How the attack works
Azure Blob Storage supports the SSH File Transfer Protocol, and with it what Microsoft calls a new form of identity management: local users. A local user belongs to one storage account, authenticates with a password that Azure generates or with an SSH key pair, and is given permissions per container. Microsoft documents that local users do not interoperate with the other permission models of Azure Storage such as RBAC and ABAC. Its example is a person who has read-only access through a Microsoft Entra identity and delete permission through a local user. The user name for a connection is the account name and the local user name joined by a dot, and the endpoint is the public blob endpoint of the account unless the storage firewall limits it.
For an attacker with a contributor role on a storage account a local user is a second, quieter way to the data. The account is created with Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/localusers/write, with the attacker's own SSH public key or a generated password and with permissions on the containers of the attacker's choice. An existing local user is taken over by generating a new password for it (localusers/regeneratePassword/action) or by replacing its keys through an update, and localusers/listKeys/action returns its stored keys. Nothing of this needs the account keys, and the local user keeps working after the attacker's Azure identity is disabled. The operations are recorded in the Azure Activity log with their caller. What the local user transfers afterwards is data-plane activity, which the Activity log does not record. It is in the resource logs of the storage account, if a diagnostic setting collects them.
What an attacker needs
- A role with the local user actions on the storage account, such as Owner, Contributor or Storage Account Contributor, or a custom role with
Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/localusers/write. - A storage account with a hierarchical namespace and SFTP support enabled, or the right to update the account and enable it. Microsoft documents that SFTP support requires the hierarchical namespace.
- Network access to the blob endpoint of the account on the SFTP port.
Impact
Lasting read, write or delete access to the containers the local user was given, with a credential that is not a Microsoft Entra identity and is not subject to sign-in policies. The attacker uses it to copy data out, to plant or change files that other systems read, or to delete data. The access remains until the local user is deleted or its credentials are replaced.
Detection rules
Storage Account Local User Password Regenerated or Keys Listed
Detects a successful regeneration of the SSH password of a storage account local user (Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/localusers/regeneratePassword/action) or a listing of its keys (localusers/listKeys/action). Azure generates the password of a local user and does not show it again, so regeneration is the way to obtain a working password for an existing user, and whoever calls it can sign in as that user over SFTP. The key listing returns the SSH authorized keys and the shared key that Azure stores for the user. The rule assumes that these requests are written to the Activity log like other action operations.
title: Storage Account Local User Password Regenerated or Keys Listed
id: 54b335f5-7adc-4cc8-9877-fd8b1a6cf771
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful regeneration of the SSH password of a storage account
local user (Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/localusers/regeneratePassword/action)
or a listing of its keys (localusers/listKeys/action). Azure generates the
password of a local user and does not show it again, so regeneration is the
way to obtain a working password for an existing user, and whoever calls it
can sign in as that user over SFTP. The key listing returns the SSH
authorized keys and the shared key that Azure stores for the user. The rule
assumes that these requests are written to the Activity log like other
action operations.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storagerp/local-users/regenerate-password
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storagerp/local-users/list-keys
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/secure-file-transfer-protocol-support
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/storage
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1136.003
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue:
- MICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/LOCALUSERS/REGENERATEPASSWORD/ACTION
- MICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/LOCALUSERS/LISTKEYS/ACTION
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned password resets for partners who lost the password, and administrators who review the keys of a local user. Match each event to a request from the owner of the local user.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned password resets for partners who lost the password, and administrators who review the keys of a local user. Match each event to a request from the owner of the local user.
Storage Account Local User Created or Updated
Detects a successful create or update of a local user on an Azure storage account (Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/localusers/write). A local user signs in to the account over SFTP with a password or an SSH key and has its own container permissions. Microsoft documents that local users do not interoperate with Azure RBAC and ABAC, so the account is a way to the data that no Microsoft Entra policy covers. An update can add an SSH public key or widen the permissions of an existing user. The event names the storage account and the local user but not its permissions or keys, so read the local user after each event.
