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IAM Identity Center User or Group Created, or Member Added to a Group detection rules

An attacker with Identity Center administration rights creates a user or a group in the Identity Center directory, or adds a user to a group that holds account assignments, and then signs in through the AWS access portal.

Platform
AWS
Severity
High
Log source
AWS CloudTrail
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Write permissions on the Identity Store in the management account or the Identity Center delegated administrator account.
Impact
A sign-in identity of the attacker's own, with the permission sets of the groups it joins in every AWS account they are assigned to.
Response
Disable or delete the user, remove it from the groups it joined, end its portal sessions and deny it by its Identity Store user ID until role sessions expire.
Mitigation
Limit Identity Center administration to a small group, and treat users and groups created outside your provisioning process as an incident.
CloudTrail events
CreateGroupCreateGroupMembershipAddMemberToGroupCreateUser

How the attack works

IAM Identity Center keeps its users and groups in an identity store, and account assignments decide which permission sets a user or a group gets in which AWS account. An attacker who holds Identity Center administration rights needs no credential in any member account. A new user is a new way to sign in to the AWS access portal, and membership of a group that already holds assignments gives that user the permission sets of the group in every account they cover. Datadog Security Labs reported an intrusion in May 2025 in which the actor created a group and a user in Identity Center, added the user to the group and assigned a new permission set to the group, and the user later signed in with a password alone.

CloudTrail records the public API calls with event source identitystore.amazonaws.com: CreateUser, CreateGroup and CreateGroupMembership. The same actions made in the console are recorded with event source sso-directory.amazonaws.com and partly other names, among them CreateUser, CreateGroup and AddMemberToGroup, and AWS recommends considering both when you need to detect an operation such as adding a member to a group. Where users and groups are synchronized from an external identity provider, a user or a group that someone creates by hand in Identity Center stands out even more.

What an attacker needs

  • Credentials with write permissions on the Identity Store (identitystore:CreateUser, CreateGroup, CreateGroupMembership, or the sso-directory actions the console uses) in the management account or the Identity Center delegated administrator account.
  • For access to AWS accounts, a group that already holds account assignments, or the right to create assignments.

Impact

A sign-in identity of the attacker's own in the identity system of the organization, with the permission sets of the groups it joins in every account they are assigned to. The access does not depend on the credentials that were used to set it up, and it does not show in a review of IAM users and access keys in the member accounts.

Detection rules

IAM Identity Center Group Created or Member Added to a Group

Detects a new group in the IAM Identity Center identity store and a member being added to a group. The public Identity Store API records these as CreateGroup and CreateGroupMembership with event source identitystore.amazonaws.com. The console records them with event source sso-directory.amazonaws.com, where the directory actions are named CreateGroup and AddMemberToGroup, and AWS recommends considering both sources when you need to detect that a member was added to a group. A member of a group gets the permission sets assigned to the group in every account they cover, and no account assignment event is written for it. The rule matches the event names only: read the group and the member in the request parameters and check which assignments the group holds. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: IAM Identity Center Group Created or Member Added to a Group
id: b36d581f-489b-4f1a-a639-731dfabcd208
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a new group in the IAM Identity Center identity store and a member
  being added to a group. The public Identity Store API records these as
  CreateGroup and CreateGroupMembership with event source
  identitystore.amazonaws.com. The console records them with event source
  sso-directory.amazonaws.com, where the directory actions are named
  CreateGroup and AddMemberToGroup, and AWS recommends considering both
  sources when you need to detect that a member was added to a group. A
  member of a group gets the permission sets assigned to the group in every
  account they cover, and no account assignment event is written for it.
  The rule matches the event names only: read the group and the member in
  the request parameters and check which assignments the group holds.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/IdentityStoreAPIReference/API_CreateGroupMembership.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_sso-directory.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource:
      - identitystore.amazonaws.com
      - sso-directory.amazonaws.com
    eventName:
      - CreateGroup
      - CreateGroupMembership
      - AddMemberToGroup
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Access requests fulfilled by the identity team, and automatic provisioning of groups and memberships. Add the identities they run as to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn, and review changes to groups that hold administrator permission sets whoever made them.
level: medium

False positives

  • Access requests fulfilled by the identity team, and automatic provisioning of groups and memberships. Add the identities they run as to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn, and review changes to groups that hold administrator permission sets whoever made them.

