How the attack works
Microsoft Entra ID can check the sign-in of a user synchronized from Active Directory in several ways. With password hash synchronization it validates the password itself, against a hash synchronized from Active Directory. With pass-through authentication (PTA) it hands the password to an authentication agent on an on-premises server, which validates it against Active Directory and answers yes or no. With Seamless single sign-on it accepts a Kerberos ticket for the AZUREADSSOACC computer account, decrypted with a key that the on-premises forest shares with the cloud. In the last two cases the decision depends on something outside the cloud: an agent registered to the tenant, or a Kerberos decryption key.
An attacker who holds the Hybrid Identity Administrator or Global Administrator role can change which of these methods the tenant uses. If pass-through authentication is enabled with an agent the attacker runs, that agent receives the password of every user it validates and can accept any password. If Seamless SSO is enabled for a domain with a key the attacker knows, tickets made with that key are accepted for the users of that domain. The same result follows when an existing agent server or the AZUREADSSOACC account is compromised on-premises, and that variant leaves nothing in the cloud logs.
What the cloud does record is the change of sign-in method. The audit log (service Application Proxy) lists the activities Enable passthrough authentication, Enable Desktop Sso and Enable Desktop Sso for a specific domain. They occur when hybrid sign-in is deployed and almost never afterwards. Microsoft's audit activity reference does not say which activity, if any, records the registration of one more authentication agent in a tenant that already uses pass-through authentication, so the list of registered agents has to be reviewed in the admin center. A third rule reads the Staged Rollout activities, such as Create rollout policy for feature and Add a group to feature rollout, because Staged Rollout moves the users of a group in a federated domain to password hash synchronization, pass-through authentication or Seamless SSO without changing the domain.
What an attacker needs
- The Hybrid Identity Administrator or Global Administrator role in the tenant, or control of a server that already runs an authentication agent or Microsoft Entra Connect.
- For pass-through authentication, at least one authentication agent registered to the tenant that the attacker controls.
Impact
Sign-in as any synchronized user whose authentication passes through the changed method, without knowing the user's password, and capture of the passwords that users type. The access lasts until the sign-in method and its agents or keys are reviewed; resetting user passwords does not remove it. Where synchronized accounts hold privileged roles, this is control of the tenant.
Detection rules
Pass-Through Authentication Enabled for the Tenant
Detects pass-through authentication being enabled as a sign-in method of the tenant. From that moment the passwords of synchronized users are sent to the authentication agents registered to the tenant, and those agents decide whether a sign-in succeeds. The activity belongs to a planned hybrid identity deployment; at any other time it can mean an attacker has put an agent they control in the sign-in path.
title: Pass-Through Authentication Enabled for the Tenant
id: 2d57c711-3efc-44a2-9141-6d39f7489a95
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects pass-through authentication being enabled as a sign-in method of
the tenant. From that moment the passwords of synchronized users are sent to
the authentication agents registered to the tenant, and those agents decide
whether a sign-in succeeds. The activity belongs to a planned hybrid
identity deployment; at any other time it can mean an attacker has put an
agent they control in the sign-in path.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-pta-security-deep-dive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/007/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1556.007
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName: Enable passthrough authentication
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- A planned move to pass-through authentication, or Microsoft Entra Connect being reinstalled or reconfigured with this sign-in method. Match the event to the change record and to the administrator who ran it.
level: high
False positives
- A planned move to pass-through authentication, or Microsoft Entra Connect being reinstalled or reconfigured with this sign-in method. Match the event to the change record and to the administrator who ran it.
