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Per-User MFA Disabled for an Account detection rules

An attacker holding Authentication Policy Administrator or Global Administrator switches off per-user MFA for an account, so it signs in with a password alone in tenants that still rely on per-user MFA.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
Medium
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID audit logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Authentication Policy Administrator or Global Administrator, in a tenant where per-user MFA and not Conditional Access is what enforces MFA for the account.
Impact
Password-only access to the account, which turns a phished or sprayed password into a working sign-in and removes a control others assume is still in place.
Response
Set the per-user MFA state of the account back to enabled or enforced, then revoke its sessions and reset its password.
Mitigation
Enforce MFA with Conditional Access or security defaults for all users, then retire per-user MFA so a single account setting cannot remove the requirement.
Audit activities
Create application password for userUpdate per-user multifactor authentication stateDisable Strong Authentication
Threat groups
Scattered Spider

How the attack works

Per-user MFA is the legacy way to require MFA in Microsoft Entra ID: each account has a state of disabled, enabled or enforced. Many tenants still use it alongside or instead of Conditional Access. An administrator with the right role (for example Authentication Policy Administrator or Global Administrator) can set an account back to disabled, which removes the MFA requirement for that account unless a Conditional Access policy or security defaults still demand it.

Attackers disable per-user MFA on a compromised account or on a backdoor account so their password-only sign-ins succeed. Depending on the interface used, the change is logged by Core Directory as Disable Strong Authentication or by the Authentication Methods service as Update per-user multifactor authentication state; the second activity is also written when MFA is enabled or enforced, so its new value has to be read. A related way to keep access without MFA is an app password, a generated credential for older applications that cannot answer an MFA prompt. Core Directory writes its creation as Create application password for user, and a third rule on this page reads it.

What an attacker needs

  • A compromised identity with Authentication Policy Administrator or Global Administrator (Authentication Administrator and Privileged Authentication Administrator cannot change per-user MFA states), or an application with Policy.ReadWrite.AuthenticationMethod.
  • A tenant where per-user MFA, not Conditional Access, is what enforces MFA for the account.

Impact

Password-only access to the account, which turns a phished or sprayed password into a working sign-in and removes a control the user and help desk may assume is still in place.

Detection rules

App Password Created for a User

Detects the creation of an app password. App passwords exist for older applications that cannot show an MFA prompt: the application signs in with the generated password instead of the user's password and no second factor is asked for. For an attacker who is inside an account, an app password is a credential that keeps working where MFA would otherwise stop them. Microsoft states that app passwords are not revoked automatically when the account password is reset, that a user can hold up to 40 of them and that they are verified by Microsoft Entra ID and therefore bypass federation. Microsoft lists the activity "Create application password for user" in the UserManagement category of Core Directory and documents its name only. App passwords do not work for accounts that are required to use modern authentication, so the event should be rare in a tenant that has moved to modern authentication.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: App Password Created for a User
id: 59072338-3525-4322-a133-d87fc9c7be6a
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the creation of an app password. App passwords exist for older
  applications that cannot show an MFA prompt: the application signs in with
  the generated password instead of the user's password and no second factor
  is asked for. For an attacker who is inside an account, an app password is a
  credential that keeps working where MFA would otherwise stop them. Microsoft
  states that app passwords are not revoked automatically when the account
  password is reset, that a user can hold up to 40 of them and that they are
  verified by Microsoft Entra ID and therefore bypass federation. Microsoft
  lists the activity "Create application password for user" in the
  UserManagement category of Core Directory and documents its name only. App
  passwords do not work for accounts that are required to use modern
  authentication, so the event should be rare in a tenant that has moved to
  modern authentication.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-app-passwords
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1556.006
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName: Create application password for user
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Users who still run an old mail client or a device that cannot use modern authentication and create an app password for it. Check whether the tenant still allows app passwords on purpose.
level: medium

False positives

  • Users who still run an old mail client or a device that cannot use modern authentication and create an app password for it. Check whether the tenant still allows app passwords on purpose.

