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Sign-On Policy Changed or MFA Bypassed in an OCI Identity Domain detection rules

An attacker with an administrator role edits the sign-on policy that enforces MFA for the OCI Console, or removes a user's factor and issues a bypass code, so that a stolen password is enough to sign in.

Platform
Oracle Cloud Infrastructure
Severity
High
Log source
Oracle Cloud Infrastructure Audit
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
The identity domain administrator role for the Console sign-on policy, or a help desk administrator or user manager role for a single user, plus the account's password.
Impact
Console sign-ins that should need a second factor succeed with a password alone, which on administrator accounts turns password theft into control of the tenancy.
Response
Bring the Console sign-on policy back to Oracle's security defaults, revoke every bypass code issued in the period, and contain the administrator account that made the change.
Mitigation
Keep the Console sign-on policy at Oracle's security defaults, and scope user manager and help desk administrator roles to selected groups that exclude administrators.
Event types
com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.UpdateAuthenticationPolicycom.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.DeleteMfaTotpDevice
Identity domain events
admin.passwordpolicy.create.successadmin.passwordpolicy.update.successadmin.policy.*admin.rule.*sso.bypasscode.create.success

How the attack works

In tenancies with identity domains, sign-on policies decide whether a sign-in is allowed and whether a second factor is required. Oracle seeds every domain with the "Security Policy for OCI Console", whose rules require MFA for members of Administrators, for holders of administrator roles and for all other users of the Console. Identity domain administrators can add a rule above those two, change a rule's conditions or actions, or deactivate the policy. Since Oracle introduced its security defaults, changing this policy needs a recorded consent and notifies the identity domain administrators by email, but a compromised administrator can give that consent.

A quieter route targets one account. A help desk administrator or user manager can reset a user's authentication factors and generate a bypass code, and manage users covers deleting a TOTP device. The identity domain writes its event ids to the Audit log in data.additionalDetails.eventId: Oracle documents admin.policy.create.success, admin.policy.update.success, admin.rule.create.success and admin.rule.update.success for policies and rules, and sso.bypasscode.create.success for a bypass code. The IAM control plane records com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.DeleteMfaTotpDevice. Policy and rule events cover every policy type of the domain, not only sign-on policies, so read the changed object. A third rule reads com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.UpdateAuthenticationPolicy and the identity domain event ids admin.passwordpolicy.create.success and admin.passwordpolicy.update.success: the authentication settings of a tenancy hold the password rules for local users and the network source restriction on Console sign-in, and in an identity domain the password rules are password policies. Neither event says what changed, so compare the settings with your baseline.

Collection: ship the _Audit log group of the root compartment (subcompartments included) and of any compartment that holds an identity domain to the SIEM through a service connector and a stream. Tenancies without identity domains do not produce the identity domain event ids.

What an attacker needs

  • The identity domain administrator role (or membership of Administrators) to change the seeded Console policy. For sign-on policies in general Oracle also lists the security administrator and application administrator roles and groups granted manage identity-domains. For the single-user route a help desk administrator or user manager role, or manage users in the tenancy.
  • The password of the account that will sign in afterwards, or the ability to reset it.

Impact

Console sign-ins that should need a second factor succeed with a password alone, for one account or for everyone the changed rule covers. On administrator accounts this turns password theft or a password reset into control of the tenancy.