Seamless Single Sign-On Enabled for the Tenant or a Domain
Detects Seamless single sign-on (Desktop SSO) being enabled for the tenant or for one Active Directory domain. Microsoft Entra ID then accepts Kerberos tickets decrypted with the key registered for that domain as proof of a user's sign-in, so whoever knows that key can obtain sign-ins for the domain's synchronized users. Expected only during a hybrid identity deployment or when a forest is added.
title: Seamless Single Sign-On Enabled for the Tenant or a Domain
id: b3541bcd-cf6c-43ad-981f-611abd076ba2
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects Seamless single sign-on (Desktop SSO) being enabled for the tenant
or for one Active Directory domain. Microsoft Entra ID then accepts Kerberos
tickets decrypted with the key registered for that domain as proof of a
user's sign-in, so whoever knows that key can obtain sign-ins for the
domain's synchronized users. Expected only during a hybrid identity
deployment or when a forest is added.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-sso-how-it-works
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/007/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1556.007
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName:
- Enable Desktop Sso
- Enable Desktop Sso for a specific domain
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- Seamless SSO being deployed, a new Active Directory forest being added to it, or Microsoft Entra Connect being reconfigured. Confirm the domain in the event is one of your forests and that the change was planned.
level: medium
False positives
- Seamless SSO being deployed, a new Active Directory forest being added to it, or Microsoft Entra Connect being reconfigured. Confirm the domain in the event is one of your forests and that the change was planned.
Staged Rollout of a Cloud Authentication Method Created, Changed or Given a Group
Detects a change to Staged Rollout, the feature that moves the users of chosen groups in a federated domain to cloud authentication. For those users Microsoft Entra ID stops redirecting to the federated identity provider and decides the sign-in itself, with password hash synchronization, pass-through authentication or Seamless single sign-on. The federation settings of the domain do not change, so the rules that watch the domain see nothing. An attacker with the Hybrid Identity Administrator role can use it to take a group of users out of the identity provider's controls, or to send their passwords to pass-through authentication agents. Microsoft states that audit events are written when a Staged Rollout is enabled for a feature and when a group is added to it, and its audit activity reference lists the activities "Create rollout policy for feature", "Update rollout policy of feature" and "Add a group to feature rollout" in the category Authentication. The rule matches on these names only. Microsoft does not document the fields that name the feature or the group, so the rule is rated low. Read both in TargetResources. The activity that is written for every user of an added group is left out.
title: Staged Rollout of a Cloud Authentication Method Created, Changed or Given a Group
id: 75d5cd9e-856b-4483-9564-e92179add58d
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change to Staged Rollout, the feature that moves the users of
chosen groups in a federated domain to cloud authentication. For those
users Microsoft Entra ID stops redirecting to the federated identity
provider and decides the sign-in itself, with password hash
synchronization, pass-through authentication or Seamless single sign-on.
The federation settings of the domain do not change, so the rules that
watch the domain see nothing. An attacker with the Hybrid Identity
Administrator role can use it to take a group of users out of the identity
provider's controls, or to send their passwords to pass-through
authentication agents. Microsoft states that audit events are written when
a Staged Rollout is enabled for a feature and when a group is added to it,
and its audit activity reference lists the activities "Create rollout
policy for feature", "Update rollout policy of feature" and "Add a group to
feature rollout" in the category Authentication. The rule matches on these
names only. Microsoft does not document the fields that name the feature or
the group, so the rule is rated low. Read both in TargetResources. The
activity that is written for every user of an added group is left out.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-staged-rollout
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/007/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1556.007
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName:
- Create rollout policy for feature
- Update rollout policy of feature
- Add a group to feature rollout
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- A planned migration from federated to cloud authentication, in which pilot groups are added to Staged Rollout step by step. Match each event to the migration plan and to the administrator who runs it.
level: low
False positives
- A planned migration from federated to cloud authentication, in which pilot groups are added to Staged Rollout step by step. Match each event to the migration plan and to the administrator who runs it.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Pass-through sign-ins validated by an authentication agent you do not run
With pass-through authentication an on-premises agent decides whether a password is right, and an agent the attacker registered accepts any password. Microsoft's audit reference names no activity for one more agent in a tenant that already uses the method. The sign-in log records the agent that processed a pass-through sign-in, so a list of your agent servers finds a rogue agent at work.
- Keep a list of the servers that run your pass-through authentication agents.
- Sign-in log: successful sign-ins (
ResultType0) whoseAuthenticationDetailsshow pass-through authentication as the password source, withAuthenticationProcessingDetails,UserPrincipalNameandIPAddress. - Read the agent name in
AuthenticationProcessingDetails, and alert when it is not on the list or appears for the first time. - Raise the priority when the user holds a privileged role.
