How the attack works
Access Context Manager holds the context rules of a Google Cloud organization. An access policy is the organization-wide container. Inside it, access levels describe the requirements a request has to meet, such as device type, IP address or user identity, and service perimeters define groups of resources that can exchange data with each other but not with the outside. Google documents that these definitions are enforced by other components, namely VPC Service Controls, Identity-Aware Proxy, context-aware access for Google Workspace and IAM conditions. Access bindings apply access levels and session controls to a user group or a service account.
One change in Access Context Manager therefore changes what several controls enforce. An attacker who holds stolen credentials but sits outside the allowed network or on an unmanaged device widens an access level, for example by adding their own address range, or removes the binding that ties a group to the level. An attacker who wants to move data out removes a project or a restricted service from a perimeter, adds an access level to it, or deletes the perimeter. The existing credentials then work from the attacker's side without any new role being granted. Every write to Access Context Manager is an Admin Activity audit entry under accesscontextmanager.googleapis.com, which is always written. Google's Event Threat Detection has a finding for perimeter changes that reduce protection, available only with an organization-level activation of Security Command Center.
What an attacker needs
- A role that can write to the access policy, such as Access Context Manager Admin (
roles/accesscontextmanager.policyAdmin) or Access Context Manager Editor (roles/accesscontextmanager.policyEditor), on the organization or on a scoped policy. - Credentials or data that the access level or the perimeter currently keeps the attacker from using.
Impact
The conditions that depended on the changed object stop protecting. Sign-ins and API calls from networks and devices that were refused are accepted, for every group bound to the access level and for every IAM condition and Identity-Aware Proxy resource that refers to it. A weakened or deleted perimeter lets data in the protected projects be copied to resources outside, which is what the perimeter existed to prevent.
Detection rules
Access Context Manager Access Level Changed or Deleted
Detects updates, bulk replacement and deletion of access levels in Access Context Manager, in the v1 and v1alpha APIs (Admin Activity audit log, always written). An access level holds the requirements a request has to meet, such as IP address, device type or user identity, and is enforced by VPC Service Controls, Identity-Aware Proxy, context-aware access for Google Workspace and IAM conditions. A widened or deleted level lets requests through that were refused before. Google documents the method names, their permissions and the log type, but not which request fields the entry keeps, so the rule matches every change, including ones that tighten a level. Compare the level named in protoPayload.resourceName with its previous definition. Google marks these methods as long-running operations, which usually write a start and a completion entry.
title: Access Context Manager Access Level Changed or Deleted
id: 7721730c-5c64-4e55-84c4-de96309cec6a
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects updates, bulk replacement and deletion of access levels in Access
Context Manager, in the v1 and v1alpha APIs (Admin Activity audit log,
always written). An access level holds the requirements a request has to
meet, such as IP address, device type or user identity, and is enforced by
VPC Service Controls, Identity-Aware Proxy, context-aware access for
Google Workspace and IAM conditions. A widened or deleted level lets
requests through that were refused before. Google documents the method
names, their permissions and the log type, but not which request fields
the entry keeps, so the rule matches every change, including ones that
tighten a level. Compare the level named in protoPayload.resourceName with
its previous definition. Google marks these methods as long-running
operations, which usually write a start and a completion entry.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/access-context-manager/docs/audit-logging
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/access-context-manager/docs/overview
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1556.009
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: accesscontextmanager.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName|endswith:
- AccessContextManager.UpdateAccessLevel
- AccessContextManager.DeleteAccessLevel
- AccessContextManager.ReplaceAccessLevels
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned changes by the team that owns access policies, such as a new office address range, usually through infrastructure-as-code. Exclude that pipeline by principalEmail in a filter_* selection and review every change made by a person.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned changes by the team that owns access policies, such as a new office address range, usually through infrastructure-as-code. Exclude that pipeline by principalEmail in a filter_* selection and review every change made by a person.
Access Context Manager Access Policy Deleted
Detects deletion of an access policy in Access Context Manager, in the v1 and v1alpha APIs (Admin Activity audit log, always written). Google describes the access policy as the container for all Access Context Manager resources, such as access levels and service perimeters. Deleting the container removes every context rule defined in it at once, for the organization or for the folder or project a scoped policy covers. The policy is named in protoPayload.resourceName and the caller in principalEmail. Google documents the method name and the log type but publishes no example of the entry, so the rule matches on the method name alone. Google marks the method as a long-running operation, which usually writes a start and a completion entry.