Detection rules

OCI Authentication Policy or Identity Domain Password Policy Changed

Detects the IAM control plane operation UpdateAuthenticationPolicy and the identity domain event ids admin.passwordpolicy.create.success and admin.passwordpolicy.update.success. Oracle describes the authentication settings of a tenancy as the password rules for local users plus the network source restriction, the allowed set of IP ranges from which users can sign in to the Console. In an identity domain the password rules are password policies. Neither event says what changed, and Oracle's reference event for the control plane operation carries no setting values: read the current settings and compare them with your approved baseline. Oracle's lists name no delete or failure ids for password policies, so none is matched.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceOracle Cloud Infrastructure Audit
title: OCI Authentication Policy or Identity Domain Password Policy Changed
id: bcab9dd4-970c-4823-9cf2-5f7648f9d028
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the IAM control plane operation UpdateAuthenticationPolicy and the
  identity domain event ids admin.passwordpolicy.create.success and
  admin.passwordpolicy.update.success. Oracle describes the authentication
  settings of a tenancy as the password rules for local users plus the network
  source restriction, the allowed set of IP ranges from which users can sign
  in to the Console. In an identity domain the password rules are password
  policies. Neither event says what changed, and Oracle's reference event for
  the control plane operation carries no setting values: read the current
  settings and compare them with your approved baseline. Oracle's lists name
  no delete or failure ids for password policies, so none is matched.
references:
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en/learn/generating-iam-reports-from-oci-audit/index.html
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Tasks/managingpasswordrules.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/009/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1556.009
logsource:
  product: oci
  service: audit
detection:
  selection_control_plane:
    eventType: com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.UpdateAuthenticationPolicy
  selection_identity_domain:
    data.additionalDetails.eventId:
      - admin.passwordpolicy.create.success
      - admin.passwordpolicy.update.success
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Planned changes to password rules or to the network sources allowed for Console sign-in. These settings change rarely, so confirm each event against a change record.
  - New identity domains and new groups that receive their own password policy during setup.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned changes to password rules or to the network sources allowed for Console sign-in. These settings change rarely, so confirm each event against a change record.
  • New identity domains and new groups that receive their own password policy during setup.

OCI Identity Domain Sign-On Policy or Rule Created or Changed

Detects identity domain events for policies and their rules in the OCI Audit log. Oracle documents the event ids admin.policy.create.success, admin.policy.update.success, admin.rule.create.success and admin.rule.update.success; the rule matches the admin.policy. and admin.rule. prefixes so that other outcomes of the same objects are also seen. Oracle's lists name no delete or failure ids for these objects, so that wider part is an assumption about the naming pattern, not a documented value. The events cover all policy types of the domain: read the object named in data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName and act on sign-on policies first.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceOracle Cloud Infrastructure Audit
title: OCI Identity Domain Sign-On Policy or Rule Created or Changed
id: 47bdc5c5-ed8c-437f-8d2c-dc6f03f71773
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects identity domain events for policies and their rules in the OCI Audit
  log. Oracle documents the event ids admin.policy.create.success,
  admin.policy.update.success, admin.rule.create.success and
  admin.rule.update.success; the rule matches the admin.policy. and admin.rule.
  prefixes so that other outcomes of the same objects are also seen. Oracle's
  lists name no delete or failure ids for these objects, so that wider part is
  an assumption about the naming pattern, not a documented value. The events
  cover all policy types of the domain: read the object named in
  data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName and act on sign-on policies first.
references:
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en/learn/generating-iam-reports-from-oci-audit/index.html
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/signonpolicies/managingsignonpolicies.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/009/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1556.009
logsource:
  product: oci
  service: audit
detection:
  selection:
    data.additionalDetails.eventId|startswith:
      - admin.policy.
      - admin.rule.
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Identity administrators maintaining sign-on, identity provider or other domain policies. Expect few events in a stable domain; confirm each against a change record.
level: medium

False positives

  • Identity administrators maintaining sign-on, identity provider or other domain policies. Expect few events in a stable domain; confirm each against a change record.

