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User Account Created in Google Workspace detection rules

An attacker with user management rights in Google Workspace creates a new user account, one at a time or through a bulk upload, and keeps it as a way back in after the account they compromised is recovered.

Platform
Google Cloud
Severity
Medium
Log source
Google Cloud Audit Logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
An admin account with the appropriate User management privilege, or a super admin account, plus a free license where one is needed.
Impact
A valid account in the organization that survives the cleanup of the admin account that created it and can be given roles like any other user.
Response
Suspend the unexplained account, remove the roles and memberships it received and secure the admin account that created it.
Mitigation
Create accounts through one provisioning path, limit who can create users and compare the user list with the HR record regularly.
API methods
google.admin.AdminService.createUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.usersBulkUploadgoogle.admin.AdminService.bulkUpload
Threat groups
APT29LAPSUS$

How the attack works

Every person who uses an organization's Google services has a user account in Google Workspace or Cloud Identity. An administrator with the User management privilege adds accounts one at a time in the Admin console, or many at once with a CSV file, which Google supports for up to 150,000 users. A new account can sign in right away, and it is an identity for Google Cloud as well as for mail and files.

An attacker who controls an admin account creates an account of their own. It has a password only they know, a name that looks like an employee or a service, and no owner who would notice it. When the defenders reset the compromised admin account, the new one stays. Its value grows with what follows, such as an admin role, group memberships or roles in Google Cloud.

The Admin audit log records CREATE_USER with the primary email address of the new user. A bulk upload is recorded as USERS_BULK_UPLOAD or BULK_UPLOAD, which carry the number of users in the file and the number that failed, not their names. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive the events in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com. Account creation is everyday work, so the rules on this page are a record to review against the joiner process and not an alarm by themselves.

What an attacker needs

  • An admin account with the appropriate User management privilege, or a super admin account.
  • A free license where the organization is on an Annual Plan. On a Flexible Plan Google states that adding a user account increases the monthly payment automatically.

Impact

A valid account inside the organization that survives the cleanup of the account that created it. It receives mail at the organization's domain, appears as a colleague to other users and can be granted admin roles, group memberships and Google Cloud roles like any other user.

Detection rules

User Account Created by an Admin in Google Workspace

Detects the creation of a user account in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event CREATE_USER, rendered as "{USER_EMAIL} created"). The primary email address of the new user is the parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin who created it is in principalEmail. A new account can sign in right away and is an identity for Google Cloud as well. An attacker who controls an admin account creates one to keep access after that admin account is recovered. Account creation is routine, so use the rule as a record to compare with the joiner process and exclude the identity your provisioning uses. Google describes the Admin audit log as the record of actions performed in the Admin console and does not say whether accounts created by a sync tool or through the Directory API write the same event. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: User Account Created by an Admin in Google Workspace
id: bb7aef50-5a2c-4d8b-9282-b9b0a1d75c07
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the creation of a user account in a Google Workspace or Cloud
  Identity account (Admin audit event CREATE_USER, rendered as
  "{USER_EMAIL} created"). The primary email address of the new user is the
  parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin who created
  it is in principalEmail. A new account can sign in right away and is an
  identity for Google Cloud as well. An attacker who controls an admin
  account creates one to keep access after that admin account is
  recovered. Account creation is routine, so use the rule as a record to
  compare with the joiner process and exclude the identity your
  provisioning uses. Google describes the Admin audit log as the record of
  actions performed in the Admin console and does not say whether accounts
  created by a sync tool or through the Directory API write the same event.
  The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at
  organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data
  sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the
  organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/add-an-account-for-a-new-user
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1136.003
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.createUser
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Onboarding of employees, contractors and shared mailboxes, which is the normal source of this event. Exclude the identity of your provisioning tool in a filter_* selection on principalEmail and review the rest against joiner records.
  - Test accounts created by the identity team.
level: low

False positives

  • Onboarding of employees, contractors and shared mailboxes, which is the normal source of this event. Exclude the identity of your provisioning tool in a filter_* selection on principalEmail and review the rest against joiner records.
  • Test accounts created by the identity team.

