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Provisioning Configuration Created or Changed detection rules

An attacker adds or alters a Microsoft Entra provisioning job, such as a cross-tenant synchronization, to push accounts into another tenant or application, or to send the organization's identities to a target they control.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
Medium
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID audit logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
A role that can manage provisioning in the tenant, and for cross-tenant synchronization a target tenant that already allows inbound synchronization from it.
Impact
Accounts of the attacker's choice created in another tenant or application by a trusted service, without an invitation and without the usual joiner process.
Response
Pause the provisioning job, remove the configuration nobody owns, and delete the accounts it created in the target, which do not disappear with the job.
Mitigation
Keep the roles that manage provisioning small, scope jobs to assigned users and groups, and allow inbound synchronization only from your own tenants.
Audit activities
Add provisioning configurationEnable/start provisioning configurationUpdate provisioning setting or credentialsUpdate attribute mappings or scope
Threat groups
APT29LAPSUS$

How the attack works

The Microsoft Entra provisioning service creates, updates and deletes accounts in other systems on a schedule. One engine runs several features: application provisioning, HR provisioning, Microsoft Entra Connect cloud sync and cross-tenant synchronization. Each of them is a provisioning configuration with a target, a scope that says which users and groups are included, and attribute mappings that say what is written.

Cross-tenant synchronization shows why the configuration matters. Microsoft describes it as a push process from the source tenant: the users in scope and the attribute mappings are configured in the source tenant, and the target tenant only allows or refuses inbound synchronization. An attacker who can manage provisioning in a tenant that another tenant already accepts as a source can add a job, or widen the scope of an existing one, and have accounts created in the target tenant. The users receive no invitation email and see no consent prompt, and by default they arrive as external members. Changing the attribute mappings changes what the accounts look like in the target. Changing the settings or the credentials of a job changes how it reaches the target and who is included.

Microsoft records configuration changes of all these features in one audit category, ProvisioningManagement, with activities such as Add provisioning configuration, Enable/start provisioning configuration, Update attribute mappings or scope and Update provisioning setting or credentials. The rules on this page read those activities by name. Microsoft documents no field of the records that tells a cross-tenant synchronization from an application provisioning job, so the rules cannot separate them. What a job then does to individual accounts is in the provisioning logs, not in the audit log.

What an attacker needs

  • An account that can manage provisioning in the tenant. Microsoft names Application Administrator as the least privileged role for editing the scope of a provisioning job.
  • For cross-tenant synchronization, a target tenant that already allows inbound synchronization from this tenant. The target tenant decides that, not the source.

Impact

Accounts of the attacker's choice in another tenant or application, created by a trusted service without an invitation and without the usual joiner process. In a multitenant organization this is a way from one compromised tenant into the others. A changed scope or mapping can also send more identities, or other attributes, to the target than the organization intended.

Detection rules

Provisioning Configuration Added or Provisioning Job Started

Detects a new provisioning configuration or the start of a provisioning job in Microsoft Entra ID. Microsoft's audit activity reference lists both activities in the category ProvisioningManagement: "Add provisioning configuration" (a new provisioning configuration has been created) and "Enable/start provisioning configuration" (the provisioning job has been started). The category covers application provisioning, HR provisioning, cross-tenant synchronization and Microsoft Entra Connect cloud sync, and Microsoft documents no field that tells them apart, so the rule fires for all of them. A new job is how accounts start to flow into another tenant or application. The actor is in InitiatedBy and the configuration in TargetResources.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Provisioning Configuration Added or Provisioning Job Started
id: 1999bcf7-49dc-4b30-ac94-5867e424027a
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a new provisioning configuration or the start of a provisioning job
  in Microsoft Entra ID. Microsoft's audit activity reference lists both
  activities in the category ProvisioningManagement: "Add provisioning
  configuration" (a new provisioning configuration has been created) and
  "Enable/start provisioning configuration" (the provisioning job has been
  started). The category covers application provisioning, HR provisioning,
  cross-tenant synchronization and Microsoft Entra Connect cloud sync, and
  Microsoft documents no field that tells them apart, so the rule fires for
  all of them. A new job is how accounts start to flow into another tenant or
  application. The actor is in InitiatedBy and the configuration in
  TargetResources.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/multi-tenant-organizations/cross-tenant-synchronization-overview
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1136.003
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    Category: ProvisioningManagement
    OperationName:
      - Add provisioning configuration
      - Enable/start provisioning configuration
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Planned integrations, such as a new SaaS application with automatic provisioning, a new HR connector or a cross-tenant synchronization between tenants of the same organization. Match the event to a change record and to the owner of the integration.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned integrations, such as a new SaaS application with automatic provisioning, a new HR connector or a cross-tenant synchronization between tenants of the same organization. Match the event to a change record and to the owner of the integration.

