How the attack works
Google Workspace gives administrators three recovery tools on a user's security page. They can get backup verification codes for a user who cannot reach their second factor, add a security key for a user, and turn off the login challenge for 10 minutes for a user who cannot verify their identity. All three exist for locked-out users, and all three let someone other than the owner satisfy or skip the second step of sign-in.
An attacker who controls an admin account uses them on a chosen target. Backup codes pass 2-Step Verification wherever it is on, including where it is enforced and a single user cannot be exempted. A security key that the attacker registers for the user stays valid as that user's second factor until someone removes it. Turning off the login challenge removes the extra check that Google applies when a sign-in looks suspicious. Together with a password the attacker knows or sets, each of them opens the account while its 2-Step Verification setting still reads on.
The Admin audit log records GENERATE_2SV_SCRATCH_CODES when new backup codes are generated for a user, SECURITY_KEY_REGISTERED_FOR_USER when a security key is registered for a user and UNBLOCK_USER_SESSION when a user is unblocked by temporarily disabling the login challenge. Each names the affected user in USER_EMAIL. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive them in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com. Turning 2-Step Verification off or unenrolling a user is a different action and has its own page (2-Step Verification Weakened in Google Workspace).
What an attacker needs
- Control of an admin account with user management privileges. Google states that only super administrators can generate backup codes for other admins.
- The password of the target, or the right to reset it, which usually comes with the same role.
Impact
The attacker signs in as the target although 2-Step Verification is on for the account. Backup codes work until they are used up or replaced, and for users who must use a security key until the grace period that starts with the codes ends. A registered security key keeps working as the target's second factor until it is removed, so it survives a password reset. Google states that creating new backup codes invalidates the existing ones, so the owner's own codes stop working. Targets that hold admin roles or IAM roles in Google Cloud pass those privileges on.
Detection rules
Backup Verification Codes Generated for a User by an Admin in Google Workspace
Detects an administrator generating new 2-Step Verification backup codes for a user of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event GENERATE_2SV_SCRATCH_CODES, rendered as "New 2-step verification scratch codes generated for the user {USER_EMAIL}"). A backup code passes the second step of sign-in in place of the user's phone or key, also where 2-Step Verification is enforced, so an attacker in an admin session uses it to get into a chosen account. Google states that creating new codes invalidates any existing code and that only super administrators can generate backup codes for other admins. The affected user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Backup Verification Codes Generated for a User by an Admin in Google Workspace
id: 9c0012a5-e9d0-4701-b307-18d35e6e4783
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects an administrator generating new 2-Step Verification backup codes
for a user of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit
event GENERATE_2SV_SCRATCH_CODES, rendered as "New 2-step verification
scratch codes generated for the user {USER_EMAIL}"). A backup code passes
the second step of sign-in in place of the user's phone or key, also where
2-Step Verification is enforced, so an attacker in an admin session uses
it to get into a chosen account. Google states that creating new codes
invalidates any existing code and that only super administrators can
generate backup codes for other admins. The affected user is in the event
parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin in
principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity
entry at organization level, which is always written once Google
Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM
only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/manage-a-users-security-settings
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1556.006
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.generate2SvScratchCodes
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Helpdesk staff helping a user who lost a phone or left a security key at home, which is the purpose of the feature. Confirm each event against a ticket and with the user, and give priority to targets that are administrators or hold IAM roles in Google Cloud.
level: medium
False positives
- Helpdesk staff helping a user who lost a phone or left a security key at home, which is the purpose of the feature. Confirm each event against a ticket and with the user, and give priority to targets that are administrators or hold IAM roles in Google Cloud.
