How the attack works
Every person who uses an organization's Google services has a user account in Google Workspace or Cloud Identity. An administrator with the User management privilege adds accounts one at a time in the Admin console, or many at once with a CSV file, which Google supports for up to 150,000 users. A new account can sign in right away, and it is an identity for Google Cloud as well as for mail and files.
An attacker who controls an admin account creates an account of their own. It has a password only they know, a name that looks like an employee or a service, and no owner who would notice it. When the defenders reset the compromised admin account, the new one stays. Its value grows with what follows, such as an admin role, group memberships or roles in Google Cloud.
The Admin audit log records CREATE_USER with the primary email address of the new user. A bulk upload is recorded as USERS_BULK_UPLOAD or BULK_UPLOAD, which carry the number of users in the file and the number that failed, not their names. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive the events in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com. Account creation is everyday work, so the rules on this page are a record to review against the joiner process and not an alarm by themselves.
What an attacker needs
- An admin account with the appropriate User management privilege, or a super admin account.
- A free license where the organization is on an Annual Plan. On a Flexible Plan Google states that adding a user account increases the monthly payment automatically.
Impact
A valid account inside the organization that survives the cleanup of the account that created it. It receives mail at the organization's domain, appears as a colleague to other users and can be granted admin roles, group memberships and Google Cloud roles like any other user.
Detection rules
User Account Created by an Admin in Google Workspace
Detects the creation of a user account in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event CREATE_USER, rendered as "{USER_EMAIL} created"). The primary email address of the new user is the parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin who created it is in principalEmail. A new account can sign in right away and is an identity for Google Cloud as well. An attacker who controls an admin account creates one to keep access after that admin account is recovered. Account creation is routine, so use the rule as a record to compare with the joiner process and exclude the identity your provisioning uses. Google describes the Admin audit log as the record of actions performed in the Admin console and does not say whether accounts created by a sync tool or through the Directory API write the same event. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: User Account Created by an Admin in Google Workspace
id: bb7aef50-5a2c-4d8b-9282-b9b0a1d75c07
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the creation of a user account in a Google Workspace or Cloud
Identity account (Admin audit event CREATE_USER, rendered as
"{USER_EMAIL} created"). The primary email address of the new user is the
parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin who created
it is in principalEmail. A new account can sign in right away and is an
identity for Google Cloud as well. An attacker who controls an admin
account creates one to keep access after that admin account is
recovered. Account creation is routine, so use the rule as a record to
compare with the joiner process and exclude the identity your
provisioning uses. Google describes the Admin audit log as the record of
actions performed in the Admin console and does not say whether accounts
created by a sync tool or through the Directory API write the same event.
The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at
organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data
sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the
organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/add-an-account-for-a-new-user
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1136.003
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.createUser
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Onboarding of employees, contractors and shared mailboxes, which is the normal source of this event. Exclude the identity of your provisioning tool in a filter_* selection on principalEmail and review the rest against joiner records.
- Test accounts created by the identity team.
level: low
False positives
- Onboarding of employees, contractors and shared mailboxes, which is the normal source of this event. Exclude the identity of your provisioning tool in a filter_* selection on principalEmail and review the rest against joiner records.
- Test accounts created by the identity team.
Users Bulk Uploaded in Google Workspace
Detects a bulk upload of users to a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit events USERS_BULK_UPLOAD and BULK_UPLOAD, rendered as "A total of {BULK_UPLOAD_TOTAL_USERS_NUMBER} users selected for upload"). A bulk upload creates or updates many accounts from one CSV file. Google documents that the same file can reactivate suspended users and move users to another organizational unit, and that password strength and length requirements are not enforced on passwords set through the bulk upload tool. The event carries only the total number of users and the number that failed (BULK_UPLOAD_TOTAL_USERS_NUMBER, BULK_UPLOAD_FAIL_USERS_NUMBER in protoPayload.metadata) and does not name the accounts, so the file has to come from the admin in principalEmail. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Users Bulk Uploaded in Google Workspace
id: bf15d642-7405-45fe-be38-d3a026cb4113
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a bulk upload of users to a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity
account (Admin audit events USERS_BULK_UPLOAD and BULK_UPLOAD, rendered
as "A total of {BULK_UPLOAD_TOTAL_USERS_NUMBER} users selected for
upload"). A bulk upload creates or updates many accounts from one CSV
file. Google documents that the same file can reactivate suspended users
and move users to another organizational unit, and that password
strength and length requirements are not enforced on passwords set
through the bulk upload tool. The event carries only the total number of
users and the number that failed
(BULK_UPLOAD_TOTAL_USERS_NUMBER, BULK_UPLOAD_FAIL_USERS_NUMBER in
protoPayload.metadata) and does not name the accounts, so the file has to
come from the admin in principalEmail. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs
as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written
once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and
reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/options-for-adding-users
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/enforce-and-monitor-password-requirements-for-users
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1136.003
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName:
- google.admin.AdminService.usersBulkUpload
- google.admin.AdminService.bulkUpload
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned bulk work by the identity team, such as the start of a school term, a merger or a mass update of user profiles. Bulk uploads are few and announced. Ask for the file and the change record for each one.