Provisioning Settings, Credentials, Attribute Mappings or Scope Changed

Detects a change to an existing provisioning configuration in Microsoft Entra ID. Microsoft's audit activity reference describes "Update provisioning setting or credentials" as a change of the settings of the job (for example the notification email, sync all or sync assigned users and groups, accidental deletions prevention) or of its credentials (for example a new bearer token), and "Update attribute mappings or scope" as a change of the attribute mappings or scoping rules. These changes decide who is provisioned, what is written to the target and how the job signs in to it. Microsoft documents no field that says which setting changed, so the rule matches the activity names and is rated low: open the configuration to see the change. The actor is in InitiatedBy.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Provisioning Settings, Credentials, Attribute Mappings or Scope Changed
id: 8f9c7739-f87e-4be4-b800-3956067aaf2a
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a change to an existing provisioning configuration in Microsoft
  Entra ID. Microsoft's audit activity reference describes "Update
  provisioning setting or credentials" as a change of the settings of the job
  (for example the notification email, sync all or sync assigned users and
  groups, accidental deletions prevention) or of its credentials (for example
  a new bearer token), and "Update attribute mappings or scope" as a change
  of the attribute mappings or scoping rules. These changes decide who is
  provisioned, what is written to the target and how the job signs in to it.
  Microsoft documents no field that says which setting changed, so the rule
  matches the activity names and is rated low: open the configuration to see
  the change. The actor is in InitiatedBy.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/app-provisioning/define-conditional-rules-for-provisioning-user-accounts
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1136.003
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    Category: ProvisioningManagement
    OperationName:
      - Update provisioning setting or credentials
      - Update attribute mappings or scope
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Routine maintenance of provisioning jobs, such as a renewed secret token for the target application, a new attribute in the mappings or a changed notification address. Filter the administrators who own the integrations in InitiatedBy if the volume is high.
level: low

False positives

  • Routine maintenance of provisioning jobs, such as a renewed secret token for the target application, a new attribute in the mappings or a changed notification address. Filter the administrators who own the integrations in InitiatedBy if the volume is high.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Provisioning change by an account that has not managed provisioning before

Detection hypothesisNeeds a baseline

Provisioning is set up by a few people and then left alone. A configuration that is added, or a scope or mapping that is changed, by an account that never touched provisioning before is either a new duty or a compromised administrator preparing to create accounts somewhere else.

  1. Build the list of accounts in InitiatedBy that wrote an activity of the audit category ProvisioningManagement in the last 90 days. Leave out the activities the service writes while a job runs, such as Execution, Export and Import.
  2. For each new Add provisioning configuration, Enable/start provisioning configuration, Update attribute mappings or scope or Update provisioning setting or credentials, check whether its actor is on the list.
  3. Alert when the actor is new, and raise the priority when the same actor also changed cross-tenant access settings on the same day.

EventsAdd provisioning configurationEnable/start provisioning configurationUpdate attribute mappings or scopeUpdate provisioning setting or credentials

LimitsNew staff and a change of duties look the same as an attacker. The baseline is empty until 90 days of audit history exist, and the 90 days are a starting point. It cannot see a change made by the usual administrator whose account was taken over.

Triage

  • Read InitiatedBy for the actor and TargetResources for the application or configuration that was changed.
  • Establish what the configuration is and where it writes. Check whether the target tenant or application is one your organization uses.
  • Ask for the change record. New integrations and changes of scope are planned work with an owner.
  • For a change of mappings or scope, open the configuration and compare who is in scope and which attributes are written with what the owner expects.
  • Look in the provisioning logs for accounts the job created or changed after the event.
  • Review the sign-in behind the actor's session, such as its IP address, device and risk level.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Pause the provisioning job, and remove the configuration when nobody in the organization owns it.
  2. In the target tenant, turn off inbound synchronization for the source tenant until the job is understood. Microsoft states that target tenant administrators can stop a synchronization at any time.
  3. List the accounts the job created or changed from the provisioning logs. Block sign-in for them and delete the ones that should not exist. They are not removed when the synchronization relationship ends.
  4. Replace the credentials the job uses for its target, and restore the scope and the attribute mappings from a known good state.
  5. Revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of the account that made the change, and remove the role that allowed it.
  6. Review what the created accounts did in the target tenant or application, and undo it.

Mitigation

  • Keep the roles that can manage enterprise applications and provisioning small, and make them eligible through Privileged Identity Management instead of permanently active.
  • In every target tenant, allow inbound user synchronization only for tenants that belong to your own organization, and leave the inbound setting for role-enabled groups off unless you need it.
  • Scope provisioning jobs to assigned users and groups instead of all users, so that widening the scope is a visible change.
  • Review the provisioning configurations of the tenant and their targets regularly, and compare them with the list of integrations you expect.
  • Send the audit log and the provisioning logs to your SIEM.

Frequently asked questions

Does the audit log show which accounts a provisioning job created?

No. The audit log holds the changes to the provisioning configuration, in the category ProvisioningManagement. For the actions the provisioning service performs, such as creating, updating and deleting users, Microsoft recommends the provisioning logs. Use the audit log to see who changed a job, and the provisioning logs to see what the job then did.

Can these rules tell a cross-tenant synchronization job from application provisioning?

No. Microsoft writes the configuration changes of application provisioning, HR provisioning, cross-tenant synchronization and Microsoft Entra Connect cloud sync to the same audit category and documents the activity names only. The rules match those names. Which feature a configuration belongs to shows when you open the application named in the event.

Do the accounts disappear when the synchronization is removed?

No. Microsoft states that no changes are made to the external users that cross-tenant synchronization managed when the relationship is severed, for example when the synchronization policy is deleted. The accounts stay in the target tenant until somebody blocks or deletes them there.

Is there a public incident report for this technique?

No public incident report describes this at the audit event level. The page is based on what Microsoft documents about the provisioning service: the configuration is managed in the source tenant, it decides which accounts are created in the target, and every change to it is an audit activity.

References

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