How the attack works
The authentication methods policy decides which methods users may register and use (Microsoft Authenticator, FIDO2 and passkeys, Temporary Access Pass, SMS, voice call, email OTP, third-party OATH tokens, certificates) and for which groups. Custom authentication strengths, referenced by Conditional Access, decide which method combinations count as strong enough for a resource. Together they define what "MFA" means in the tenant.
An attacker holding Authentication Policy Administrator or Global Administrator can enable a weak or easily intercepted method, scope Temporary Access Pass to a group they control, relax method settings or register an external MFA provider they operate. An attacker holding Conditional Access Administrator or Security Administrator can add a weaker combination to a custom authentication strength that protects administrators. Each change is logged by the Authentication Methods service as Authentication Methods Policy Update or Authentication Methods Policy Reset, and authentication strength changes as Authentication Strength Policy Update or Authentication Strength Policy Delete, with Authentication Strength Combination Configuration Update and Authentication Strength Combination Configuration Delete for the restrictions attached to a method combination.
What an attacker needs
- For the authentication methods policy, a compromised identity with Authentication Policy Administrator or Global Administrator, or an application with
Policy.ReadWrite.AuthenticationMethod. - For authentication strengths, Conditional Access Administrator, Security Administrator or Global Administrator, or an application with
Policy.ReadWrite.ConditionalAccess.
Impact
MFA requirements that can be satisfied with methods the attacker can control or intercept, tenant-wide or for selected groups, which supports account takeover and persistence without changing any Conditional Access policy.
Detection rules
Authentication Methods Policy Updated or Reset
Detects an update to or reset of the tenant authentication methods policy, which controls the methods users can register and use for MFA and passwordless sign-in.
title: Authentication Methods Policy Updated or Reset
id: 84ec78f2-ffc1-4dec-9b24-5a0b4972c9f7
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects an update to or reset of the tenant authentication methods policy,
which controls the methods users can register and use for MFA and
passwordless sign-in.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1556.006
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName:
- Authentication Methods Policy Update
- Authentication Methods Policy Reset
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- Planned rollouts of new methods (passkeys, Temporary Access Pass) and the migration from legacy MFA and SSPR policies; match each change to a change record.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned rollouts of new methods (passkeys, Temporary Access Pass) and the migration from legacy MFA and SSPR policies; match each change to a change record.
Authentication Strength Policy or Combination Configuration Updated or Deleted
Detects an update to or deletion of an authentication strength policy, or of a combination configuration inside one (the restrictions on a method combination, such as the allowed FIDO2 keys or certificate issuers). Adding a weaker method combination to a custom strength, or removing such a restriction, lowers the bar for every Conditional Access policy that requires it.
title: Authentication Strength Policy or Combination Configuration Updated or Deleted
id: 55a1832c-f421-45b3-ba8d-f6d529e14370
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects an update to or deletion of an authentication strength policy, or
of a combination configuration inside one (the restrictions on a method
combination, such as the allowed FIDO2 keys or certificate issuers). Adding
a weaker method combination to a custom strength, or removing such a
restriction, lowers the bar for every Conditional Access policy that
requires it.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-strengths
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1556.006
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName:
- Authentication Strength Policy Update
- Authentication Strength Policy Delete
- Authentication Strength Combination Configuration Update
- Authentication Strength Combination Configuration Delete
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- Planned changes to custom authentication strengths; review the allowed combinations in TargetResources against the change record.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned changes to custom authentication strengths; review the allowed combinations in TargetResources against the change record.
Triage
- Compare the old and new policy values in TargetResources; look for newly enabled methods, a new external MFA provider, wider target groups or relaxed method settings.
- Confirm the actor (InitiatedBy) and a change record.
- Check for registrations of the newly allowed method right after the change, especially on privileged accounts.
- If unauthorized, restore the previous configuration and review the actor's other changes.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Put the policy back. Disable the method that was enabled, restore the target groups and method settings, and remove an external MFA provider nobody recognizes. For a custom authentication strength, remove the weaker combination or restore the restriction that was deleted.
- Find the accounts that registered or used the newly allowed method while the change was in place, privileged accounts first. Remove that method from them and revoke their sessions.
- If Temporary Access Pass was opened to a group, check the members of the group and delete the passes issued to them during the period.
- Revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of the identity that made the change, and remove its Authentication Policy Administrator, Conditional Access Administrator or Security Administrator role.
- Compare the whole authentication methods policy and every custom authentication strength with your approved configuration, because the same actor may have changed more than one setting.
Mitigation
- Enable only the methods the organization needs and prefer phishing-resistant methods; keep SMS, voice and email OTP disabled or tightly scoped.
- Use the built-in phishing-resistant authentication strength for administrators instead of editable custom strengths where possible.
- Limit Authentication Policy Administrator, Conditional Access Administrator and Security Administrator to a few PIM-managed accounts and alert on every policy change.
Frequently asked questions
Does the alert say which method or setting was weakened?
No. The rules match the activity names only. Compare the old and the new policy values in TargetResources to find newly enabled methods, a new external MFA provider, wider target groups or relaxed method settings.
Why watch authentication strengths when Conditional Access changes are already monitored?
A custom authentication strength decides which method combinations count as strong enough for the Conditional Access policies that require it. Adding a weaker combination lowers the bar for all of those policies, and no Conditional Access policy is changed. The change is logged as an authentication strength activity instead.
Which changes to this policy are normal?
Planned rollouts of new methods such as passkeys or Temporary Access Pass, and the migration from the legacy MFA and self-service password reset policies. Each of them should match a change record. A change that enables SMS, voice or email one-time passcodes, or one made by an identity that does not normally manage authentication, deserves a closer look.