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Temporary Access Pass Created for a User detection rules

An attacker holding Authentication Administrator or Privileged Authentication Administrator issues a Temporary Access Pass for another account and signs in with it, satisfying MFA without the user's password or methods.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
High
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID audit logs
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1098Account Manipulation
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Authentication Administrator, Privileged Authentication Administrator or Global Administrator, and Temporary Access Pass enabled for the target user.
Impact
Sign-in as the target account with MFA satisfied, followed by registration of an attacker-controlled method that outlives the pass.
Response
Delete the Temporary Access Pass from the target account, remove every authentication method registered since it was created and revoke the sessions.
Mitigation
Limit the authentication administrator roles to a few PIM-managed accounts, and scope the Temporary Access Pass policy to the groups that need it with one-time use.
Audit activity
Admin registered security info

How the attack works

A Temporary Access Pass (TAP) is a time-limited passcode that an administrator creates for a user. It is meant for onboarding and recovery: the user signs in with the pass, which satisfies Conditional Access requirements for multifactor authentication, and registers a passkey, Microsoft Authenticator or another method. By default a pass is valid for one hour and one-time use is not enforced; the policy allows lifetimes of up to 30 days.

The same property makes it a takeover tool. An attacker who holds Authentication Administrator, Privileged Authentication Administrator or Global Administrator, or an application with UserAuthenticationMethod.ReadWrite.All, creates a pass for the account they want, signs in as that user with strong authentication already satisfied, and registers a method of their own to stay. The user's password and existing methods are never touched, so nothing looks wrong to the user. The Authentication Methods service logs the creation as Admin registered security info with the status reason Admin registered temporary access pass method for user; the actor is in InitiatedBy and the account in TargetResources.

What an attacker needs

  • A compromised identity with Authentication Administrator (non-administrators and some roles), Privileged Authentication Administrator or Global Administrator (any user), or an application with UserAuthenticationMethod.ReadWrite.All.
  • Temporary Access Pass enabled in the authentication methods policy for the target user, or the rights to enable it.

Impact

Sign-in as the target account with MFA satisfied, followed by registration of an attacker-controlled method that outlives the pass. When the target is a privileged account this is direct privilege escalation; Microsoft rates the creation of a pass for a privileged account as a high-risk event to alert on.

Detection rules

Temporary Access Pass Created for a User by an Administrator

Detects an administrator or application creating a Temporary Access Pass for a user: the activity Admin registered security info with the status reason Admin registered temporary access pass method for user. The event does not say whether the target is privileged, so enrich it with role assignments and treat a pass for a privileged account as high severity.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Temporary Access Pass Created for a User by an Administrator
id: 70a9cc50-5ed5-4504-b41a-645647801c40
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an administrator or application creating a Temporary Access Pass for
  a user: the activity Admin registered security info with the status reason
  Admin registered temporary access pass method for user. The event does not
  say whether the target is privileged, so enrich it with role assignments and
  treat a pass for a privileged account as high severity.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-authentication-temporary-access-pass
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName: Admin registered security info
    ResultReason: Admin registered temporary access pass method for user
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Help desk staff issuing passes for onboarding, passkey registration and lost-device recovery; match each event to a ticket and alert only on privileged targets (for example with a watchlist) if volume is high.
level: medium

False positives

  • Help desk staff issuing passes for onboarding, passkey registration and lost-device recovery; match each event to a ticket and alert only on privileged targets (for example with a watchlist) if volume is high.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Temporary Access Pass issued for an account that already had methods, then a new method registered

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsCompares with an earlier valueNeeds a baseline

A Temporary Access Pass exists for onboarding and recovery. An attacker uses it on an established account that does not need one and registers a method of their own to stay. A pass for an account that already had methods, followed within its lifetime by a new registration from an address the user never used, is that takeover.

  1. Audit log: Admin registered security info with the status reason Admin registered temporary access pass method for user. Take the account in TargetResources and the actor in InitiatedBy.
  2. Audit log of the previous 90 days: did the account register methods before (User registered security info)? An account with methods is not being onboarded.
  3. Audit log, within the pass lifetime (1 hour by default): User registered security info by the same account. Read the ipAddress of the user in InitiatedBy.
  4. Alert when the account had methods before and the registration came from an address the user has not used.

EventsAdmin registered security infoUser registered security info

LimitsRecovery after a lost phone is the legitimate case of a pass for an established account, so confirm with the user over a separate channel. Passes with a longer lifetime need a longer window. The 90 days are a starting point.

Triage

  • Identify the target account (TargetResources) and the actor (InitiatedBy); check whether the target holds privileged roles, owns applications or holds Azure roles.
  • Confirm an onboarding or recovery ticket exists and that the user asked for the pass.
  • Review the target's sign-ins and security info registrations after the pass was created, especially from an IP address the user has not used before.
  • If unauthorized, delete the pass and any method registered since, revoke the target's sessions and investigate the actor's other changes.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Delete the Temporary Access Pass from the target account. It may still be valid, and one-time use is not enforced by default.
  2. Remove every authentication method registered on the account since the pass was created and revoke the sessions of the account.
  3. Revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of the identity that created the pass, and remove its authentication administrator role. If an application created it, remove UserAuthenticationMethod.ReadWrite.All from it.
  4. Review what was done as the target account after the pass was created, with priority for accounts that hold privileged roles, and undo it.
  5. Search the audit log for other passes the same actor created, and confirm with each user that the methods on the account are theirs.

Mitigation

  • Limit Privileged Authentication Administrator and Authentication Administrator to a few PIM-managed accounts, and review applications that hold UserAuthenticationMethod.ReadWrite.All.
  • Scope the Temporary Access Pass policy to the groups that need it, require one-time use and keep the lifetime short.
  • Put privileged accounts in role-assignable groups or restricted management administrative units so lower-tier authentication administrators cannot change their methods.
  • Alert on every pass created for an account that holds a privileged role, and require a ticket for each one.

Frequently asked questions

Would the user notice a Temporary Access Pass created for their account?

No. The password and the existing methods of the user are never touched, so nothing looks wrong to the user. The audit log event and a sign-in from an IP address the user has not used before are the traces.

How long can an attacker use the pass?

By default a pass is valid for one hour and one-time use is not enforced, and the policy allows lifetimes of up to 30 days. The larger problem is the method the attacker registers while signed in with the pass. That method outlives the pass.

Does a Temporary Access Pass count as MFA?

Yes. A sign-in with the pass satisfies Conditional Access requirements for multifactor authentication. An attacker who creates one therefore signs in as the user with strong authentication already satisfied.

How do we find the passes that matter among routine help desk work?

The event names the actor and the target account only, not whether the target is privileged. Enrich it with role assignments, for example through a watchlist, and match each pass to an onboarding or recovery ticket. Microsoft rates a pass created for a privileged account as a high-risk event to alert on.

References

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