1. Resources
  2. Detection rules
  3. PingOne Gateway Added or Changed

PingOne Gateway Added or Changed detection rules

An attacker with PingOne administrator rights adds or edits a gateway, the link through which PingOne checks passwords against an outside directory, or starts a gateway instance of their own, and so gets into the path of those checks.

Platform
Ping Identity
Severity
High
Log source
PingOne audit activities
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft Sentinel
What an attacker needs
A PingOne role that can manage gateways, such as Environment Admin, or a gateway credential and a place to run a gateway instance.
Impact
The attacker stands in the path of password checks for users of the outside directory and can influence which sign-ons succeed.
Response
Delete gateway credentials you cannot account for, restore the gateway from the inventory and reset the passwords of users who signed on through it.
Mitigation
Limit the roles that can manage gateways, protect gateway credentials like passwords and keep an inventory of gateways and instances.
Action types
GATEWAY.CREATEDGATEWAY.UPDATEDGATEWAY_INSTANCE.CREATED
Threat groups
APT29

How the attack works

A PingOne gateway connects an environment with resources in another security domain, such as an on-premises data center. The common case is the LDAP gateway in front of Active Directory or another directory: users of that directory are created in PingOne the first time they sign on, and depending on the gateway's passwordAuthority setting PingOne either checks the password against the outside directory once and then keeps it, or sends every password check to the directory. The gateway is two things. In PingOne it is configuration: the directory servers, a bind account, the connection security and the user types. In the customer's network it is one or more gateway instances, containers that Ping describes as software that can communicate with both PingOne and the remote directory. An instance authenticates to PingOne with a gateway credential, which Ping calls like a password, and several instances can use the same credential. Other gateway types connect RADIUS clients and PingFederate.

Both halves can be turned. Whoever edits the gateway decides which directory servers answer the password check and whether their TLS certificates are validated. Whoever holds a gateway credential can start an instance, and an instance stands in the path of the password checks PingOne sends to that gateway. A new gateway of the PingFederate type is a credential with roles: Ping documents that it receives the Environment Admin or Identity Data Admin role of the actor who creates it. PingOne records GATEWAY.CREATED, GATEWAY.UPDATED and GATEWAY_INSTANCE.CREATED audit activities. The page follows Ping's documentation of gateways: no public incident report describes this for PingOne, and the nearest known case is the abuse of pass-through authentication agents at other identity providers.

Log source: the rules read PingOne audit activities. Include the Gateway and Gateway Instance event types in the PingOne webhook that feeds the SIEM, or poll the Audit Activities API, for every environment that has a gateway and for those that should have none.

What an attacker needs

  • A PingOne role that can manage gateways. Ping names the Environment Admin role for operations on gateway entities.
  • For a rogue instance, a gateway credential of an existing gateway, either newly created by such an administrator or taken from a host where an instance runs, and a place to run the container.

Impact

An attacker in the path of the password checks can learn the passwords users type at sign-on and can decide which checks succeed, for every user whose password authority is the outside directory. A gateway that points at a directory the attacker runs lets them sign on as users of their choice and creates those users in PingOne at first sign-on. Because applications trust PingOne's result, the effect reaches every application of the environment.

