How the attack works
A user in OCI IAM is a person or a system that signs in to the Console or calls the API. In a tenancy without identity domains an administrator creates the user in the tenancy. With identity domains the user is created in a domain and moves through a life cycle that Oracle describes as created, activated, deactivated and deleted. An activated user can sign in and, in Oracle's words, can access all groups, applications and administration role privileges assigned to the account. Oracle states that a new user has no permissions until it is placed in a group that a policy grants access to, and that all credential capabilities are enabled by default when a user is created.
An attacker who holds manage users, or an administrator role in an identity domain, creates a user of their own and then adds it to a group or gives it an API key, an auth token or a password. The new account does not depend on the compromised one, so resetting the first account does not remove it. Activating an account that was deactivated, for example the account of someone who left, gives the same result with a name that already looks familiar. No public incident report describes this at the audit event level for OCI. The page follows what Oracle documents about users and their events, and mirrors the library's AWS page for new IAM users.
The Audit log records com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.CreateUser. Oracle's reference event for users carries the user name in data.resourceName, the user OCID in data.resourceId and the acting user in data.additionalDetails.actorName. Identity domains write their own event ids to data.additionalDetails.eventId, and Oracle documents admin.user.create.success and admin.user.activated.success. Users that come from a federated identity provider through the older Console feature produce CreateIdpUser, which the page on identity provider and group mapping changes covers. Collection is the same as for the other OCI pages. Ship the _Audit log group of the root compartment (subcompartments included) and of any compartment that holds an identity domain to the SIEM through a service connector and a stream.
What an attacker needs
- A principal with
manage usersin the tenancy (Administrators or a help desk group), or the identity domain administrator or user administrator role in the domain. For an activation the user manager role is enough, because Oracle lists activating user accounts among its privileges. - To make the new user useful, also the right to add it to a group (
use groups) or an existing policy that already grants access to a group the attacker can reach.
Impact
A second identity in the tenancy that the attacker controls. On its own a new user has no permissions, so the damage depends on what follows: a group membership, an administrator role, or credentials such as an API key that work without the Console sign-in. An activated account regains every group, application and administrator role that was still assigned to it.
Detection rules
OCI Identity Domain User Activated
Detects the identity domain event id admin.user.activated.success, which Oracle lists as User Activate Success. Oracle describes the user life cycle of an identity domain as created, activated, deactivated and deleted, and an activated user as able to sign in and to use all groups, applications and administrator roles assigned to the account. An activation of an account that was deactivated long ago, by an actor outside the identity team, is the case to look for. Oracle's lists do not say whether a newly created user also produces this id, so expect it next to creations until you have checked your own events. Read the user in data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName and the actor in data.additionalDetails.actorName.
title: OCI Identity Domain User Activated
id: bacb82e4-fc77-4fb9-b8e4-d6cc6748bb1a
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the identity domain event id admin.user.activated.success, which
Oracle lists as User Activate Success. Oracle describes the user life cycle
of an identity domain as created, activated, deactivated and deleted, and an
activated user as able to sign in and to use all groups, applications and
administrator roles assigned to the account. An activation of an account
that was deactivated long ago, by an actor outside the identity team, is the
case to look for. Oracle's lists do not say whether a newly created user
also produces this id, so expect it next to creations until you have
checked your own events. Read the user in
data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName and the actor in
data.additionalDetails.actorName.
references:
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/api-getstarted/usingauditeventapis.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/users/lifecycle-managing-users.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/users/change-status-user-account.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en/learn/generating-iam-reports-from-oci-audit/index.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1136.003
logsource:
product: oci
service: audit
detection:
selection:
data.additionalDetails.eventId: admin.user.activated.success
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Employees who return from leave and users whose start date has arrived, activated by the identity team or by a life cycle process. Allow-list those actors and review activations of accounts that hold an administrator role whoever made them.
level: low
False positives
- Employees who return from leave and users whose start date has arrived, activated by the identity team or by a life cycle process. Allow-list those actors and review activations of accounts that hold an administrator role whoever made them.
OCI IAM User Created
Detects the creation of a user in OCI IAM: the IAM control plane operation CreateUser and the identity domain event id admin.user.create.success. Oracle's reference event for users carries the user name in data.resourceName, the user OCID in data.resourceId and the acting user in data.additionalDetails.actorName. For the identity domain event, Oracle's report query reads the target from data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName. A new user has no permissions until it is added to a group, so follow the user through the Audit log for group memberships, role grants and new credentials. Oracle does not say which of the two forms a tenancy records for one creation, so the rule matches either.
title: OCI IAM User Created
id: bdea5035-9b98-4d1f-8b2f-e2fa88c5364a
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the creation of a user in OCI IAM: the IAM control plane operation
CreateUser and the identity domain event id admin.user.create.success.
Oracle's reference event for users carries the user name in
data.resourceName, the user OCID in data.resourceId and the acting user in
data.additionalDetails.actorName. For the identity domain event, Oracle's
report query reads the target from data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName.
A new user has no permissions until it is added to a group, so follow the
user through the Audit log for group memberships, role grants and new
credentials. Oracle does not say which of the two forms a tenancy records
for one creation, so the rule matches either.
references:
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/api-getstarted/usingauditeventapis.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en/learn/generating-iam-reports-from-oci-audit/index.html
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Tasks/managingusers.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1136.003
logsource:
product: oci
service: audit
detection:
selection_control_plane:
eventType: com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.CreateUser
selection_identity_domain:
data.additionalDetails.eventId: admin.user.create.success
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Onboarding of employees and service users by the identity team or by a provisioning pipeline. Allow-list those actors by data.additionalDetails.actorName or data.identity.principalName and alert on every other one.