Login Challenge Temporarily Turned Off for a User by an Admin in Google Workspace
Detects an administrator turning off the login challenge for a user of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event UNBLOCK_USER_SESSION, rendered as "User {USER_EMAIL} unblocked by temporarily disabling login challenge"). Google presents a login challenge when it suspects that an unauthorized person is trying to sign in, and a verify-it's-you challenge before some sensitive actions. An admin can turn these off for one user for 10 minutes. An attacker in an admin session does this for an account whose password they hold, at the moment their own sign-in is being challenged. The affected user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Login Challenge Temporarily Turned Off for a User by an Admin in Google Workspace
id: b0cdbc83-9065-4b34-9c0d-bc7310caa146
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects an administrator turning off the login challenge for a user of a
Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event
UNBLOCK_USER_SESSION, rendered as "User {USER_EMAIL} unblocked by
temporarily disabling login challenge"). Google presents a login challenge
when it suspects that an unauthorized person is trying to sign in, and a
verify-it's-you challenge before some sensitive actions. An admin can turn
these off for one user for 10 minutes. An attacker in an admin session
does this for an account whose password they hold, at the moment their
own sign-in is being challenged. The affected user is in the event
parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin in
principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity
entry at organization level, which is always written once Google
Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM
only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/temporarily-turn-off-login-challenges-for-a-user
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/protect-google-workspace-accounts-with-security-challenges
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1556.006
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.unblockUserSession
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Helpdesk staff helping a user who cannot receive a verification code or does not remember their employee ID, which is the purpose of the feature. Confirm each event against a ticket, and review the user's sign-ins and account changes in the minutes after it.
level: medium
False positives
- Helpdesk staff helping a user who cannot receive a verification code or does not remember their employee ID, which is the purpose of the feature. Confirm each event against a ticket, and review the user's sign-ins and account changes in the minutes after it.
Security Key Registered for a User in the Admin Audit Log of Google Workspace
Detects a security key being registered for a user of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account as recorded in the Admin audit log (event SECURITY_KEY_REGISTERED_FOR_USER, rendered as "Security key registered for {USER_EMAIL}"). Google's help describes how an admin adds a security key for a user on the user's security page, and states that a key added this way is for 2-Step Verification only. A key that an attacker in an admin session registers for a chosen user stays valid as that user's second factor until it is removed, so it outlasts a password reset. Google's reference does not say whether a key that a user adds in their own account is also written under this event, so compare the admin in principalEmail with the affected user in the event parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Security Key Registered for a User in the Admin Audit Log of Google Workspace
id: 871d01cd-9f05-4822-97d9-29d752684371
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a security key being registered for a user of a Google Workspace
or Cloud Identity account as recorded in the Admin audit log (event
SECURITY_KEY_REGISTERED_FOR_USER, rendered as "Security key registered
for {USER_EMAIL}"). Google's help describes how an admin adds a security
key for a user on the user's security page, and states that a key added
this way is for 2-Step Verification only. A key that an attacker in an
admin session registers for a chosen user stays valid as that user's
second factor until it is removed, so it outlasts a password reset.
Google's reference does not say whether a key that a user adds in their
own account is also written under this event, so compare the admin in
principalEmail with the affected user in the event parameter USER_EMAIL
in protoPayload.metadata. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin
Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google
Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM
only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/manage-a-users-security-settings
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1556.006
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.securityKeyRegisteredForUser
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Rollouts in which the IT team registers security keys for users before handing them out. These come in planned batches by known admins. Outside a rollout, confirm each event with the user, who can say whether the key listed on their account is theirs.
level: medium
False positives
- Rollouts in which the IT team registers security keys for users before handing them out. These come in planned batches by known admins. Outside a rollout, confirm each event with the user, who can say whether the key listed on their account is theirs.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Backup codes generated by an admin and then used to sign in from an unfamiliar address
Backup codes that the helpdesk hands to a locked-out user are used by that user from their usual network. Codes that an attacker generated in an admin session are used by the attacker. The pair of the admin event and a sign-in with a backup code from a place the user never signed in from is the trace.
- A
google.admin.AdminService.generate2SvScratchCodesentry. Note the user in the event parameterUSER_EMAILand the admin inauthenticationInfo.principalEmail. - Within 24 hours, a
google.login.LoginService.loginSuccessentry oflogin.googleapis.comfor that user whose event parameterlogin_challenge_methodholdsbackup_code. - Compare the
requestMetadata.callerIpof that sign-in with the addresses the user signed in from in the past 30 days.
Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.generate2SvScratchCodesgoogle.login.LoginService.loginSuccess
LimitsA user who lost a phone while travelling matches as well, so confirm with the user. The 24 hours and 30 days are starting points. A code that is used days later, or a sign-in from the user's own network through a compromised device, is not found.
Password reset and second factor issued for the same user by one admin
A locked-out user usually needs one thing, a new password or a way past the second factor. An attacker who takes an account over needs both, so the same admin sets a password and generates backup codes or registers a security key for the same user within minutes.