Users Bulk Uploaded in Google Workspace

Detects a bulk upload of users to a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit events USERS_BULK_UPLOAD and BULK_UPLOAD, rendered as "A total of {BULK_UPLOAD_TOTAL_USERS_NUMBER} users selected for upload"). A bulk upload creates or updates many accounts from one CSV file. Google documents that the same file can reactivate suspended users and move users to another organizational unit, and that password strength and length requirements are not enforced on passwords set through the bulk upload tool. The event carries only the total number of users and the number that failed (BULK_UPLOAD_TOTAL_USERS_NUMBER, BULK_UPLOAD_FAIL_USERS_NUMBER in protoPayload.metadata) and does not name the accounts, so the file has to come from the admin in principalEmail. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Users Bulk Uploaded in Google Workspace
id: bf15d642-7405-45fe-be38-d3a026cb4113
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a bulk upload of users to a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity
  account (Admin audit events USERS_BULK_UPLOAD and BULK_UPLOAD, rendered
  as "A total of {BULK_UPLOAD_TOTAL_USERS_NUMBER} users selected for
  upload"). A bulk upload creates or updates many accounts from one CSV
  file. Google documents that the same file can reactivate suspended users
  and move users to another organizational unit, and that password
  strength and length requirements are not enforced on passwords set
  through the bulk upload tool. The event carries only the total number of
  users and the number that failed
  (BULK_UPLOAD_TOTAL_USERS_NUMBER, BULK_UPLOAD_FAIL_USERS_NUMBER in
  protoPayload.metadata) and does not name the accounts, so the file has to
  come from the admin in principalEmail. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs
  as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written
  once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and
  reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/options-for-adding-users
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/enforce-and-monitor-password-requirements-for-users
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1136.003
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.admin.AdminService.usersBulkUpload
      - google.admin.AdminService.bulkUpload
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned bulk work by the identity team, such as the start of a school term, a merger or a mass update of user profiles. Bulk uploads are few and announced. Ask for the file and the change record for each one.
level: low

False positives

  • Planned bulk work by the identity team, such as the start of a school term, a merger or a mass update of user profiles. Bulk uploads are few and announced. Ask for the file and the change record for each one.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

New account receives an admin role soon after it is created

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

An account that is created and made an administrator within hours did not go through a joiner process. Each of the two events is routine. Together, and most of all when one admin did both, they show an account that was built to keep administrative access.

  1. A user is created: google.admin.AdminService.createUser of admin.googleapis.com. Keep the parameter USER_EMAIL and the admin in authenticationInfo.principalEmail.
  2. Within 24 hours the same USER_EMAIL appears in google.admin.AdminService.assignRole, grantAdminPrivilege or grantDelegatedAdminPrivileges.
  3. Raise it with higher priority when the same admin made both changes, or when the parameter ROLE_NAME of the role assignment is _SEED_ADMIN_ROLE.

Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.createUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.assignRolegoogle.admin.AdminService.grantAdminPrivilege

LimitsA new administrator who is onboarded properly matches as well, so check the joiner record. An attacker who waits longer than the window, or who gives the account access through a group or a Google Cloud role instead of an admin role, is not found. The 24 hours are a starting point.

Triage

  • Read USER_EMAIL in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata for the new account and principalEmail for the admin who created it.
  • Match the new account to a joiner record or a service request. An account nobody asked for is the finding.
  • Check whether the creating identity is the one your provisioning normally uses, and whether it signed in from an unusual address shortly before.
  • Search for what happened to the new account next. Look for an admin role (assignRole, grantAdminPrivilege), a move to another organizational unit (moveUserToOrgUnit) and its first sign-ins.
  • For a bulk upload, read BULK_UPLOAD_TOTAL_USERS_NUMBER and ask the admin for the file, because the event does not name the accounts.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Suspend the account that nobody can account for, which blocks its sign-in while its mail and files are kept for the investigation.
  2. Remove the admin roles, group memberships and Google Cloud IAM bindings the account received.
  3. Secure the admin account that created it. Reset its password, reset its sign-in cookies and review its 2-Step Verification methods and admin roles.
  4. Review everything the new account did, in Workspace and in Google Cloud, and everything else the creating admin changed in the same period.
  5. Delete the account once the investigation no longer needs it and confirm that no other unexplained account remains.

Mitigation

  • Create accounts through one provisioning path, such as directory synchronization from the HR system, and give the User management privilege to as few administrators as possible.
  • Compare the list of users with the HR record regularly and investigate accounts that have no owner.
  • Enforce 2-Step Verification for every user and place new accounts in an organizational unit where it is enforced from the first sign-in.
  • Alert on admin role assignments and privileged group changes separately, because that is where a new account becomes dangerous.
  • Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM.

Frequently asked questions

Which ways of creating a user does the rule see?

The rule reads the Admin audit event `CREATE_USER`, which Google renders as the new address followed by created. Google describes the Admin audit log as the record of actions performed in the Admin console. Its reference does not say whether accounts created by a synchronization tool or through the Directory API write the same event, so create a test account through your provisioning path and check.

Why would an attacker create an account when they already control one?

Because the account they control can be taken back with a password reset, and a second account that nobody knows about cannot. A new account also has no owner who would notice sign-in alerts, and it can be named like an employee or a service so that it does not stand out in the user list.

Does the bulk upload event show which accounts were created?

No. Google documents two parameters for it, the total number of users in the upload and the number that failed. The accounts are not named. A bulk upload can also change existing users, for example reactivate suspended ones or move users to another organizational unit, so ask for the file and compare the user list before and after.

References

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