Per-User MFA State Updated

Detects the Authentication Methods activity Update per-user multifactor authentication state, logged when an account's per-user MFA state changes (disabled, enabled or enforced). Read the new state in TargetResources: only changes to disabled weaken the account.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Per-User MFA State Updated
id: 029c492b-4ba5-442a-9a33-b3eb2ef3555f
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the Authentication Methods activity Update per-user multifactor
  authentication state, logged when an account's per-user MFA state changes
  (disabled, enabled or enforced). Read the new state in TargetResources:
  only changes to disabled weaken the account.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-userstates
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1556.006
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName: Update per-user multifactor authentication state
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Enabling or enforcing per-user MFA also produces this event; once you have confirmed how the new state appears in your logs, add a selection on it to alert only on disabled.
level: low

False positives

  • Enabling or enforcing per-user MFA also produces this event; once you have confirmed how the new state appears in your logs, add a selection on it to alert only on disabled.

Per-User MFA Disabled (Disable Strong Authentication)

Detects the Core Directory activity Disable Strong Authentication, which is logged when per-user MFA is turned off for an account.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Per-User MFA Disabled (Disable Strong Authentication)
id: 6223d723-f0ad-4e1e-8a6a-8e361ed602d4
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the Core Directory activity Disable Strong Authentication, which is
  logged when per-user MFA is turned off for an account.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1556.006
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName: Disable Strong Authentication
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Migration from per-user MFA to Conditional Access, which disables per-user MFA in bulk; confirm the migration window and that Conditional Access enforces MFA for the accounts.
level: medium

False positives

  • Migration from per-user MFA to Conditional Access, which disables per-user MFA in bulk; confirm the migration window and that Conditional Access enforces MFA for the accounts.

Triage

  • Identify the account (TargetResources) and the actor (InitiatedBy); for the Graph-based activity, read the new state in modifiedProperties.
  • Check whether Conditional Access still requires MFA for the account; if not, review its sign-ins since the change.
  • Confirm a help desk ticket exists; disabling MFA on an administrator account needs strong justification.
  • If unauthorized, re-enable MFA, reset the password and revoke sessions for the account.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Set the per-user MFA state of the account back to enabled or enforced, then revoke its sessions and reset its password. Sign-ins made while MFA was off needed only the password.
  2. Revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of the identity that changed the state, and remove its Authentication Policy Administrator or Global Administrator role.
  3. Review the sign-ins of the account since the change and the authentication methods registered on it. Disable the account if it turns out to be one the attacker created.
  4. Search the audit log for other accounts whose per-user MFA state the same actor changed, and restore them too.
  5. Confirm that a Conditional Access policy or the per-user state now requires MFA for the account.

Mitigation

  • Enforce MFA with Conditional Access (or security defaults) for all users, then retire per-user MFA so a single account setting cannot remove the requirement.
  • Limit Authentication Policy Administrator, the least privileged role that can change per-user MFA states, to a few PIM-managed accounts.
  • Review per-user MFA states regularly and alert on any account set to disabled.

Frequently asked questions

Does disabling per-user MFA always remove MFA from the account?

No. It removes the requirement only where per-user MFA is what enforces it. If a Conditional Access policy or security defaults still demand MFA for the account, the sign-in is challenged as before. Check which control applies before you judge the impact.

Why are there two rules for one action?

The change is logged differently depending on the interface. Core Directory writes `Disable Strong Authentication`, and the Authentication Methods service writes `Update per-user multifactor authentication state`. The second activity is also written when MFA is enabled or enforced, so the new state has to be read in the event.

Can a help desk administrator disable per-user MFA?

Not with the Authentication Administrator or Privileged Authentication Administrator role. Those roles cannot change per-user MFA states. Authentication Policy Administrator is the least privileged role that can, next to Global Administrator.

Which legitimate change produces many of these events at once?

A migration from per-user MFA to Conditional Access, which disables per-user MFA in bulk. Confirm the migration window and that Conditional Access enforces MFA for the same accounts before you close the alerts.

References

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