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2-Step Verification Weakened in Google Workspace detection rules

An attacker with admin rights in Google Workspace stops enforcing 2-Step Verification, turns it off for a user or disables it on a hijacked account, so a password alone opens accounts that also reach Google Cloud.

Platform
Google Cloud
Severity
High
Log source
Google Cloud Audit Logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Control of a super admin account or an admin whose role can manage security settings or users, or a signed-in session of the target account.
Impact
Accounts in the affected scope can be opened with a password alone, including Workspace admins and principals that hold IAM roles in Google Cloud.
Response
Restore the previous values of the two policy settings for the affected organizational unit or group, and secure the admin account that made the change.
Mitigation
Enforce 2-Step Verification for every organizational unit, with security keys or passkeys for administrators and no exception groups where enforcement is off.
API methods
google.login.LoginService.titaniumUnenrollgoogle.login.LoginService.2svDisablegoogle.admin.AdminService.changeAllowedTwoStepVerificationMethodsgoogle.admin.AdminService.changeTwoStepVerificationEnrollmentPeriodDurationgoogle.admin.AdminService.changeTwoStepVerificationGracePeriodDurationgoogle.admin.AdminService.changeTwoStepVerificationFrequencygoogle.admin.AdminService.changeTwoStepVerificationStartDategoogle.admin.AdminService.enforceStrongAuthenticationgoogle.admin.AdminService.allowStrongAuthenticationgoogle.admin.AdminService.turnOff2StepVerificationgoogle.admin.AdminService.unenrollUserFromStrongAuthgoogle.admin.AdminService.unenrollUserFromTitaniumand 1 more in the rules below
Threat groups
Scattered Spider

How the attack works

Google Workspace and Cloud Identity call multi-factor authentication 2-Step Verification (2SV). Admins control it with two settings in the Admin console: whether users are allowed to turn 2SV on, and whether it is enforced. Enforcement can differ by organizational unit or group. The same identities sign in to Google Cloud, so the 2SV policy of the Workspace account is also the second factor of the Google Cloud organization.

An attacker who controls an admin account can take the second factor away in more than one way. Turning enforcement off lets the accounts in scope sign in with a password alone. Turning 2SV off for one user removes the factor from a chosen target; the Admin console offers this only where 2SV is not enforced. On a user account that is already hijacked, the attacker can disable 2SV in the account's own settings, so that the stolen password keeps working without the owner's phone or key.

Each action leaves one audit entry. The Admin audit log records ENFORCE_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION and ALLOW_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION for the two policy settings, with the old and the new value, and TURN_OFF_2_STEP_VERIFICATION when an admin turns 2SV off for a user. The Login audit log records 2sv_disable when a user disables it. Enforcement can also be softened while it stays on, and the same logs record that as changes to the allowed methods, the enrollment and grace periods, the frequency and the start date, and for a single user as unenrollment from strong authentication or Advanced Protection or a grace period. These entries reach Google Cloud only if the organization shares Workspace data with Google Cloud. They then appear in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level, under the service names admin.googleapis.com (Admin Activity) and login.googleapis.com (Data Access).

What an attacker needs

  • Control of a super admin account, or of an admin whose role can manage security settings (for the policy) or users (for a single user).
  • For the user-side path, a signed-in session of the target account.

Impact

Accounts in the affected scope can be opened with a password alone, including Workspace admins and principals that hold IAM roles in Google Cloud. A policy change exposes every user of the organizational unit or group at once, and it weakens later containment, because a guessed or reset password is again enough to get back in.