OCI MFA Bypass Code Created or TOTP Device Deleted

Detects the identity domain event sso.bypasscode.create.success (a bypass code that replaces the second factor at sign-in) and the IAM control plane operation DeleteMfaTotpDevice. Either lets the next sign-in of that user pass without the enrolled factor. Compare the actor with the affected user.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceOracle Cloud Infrastructure Audit
title: OCI MFA Bypass Code Created or TOTP Device Deleted
id: 6a4a1c5d-da11-44d4-a41a-53b16245dc37
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the identity domain event sso.bypasscode.create.success (a bypass
  code that replaces the second factor at sign-in) and the IAM control plane
  operation DeleteMfaTotpDevice. Either lets the next sign-in of that user
  pass without the enrolled factor. Compare the actor with the affected user.
references:
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/api-getstarted/usingauditeventapis.htm
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1556.006
logsource:
  product: oci
  service: audit
detection:
  selection_bypass_code:
    data.additionalDetails.eventId: sso.bypasscode.create.success
  selection_totp_deleted:
    eventType: com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.DeleteMfaTotpDevice
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Users who lost a phone and the help desk restoring their access, and break-glass preparation that stores a bypass code. Confirm with the affected user and alert without exception for tenancy administrators.
level: medium

False positives

  • Users who lost a phone and the help desk restoring their access, and break-glass preparation that stores a bypass code. Confirm with the affected user and alert without exception for tenancy administrators.

Triage

  • For a policy or rule event, read the object named in data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName. Check whether the "Security Policy for OCI Console" is still active, whether a new rule sits above "MFA for administrators" and which group that rule exempts.
  • For a bypass code or deleted TOTP device, identify the affected user and the actor (data.additionalDetails.actorName or data.identity.principalName). A code created by someone other than the user, for a privileged user, needs confirmation from that user.
  • Check sign-ins of the affected accounts after the event and which factor, if any, they used.
  • Check the domain (data.additionalDetails.domainDisplayName); the Default domain holds the tenancy administrators.
  • If not approved, restore the Oracle security defaults, revoke the bypass code, re-enroll the factor and reset the account's password and credentials.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Close the gap first. Bring the Console sign-on policy back to Oracle's security defaults, and revoke every bypass code that was issued in the period, not only the one in the alert.
  2. Treat each account that signed in without a second factor while the gap was open as compromised. Reset its password, enroll its factor again with the owner, and delete API keys and auth tokens that were added in that time.
  3. Contain the administrator account that made the change, and remove its administrator role until its owner is verified.
  4. Review what those accounts did after they signed in, with priority on policies, group memberships, identity providers and new credentials.
  5. Check the consent records of the Console sign-on policy, and confirm that sign-ins of administrators use a second factor again.

Mitigation

  • Keep the "Security Policy for OCI Console" at Oracle's security defaults and restore the defaults rather than editing rules by hand after a rollout.
  • Limit the identity domain administrator, security administrator, help desk administrator and user manager roles, and scope user managers and help desk administrators to selected groups that exclude administrators.
  • Use phishing-resistant factors for administrators and store bypass codes for break-glass accounts offline.
  • Review the consent records of the Console sign-on policy and alert on any new consent.

Frequently asked questions

Does the policy rule fire only for sign-on policies?

No. The identity domain event ids for policies and rules cover every policy type of the domain, not only sign-on policies. Read the object named in `data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName` and act on sign-on policies first, above all on the "Security Policy for OCI Console".

Which event ids in the policy rule are documented and which are assumed?

Oracle documents `admin.policy.create.success`, `admin.policy.update.success`, `admin.rule.create.success` and `admin.rule.update.success`. The rule matches the prefixes `admin.policy.` and `admin.rule.` so that other outcomes for the same objects are also seen. Oracle's lists name no delete or failure ids for these objects, so that wider part is an assumption about the naming pattern.

Oracle asks for consent and notifies administrators when the Console policy changes. Is that not enough?

It helps, but it does not block the change. Since Oracle introduced its security defaults, changing this policy needs a recorded consent and notifies the identity domain administrators by email. A compromised administrator can give that consent, so the change still has to be detected and the consent records reviewed.

Do tenancies without identity domains produce these events?

They do not produce the identity domain event ids, so there are no policy, rule or bypass code events. The IAM control plane event for a deleted TOTP device, `DeleteMfaTotpDevice`, is the part of the second rule that does not depend on identity domains.

References

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