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Restricted Management Administrative Unit Abuse detection rules

An attacker with Global Administrator or Privileged Role Administrator places an account in a restricted management administrative unit, so that tenant-level administrators can no longer reset, disable or delete it.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
High
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID audit logs
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1098Account Manipulation
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Control of an identity with the Global Administrator or Privileged Role Administrator role, which are the roles that manage restricted management administrative units.
Impact
An attacker-controlled account that administrators cannot reset, disable or delete in the usual way, or control of the accounts a restricted unit was meant to protect.
Response
Contain the actor, take the attacker's account out of the restricted unit, then disable it and remove role assignments scoped to the unit that were not approved.
Mitigation
Keep an inventory of restricted management administrative units, their members and scoped roles, and alert on every new unit and every membership change.
Audit activities
Add member to restricted management administrative unitRemove member from restricted management administrative unitAdd administrative unitAdd member to role scoped over Restricted Management Administrative UnitRemove member from role scoped over Restricted Management Administrative Unit

How the attack works

Restricted management administrative units exist to protect sensitive objects, such as the accounts of executives. Users, devices and security groups placed in such a unit can only be changed by administrators who hold a role scoped to that unit. Everyone else is blocked from changing the properties of the member, deleting it, resetting its password or changing the owners and members of a group in the unit, and that includes Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator at tenant scope. Applications are blocked as well, because Microsoft Graph application permissions do not apply to members of the unit.

The same protection works for an attacker. Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator cannot change the members, but they manage the units: they create them, add and remove members and assign roles scoped to them, also to themselves. An attacker who holds one of these roles puts an account they control into a restricted unit. When the intrusion is found, the usual containment steps fail on that account until someone finds the unit and removes the account from it. Research published by Datadog Security Labs on September 16, 2024 describes this use as sticky persistence. The opposite action is just as useful to an attacker: taking a protected account out of its unit makes it resettable again, and assigning a role scoped to the unit gives control of the protected accounts.

Microsoft documents the audit activities for all of these steps, and the rules on this page read them: Add administrative unit with the detail IsMemberManagementRestricted, Add member to restricted management administrative unit, Remove member from restricted management administrative unit and the two activities for a role scoped over such a unit. The restricted setting is chosen when the unit is created and cannot be changed afterwards.

What an attacker needs

  • Control of an identity with the Global Administrator or Privileged Role Administrator role. Microsoft names these two roles as the ones that manage restricted management administrative units.
  • An account to protect: one the attacker created or one they have taken over.

Impact

An attacker-controlled account that administrators cannot reset, disable or delete in the usual way, which delays containment while the account keeps its access. A role scoped to a restricted unit gives control of the protected members, for example the right to reset the password of an executive. Removing a member from its unit strips the protection the organization relied on for that account.

Detection rules

Member Added to or Removed From a Restricted Management Administrative Unit

Detects a membership change of a restricted management administrative unit. Microsoft documents two audit activities for it in the AdministrativeUnit category: "Add member to restricted management administrative unit" and "Remove member from restricted management administrative unit". An added user, device or security group can from then on only be changed by administrators with a role scoped to the unit, so an attacker's account that is added becomes hard to reset, disable or delete. A removed member loses that protection and can again be changed by tenant-level administrators and by help desk roles, which is the step before a protected account is taken over. The member and the unit are in TargetResources and the actor is in InitiatedBy.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Member Added to or Removed From a Restricted Management Administrative Unit
id: 179041bf-2c5a-4a53-ad2e-2f1710406fab
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a membership change of a restricted management administrative unit.
  Microsoft documents two audit activities for it in the AdministrativeUnit
  category: "Add member to restricted management administrative unit" and
  "Remove member from restricted management administrative unit". An added
  user, device or security group can from then on only be changed by
  administrators with a role scoped to the unit, so an attacker's account that
  is added becomes hard to reset, disable or delete. A removed member loses
  that protection and can again be changed by tenant-level administrators and
  by help desk roles, which is the step before a protected account is taken
  over. The member and the unit are in TargetResources and the actor is in
  InitiatedBy.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/admin-units-restricted-management
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName:
      - Add member to restricted management administrative unit
      - Remove member from restricted management administrative unit
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - The owners of a restricted unit adding a new executive or emergency access account, or removing someone who left. Match the event to a request from the owner of the unit.
  - An administrator who takes a member out of the unit for a short time because a required change cannot be made from inside it. Microsoft describes this for resetting the password of a Global Administrator. Check that the member was put back.
level: medium

False positives

  • The owners of a restricted unit adding a new executive or emergency access account, or removing someone who left. Match the event to a request from the owner of the unit.
  • An administrator who takes a member out of the unit for a short time because a required change cannot be made from inside it. Microsoft describes this for resetting the password of a Global Administrator. Check that the member was put back.