Detection rules

Advanced Protection Disabled by a User in Google Workspace

Detects a user disabling Advanced Protection on their own Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Login audit event titanium_unenroll, which Google's reference renders as the actor "has disabled Advanced Protection"). The program is meant for users at risk of a targeted attack, such as super admins, and it enforces security keys or passkeys for sign-in and blocks apps that require high-risk scopes unless an admin trusts them. Leaving it removes those protections from an account that was enrolled for a reason, which is also what an attacker with a hijacked session wants. The account is in principalEmail. Enrollment is a different event (titanium_enroll) and does not match. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as a Data Access entry of login.googleapis.com at organization level only when Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level Data Access logs are routed to it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Advanced Protection Disabled by a User in Google Workspace
id: 6a5bbf36-34ca-42e4-b24b-f587eb09fcd3
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a user disabling Advanced Protection on their own Google Workspace
  or Cloud Identity account (Login audit event titanium_unenroll, which
  Google's reference renders as the actor "has disabled Advanced
  Protection"). The program is meant for users at risk of a targeted attack,
  such as super admins, and it enforces security keys or passkeys for sign-in
  and blocks apps that require high-risk scopes unless an admin trusts them.
  Leaving it removes those protections from an account that was enrolled for
  a reason, which is also what an attacker with a hijacked session wants. The
  account is in principalEmail. Enrollment is a different event
  (titanium_enroll) and does not match. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as
  a Data Access entry of login.googleapis.com at organization level only when
  Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the
  SIEM only when the organization-level Data Access logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/login
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/protect-users-with-the-advanced-protection-program
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1556.006
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: login.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.login.LoginService.titaniumUnenroll
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - A user who leaves the program on purpose, for example because an application they need does not work with it. Confirm the change with the user, and give priority to administrators and to accounts that hold IAM roles in Google Cloud.
level: medium

False positives

  • A user who leaves the program on purpose, for example because an application they need does not work with it. Confirm the change with the user, and give priority to administrators and to accounts that hold IAM roles in Google Cloud.

2-Step Verification Disabled by a User in Google Workspace

Detects a user disabling 2-Step Verification on their own Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Login audit event 2sv_disable). An attacker with a hijacked session does this so that the password alone keeps working. The account is in principalEmail. Enrollment is a different event (2sv_enroll) and does not match. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as a Data Access entry of login.googleapis.com at organization level only when Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level Data Access logs are routed to it.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: 2-Step Verification Disabled by a User in Google Workspace
id: 064b4d74-b19a-4f8d-880e-e4135a7e6df2
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a user disabling 2-Step Verification on their own Google Workspace
  or Cloud Identity account (Login audit event 2sv_disable). An attacker with
  a hijacked session does this so that the password alone keeps working. The
  account is in principalEmail. Enrollment is a different event (2sv_enroll)
  and does not match. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as a Data Access
  entry of login.googleapis.com at organization level only when Google
  Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM
  only when the organization-level Data Access logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/login
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1556.006
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: login.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.login.LoginService.2svDisable
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Users who change phones or replace their second factor in organizational units where 2-Step Verification is not enforced. Prioritize administrators and accounts that hold IAM roles in Google Cloud, and confirm the change with the user.
level: low

False positives

  • Users who change phones or replace their second factor in organizational units where 2-Step Verification is not enforced. Prioritize administrators and accounts that hold IAM roles in Google Cloud, and confirm the change with the user.