title: Storage Account Local User Created or Updated
id: a5c50d91-371e-466b-a89c-6bfa7bd41504
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful create or update of a local user on an Azure storage
account (Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/localusers/write). A local user
signs in to the account over SFTP with a password or an SSH key and has
its own container permissions. Microsoft documents that local users do not
interoperate with Azure RBAC and ABAC, so the account is a way to the data
that no Microsoft Entra policy covers. An update can add an SSH public key
or widen the permissions of an existing user. The event names the storage
account and the local user but not its permissions or keys, so read the
local user after each event.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/secure-file-transfer-protocol-support
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/storage
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1136.003
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue: MICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/LOCALUSERS/WRITE
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Teams that run file exchanges with partners over SFTP and add or change local users for them. Match each event to a request and exclude the provisioning identity in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
level: medium
False positives
- Teams that run file exchanges with partners over SFTP and add or change local users for them. Match each event to a request and exclude the provisioning identity in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Storage account updated and a local user created by the same caller shortly after
Local users only work on an account with SFTP support enabled. On an account that never used SFTP, an attacker has to enable it first, which is an update of the storage account. A write to the account followed by the creation of a local user by the same caller is that preparation and the backdoor in order.
- In the Azure Activity log, the storage account is updated with status Success:
MICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/WRITE. Keep theCallerand the resource ID of the account. - Within 60 minutes the same
CallerrunsMICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/LOCALUSERS/WRITEon the same account with status Success. - Read the SFTP setting of the account and the permissions of the new local user, because the write events do not say which properties changed.
EventsMICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/WRITEMICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/LOCALUSERS/WRITE
LimitsA team that sets up a new SFTP exchange enables the feature and creates its users in the same change, so match the events with a request. The 60 minutes are a starting point. An account where SFTP was already enabled does not produce the first event.
Triage
- Identify the Caller, the caller's IP address, the storage account and the local user name from the resource ID, and whether this identity manages SFTP users for a business process.
- Read the local user and note its container permissions, its home directory, whether it has a password and which SSH public keys it holds.
- Check whether SFTP was enabled on the account shortly before, which shows as an update of the storage account in the Activity log.
- For a regenerated password, find out who owns the local user and whether that owner asked for a new password.
- Review the resource logs of the account, if they are collected, for transfers by the local user after the event.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Delete the local users you cannot account for. For a local user that was taken over, remove the unknown SSH keys and generate a new password for its owner.
- Disable SFTP support on the account if no business process depends on it.
- Contain the caller. Revoke its sessions, rotate its credentials and remove its role on the storage account until the event is explained.
- Review what the local user could reach and what it transferred, and treat the data in the containers it had permissions on as read if the transfers cannot be reconstructed.
- Check files that other systems consume from those containers for changes made through the local user.
Mitigation
- Keep SFTP support disabled on storage accounts that do not need it, and enforce that with Azure Policy.
- Limit Owner, Contributor and Storage Account Contributor on storage accounts that hold sensitive data.
- Where SFTP is used, restrict the account with the storage firewall, a virtual network or a private endpoint, as Microsoft recommends for limiting public access.
- Review the local users of every SFTP-enabled account regularly, with their container permissions and authentication methods, and remove the ones nobody owns.
- Create a diagnostic setting for the blob service of SFTP-enabled accounts, so that transfers can be traced.
Frequently asked questions
Does Conditional Access or Azure RBAC apply to a storage local user?
No. Microsoft documents that local users do not interoperate with other Azure Storage permission models such as RBAC and ABAC. A local user authenticates to the storage account itself with a password or an SSH key, so there is no Microsoft Entra sign-in for a policy to evaluate. Its access is defined by its own container permissions.
Can an existing local user be taken over without creating a new one?
Yes. Microsoft documents that Azure generates the password of a local user and that it cannot be retrieved again, only generated anew. The regenerate password operation therefore gives its caller a working password for an existing user, and an update of the local user can add an SSH public key. Both leave the user name unchanged.
Does the Activity log show what a local user downloaded?
No. The Activity log records the Azure Resource Manager operations on the local user, with their caller. Transfers over SFTP are requests to the storage service. Look for them in the resource logs of the storage account, which exist only where a diagnostic setting collects them.
Is there a public incident report for this technique?
No public incident report describes this at the audit event level as far as this page's sources go. The page is based on Microsoft's documentation of local users for SFTP and of the Resource Manager operations that create them and return or replace their credentials.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1136.003: Create Account, Cloud Account
- SSH File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) support for Azure Blob Storage
- Authorize access to Azure Blob Storage from an SFTP client by using local users
- Connect to Azure Blob Storage by using the SSH File Transfer Protocol (SFTP)
- Storage resource provider REST API: Local Users, Regenerate Password
- Storage resource provider REST API: Local Users, List Keys
- Azure permissions for Storage
- Azure Activity Log event schema