Restricted Management Administrative Unit Created

Detects the creation of an administrative unit whose event names the property IsMemberManagementRestricted. Microsoft's page on restricted management administrative units lists this audit record: the activity "Add administrative unit" in the AdministrativeUnit category with the detail IsMemberManagementRestricted = true. The restricted setting can only be chosen when a unit is created, so every restricted unit starts with this event. Members of such a unit cannot be changed, reset or deleted by tenant-level administrators, which protects executives and equally shields an attacker's account. The rule matches the property name. The value true is not matched, because it is too common a word in an audit record to add precision, and Microsoft does not say whether an ordinary unit writes the property with the value false. Check the value in TargetResources.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Restricted Management Administrative Unit Created
id: 16e90c11-6e27-49b7-ba0b-11a95a2d031a
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the creation of an administrative unit whose event names the
  property IsMemberManagementRestricted. Microsoft's page on restricted
  management administrative units lists this audit record: the activity "Add
  administrative unit" in the AdministrativeUnit category with the detail
  IsMemberManagementRestricted = true. The restricted setting can only be
  chosen when a unit is created, so every restricted unit starts with this
  event. Members of such a unit cannot be changed, reset or deleted by
  tenant-level administrators, which protects executives and equally shields
  an attacker's account. The rule matches the property name. The value true is
  not matched, because it is too common a word in an audit record to add
  precision, and Microsoft does not say whether an ordinary unit writes the
  property with the value false. Check the value in TargetResources.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/admin-units-restricted-management
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName: Add administrative unit
    TargetResources|contains: IsMemberManagementRestricted
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - The identity team creating a restricted unit for executives, emergency access accounts or sensitive security groups. These projects are rare, so match the event to a change record.
  - An ordinary administrative unit, if your tenant writes the property with the value false. Read the value before you act.
level: medium

False positives

  • The identity team creating a restricted unit for executives, emergency access accounts or sensitive security groups. These projects are rare, so match the event to a change record.
  • An ordinary administrative unit, if your tenant writes the property with the value false. Read the value before you act.

Role Scoped to a Restricted Management Administrative Unit Assigned or Removed

Detects a role assignment scoped to a restricted management administrative unit being added or removed. Microsoft documents both audit activities in the RoleManagement category: "Add member to role scoped over Restricted Management Administrative Unit" and "Remove member from role scoped over Restricted Management Administrative Unit". Only the holders of such a role can change the members of the unit. Microsoft points out that even a Global Administrator has to assign this role to their own account first, and calls that an auditable event. An unexpected assignment is therefore the moment someone takes control of the protected accounts. A removal takes that control away from the administrators the organization chose, and when it removes the last of them nobody can manage the members until a new assignment is made. The role, the member and the unit are in TargetResources and the actor is in InitiatedBy.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Role Scoped to a Restricted Management Administrative Unit Assigned or Removed
id: 284b6c47-805a-4e0a-a575-8bcaf3480266
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a role assignment scoped to a restricted management administrative
  unit being added or removed. Microsoft documents both audit activities in
  the RoleManagement category: "Add member to role scoped over Restricted
  Management Administrative Unit" and "Remove member from role scoped over
  Restricted Management Administrative Unit". Only the holders of such a role
  can change the members of the unit. Microsoft points out that even a Global
  Administrator has to assign this role to their own account first, and calls
  that an auditable event. An unexpected assignment is therefore the moment
  someone takes control of the protected accounts. A removal takes that
  control away from the administrators the organization chose, and when it
  removes the last of them nobody can manage the members until a new
  assignment is made. The role, the member and the unit are in
  TargetResources and the actor is in InitiatedBy.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/admin-units-restricted-management
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName:
      - Add member to role scoped over Restricted Management Administrative Unit
      - Remove member from role scoped over Restricted Management Administrative Unit
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - A change in the team that supports the protected accounts, where one scoped administrator replaces another. Match the event to a request and to the list of approved administrators for the unit.
level: high

False positives

  • A change in the team that supports the protected accounts, where one scoped administrator replaces another. Match the event to a request and to the list of approved administrators for the unit.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Member of a restricted management administrative unit holds or receives a privileged role

Detection hypothesisJoins two logsNeeds your own lists

A backdoor account is most useful to an attacker when it is both privileged and hard to remove. An account that is placed in a restricted management administrative unit and also receives a privileged directory role, in either order, is an administrator that the other administrators cannot contain in the usual way.