2-Step Verification Methods or Enrollment Timing Changed in Google Workspace

Detects a change to the 2-Step Verification settings that soften enforcement without turning it off: the allowed methods (Admin audit event CHANGE_ALLOWED_TWO_STEP_VERIFICATION_METHODS), the enrollment period for new users (CHANGE_TWO_STEP_VERIFICATION_ENROLLMENT_PERIOD_DURATION), the policy suspension grace period (CHANGE_TWO_STEP_VERIFICATION_GRACE_PERIOD_DURATION), the frequency setting that lets users trust a device (CHANGE_TWO_STEP_VERIFICATION_FREQUENCY) and the date enforcement starts (CHANGE_TWO_STEP_VERIFICATION_START_DATE). Moving the methods from security keys only to any method, lengthening a period in which a password alone is enough, or pushing the start date out all weaken the second factor while the enforcement setting still reads on. The rule fires on ANY change, because the method name does not carry the direction. Read NEW_VALUE and OLD_VALUE, or ALLOWED_TWO_STEP_VERIFICATION_METHOD for the methods event, in the event parameters (protoPayload.metadata), with the scope in ORG_UNIT_NAME or GROUP_EMAIL. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: 2-Step Verification Methods or Enrollment Timing Changed in Google Workspace
id: 3f184472-bc4a-45a4-a6d2-f90a449acd55
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a change to the 2-Step Verification settings that soften
  enforcement without turning it off: the allowed methods (Admin audit event
  CHANGE_ALLOWED_TWO_STEP_VERIFICATION_METHODS), the enrollment period for
  new users (CHANGE_TWO_STEP_VERIFICATION_ENROLLMENT_PERIOD_DURATION), the
  policy suspension grace period
  (CHANGE_TWO_STEP_VERIFICATION_GRACE_PERIOD_DURATION), the frequency setting
  that lets users trust a device (CHANGE_TWO_STEP_VERIFICATION_FREQUENCY)
  and the date enforcement starts (CHANGE_TWO_STEP_VERIFICATION_START_DATE).
  Moving the methods from security keys only to any method, lengthening a
  period in which a password alone is enough, or pushing the start date out
  all weaken the second factor while the enforcement setting still reads on.
  The rule fires on ANY change, because the method name does not carry the
  direction. Read NEW_VALUE and OLD_VALUE, or
  ALLOWED_TWO_STEP_VERIFICATION_METHOD for the methods event, in the event
  parameters (protoPayload.metadata), with the scope in ORG_UNIT_NAME or
  GROUP_EMAIL. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries
  at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data
  sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the
  organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-security-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/deploy-2-step-verification
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1556.006
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.admin.AdminService.changeAllowedTwoStepVerificationMethods
      - google.admin.AdminService.changeTwoStepVerificationEnrollmentPeriodDuration
      - google.admin.AdminService.changeTwoStepVerificationGracePeriodDuration
      - google.admin.AdminService.changeTwoStepVerificationFrequency
      - google.admin.AdminService.changeTwoStepVerificationStartDate
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Changes that tighten the settings match as well, for example a move to security keys only or a shorter enrollment period. Read the old and the new value in the event parameters.
  - Planned rollouts by the identity team, which change several of these settings in one session. Verify each change that loosens a setting against a change record.
level: medium

False positives

  • Changes that tighten the settings match as well, for example a move to security keys only or a shorter enrollment period. Read the old and the new value in the event parameters.
  • Planned rollouts by the identity team, which change several of these settings in one session. Verify each change that loosens a setting against a change record.

2-Step Verification Policy Setting Changed in Google Workspace

Detects a change to one of the two 2-Step Verification policy settings of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account: enforcement (Admin audit event ENFORCE_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION) and whether users may turn 2-Step Verification on (ALLOW_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION). The rule fires on ANY change to these settings, including a change that turns enforcement on, because the method name does not carry the direction. Read NEW_VALUE and OLD_VALUE in the event parameters (protoPayload.metadata) before acting; the scope of an enforcement change is in ORG_UNIT_NAME or GROUP_EMAIL. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level only when Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: 2-Step Verification Policy Setting Changed in Google Workspace
id: 503fc49b-c548-40a7-a69f-fd7ef675d33c
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a change to one of the two 2-Step Verification policy settings of a
  Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account: enforcement (Admin audit event
  ENFORCE_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION) and whether users may turn 2-Step
  Verification on (ALLOW_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION). The rule fires on ANY change
  to these settings, including a change that turns enforcement on, because
  the method name does not carry the direction. Read NEW_VALUE and OLD_VALUE
  in the event parameters (protoPayload.metadata) before acting; the scope of
  an enforcement change is in ORG_UNIT_NAME or GROUP_EMAIL. The entry reaches
  Cloud Audit Logs as an
  Admin Activity entry at organization level only when Google Workspace data
  sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the
  organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-security-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/deploy-2-step-verification
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1556.006
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.admin.AdminService.enforceStrongAuthentication
      - google.admin.AdminService.allowStrongAuthentication
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Changes that turn 2-Step Verification on or enforce it for more users match as well; read NEW_VALUE and OLD_VALUE in the event parameters.
  - Planned rollouts and exception handling by the identity team. These settings change rarely, so verify each change that weakens the policy against a change record.
level: medium

False positives

  • Changes that turn 2-Step Verification on or enforce it for more users match as well; read NEW_VALUE and OLD_VALUE in the event parameters.
  • Planned rollouts and exception handling by the identity team. These settings change rarely, so verify each change that weakens the policy against a change record.