- A
google.admin.AdminService.changePasswordentry. NoteUSER_EMAILand the admin inauthenticationInfo.principalEmail. - Within 60 minutes, before or after, a
generate2SvScratchCodes,securityKeyRegisteredForUserorunblockUserSessionentry ofgoogle.admin.AdminServiceby the same admin for the sameUSER_EMAIL.
Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.changePasswordgoogle.admin.AdminService.generate2SvScratchCodesgoogle.admin.AdminService.securityKeyRegisteredForUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.unblockUserSession
LimitsA user who lost both the phone and the password produces the same pair, so each match needs a ticket or a word with the user. The 60 minutes are a starting point. Two admin accounts that share the work do not match.
Triage
- Read USER_EMAIL in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata and compare it with the admin in principalEmail. Check whether the affected user holds an admin role in Workspace or IAM roles in Google Cloud.
- Look for a helpdesk ticket, and confirm with the user through a second channel that they were locked out and asked for help.
- Look for a password change for the same user by the same admin around that time (google.admin.AdminService.changePassword). A reset plus a way past the second factor is a complete takeover.
- Review the user's sign-ins afterwards (google.login.LoginService.loginSuccess of login.googleapis.com). The event parameter login_challenge_method shows the method that was used, for example backup_code or security_key.
- For a registered key, open the user's security page in the Admin console. The passkeys and security keys table shows when and where each key was added and last used, and the owner can say which keys are theirs.
- Check the admin account itself. Review its recent sign-ins and whether it did the same for several users.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Secure the admin account that acted. Reset its password, reset its sign-in cookies so that existing sessions end, and review its own 2-Step Verification methods and admin roles.
- Remove every security key from the affected account that the owner does not recognise, on the user's security page in the Admin console.
- Generate new backup codes for the affected user and hand them to the verified owner. Creating new codes invalidates the ones the attacker holds.
- Reset the affected user's password with the owner verified, require a change at the next sign-in and reset the user's sign-in cookies.
- Establish what was done as the affected user from the first sign-in that used a backup code or the new key, and reverse changes such as mail forwarding, app access and role bindings.
Mitigation
- Give user management privileges only to the helpdesk roles that need them, limited to the organizational units they serve, and keep super admins few.
- Have the helpdesk verify the user through a second channel before it issues backup codes, adds a key or turns off a login challenge, and record each case in a ticket.
- Enforce 2-Step Verification with security keys or passkeys for administrators and review the keys registered on those accounts regularly.
- Alert on these three events when the target is an administrator or an account with IAM roles in Google Cloud, where recovery by the helpdesk should never be needed without notice.
- Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM, including the Data Access log that carries the sign-in events.
Frequently asked questions
Why would an attacker generate backup codes instead of turning 2-Step Verification off?
Because turning it off is not always possible and is easier to notice. Google states that the option to turn 2-Step Verification off for a single user is disabled where it is enforced. Backup codes can be generated for a user in an enforced scope as well, even for users who must use a security key, and the account's 2-Step Verification setting does not change.
What happens to a user's existing backup codes when an admin generates new ones?
Google states that creating new verification codes invalidates any existing code. A user who finds that their saved codes no longer work, without having asked for new ones, has a reason to report it. The same behaviour is useful in the response, because a new set of codes makes the codes an attacker took worthless.
Can any admin generate backup codes for another administrator?
No. Google states that only super administrators can generate backup verification codes for other admins. Other admins can view and create backup codes only for their users. An event of this kind whose target is an administrator therefore comes from a super admin account, and that account is the first thing to check.
How long does a login challenge stay off when an admin turns it off for a user?
For 10 minutes. Google's help adds that the change can take several minutes to take effect. The setting applies to the login challenge and to the verify-it's-you challenge that Google shows before a sensitive action, so review both the sign-ins and the account changes of that user in the period after the event.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1556.006: Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
- Manage a user's security settings
- Temporarily turn off login challenges for a user
- Protect Google Workspace accounts with security challenges
- Audit logs for Google Workspace (Cloud Audit Logs)
- Admin audit events: user settings (GENERATE_2SV_SCRATCH_CODES, SECURITY_KEY_REGISTERED_FOR_USER, UNBLOCK_USER_SESSION)
- Login audit events (login_success, login_challenge_method)
- Deploy 2-Step Verification