How the attack works
Seamless single sign-on lets users on domain-joined devices sign in to Microsoft Entra ID without typing a password. When the feature is enabled, Microsoft Entra Connect creates a computer account named AZUREADSSOACC in each synchronized forest and shares its Kerberos decryption key with Entra ID. A browser on the corporate network asks Active Directory for a service ticket for that account and passes it to Entra ID, which decrypts the ticket with the shared key and signs the user in.
The computer account therefore stands for Entra ID inside the forest, and its key is a credential for the cloud. Microsoft states the risk plainly: if the key leaks, Kerberos tickets can be generated for any synchronized user and used to sign in as that user. The same holds for anyone who can make a domain controller issue such tickets in the name of other users, which is why Microsoft requires that Kerberos delegation is disabled on the account and that no other account has delegation permissions on it. No device belongs to the account, so its password is not changed automatically the way the passwords of other computer accounts are. It changes only when an administrator rolls the key over.
An attacker who can already replicate directory secrets (see DCSync) can copy the key without touching the account, and the rule on this page does not see that. What can be seen are changes to the account itself: a password set outside the rollover, delegation settings, service principal names, encryption types, or a new access control entry that prepares one of them. A domain controller logs event 4742 for each change, with the account that made it. The planned rollover, which Microsoft recommends at least every 30 days, is the only routine change, so every other one deserves an explanation.
What an attacker needs
- Write access to the
AZUREADSSOACCcomputer account. Microsoft's guidance is that only Domain Admins should have it, but any principal with rights on the account, or on the container or organizational unit it sits in, qualifies. - Seamless single sign-on enabled for the tenant, and target users who are synchronized from the forest.
Impact
Entra ID accepts a ticket for the account as proof of the identity of a user. An attacker who can produce such tickets signs in as synchronized users without their passwords. How far that reaches depends on the Conditional Access policies of the tenant, which still apply to the sign-in, and on whether privileged roles are held by synchronized accounts. A password change that is not the coordinated rollover also breaks seamless sign-on for the forest until the key is rolled over properly.
Detection rules
Seamless SSO Computer Account AZUREADSSOACC Changed
Detects event 4742 (a computer account was changed) for AZUREADSSOACC$, the computer account that represents Microsoft Entra ID in the forest for seamless single sign-on. Its Kerberos key is shared with Entra ID, and a ticket for the account signs a user in to the cloud. No device belongs to the account, so nothing changes it automatically. The expected cause of this event is the planned rollover of the key, which Microsoft recommends at least every 30 days and which shows a new value in the Password Last Set field. Any other change, such as delegation, service principal names, or an event whose changed-attribute fields are all dashes (an attribute the event does not list, for example the access control list), should be explained. Copying the key through directory replication does not change the account and is not detected. Requires the audit subcategory Audit Computer Account Management on domain controllers.
title: Seamless SSO Computer Account AZUREADSSOACC Changed
id: 338639c4-1e47-4b14-92b3-e006c91e6867
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects event 4742 (a computer account was changed) for AZUREADSSOACC$, the
computer account that represents Microsoft Entra ID in the forest for
seamless single sign-on. Its Kerberos key is shared with Entra ID, and a
ticket for the account signs a user in to the cloud. No device belongs to
the account, so nothing changes it automatically. The expected cause of this
event is the planned rollover of the key, which Microsoft recommends at
least every 30 days and which shows a new value in the Password Last Set
field. Any other change, such as delegation, service principal names, or an
event whose changed-attribute fields are all dashes (an attribute the event
does not list, for example the access control list), should be explained.
Copying the key through directory replication does not change the account
and is not detected. Requires the audit subcategory Audit Computer Account
Management on domain controllers.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/007/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-sso-how-it-works
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-sso-faq
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4742
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1556.007
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4742
TargetUserName: 'AZUREADSSOACC$'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- The planned rollover of the Kerberos decryption key by the identity team, and the setup or repair of seamless single sign-on with Microsoft Entra Connect, which create or reset the account. Match the event to the recorded rollover. A rollover that nobody recorded is a finding.
level: medium
False positives
- The planned rollover of the Kerberos decryption key by the identity team, and the setup or repair of seamless single sign-on with Microsoft Entra Connect, which create or reset the account. Match the event to the recorded rollover. A rollover that nobody recorded is a finding.