2-Step Verification Turned Off for a User by an Admin in Google Workspace

Detects an admin turning 2-Step Verification off for a user of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event TURN_OFF_2_STEP_VERIFICATION). After the change the account signs in with its password alone. The affected user is in the event parameters (USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata) and the admin in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level only when Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: 2-Step Verification Turned Off for a User by an Admin in Google Workspace
id: 1c82b22f-8793-4466-bc9e-2ae05a796682
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an admin turning 2-Step Verification off for a user of a Google
  Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event
  TURN_OFF_2_STEP_VERIFICATION). After the change the account signs in with
  its password alone. The affected user is in the event parameters
  (USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata) and the admin in principalEmail. The
  entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization
  level only when Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled,
  and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/manage-a-users-security-settings
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1556.006
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.turnOff2StepVerification
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Helpdesk staff turning 2-Step Verification off for a user who lost a phone or a security key. Google recommends backup codes for that case; confirm each event with the user and check that 2-Step Verification was turned on again.
level: medium

False positives

  • Helpdesk staff turning 2-Step Verification off for a user who lost a phone or a security key. Google recommends backup codes for that case; confirm each event with the user and check that 2-Step Verification was turned on again.

User Unenrolled From Strong Authentication or Given a Grace Period by an Admin in Google Workspace

Detects three Admin audit events with which an admin lowers the second factor of one user without turning 2-Step Verification off: the user is unenrolled from strong authentication (UNENROLL_USER_FROM_STRONG_AUTH), the user is unenrolled from Advanced Protection (UNENROLL_USER_FROM_TITANIUM), or a 2-Step Verification grace period is enabled for the user until the time in NEW_VALUE (USER_PUT_IN_TWO_STEP_VERIFICATION_GRACE_PERIOD). Google describes the grace period for users who must use a security key: it starts when an admin generates backup codes for them, and the user can sign in with a code until it ends. An attacker in an admin session uses these actions to open one chosen account. The affected user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin in principalEmail. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: User Unenrolled From Strong Authentication or Given a Grace Period by an Admin in Google Workspace
id: a1770912-91a5-4299-97a3-9cff59911bbc
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects three Admin audit events with which an admin lowers the second
  factor of one user without turning 2-Step Verification off: the user is
  unenrolled from strong authentication (UNENROLL_USER_FROM_STRONG_AUTH), the
  user is unenrolled from Advanced Protection (UNENROLL_USER_FROM_TITANIUM),
  or a 2-Step Verification grace period is enabled for the user until the
  time in NEW_VALUE (USER_PUT_IN_TWO_STEP_VERIFICATION_GRACE_PERIOD). Google
  describes the grace period for users who must use a security key: it
  starts when an admin generates backup codes for them, and the user can
  sign in with a code until it ends. An attacker in an admin session uses
  these actions to open one chosen account. The affected user is in the
  event parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin in
  principalEmail. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity
  entries at organization level, which are always written once Google
  Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM
  only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/manage-a-users-security-settings
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1556.006
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.admin.AdminService.unenrollUserFromStrongAuth
      - google.admin.AdminService.unenrollUserFromTitanium
      - google.admin.AdminService.userPutInTwoStepVerificationGracePeriod
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Helpdesk staff helping a user who lost a phone or a security key, which is the purpose of the grace period. Confirm each event with the user through a second channel, and check that the user enrolled again afterwards.
level: medium

False positives

  • Helpdesk staff helping a user who lost a phone or a security key, which is the purpose of the grace period. Confirm each event with the user through a second channel, and check that the user enrolled again afterwards.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Second factor removed and password reset for the same user by one admin

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

A helpdesk admin who helps a locked-out user either resets the password or deals with the second factor. An attacker in an admin session needs both to take over an account, so the same admin removes or relaxes a user's second factor and sets a new password for that user within minutes.

  1. An admin lowers one user's second factor: turnOff2StepVerification, unenrollUserFromStrongAuth, unenrollUserFromTitanium or userPutInTwoStepVerificationGracePeriod of google.admin.AdminService. The user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL and the admin in authenticationInfo.principalEmail.
  2. Within 60 minutes, before or after, the same admin sets a password for the same USER_EMAIL: google.admin.AdminService.changePassword.
  3. Look for a google.login.LoginService.loginSuccess entry for that user afterwards. The Login audit log is a Data Access log of login.googleapis.com.

Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.turnOff2StepVerificationgoogle.admin.AdminService.unenrollUserFromStrongAuthgoogle.admin.AdminService.unenrollUserFromTitaniumgoogle.admin.AdminService.userPutInTwoStepVerificationGracePeriodgoogle.admin.AdminService.changePasswordgoogle.login.LoginService.loginSuccess

LimitsRecovery of a user who lost both the phone and the password looks the same, so each match needs a ticket or a word with the user. The 60 minutes are a starting point. Two different admin accounts, or backup codes generated for the user in place of a password reset, do not match.

Triage

  • For a policy change, read the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata. NEW_VALUE and OLD_VALUE give the direction, and ORG_UNIT_NAME or GROUP_EMAIL give the scope of an enforcement change. The rule fires on any change, so a change that turns enforcement on needs no action.
  • For 2SV turned off for a user, read USER_EMAIL in the event parameters and confirm the request with that user through a second channel. Check for a password reset or new sign-ins on the account right after.
  • For 2SV disabled by a user, the actor is the account itself (principalEmail). Review its recent sign-ins for new devices and locations, and check whether it holds admin roles in Workspace or IAM roles in Google Cloud.
  • Confirm the change with the admin who made it, and review what else that admin changed, such as allowed 2SV methods, enrollment and grace periods, single sign-on, recovery settings and admin roles.
  • If the change is not explained, restore enforcement, have the affected users enroll again, and reset the passwords and sessions of the admin and of the affected accounts.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Restore the previous values of the two policy settings for the organizational unit or group named in the event. Until then, every password that leaks in that scope opens the account.
  2. Secure the admin account that made the change. Reset its password, end its sessions and check its own 2-Step Verification methods for ones the owner does not recognise.
  3. For each account that lost its second factor, reset the password, reset its sign-in cookies so that existing sessions end, and have the owner enroll again. Give users who are locked out backup codes, not an exemption.
  4. Review sign-ins to the affected accounts for the time they could be opened with a password alone, starting with Workspace admins and principals that hold IAM roles in Google Cloud.
  5. Reverse any other security setting the same admin changed in that period, and check the Google Cloud organization for role bindings added by accounts that signed in without a second factor.

Mitigation

  • Enforce 2-Step Verification for every organizational unit, with security keys or passkeys for administrators, and avoid exception groups where enforcement is off.
  • Keep super admins few and on separate accounts. For locked-out users, issue backup codes instead of turning 2SV off, as Google recommends.
  • Turn on multi-party approval for sensitive admin actions where your edition offers it; a change to the 2SV settings then needs a second super admin.
  • Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM, including the Data Access log that carries the login events.

Frequently asked questions

Does the policy rule tell whether 2-Step Verification was weakened or strengthened?

No. The method name does not carry the direction, so the rule fires on any change to enforcement or to whether users may turn 2-Step Verification on. Read `NEW_VALUE` and `OLD_VALUE` in the event parameters in `protoPayload.metadata`. The scope of an enforcement change is in `ORG_UNIT_NAME` or `GROUP_EMAIL`. The rule for methods and enrollment timing works the same way.

Which log carries the event when a user disables their own 2-Step Verification?

The Login audit log, as the event `2sv_disable`. With Google Workspace data sharing enabled it appears in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as a Data Access entry of `login.googleapis.com`. The admin-side events are Admin Activity entries of `admin.googleapis.com`. A SIEM that receives only the organization's Admin Activity logs therefore misses the user-side event.

When can an admin turn 2-Step Verification off for a single user?

The Admin console offers this only where 2-Step Verification is not enforced for that user. In an enforced scope the policy has to be changed first, which is the event the policy rule looks for. For locked-out users Google recommends backup codes instead of turning the second factor off.

A user disabled 2-Step Verification on their own account. When is that benign?

Users who change phones or replace their second factor do this in organizational units where 2-Step Verification is not enforced. It is suspicious when new devices or locations appear in the account's recent sign-ins, since an attacker with a hijacked session disables the factor so that the stolen password keeps working. Give priority to administrators and to accounts that hold IAM roles in Google Cloud, and confirm the change with the user.

References

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