LimitsMicrosoft states that AuthenticationProcessingDetails holds the agent name for pass-through authentication but does not document the key or the format of the value, so check one of your own sign-ins first. A compromised server that already runs a legitimate agent is on the list and is not found this way.
Triage
- Identify who made the change (InitiatedBy) and whether a hybrid identity deployment or migration was planned for that time.
- Open the list of authentication agents in the admin center. Every agent must be on a server the organization runs.
- For Seamless SSO, find the domain that was enabled in the event details and confirm it is one of your Active Directory forests.
- Review the sign-ins of synchronized users after the change, privileged ones first, for unfamiliar IP addresses, and review the actor's other audit log activity.
- If the change was not authorized, disable the feature or remove the unknown agents, then reset the passwords and revoke the sessions of users who signed in while it was active.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Take the attacker out of the sign-in path. Remove every authentication agent on a server the organization does not run, and disable pass-through authentication or Seamless SSO if the feature was not meant to be on.
- For Seamless SSO that stays in use, roll over the Kerberos decryption key of each domain so that a key the attacker knows stops working.
- Revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of the identity that made the change, and remove its Hybrid Identity Administrator or Global Administrator role.
- Treat the passwords of users who signed in through the changed method as captured. Reset them and revoke the sessions of those users, privileged accounts first.
- If the change was made from a server that runs Microsoft Entra Connect or an authentication agent, handle that server and Active Directory as a Tier 0 compromise.
- Confirm that the list of authentication agents shows only your servers and that the sign-in method of the tenant is the one you designed.
Mitigation
- Keep the Hybrid Identity Administrator and Global Administrator roles on a small number of cloud-only accounts protected with phishing-resistant MFA and Privileged Identity Management.
- Do not assign privileged cloud roles to accounts synchronized from Active Directory, so that a sign-in decided on-premises can never be an administrator's.
- Treat every server that runs Microsoft Entra Connect or an authentication agent as Tier 0 and harden it like a domain controller.
- Review the registered authentication agents regularly and remove any whose server name or IP address you do not recognize.
- Roll over the Seamless SSO Kerberos decryption key at least every 30 days, restrict management of the
AZUREADSSOACCaccount to Domain Admins, and turn Seamless SSO off where it is no longer needed. - Where pass-through authentication is not required, use password hash synchronization, so that no on-premises agent decides cloud sign-ins.
Frequently asked questions
Why does resetting user passwords not remove this backdoor?
The sign-in is decided by an authentication agent or a Kerberos decryption key, not by the password alone. An agent the attacker runs can accept any password, and it receives the new password as soon as the user types it. The access lasts until the sign-in method and its agents or keys are reviewed.
What do these rules not see?
They see the sign-in method being enabled. A compromise of an existing agent server or of the `AZUREADSSOACC` account on-premises leaves nothing in the cloud logs. Microsoft's audit activity reference also does not say which activity records one more agent in a tenant that already uses pass-through authentication, so review the list of registered agents in the admin center.
When are these events expected?
When hybrid sign-in is deployed, when a new Active Directory forest is added to Seamless SSO, or when Microsoft Entra Connect is reinstalled or reconfigured. They almost never occur afterwards. An event at any other time needs the administrator who ran it and a change record.
Are cloud-only administrator accounts affected?
The changed method decides the sign-ins of users synchronized from Active Directory. That is why privileged cloud roles belong on cloud-only accounts, so that a sign-in decided on-premises can never be an administrator's. Where synchronized accounts hold privileged roles, the backdoor is control of the tenant.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1556.007: Modify Authentication Process: Hybrid Identity
- Microsoft Entra audit log activities (Application proxy)
- Microsoft Entra pass-through authentication security deep dive
- Microsoft Entra pass-through authentication: Quickstart
- Microsoft Entra Seamless single sign-on: How it works
- Microsoft Entra Seamless single sign-on: Frequently asked questions
- SigninLogs table reference (SessionId, OriginalTransferMethod, AutonomousSystemNumber, TokenIssuerName, AuthenticationProcessingDetails)
- authenticationDetail resource type (password source in authenticationMethodDetail)