scoped to the unit, so an attacker's account that
is added becomes hard to reset, disable or delete. A removed member loses
that protection and can again be changed by tenant-level administrators and
by help desk roles, which is the step before a protected account is taken
over. The member and the unit are in TargetResources and the actor is in
InitiatedBy.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/admin-units-restricted-management
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName:
- Add member to restricted management administrative unit
- Remove member from restricted management administrative unit
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- The owners of a restricted unit adding a new executive or emergency access account, or removing someone who left. Match the event to a request from the owner of the unit.
- An administrator who takes a member out of the unit for a short time because a required change cannot be made from inside it. Microsoft describes this for resetting the password of a Global Administrator. Check that the member was put back.
level: medium
False positives
- The owners of a restricted unit adding a new executive or emergency access account, or removing someone who left. Match the event to a request from the owner of the unit.
- An administrator who takes a member out of the unit for a short time because a required change cannot be made from inside it. Microsoft describes this for resetting the password of a Global Administrator. Check that the member was put back.
Restricted Management Administrative Unit Created
Detects the creation of an administrative unit whose event names the property IsMemberManagementRestricted. Microsoft's page on restricted management administrative units lists this audit record: the activity "Add administrative unit" in the AdministrativeUnit category with the detail IsMemberManagementRestricted = true. The restricted setting can only be chosen when a unit is created, so every restricted unit starts with this event. Members of such a unit cannot be changed, reset or deleted by tenant-level administrators, which protects executives and equally shields an attacker's account. The rule matches the property name. The value true is not matched, because it is too common a word in an audit record to add precision, and Microsoft does not say whether an ordinary unit writes the property with the value false. Check the value in TargetResources.
title: Restricted Management Administrative Unit Created
id: 16e90c11-6e27-49b7-ba0b-11a95a2d031a
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the creation of an administrative unit whose event names the
property IsMemberManagementRestricted. Microsoft's page on restricted
management administrative units lists this audit record: the activity "Add
administrative unit" in the AdministrativeUnit category with the detail
IsMemberManagementRestricted = true. The restricted setting can only be
chosen when a unit is created, so every restricted unit starts with this
event. Members of such a unit cannot be changed, reset or deleted by
tenant-level administrators, which protects executives and equally shields
an attacker's account. The rule matches the property name. The value true is
not matched, because it is too common a word in an audit record to add
precision, and Microsoft does not say whether an ordinary unit writes the
property with the value false. Check the value in TargetResources.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/admin-units-restricted-management
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName: Add administrative unit
TargetResources|contains: IsMemberManagementRestricted
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- The identity team creating a restricted unit for executives, emergency access accounts or sensitive security groups. These projects are rare, so match the event to a change record.
- An ordinary administrative unit, if your tenant writes the property with the value false. Read the value before you act.
level: medium
False positives
- The identity team creating a restricted unit for executives, emergency access accounts or sensitive security groups. These projects are rare, so match the event to a change record.
- An ordinary administrative unit, if your tenant writes the property with the value false. Read the value before you act.
Role Scoped to a Restricted Management Administrative Unit Assigned or Removed
Detects a role assignment scoped to a restricted management administrative unit being added or removed. Microsoft documents both audit activities in the RoleManagement category: "Add member to role scoped over Restricted Management Administrative Unit" and "Remove member from role scoped over Restricted Management Administrative Unit". Only the holders of such a role can change the members of the unit. Microsoft points out that even a Global Administrator has to assign this role to their own account first, and calls that an auditable event. An unexpected assignment is therefore the moment someone takes control of the protected accounts. A removal takes that control away from the administrators the organization chose, and when it removes the last of them nobody can manage the members until a new assignment is made. The role, the member and the unit are in TargetResources and the actor is in InitiatedBy.
title: Role Scoped to a Restricted Management Administrative Unit Assigned or Removed
id: 284b6c47-805a-4e0a-a575-8bcaf3480266
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a role assignment scoped to a restricted management administrative
unit being added or removed. Microsoft documents both audit activities in
the RoleManagement category: "Add member to role scoped over Restricted
Management Administrative Unit" and "Remove member from role scoped over
Restricted Management Administrative Unit". Only the holders of such a role
can change the members of the unit. Microsoft points out that even a Global
Administrator has to assign this role to their own account first, and calls
that an auditable event. An unexpected assignment is therefore the moment
someone takes control of the protected accounts. A removal takes that
control away from the administrators the organization chose, and when it
removes the last of them nobody can manage the members until a new
assignment is made. The role, the member and the unit are in
TargetResources and the actor is in InitiatedBy.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/admin-units-restricted-management
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName:
- Add member to role scoped over Restricted Management Administrative Unit
- Remove member from role scoped over Restricted Management Administrative Unit
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- A change in the team that supports the protected accounts, where one scoped administrator replaces another. Match the event to a request and to the list of approved administrators for the unit.
level: high
False positives
- A change in the team that supports the protected accounts, where one scoped administrator replaces another. Match the event to a request and to the list of approved administrators for the unit.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Member of a restricted management administrative unit holds or receives a privileged role
A backdoor account is most useful to an attacker when it is both privileged and hard to remove. An account that is placed in a restricted management administrative unit and also receives a privileged directory role, in either order, is an administrator that the other administrators cannot contain in the usual way.