Detection rules

PingOne Gateway Created or Updated

Detects a new or changed gateway in a PingOne environment (audit activities GATEWAY.CREATED and GATEWAY.UPDATED, described by Ping as Gateway Created and Gateway Updated). Ping documents a gateway as the communication linkage between PingOne and a remote directory, with the types LDAP, RADIUS, PING_FEDERATE, PING_ONE_AIC, PING_AM, API_GATEWAY_INTEGRATION and AUTHORIZE. For an LDAP gateway the configuration holds the directory servers, the bind account, the connection security, whether TLS certificates are validated, and for each user type whether PingOne or the outside directory is the password authority. A change to these decides where passwords of those users are checked. A new gateway of the PingFederate type receives the Environment Admin or Identity Data Admin role of the actor who creates it. The activity does not say which property changed: read the gateway and compare it with your inventory.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourcePingOne audit activities
title: PingOne Gateway Created or Updated
id: 77075db1-3133-4057-9bb0-73aea53b28f7
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a new or changed gateway in a PingOne environment (audit activities
  GATEWAY.CREATED and GATEWAY.UPDATED, described by Ping as Gateway Created
  and Gateway Updated). Ping documents a gateway as the communication linkage
  between PingOne and a remote directory, with the types LDAP, RADIUS,
  PING_FEDERATE, PING_ONE_AIC, PING_AM, API_GATEWAY_INTEGRATION and AUTHORIZE.
  For an LDAP gateway the configuration holds the directory servers, the bind
  account, the connection security, whether TLS certificates are validated,
  and for each user type whether PingOne or the outside directory is the
  password authority. A change to these decides where passwords of those users
  are checked. A new gateway of the PingFederate type receives the Environment
  Admin or Identity Data Admin role of the actor who creates it. The activity
  does not say which property changed: read the gateway and compare it with
  your inventory.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/007/
  - https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
  - https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/gateway-management/gateways/index.html
  - https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/gateway-management/gateway-role-assignments/index.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1556.007
logsource:
  product: pingone
  service: audit
detection:
  selection:
    action.type:
      - GATEWAY.CREATED
      - GATEWAY.UPDATED
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned work on the directory connection, such as a new directory server, a renewed bind password or a new RADIUS client. Gateways change rarely, so confirm each activity with the change record.
  - Edits of the name or description, which use the same activity.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned work on the directory connection, such as a new directory server, a renewed bind password or a new RADIUS client. Gateways change rarely, so confirm each activity with the change record.
  • Edits of the name or description, which use the same activity.

PingOne Gateway Instance Created

Detects a new gateway instance (audit activity GATEWAY_INSTANCE.CREATED, described by Ping as Gateway Instance Created). Ping documents a gateway instance as a single container that runs with the configuration for a gateway and communicates with both PingOne and the remote directory. Its ID is created by the gateway when it starts up, and it authenticates to PingOne with a gateway credential that several instances can share. A new instance is therefore either one of your containers starting or a container that somebody else started with one of your credentials, and the second kind stands in the path of the password checks sent to that gateway. Ping's event list gives this activity no user or client actor attributes, so the rule cannot tell the two apart: read the instance's host name and credential ID through the API and compare them with your own deployment.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourcePingOne audit activities
title: PingOne Gateway Instance Created
id: c99b584c-b837-42b1-8c26-9bc9c32e380e
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a new gateway instance (audit activity GATEWAY_INSTANCE.CREATED,
  described by Ping as Gateway Instance Created). Ping documents a gateway
  instance as a single container that runs with the configuration for a
  gateway and communicates with both PingOne and the remote directory. Its ID
  is created by the gateway when it starts up, and it authenticates to PingOne
  with a gateway credential that several instances can share. A new instance
  is therefore either one of your containers starting or a container that
  somebody else started with one of your credentials, and the second kind
  stands in the path of the password checks sent to that gateway. Ping's
  event list gives this activity no user or client actor attributes, so the
  rule cannot tell the two apart: read the instance's host name and
  credential ID through the API and compare them with your own deployment.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/007/
  - https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
  - https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/gateway-management/gateway-instances/index.html
  - https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/gateway-management/gateway-credentials/index.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1556.007
logsource:
  product: pingone
  service: audit
detection:
  selection:
    action.type: GATEWAY_INSTANCE.CREATED
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Restarts, upgrades and scaling of your own gateway containers, each of which starts a new instance. If your platform restarts containers often, alert only outside deployment windows or keep the rule for review.
level: medium

False positives

  • Restarts, upgrades and scaling of your own gateway containers, each of which starts a new instance. If your platform restarts containers often, alert only outside deployment windows or keep the rule for review.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Gateway instance registered from a host that is not one of your gateway hosts

Detection hypothesisNeeds your own lists

Your own instances run on a few known hosts and start when you deploy or restart them. An instance that registers from a host name outside that list, or with a credential you did not issue for that host, is a container somebody else started with one of your gateway credentials.