title: Access Context Manager Access Policy Deleted
id: dd2070b0-54f5-494c-8814-8e5f28b944d2
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects deletion of an access policy in Access Context Manager, in the v1
and v1alpha APIs (Admin Activity audit log, always written). Google
describes the access policy as the container for all Access Context
Manager resources, such as access levels and service perimeters. Deleting
the container removes every context rule defined in it at once, for the
organization or for the folder or project a scoped policy covers. The
policy is named in protoPayload.resourceName and the caller in
principalEmail. Google documents the method name and the log type but
publishes no example of the entry, so the rule matches on the method name
alone. Google marks the method as a long-running operation, which usually
writes a start and a completion entry.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/access-context-manager/docs/audit-logging
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/access-context-manager/docs/overview
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1556.009
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: accesscontextmanager.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName|endswith: AccessContextManager.DeleteAccessPolicy
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Removal of a scoped access policy that was created for a test or for a project that is being retired. Deleting an access policy is very rare. Confirm each case with the team that owns access policies.
level: high
False positives
- Removal of a scoped access policy that was created for a test or for a project that is being retired. Deleting an access policy is very rare. Confirm each case with the team that owns access policies.
VPC Service Controls Perimeter Changed or Deleted
Detects updates, bulk replacement, commits of dry run configurations and deletion of service perimeters in Access Context Manager, in the v1 and v1alpha APIs (Admin Activity audit log, always written). A perimeter keeps the data of its projects from being exported to resources outside it. Google's Event Threat Detection names a project removed from a perimeter, an access level added to it and services added to its accessible services as changes that reduce its protection. Google documents the method names, their permissions and the log type, but not which request fields the entry keeps, so the rule matches every change, including ones that tighten a perimeter. Compare the perimeter named in protoPayload.resourceName with its previous definition. Google marks these methods as long-running operations, which usually write a start and a completion entry.
title: VPC Service Controls Perimeter Changed or Deleted
id: e8ff20a8-9899-477d-a559-b5f8b5022f0e
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects updates, bulk replacement, commits of dry run configurations and
deletion of service perimeters in Access Context Manager, in the v1 and
v1alpha APIs (Admin Activity audit log, always written). A perimeter keeps
the data of its projects from being exported to resources outside it.
Google's Event Threat Detection names a project removed from a perimeter,
an access level added to it and services added to its accessible services
as changes that reduce its protection. Google documents the method names,
their permissions and the log type, but not which request fields the
entry keeps, so the rule matches every change, including ones that
tighten a perimeter. Compare the perimeter named in
protoPayload.resourceName with its previous definition. Google marks
these methods as long-running operations, which usually write a start and
a completion entry.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/access-context-manager/docs/audit-logging
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/findings/threats/vpcsc-change-reduces-perimeter-protection
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/vpc-service-controls/docs/dry-run-mode
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1556.009
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: accesscontextmanager.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName|endswith:
- AccessContextManager.UpdateServicePerimeter
- AccessContextManager.DeleteServicePerimeter
- AccessContextManager.ReplaceServicePerimeters
- AccessContextManager.CommitServicePerimeters
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned perimeter changes by the network security team, such as onboarding a project or a service, usually through infrastructure-as-code. Exclude that pipeline by principalEmail in a filter_* selection and review every change made by a person.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned perimeter changes by the network security team, such as onboarding a project or a service, usually through infrastructure-as-code. Exclude that pipeline by principalEmail in a filter_* selection and review every change made by a person.
Access Context Manager Access Binding Changed or Deleted
Detects updates and deletions of access bindings in Access Context Manager, in the v1 and v1alpha APIs (Admin Activity audit log, always written). Google documents that an access binding determines how access levels and session controls are applied to a user group or a service account. Deleting the binding, or pointing it at a weaker access level, takes the context condition away from every member of the group while the access level itself stays untouched. Google documents the method names, their permissions and the log type, but not which request fields the entry keeps, so the rule matches every change. Read the binding named in protoPayload.resourceName and check which group it covers and which access levels it applies now.
title: Access Context Manager Access Binding Changed or Deleted
id: 79b3f231-e49f-4ef5-8f5f-eae138d857bd
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects updates and deletions of access bindings in Access Context
Manager, in the v1 and v1alpha APIs (Admin Activity audit log, always
written). Google documents that an access binding determines how access
levels and session controls are applied to a user group or a service
account. Deleting the binding, or pointing it at a weaker access level,
takes the context condition away from every member of the group while
the access level itself stays untouched. Google documents the method
names, their permissions and the log type, but not which request fields
the entry keeps, so the rule matches every change. Read the binding named
in protoPayload.resourceName and check which group it covers and which
access levels it applies now.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/access-context-manager/docs/audit-logging
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/access-context-manager/docs/manage-access-bindings
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1556.009
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: accesscontextmanager.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName|endswith:
- AccessContextManager.UpdateGcpUserAccessBinding
- AccessContextManager.DeleteGcpUserAccessBinding
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned changes to which groups are covered by context-aware access, for example during a rollout. Access bindings change rarely. Confirm each change with the team that owns access policies.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned changes to which groups are covered by context-aware access, for example during a rollout. Access bindings change rarely. Confirm each change with the team that owns access policies.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Access level or perimeter changed and changed back within a short time
An attacker who needs the door open only for one sign-in or one copy job changes the object, uses the gap and restores the old definition so that a later review finds nothing wrong. Two updates of the same object by the same caller within a short time are that pattern.