- Collect the accounts added to restricted units: audit activity
Add member to restricted management administrative unit, with the account inTargetResources. - Collect privileged role assignments: category RoleManagement, activities such as
Add member to roleandAdd eligible member to role, with the member inTargetResourcesand the role in theRole.DisplayNamemodified property. - Join the two sets on the account. Alert when the same account appears in both within 30 days, whichever event came first.
- Compare the result with the accounts you placed in restricted units on purpose, such as emergency access accounts.
EventsAdd member to restricted management administrative unitAdd member to roleAdd eligible member to role
LimitsOrganizations protect their own emergency access and executive accounts in exactly this way, so the result has to be read against the list of intended members. The 30 days are a starting point. An account that was already in a restricted unit before your log retention began is not found by the join.
Account created and placed in a restricted management administrative unit soon after
Restricted units are meant for a small set of long-lived, sensitive accounts. An account that is created and moved into a restricted unit within a short time, by the same actor, looks like a new backdoor account being shielded from the administrators.
- A user is created: audit activity
Add userin the UserManagement category, with the new account inTargetResourcesand the actor inInitiatedBy. - Within 24 hours the same account is added to a restricted unit:
Add member to restricted management administrative unitwith that account inTargetResources. - Raise the priority when the actor in
InitiatedByis the same in both events.
EventsAdd userAdd member to restricted management administrative unit
LimitsA new executive or a new emergency access account is handled the same way when the process is followed, so confirm with the owner of the unit. The 24 hours are a starting point. An attacker who shields an existing account does not match and is covered by the single-event rules.
Triage
- Read the unit, the member and the actor in the event (TargetResources and InitiatedBy), and check whether the unit is in your inventory of restricted units.
- For a new member, find out what the account is. A recently created account, a service account or an account with a privileged role inside a restricted unit needs an explanation.
- For a removal, check what happened to the account next, such as a password reset, a new authentication method or a role change.
- For a role scoped to a restricted unit, check who received it and whether that person is on the list of approved administrators for the unit. An actor who assigned the role to their own account needs an explanation.
- Review the sign-ins and the other changes of the actor in the same session.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Contain the actor first. Revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of the identity that created the unit or changed its membership, and remove its privileged role.
- Take the attacker's account out of the restricted unit, which a Global Administrator or Privileged Role Administrator can do, then disable it and revoke its sessions. Microsoft notes that after a restricted unit is deleted it can take up to 30 minutes until the protection is gone from the former members.
- Remove role assignments scoped to the unit that were not approved, and review what their holders changed on the members, such as password resets and authentication methods.
- Put accounts that were taken out of a restricted unit back into it after you have checked their credentials and authentication methods.
- Compare all restricted management administrative units, their members and their scoped role assignments with your inventory.
Mitigation
- Keep Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator to a few cloud-only accounts with phishing-resistant MFA, and give both roles through PIM with approval.
- Keep an inventory of the restricted management administrative units, their members and the roles scoped to them, and review it regularly. Microsoft allows at most 100 such units in a tenant, so the list is short.
- Alert on every new restricted management administrative unit and every membership change of one. In most tenants these events are rare.
- Write down who may hold a role scoped to each restricted unit, and treat any other assignment as an incident.
Frequently asked questions
Can a Global Administrator still reset the password of an account in a restricted management administrative unit?
Not directly. Microsoft documents that Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator at tenant scope cannot modify objects in such a unit. They can manage the unit itself, so they can remove the account from the unit or assign themselves a role scoped to it, and then act. Both steps are written to the audit log.
Why is a new restricted management administrative unit worth an alert?
The restricted setting is chosen when the unit is created and cannot be changed later, so every restricted unit starts with this one event. Units of this kind are created rarely and on purpose. A unit nobody planned is either a mistake or the first step of hiding an account from the administrators.
Does the rule for new units also match ordinary administrative units?
It matches the activity Add administrative unit when the event names the property IsMemberManagementRestricted, which Microsoft documents with the value true for a restricted unit. Microsoft does not say whether an ordinary unit writes the same property with the value false. Check the value in the event before you act on it.
Can an account in a restricted unit still be added to groups or given roles?
Yes. Microsoft lists adding users, groups or devices of a restricted unit to groups in Microsoft Entra ID as an allowed operation, and the restriction concerns changes to the member itself. An account in a restricted unit can therefore still receive access, which is why a privileged role on such an account deserves attention.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098: Account Manipulation
- Restricted management administrative units in Microsoft Entra ID (operations blocked, who can manage, audit logs, limitations)
- Microsoft Entra audit log activities (AdministrativeUnit, RoleManagement and UserManagement categories)
- Security operations for privileged accounts in Microsoft Entra ID (role assignment events and Role.DisplayName)
- Datadog Security Labs (September 16, 2024): Hidden in Plain Sight, Abusing Entra ID Administrative Units for Sticky Persistence