  1. Take each GATEWAY_INSTANCE.CREATED activity and read the gateway and the instance it names in resources.id and resources.name.
  2. Read the instance through the gateway instances API and note its hostname, its credential.id and its initializedAt time.
  3. Compare the host name with your list of gateway hosts, and the credential ID with the credentials you issued, which the gateway lists with createdAt and lastUsedAt.
  4. Check whether a deployment, restart or upgrade of your gateway containers explains the time of the activity.

EventsGATEWAY_INSTANCE.CREATED

LimitsIt needs your own list of gateway hosts and credentials. A host name is reported by the container, so an attacker who knows your naming can imitate it, and container platforms that give every start a new host name make the list hard to keep. The credential comparison is the stronger of the two checks.

Triage

  • Identify the actor (actors.user.name or actors.client.name) and the gateway named in the activity's resources, and check for an approved change. An instance activity may carry no administrator as actor, because the instance registers itself.
  • Read the gateway through the API or the console. Check its type, whether it is enabled, the directory servers, the bind account, the connection security, whether TLS certificates are validated, and the password authority of each user type.
  • List the gateway's credentials with their creation and last-use times, and its instances with host name, version and the credential each one uses. An instance on a host you do not run, or a credential nobody issued, is the finding.
  • For a new PingFederate gateway, list its role assignments.
  • Review sign-ons through the gateway since the change, looking for users created at first sign-on and for sign-ons from unusual addresses.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Disable the gateway if a rogue instance or directory server is confirmed, and accept the sign-on outage for its users while you repair it.
  2. Delete every gateway credential you cannot account for, and replace the ones in use so that only your own instances can connect.
  3. Restore the gateway's directory servers, connection security and user types from the inventory, and delete a gateway that nobody owns together with its role assignments.
  4. Reset the passwords of the users who signed on through the gateway while it was changed or while the rogue instance was connected, and change the bind account's password.
  5. Suspend the administrator or worker application that made the change, and review the users that were created through the gateway in that period.

Mitigation

  • Limit the Environment Admin role and custom roles that can manage gateways, and require a change record for every edit.
  • Keep an inventory of gateways with their type, directory servers, connection security and user types, and of the gateway instances with their host names, and compare it after every change event.
  • Treat gateway credentials like passwords, as Ping advises. Keep as few as needed, remove unused ones, and protect the hosts and deployment files that hold them.
  • Keep TLS certificate validation enabled for LDAP gateways and use TLS or StartTLS as connection security.
  • Require MFA in PingOne for users who authenticate through a gateway, so that a password answered by the gateway is not enough by itself.

Frequently asked questions

Why is a new gateway instance a security event and not only an operations event?

Ping documents a gateway instance as the container that communicates with both PingOne and the remote directory, and says that the instance ID is created by the gateway when it starts up. An instance needs only a gateway credential to connect, and several instances can use the same one. A new instance is therefore either your own container starting, or someone else's container that holds one of your credentials. The host name of the instance tells the two apart.

Does the audit log show when a gateway credential is created?

Ping's event list has no activity whose name refers to gateway credentials. The gateway resource lists its credentials, up to five, with the time each was created and last used, and each instance reports the ID of the credential it uses. Read that list when a gateway or instance activity fires, and periodically, to find credentials nobody issued.

What does the password authority of an LDAP gateway decide?

Ping documents two values for the user types of an LDAP gateway. With PING_ONE, PingOne authenticates with the external directory initially and then authenticates all subsequent sign-ons itself. With LDAP, the outside directory stays the place where the password is checked. In the second case every sign-on of those users passes through the gateway, which is why its servers and its instances matter so much.

Has a PingOne gateway been abused in a reported attack?

No public incident report describes it. The page is derived from Ping's documentation of gateways, instances and credentials. The pattern is known from other identity providers, where an agent that validates passwords on premises for a cloud service has been used to capture passwords and approve sign-ons, which MITRE ATT&CK describes as the Hybrid Identity technique.

References

We respect your privacy

We use cookies to keep this site secure and working properly. With your permission, we also use optional cookies to understand usage and improve the experience. Cookie Policy

You can change your choice at any time.