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Authentication Method Removed From an Account detection rules

An administrator or the user deletes a sign-in method (security info) from an account. An attacker does it to leave the account without MFA, to lock out its owner or to push it back to weaker methods.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
Medium
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID audit logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
An administrator role or application permission that can manage other users' authentication methods, or a session as the user whose methods are deleted.
Impact
An account without MFA that the next person with the password can register, an owner locked out of the account, or a fall back from phishing-resistant sign-in.
Response
Revoke the sessions of the account, delete every method the user does not own, reset the password and have the user register again under supervision.
Mitigation
Keep the roles that manage authentication methods small, and protect the registration of security information with Conditional Access.
Audit activities
Admin deleted security infoUser deleted security info
Threat groups
Scattered Spider

How the attack works

Every Microsoft Entra ID user has a set of authentication methods, which Microsoft also calls security info: Authenticator apps, phone numbers, OATH tokens, passkeys and others. Users delete their own methods on the Security info page. Administrators with the Authentication Administrator or Privileged Authentication Administrator role delete the methods of other users, and an application with the Microsoft Graph permission UserAuthenticationMethod.ReadWrite.All can do the same.

An attacker removes methods for three reasons. With an administrator role, deleting every method of a target leaves the account without MFA. Microsoft Entra ID then asks for a new registration at the next sign-in that needs strong authentication, and the attacker completes it with a password they know or have just reset. Inside a user's session, the attacker deletes the owner's methods after adding their own, so that the owner can no longer pass MFA. And deleting a passkey or another phishing-resistant method pushes the account back to methods that can be phished.

The Authentication Methods service writes each deletion to the audit log as Admin deleted security info or User deleted security info, with the actor in InitiatedBy and the account in TargetResources. The registration that usually comes before or after the deletion is covered by the page MFA Method Registered by an Attacker.

What an attacker needs

  • For another user's methods: an identity with the Authentication Administrator or Privileged Authentication Administrator role, or an application with UserAuthenticationMethod.ReadWrite.All.
  • For the account's own methods: a session as the user. Microsoft Entra ID asks for MFA again when the user last authenticated more than 10 minutes ago, so the attacker needs a fresh session or a method of their own on the account.

Impact

The account loses a factor that protected it. Depending on what is left, the result is an account without MFA that the next person with the password can register, an owner who is locked out while the attacker's method stays, or an account that fell from phishing-resistant to phishable sign-in.

Detection rules

Administrator Deleted an Authentication Method of a User

Detects an administrator or an application deleting an authentication method (security info) from another user's account, the audit activity "Admin deleted security info" of the Authentication Methods service. An attacker with an authentication administrator role deletes the methods of a target so that the account can be registered again by whoever signs in with the password. The event does not say whether the target is privileged, so enrich it with role assignments.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Administrator Deleted an Authentication Method of a User
id: 9f9a5617-0c15-41f7-a9b6-6a7627ce0b9b
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an administrator or an application deleting an authentication method
  (security info) from another user's account, the audit activity "Admin
  deleted security info" of the Authentication Methods service. An attacker
  with an authentication administrator role deletes the methods of a target so
  that the account can be registered again by whoever signs in with the
  password. The event does not say whether the target is privileged, so enrich
  it with role assignments.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-userdevicesettings
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1556.006
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName: Admin deleted security info
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Help desk staff who delete a method for a user with a lost or replaced phone. Match each event to a ticket, and exclude the documented support identities in a filter on InitiatedBy if the volume is high.
  - Identity lifecycle tools that clear the methods of leavers through Microsoft Graph. Confirm the application and add a filter for it.
level: medium

False positives

  • Help desk staff who delete a method for a user with a lost or replaced phone. Match each event to a ticket, and exclude the documented support identities in a filter on InitiatedBy if the volume is high.
  • Identity lifecycle tools that clear the methods of leavers through Microsoft Graph. Confirm the application and add a filter for it.