Triage
- Check the Password Last Set field. A value there means that the key was changed. Match the time and SubjectUserName with a rollover recorded by the identity team.
- If all changed-attribute fields are dashes, an attribute that the event does not list was written, such as the access control list, the supported encryption types or the delegation settings. Read the 5136 events for the account with the same logon ID to see which one.
- Look at User Account Control, AllowedToDelegateTo and Service Principal Names in the event. Delegation enabled on this account, or a new service principal name outside the initial setup, has no legitimate reason.
- Identify the writer and the source of the logon (4624). Anything other than a Domain Admin working from the Microsoft Entra Connect server or an administrative workstation needs an explanation.
- If the change is not explained, remove added permissions and delegation, roll the key over with the procedure Microsoft documents, and review Entra ID sign-ins that used seamless single sign-on since the change.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Disable or reset the account that changed AZUREADSSOACC and isolate the host it worked from.
- Remove what was added, that is delegation settings, service principal names and access control entries, on the account and on the organizational unit it sits in.
- Roll over the Kerberos decryption key in each forest with the procedure Microsoft documents (the Update-AzureADSSOForest cmdlet), not with a plain password reset. Microsoft warns against running it more than once per forest, because the feature then stops working until the Kerberos tickets of the users are reissued.
- In Microsoft Entra ID, review the sign-ins that used seamless single sign-on since the change. Revoke the sessions of the users concerned and check what was changed with their accounts, holders of privileged roles first.
- Confirm that the next event 4742 for the account matches a recorded rollover and that seamless sign-in works for users again.
Mitigation
- Roll over the Kerberos decryption key of the account at least every 30 days with the procedure Microsoft documents, and record each rollover so that the resulting event can be matched.
- Treat the account as Tier 0. Keep it in an organizational unit that only Domain Admins can manage, as Microsoft advises, and review the access control lists of the account and of that organizational unit.
- Keep Kerberos delegation disabled on the account and make sure that no principal is allowed to delegate to it.
- Set the supported encryption types of the account to AES, and roll the key over before removing RC4, as Microsoft describes.
- Do not give privileged Entra roles to synchronized accounts. Use cloud-only administrator accounts, which a ticket from the on-premises forest cannot reach.
- Where all devices sign in through Microsoft Entra join or hybrid join, which take precedence over seamless single sign-on, consider disabling the feature and removing the account.
- Enable the audit subcategory Audit Computer Account Management on domain controllers.
Frequently asked questions
How often should a change to AZUREADSSOACC appear in the logs?
Only at the planned rollover of the Kerberos decryption key, which Microsoft recommends at least every 30 days, and during setup or repair of seamless single sign-on. No device belongs to the account, so nothing changes it automatically. Every other event 4742 for it needs an explanation.
Can the key of the account be stolen without this rule firing?
Yes. An attacker who can replicate directory secrets copies the key without touching the account, so no event 4742 is written. That theft has to be caught by the detection of DCSync. Rolling the key over on schedule limits how long a copied key stays useful.
What does an event 4742 mean in which all changed-attribute fields are dashes?
An attribute that the event does not list was written, such as the access control list, the supported encryption types or the delegation settings. Read the 5136 events for the account with the same logon ID to see which one. On this account such a write can prepare an abuse, so it should be explained like any other change.
Why not simply reset the password of the computer account after an incident?
The password of the account is the Kerberos decryption key that is shared with Entra ID. A password change that is not the coordinated rollover breaks seamless sign-on for the forest until the key is rolled over properly. The documented rollover updates the key in Active Directory and in Entra ID together.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1556.007: Hybrid Identity
- Microsoft Entra seamless single sign-on: technical deep dive (the AZUREADSSOACC account)
- Seamless single sign-on FAQ: roll over the Kerberos decryption key
- Seamless single sign-on quickstart: roll over keys
- Troubleshoot Microsoft Entra seamless single sign-on
- Defender for Identity posture assessment: Change password for Microsoft Entra seamless SSO account
- Event 4742: A computer account was changed