  1. Collect the accounts added to restricted units: audit activity Add member to restricted management administrative unit, with the account in TargetResources.
  2. Collect privileged role assignments: category RoleManagement, activities such as Add member to role and Add eligible member to role, with the member in TargetResources and the role in the Role.DisplayName modified property.
  3. Join the two sets on the account. Alert when the same account appears in both within 30 days, whichever event came first.
  4. Compare the result with the accounts you placed in restricted units on purpose, such as emergency access accounts.

EventsAdd member to restricted management administrative unitAdd member to roleAdd eligible member to role

LimitsOrganizations protect their own emergency access and executive accounts in exactly this way, so the result has to be read against the list of intended members. The 30 days are a starting point. An account that was already in a restricted unit before your log retention began is not found by the join.

Account created and placed in a restricted management administrative unit soon after

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

Restricted units are meant for a small set of long-lived, sensitive accounts. An account that is created and moved into a restricted unit within a short time, by the same actor, looks like a new backdoor account being shielded from the administrators.

  1. A user is created: audit activity Add user in the UserManagement category, with the new account in TargetResources and the actor in InitiatedBy.
  2. Within 24 hours the same account is added to a restricted unit: Add member to restricted management administrative unit with that account in TargetResources.
  3. Raise the priority when the actor in InitiatedBy is the same in both events.

EventsAdd userAdd member to restricted management administrative unit

LimitsA new executive or a new emergency access account is handled the same way when the process is followed, so confirm with the owner of the unit. The 24 hours are a starting point. An attacker who shields an existing account does not match and is covered by the single-event rules.

Triage

  • Read the unit, the member and the actor in the event (TargetResources and InitiatedBy), and check whether the unit is in your inventory of restricted units.
  • For a new member, find out what the account is. A recently created account, a service account or an account with a privileged role inside a restricted unit needs an explanation.
  • For a removal, check what happened to the account next, such as a password reset, a new authentication method or a role change.
  • For a role scoped to a restricted unit, check who received it and whether that person is on the list of approved administrators for the unit. An actor who assigned the role to their own account needs an explanation.
  • Review the sign-ins and the other changes of the actor in the same session.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Contain the actor first. Revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of the identity that created the unit or changed its membership, and remove its privileged role.
  2. Take the attacker's account out of the restricted unit, which a Global Administrator or Privileged Role Administrator can do, then disable it and revoke its sessions. Microsoft notes that after a restricted unit is deleted it can take up to 30 minutes until the protection is gone from the former members.
  3. Remove role assignments scoped to the unit that were not approved, and review what their holders changed on the members, such as password resets and authentication methods.
  4. Put accounts that were taken out of a restricted unit back into it after you have checked their credentials and authentication methods.
  5. Compare all restricted management administrative units, their members and their scoped role assignments with your inventory.

Mitigation

  • Keep Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator to a few cloud-only accounts with phishing-resistant MFA, and give both roles through PIM with approval.
  • Keep an inventory of the restricted management administrative units, their members and the roles scoped to them, and review it regularly. Microsoft allows at most 100 such units in a tenant, so the list is short.
  • Alert on every new restricted management administrative unit and every membership change of one. In most tenants these events are rare.
  • Write down who may hold a role scoped to each restricted unit, and treat any other assignment as an incident.

Frequently asked questions

Can a Global Administrator still reset the password of an account in a restricted management administrative unit?

Not directly. Microsoft documents that Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator at tenant scope cannot modify objects in such a unit. They can manage the unit itself, so they can remove the account from the unit or assign themselves a role scoped to it, and then act. Both steps are written to the audit log.

Why is a new restricted management administrative unit worth an alert?

The restricted setting is chosen when the unit is created and cannot be changed later, so every restricted unit starts with this one event. Units of this kind are created rarely and on purpose. A unit nobody planned is either a mistake or the first step of hiding an account from the administrators.

Does the rule for new units also match ordinary administrative units?

It matches the activity Add administrative unit when the event names the property IsMemberManagementRestricted, which Microsoft documents with the value true for a restricted unit. Microsoft does not say whether an ordinary unit writes the same property with the value false. Check the value in the event before you act on it.

Can an account in a restricted unit still be added to groups or given roles?

Yes. Microsoft lists adding users, groups or devices of a restricted unit to groups in Microsoft Entra ID as an allowed operation, and the restriction concerns changes to the member itself. An account in a restricted unit can therefore still receive access, which is why a privileged role on such an account deserves attention.

References

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