How the attack works
A dynamic membership group has no member list that an administrator maintains. It has a rule over user or device attributes, and Microsoft Entra ID evaluates the rule whenever an attribute changes: objects that satisfy it are added, objects that no longer satisfy it are removed, and nobody can add or remove a member by hand. Whatever the group grants, such as an application assignment, an Azure role, a license or an exclusion from a Conditional Access policy, follows the rule automatically.
That gives an attacker two ways in. One is to change an attribute the rule reads. Microsoft's documentation carries a security consideration for exactly this: the security of the group's membership depends on who can modify the attributes referenced in the rule, and attributes synchronized from on-premises Active Directory may allow users to modify their own values. The other is to change the rule itself, which this page is about. An account with the Groups Administrator role can rewrite the rule so that it matches an account the attacker controls, or pause the processing of the rule so that the present members stay whatever happens to their attributes.
Microsoft lists the audit activity set dynamic group properties for the self-service group management service and documents its name only. The rule on this page reads that activity. A change of a group is also written by Core Directory as Update group, but that activity is written for every edit of every group and Microsoft does not document the name of the modified property that carries the rule, so no rule here reads it. Role-assignable groups are outside this attack: Microsoft requires assigned membership for them.
What an attacker needs
- An account that can edit the group's dynamic membership rule. Microsoft's procedure asks for at least the Groups Administrator role.
- A dynamic group that grants something worth having, such as access to an application, an Azure role or an exclusion from a Conditional Access policy.
Impact
Membership of the group for an account of the attacker's choice, without an Add member to group action by any person and without the approval or review that assigned groups can have. The access lasts for as long as the rule matches, and a paused rule keeps it in place even after the attributes are corrected. A rule that is widened by mistake or on purpose can also add many accounts at once.
Detection rules
Dynamic Group Properties Set
Detects the audit activity "set dynamic group properties", which Microsoft's audit activity reference lists for the self-service group management service in the category GroupManagement. The properties of a dynamic membership group are its membership rule and the state of its rule processing. Whoever changes the rule decides who is added to the group automatically, and with it who receives the application access, Azure role or policy exclusion the group carries. Pausing the processing freezes the present members. Microsoft documents the activity by name only. The rule therefore matches on the name alone, cannot show the old or the new rule, and is rated low. Microsoft also does not say which interfaces write this activity, so a rule change that is recorded only as "Update group" is not seen. The group is in TargetResources and the actor in InitiatedBy.
title: Dynamic Group Properties Set
id: 8d25175d-5f36-44f2-8a97-efd86b91fbc1
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the audit activity "set dynamic group properties", which
Microsoft's audit activity reference lists for the self-service group
management service in the category GroupManagement. The properties of a
dynamic membership group are its membership rule and the state of its rule
processing. Whoever changes the rule decides who is added to the group
automatically, and with it who receives the application access, Azure role
or policy exclusion the group carries. Pausing the processing freezes the
present members. Microsoft documents the activity by name only. The rule
therefore matches on the name alone, cannot show the old or the new rule,
and is rated low. Microsoft also does not say which interfaces write this
activity, so a rule change that is recorded only as "Update group" is not
seen. The group is in TargetResources and the actor in InitiatedBy.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/groups-dynamic-membership
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/groups-create-rule
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName: set dynamic group properties
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- Administrators who create dynamic groups or adjust their rules, for example when departments, locations or device naming change. Match the event to the owner of the group and to a change record.
- Administrators who pause and resume rule processing during a large attribute cleanup. Check that processing was resumed.
level: low
False positives
- Administrators who create dynamic groups or adjust their rules, for example when departments, locations or device naming change. Match the event to the owner of the group and to a change record.
- Administrators who pause and resume rule processing during a large attribute cleanup. Check that processing was resumed.
Triage
- Identify the group in TargetResources and the actor in InitiatedBy.
- Open the group and read the membership rule and the processing status. Compare the rule with the recorded one, and treat a status of Update paused as a finding of its own.
- Establish what the group grants, such as application assignments, Azure role assignments, licenses and Conditional Access policies that include or exclude it.
- List the members that joined after the change and check whether each of them should match the intended rule.
- Ask the owner of the group for the change record, and review the sign-in behind the actor's session.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Restore the membership rule from the recorded version and resume processing, then confirm that the unexpected members have left the group.
- Until the rule is trusted again, remove what the group grants, or replace the group with an assigned group for the most sensitive access.
- Revoke the sessions of the accounts that gained membership, and review what they did with the access.
- Revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of the account that changed the rule, and remove the role that allowed it.
- Check the other dynamic groups for rule changes by the same actor.
Mitigation
- Do not grant sensitive access through dynamic groups whose rules read attributes that users or less trusted systems can write. Microsoft advises auditing the write permissions of every attribute a rule uses, in Microsoft Entra ID and at the source.
- Use assigned or role-assignable groups for privileged access. Role-assignable groups require assigned membership.
- Keep the Groups Administrator role and other roles that can edit groups on a few accounts, eligible through Privileged Identity Management.
- Record the membership rule of every sensitive dynamic group and compare it with the live rule at regular intervals.
- Review the members of sensitive dynamic groups with access reviews, so that an unexpected member is noticed even when the rule looks right.
Frequently asked questions
Does the rule on this page show what the membership rule was changed to?
No. Microsoft lists the activity `set dynamic group properties` in its audit activity reference and documents nothing about its fields. The detection matches the activity name and is rated low for that reason. Open the group to read the current rule and the processing status, and keep a recorded copy of the rules of sensitive groups to compare against.
Can an attacker get in without changing the rule at all?
Yes. Changing an attribute that the rule reads has the same effect, and it is an ordinary user update. Microsoft's documentation warns that the security of a dynamic group depends on who can modify the attributes in its rule, and that some on-premises attributes can be written by the users themselves. This page does not detect that path.
Are groups that hold Microsoft Entra roles exposed to this?
No. Microsoft states that role-assignable groups prevent this risk because they require assigned membership and cannot be dynamic. Dynamic groups can still carry application access, Azure role assignments, licenses and Conditional Access scoping, which is what an attacker gains here.
Is there a public incident report for this technique?
No public incident report describes this at the audit event level. The page is based on what Microsoft documents about dynamic membership groups: membership follows the rule automatically, and the rule and the attributes it reads decide who is in the group.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098: Account Manipulation
- Manage rules for dynamic membership groups in Microsoft Entra ID (security consideration on attribute write permissions)
- Create or update a dynamic membership group in Microsoft Entra ID (required role, processing status, pause processing)
- Microsoft Entra audit log activities (Self-service group management, Core Directory)