- An
UpdateAccessLevel,UpdateServicePerimeterorUpdateGcpUserAccessBindingentry fromaccesscontextmanager.googleapis.com. Note the object inprotoPayload.resourceNameand the caller inprotoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail. - Within 4 hours a second entry with the same method for the same object, or a delete and a create of an object with the same name.
- Collect the sign-ins and the API calls of the caller between the two entries, and for a perimeter the data access in the protected projects.
EventsUpdateAccessLevelUpdateServicePerimeterUpdateGcpUserAccessBinding
LimitsGoogle marks most of these methods as long-running operations, which usually write a start and a completion entry, so count operations and not entries. A pipeline that applies a change and a correction produces the same pair. The 4 hours are a starting point.
Triage
- Identify the caller (protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail) and the access level, binding or perimeter in protoPayload.resourceName, and check whether the change went through the usual pipeline.
- Read the object as it is now and compare it with its definition in version control. For an access level look for added IP ranges, removed device requirements and changed combining logic. For a perimeter look for removed projects, removed restricted services and added access levels or ingress and egress rules.
- For an access binding, check which group or service account lost its access level or session control.
- Look for sign-ins and API calls by the caller, and by accounts it is linked to, from addresses or devices that the old definition would have refused.
- For a perimeter, look for data leaving the protected projects after the change, such as copies to buckets or datasets outside the perimeter.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Restore the access level, binding or perimeter from version control, or recreate a deleted one, and confirm that the conditions that refer to it enforce again.
- Remove the Access Context Manager roles from the caller and contain that identity.
- Review the activity of all accounts that could pass the weakened access level during the time it was in place, and end the sessions that started from addresses or devices outside the restored definition.
- For a perimeter, find what was copied out of the protected projects during that time and treat it as exposed.
- Review who holds roles on the access policy, including its own allow policy, and remove what is not needed.
Mitigation
- Grant the Access Context Manager Admin and Editor roles to very few identities, and use scoped access policies to delegate a folder or a project without handing over the organization-level policy.
- Manage access levels and perimeters through reviewed infrastructure-as-code and treat any change outside that pipeline as an incident.
- Test perimeter changes in dry run mode first, where Google documents that violating requests are logged and not denied, so that enforced perimeters are changed rarely and on purpose.
- Keep the definitions of access levels, access bindings and perimeters under version control, so that the state before a change can be compared and restored.
- Route the Admin Activity logs of the organization to the SIEM, since Access Context Manager changes are made at organization level.
Frequently asked questions
What do access levels and service perimeters control?
Google describes access levels as the requirements for requests to be honored, with device type and operating system, IP address and user identity as examples. Service perimeters define groups of resources that can exchange data freely but cannot export data outside the perimeter. Access Context Manager only defines them. Enforcement happens in VPC Service Controls, Identity-Aware Proxy, context-aware access for Google Workspace and IAM conditions.
Do the rules tell a weakening change from a tightening one?
No. Google documents the method names, their permissions and the log type of Access Context Manager entries, but not which request fields the entry keeps. The rules match every update and deletion, and the object named in `protoPayload.resourceName` has to be compared with its previous definition. Changes to these objects are rare enough that each one can be reviewed.
How is this related to context-aware access in Google Workspace?
Context-aware access for Google Workspace is one of the components that enforces access levels from Access Context Manager. Turning it off or reassigning levels in the Admin console is a Workspace admin event and has its own page in this library. This page covers the definition side in Google Cloud, where a changed access level also affects Identity-Aware Proxy, IAM conditions and VPC Service Controls.
Does Google detect perimeter changes itself?
Partly. Event Threat Detection has the finding Defense Evasion, Modify VPC Service Control, for changes that reduce the protection of a perimeter, such as a project removed from it or an access level added to it. Google states that the finding is not available for project-level activations of Security Command Center. There is no equivalent finding for access levels and access bindings.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1556.009: Conditional Access Policies
- Access Context Manager audit logging
- Access Context Manager overview
- Manage access bindings
- Access control with IAM (Access Context Manager roles)
- Dry run mode for service perimeters
- Security Command Center finding: Defense Evasion, Modify VPC Service Control