IAM Identity Center User Created

Detects the creation of a user in the IAM Identity Center identity store. The public Identity Store API records it as CreateUser with event source identitystore.amazonaws.com. The console records it with event source sso-directory.amazonaws.com, where the action that creates a user in the directory is also named CreateUser, and AWS recommends considering both sources. A new user is a new identity that can sign in to the AWS access portal once it has credentials, and it gets access to AWS accounts through account assignments or group membership. The rule matches the event name only: look the user up in the Identity Store and check the caller in userIdentity.arn. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: IAM Identity Center User Created
id: c0f5e52d-ed9c-4f7f-a681-e51122a8dc4d
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the creation of a user in the IAM Identity Center identity store.
  The public Identity Store API records it as CreateUser with event source
  identitystore.amazonaws.com. The console records it with event source
  sso-directory.amazonaws.com, where the action that creates a user in the
  directory is also named CreateUser, and AWS recommends considering both
  sources. A new user is a new identity that can sign in to the AWS access
  portal once it has credentials, and it gets access to AWS accounts through
  account assignments or group membership. The rule matches the event name
  only: look the user up in the Identity Store and check the caller in
  userIdentity.arn.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/IdentityStoreAPIReference/API_CreateUser.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_sso-directory.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1136.003
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource:
      - identitystore.amazonaws.com
      - sso-directory.amazonaws.com
    eventName: CreateUser
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Onboarding by the identity team and automatic provisioning of users. Add the identities they run as to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn and alert on users created by anyone else.
level: medium

False positives

  • Onboarding by the identity team and automatic provisioning of users. Add the identities they run as to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn and alert on users created by anyone else.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

New Identity Center user or group receives access shortly after it was created

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsJoins two logs

A user or a group that an attacker creates is useless until it has access to an account. Creation followed within hours by an account assignment for the same identity, or by membership of a group that holds assignments, is the whole backdoor in two steps.

  1. A CreateUser or CreateGroup event from identitystore.amazonaws.com or sso-directory.amazonaws.com. The Identity Store API returns the identifier of the new object as UserId or GroupId in its response.
  2. Within 24 hours a CreateAccountAssignment event from sso.amazonaws.com whose PrincipalId parameter is that identifier, or a CreateGroupMembership or AddMemberToGroup event that puts the new user into a group.
  3. Raise the priority when the permission set of the assignment or of the group holds administrator policies, and when the same caller made both events.

EventsCreateUserCreateGroupCreateGroupMembershipAddMemberToGroupCreateAccountAssignment

LimitsThe onboarding of a new employee produces the same sequence through the normal process, so the identity team and its automation have to be excluded. The 24 hours are a starting point. AWS publishes no example records of these events, so check on your own events where the identifiers appear before you build the join.

Triage

  • Identify the caller (userIdentity.arn) and decide whether it is the identity team, the provisioning integration or someone else. Note the event source, which is identitystore.amazonaws.com for API calls and sso-directory.amazonaws.com for the console.
  • Look the new user or group up in the Identity Store. For a membership change, read the group and the member in the request parameters and check which account assignments the group holds.
  • Look for CreateAccountAssignment events and permission set changes by the same caller around the same time.
  • Check whether the new user has signed in to the AWS access portal, and from where.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Disable the sign-in of the user or delete the user, remove it from the groups it was added to, and end its active AWS access portal sessions.
  2. Block the role sessions that already exist. Role sessions the user opened through a permission set keep working until they expire, so deny the user by its Identity Store user ID in a service control policy until then.
  3. Delete the groups, permission sets and account assignments that were created for the user, and compare the remaining ones with your last approved state.
  4. Contain the administrator identity that made the changes, in the management account or in the delegated administrator account.
  5. Review what the role sessions of the user did in each account they reached.

Mitigation

  • Limit Identity Center administration to a small group in the management account, and delegate administration with care.
  • Where an external identity provider is the identity source, create users and groups only there, and treat a user or group created directly in Identity Center as an incident.
  • Require MFA for every sign-in to the AWS access portal where Identity Center manages authentication, and review that setting after any incident.
  • Review the members of the groups that hold administrator permission sets on a schedule, and change group membership only through an approval process.

Frequently asked questions

Why are there two event sources for the same action?

The public Identity Store API is recorded with event source `identitystore.amazonaws.com`. The console and the AWS access portal use other API operations, which are recorded with event source `sso-directory.amazonaws.com`. AWS recommends considering both when you need to detect an operation such as adding a member to a group, and the rules on this page match both.

Do these rules matter when an external identity provider is the identity source?

Yes, in a different way. Users and groups then come from the identity provider, so a user or group that someone creates directly in IAM Identity Center is outside the normal process. Check how your provisioning appears in CloudTrail before you tune the rules, and exclude the identity it runs as once you have confirmed it.

Does a new Identity Center user have access to AWS accounts right away?

No. A user gets access through account assignments, made to the user or to a group it belongs to. That is why membership of a group that already holds assignments is the quiet step. No assignment event is written, and the user gets the permission sets of the group in every account they cover.

References

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