User Deleted One of Their Own Authentication Methods

Detects a user deleting an authentication method (security info) from their own account, the audit activity "User deleted security info" of the Authentication Methods service. People do this when they replace a phone, so the rule is a building block. It becomes valuable when the same account has a risky or unfamiliar sign-in, a new method registered or a password reset around the same time, which is how it looks when an attacker in the session removes the owner's method.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: User Deleted One of Their Own Authentication Methods
id: 6278c720-e373-4cf1-b3fa-fb2e11ac7727
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a user deleting an authentication method (security info) from their
  own account, the audit activity "User deleted security info" of the
  Authentication Methods service. People do this when they replace a phone, so
  the rule is a building block. It becomes valuable when the same account has
  a risky or unfamiliar sign-in, a new method registered or a password reset
  around the same time, which is how it looks when an attacker in the session
  removes the owner's method.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/microsoftauthenticatorauthenticationmethod-delete
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1556.006
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName: User deleted security info
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Users who replace or lose a phone, or who tidy up old methods. Expect a steady number in any tenant. Correlate with sign-in risk and location, or leave out deletions made from your corporate network ranges.
level: low

False positives

  • Users who replace or lose a phone, or who tidy up old methods. Expect a steady number in any tenant. Correlate with sign-in risk and location, or leave out deletions made from your corporate network ranges.

Triage

  • Identify the actor (InitiatedBy) and the account (TargetResources), and open the account's current methods. Was the deleted method the last strong one?
  • For a deletion by an administrator, find the ticket. Help desk staff delete methods for lost phones, and each case should start with a request from the user.
  • For a deletion by the user, compare the IP address and device of the session with the user's sign-in history, and ask the user.
  • Read the audit log of the same account around the event. A method registered shortly before or after, a password reset or a Temporary Access Pass turns a routine deletion into the pattern of a takeover.
  • Check whether the account holds a privileged role. A deletion on an administrator account needs a clear reason.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Revoke the sessions of the affected account. If the deletion came from an administrator or an application you do not trust, block that identity and revoke its sessions as well.
  2. Go through every method that is on the account now with the user and delete the ones the user does not own.
  3. Reset the password, then have the user register again under supervision, for example with a Temporary Access Pass issued after you verified who is asking.
  4. Review the sign-ins and changes of the account since the deletion, such as new methods, inbox rules and application consents.
  5. If an administrator account or an application deleted the method, list every deletion it made in the period and treat each of those accounts the same way.

Mitigation

  • Keep the Authentication Administrator and Privileged Authentication Administrator roles small and activate them through Privileged Identity Management.
  • Protect the "Register security information" user action with Conditional Access, so that an account whose methods were deleted cannot be registered again from anywhere with only a password.
  • Issue a Temporary Access Pass when a user has to register again, so that no account waits without methods for the first person who signs in.
  • Review the applications that hold UserAuthenticationMethod.ReadWrite.All and remove the permission where it is not needed.
  • Give administrators and other sensitive accounts at least two phishing-resistant methods, so that the loss of one does not leave the account on a weaker method.

Frequently asked questions

Why would an attacker delete a method instead of adding one?

Deleting every method leaves the account without MFA. Microsoft Entra ID then asks for a new registration at the next sign-in that needs strong authentication, and whoever signs in with the password completes it. Deleting the owner's method after adding their own also locks the owner out, and deleting a passkey pushes the account back to methods that can be phished.

Which of the two rules should we alert on first?

The deletion by an administrator. It is rarer, it acts on another person's account and it needs a privileged role. Users delete methods whenever they replace a phone, so that rule is rated low and is most useful next to a risky sign-in, a new registration or a password reset on the same account.

Do the rules fire when an administrator uses Require re-register MFA?

Microsoft documents that the action deletes the user's phone numbers, Authenticator apps and software OATH tokens. It does not document which audit activity the action writes. Run it on a test account and read the audit log before you rely on these rules for it.

Does the event say which method was deleted?

Microsoft documents the two activity names but not the wording that describes the method, so the rules match only the activity name. Open the record and the user's current methods to see what was removed and what is left on the account.

References

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