- Users provisioned into an identity domain by an identity provider through SCIM or just-in-time provisioning, which can arrive in bulk.
level: low
False positives
- Onboarding of employees and service users by the identity team or by a provisioning pipeline. Allow-list those actors by data.additionalDetails.actorName or data.identity.principalName and alert on every other one.
- Users provisioned into an identity domain by an identity provider through SCIM or just-in-time provisioning, which can arrive in bulk.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
New user added to a group or given a credential shortly after it was created
A user that is created and, within a short time, added to a group or given an API key or auth token by the same actor is an account built to be used at once. The pair is stronger evidence than the creation alone, and it is strongest when the group is an administrator group and the actor is outside the provisioning path.
- The Audit log records
com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.CreateUser. Oracle's reference event for users carries the user name indata.resourceNameand the user OCID indata.resourceId. - Within 60 minutes the Audit log records
AddUserToGroup,UploadApiKey,CreateAuthTokenorCreateCustomerSecretKeywhosedata.additionalDetails.userIdis the OCID of the new user. - For
AddUserToGroup, read the group name indata.resourceNameand give priority to Administrators and other groups that policies grant wide access. - Compare
data.additionalDetails.actorNameof the events. The same actor on all of them, outside the accounts that provision users, is the pattern to act on.
EventsCreateUserAddUserToGroupUploadApiKeyCreateAuthTokenCreateCustomerSecretKey
LimitsNormal onboarding produces the same sequence, so the provisioning accounts have to be excluded. The 60 minutes are a starting point. A user created through an identity domain interface may be recorded with the identity domain event id and without the OCID fields, in which case the join has to use the user name.
Triage
- Identify who created or activated the user (data.additionalDetails.actorName, data.identity.principalName) and from where (data.identity.ipAddress). A creation outside the provisioning path is the key signal.
- Read the new user's name in data.resourceName for the control plane event, or in data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName for the identity domain event, and check whether it imitates an existing user or a service name.
- Check the domain (data.additionalDetails.domainDisplayName). The Default domain holds the tenancy administrators.
- Search the Audit log for what happened to the same user afterwards, such as AddUserToGroup, an administrator role grant, UploadApiKey, CreateAuthToken or a password reset.
- For an activation, find out when and why the account was deactivated and whether its owner asked for it to be activated.
- If nobody approved the user, deactivate or delete it and review what the creating account did around the same time.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Deactivate the user at once, or delete its API keys, auth tokens and customer secret keys and reset its password where deactivation is not available, so that the account can no longer be used.
- Remove the user from every group and administrator role, then delete it once the investigation no longer needs it.
- Contain the account that created or activated the user. Reset its credentials and take away its user management rights until its owner is verified.
- Review the Audit events for what the new user did since it was created and undo the changes, with priority on policies, groups, dynamic groups, identity providers and further users.
- Check whether the same actor created or activated other users, and confirm that no unexpected user remains in the tenancy or in any identity domain.
Mitigation
- Keep
manage usersin the tenancy to a minimum. Oracle's help desk example grants the creation of users and credentials without control over group membership, which keeps a new user powerless until someone else adds it to a group. - Create users through one provisioning path (the identity provider or an infrastructure-as-code pipeline) and treat every user created outside it as an exception.
- Remove groups, administrator roles and credentials from accounts when they are deactivated, so that activating one again does not restore access.
- Review the users of the tenancy and of each identity domain on a schedule, including deactivated accounts, and delete what has no owner.
Frequently asked questions
Is a new OCI user dangerous on its own?
Not by itself. Oracle states that a new user has no permissions until it is placed in a group that a policy grants access to. The risk is the next step, namely a group membership, an administrator role or a credential such as an API key. That is why triage follows the user through the Audit log after the creation event.
Which Audit events show that a user was created?
The IAM control plane records `com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.CreateUser`, with the user name in `data.resourceName`. Identity domains write the event id `admin.user.create.success` to `data.additionalDetails.eventId`. The first rule on this page matches either form, because Oracle does not say which of the two a given tenancy records for one creation.
Why is the activation of a user watched separately?
An account that was deactivated keeps its name and whatever groups, applications and administrator roles were left on it. Oracle describes an activated user as able to sign in and to use all of them again. An attacker who activates a forgotten account gets an identity that looks established. Oracle documents the event id `admin.user.activated.success` for it.
Is there a public incident where attackers created OCI users?
No public incident report describes this at the audit event level for OCI. The page is derived from Oracle's documentation of users and their events. Oracle's own Cloud Guard ships a detector rule named "IAM User created" for the same event, which alerts when a local or federated user is created.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1136.003: Create Account: Cloud Account
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Services that produce events, IAM user event types
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Using the Audit Event APIs (identity domain event ids)
- Oracle: Generate IAM reports from OCI Audit (identity domain event ids in Audit)
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Managing users (tenancies without identity domains)
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Lifecycle for managing users (identity domains)
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Changing a user's status (identity domains)
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Details for IAM with Identity Domains (permissions of manage users)
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Understanding administrator roles
- Oracle Cloud Guard: Detector recipe reference (IAM User created)