level: low
False positives
- Planned bulk work by the identity team, such as the start of a school term, a merger or a mass update of user profiles. Bulk uploads are few and announced. Ask for the file and the change record for each one.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
New account receives an admin role soon after it is created
An account that is created and made an administrator within hours did not go through a joiner process. Each of the two events is routine. Together, and most of all when one admin did both, they show an account that was built to keep administrative access.
- A user is created:
google.admin.AdminService.createUserofadmin.googleapis.com. Keep the parameterUSER_EMAILand the admin inauthenticationInfo.principalEmail. - Within 24 hours the same
USER_EMAILappears ingoogle.admin.AdminService.assignRole,grantAdminPrivilegeorgrantDelegatedAdminPrivileges. - Raise it with higher priority when the same admin made both changes, or when the parameter
ROLE_NAMEof the role assignment is_SEED_ADMIN_ROLE.
Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.createUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.assignRolegoogle.admin.AdminService.grantAdminPrivilege
LimitsA new administrator who is onboarded properly matches as well, so check the joiner record. An attacker who waits longer than the window, or who gives the account access through a group or a Google Cloud role instead of an admin role, is not found. The 24 hours are a starting point.
Triage
- Read USER_EMAIL in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata for the new account and principalEmail for the admin who created it.
- Match the new account to a joiner record or a service request. An account nobody asked for is the finding.
- Check whether the creating identity is the one your provisioning normally uses, and whether it signed in from an unusual address shortly before.
- Search for what happened to the new account next. Look for an admin role (assignRole, grantAdminPrivilege), a move to another organizational unit (moveUserToOrgUnit) and its first sign-ins.
- For a bulk upload, read BULK_UPLOAD_TOTAL_USERS_NUMBER and ask the admin for the file, because the event does not name the accounts.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Suspend the account that nobody can account for, which blocks its sign-in while its mail and files are kept for the investigation.
- Remove the admin roles, group memberships and Google Cloud IAM bindings the account received.
- Secure the admin account that created it. Reset its password, reset its sign-in cookies and review its 2-Step Verification methods and admin roles.
- Review everything the new account did, in Workspace and in Google Cloud, and everything else the creating admin changed in the same period.
- Delete the account once the investigation no longer needs it and confirm that no other unexplained account remains.
Mitigation
- Create accounts through one provisioning path, such as directory synchronization from the HR system, and give the User management privilege to as few administrators as possible.
- Compare the list of users with the HR record regularly and investigate accounts that have no owner.
- Enforce 2-Step Verification for every user and place new accounts in an organizational unit where it is enforced from the first sign-in.
- Alert on admin role assignments and privileged group changes separately, because that is where a new account becomes dangerous.
- Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM.
Frequently asked questions
Which ways of creating a user does the rule see?
The rule reads the Admin audit event `CREATE_USER`, which Google renders as the new address followed by created. Google describes the Admin audit log as the record of actions performed in the Admin console. Its reference does not say whether accounts created by a synchronization tool or through the Directory API write the same event, so create a test account through your provisioning path and check.
Why would an attacker create an account when they already control one?
Because the account they control can be taken back with a password reset, and a second account that nobody knows about cannot. A new account also has no owner who would notice sign-in alerts, and it can be named like an employee or a service so that it does not stand out in the user list.
Does the bulk upload event show which accounts were created?
No. Google documents two parameters for it, the total number of users in the upload and the number that failed. The accounts are not named. A bulk upload can also change existing users, for example reactivate suspended ones or move users to another organizational unit, so ask for the file and compare the user list before and after.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1136.003: Create Account: Cloud Account
- Add an account for a new user
- Options for adding users
- Audit logs for Google Workspace (Cloud Audit Logs)
- Admin audit events: user settings (CREATE_USER, USERS_BULK_UPLOAD, BULK_UPLOAD)
- Admin audit events: delegated admin settings (ASSIGN_ROLE)
- Restore a suspended user (bulk restore with a CSV file)
- Suspend a user temporarily
- Security best practices for administrator accounts