How the attack works
Google Workspace and Cloud Identity keep accounts that are no longer in use. A suspended account cannot sign in but keeps its mail, files and settings. A deleted account can be restored for 20 days, and Google states that this includes administrator accounts. An archived account belongs to a former employee, cannot sign in and keeps its data. Reactivating, restoring or unarchiving gives the account back everything it had, and Google states that a restored user gets access to all previous services and data.
For an attacker with admin rights this is cheaper than creating an account. The restored identity has a history, group memberships, shared files and sometimes admin roles, and its owner has left and will not notice a sign-in. The same step undoes a response measure. An account that the security team suspended during an incident, or that Google suspended because it looked compromised, works again once any admin with user management rights reactivates it.
The Admin audit log records UNSUSPEND_USER, UNDELETE_USER and UNARCHIVE_USER, each with the address of the user in the parameter USER_EMAIL. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive them in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com. Reactivation is common after leave, after a mistaken suspension and when Google suspended an account automatically, so the value of the event lies in who the account is and why it was closed.
What an attacker needs
- An admin account with the appropriate User management privilege for reactivating a suspended user. Google requires a super admin for restoring a deleted user.
- A closed account worth having. A deleted account can be restored only within 20 days and only while a license is available for it.
Impact
A working account with the data, group memberships, shared files and roles it had before it was closed, without the trace of a new account. When the account had been suspended as a response measure, the attacker is back in the account the defenders had just locked.
Detection rules
Deleted User Restored in Google Workspace
Detects the restoring of a deleted user account in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event UNDELETE_USER, rendered as "{USER_EMAIL} undeleted"). Google states that a user account, including an administrator account, can be restored up to 20 days after it was deleted and that the restored user gets access to all previous services and data. Restoring needs a super admin. The account is the parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin is in principalEmail. Accounts are deleted on purpose, so a restore should match a request. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Deleted User Restored in Google Workspace
id: daa10027-b8fa-4e0f-a800-862a1a6190a0
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the restoring of a deleted user account in a Google Workspace or
Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event UNDELETE_USER, rendered as
"{USER_EMAIL} undeleted"). Google states that a user account, including
an administrator account, can be restored up to 20 days after it was
deleted and that the restored user gets access to all previous services
and data. Restoring needs a super admin. The account is the parameter
USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin is in principalEmail.
Accounts are deleted on purpose, so a restore should match a request.
The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at
organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data
sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the
organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/restore-a-recently-deleted-user
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.undeleteUser
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- An account deleted by mistake, or restored so that its data can be transferred to another user, which Google's help page describes. Restores are rare. Verify each one against a request and check that the account is suspended or deleted again when the work is done.
level: medium
False positives
- An account deleted by mistake, or restored so that its data can be transferred to another user, which Google's help page describes. Restores are rare. Verify each one against a request and check that the account is suspended or deleted again when the work is done.
Suspended or Archived User Reactivated in Google Workspace
Detects a suspended user being reactivated (Admin audit event UNSUSPEND_USER, rendered as "{USER_EMAIL} unsuspended") or an archived user being unarchived (UNARCHIVE_USER) in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account. A suspended or archived account cannot sign in but keeps its data. Once it is reactivated the user can sign in and reach all services and data again, and an unarchived user returns to the previous status. The account is the parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin is in principalEmail. Reactivation is common, so the finding is an account that belongs to a leaver, or one that the security team or Google suspended shortly before. Google's reference does not say whether a bulk reactivation with a CSV file writes this event for each user. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Suspended or Archived User Reactivated in Google Workspace
id: 44d831da-66a7-43e8-b81d-d415ba3ac1dd
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a suspended user being reactivated (Admin audit event
UNSUSPEND_USER, rendered as "{USER_EMAIL} unsuspended") or an archived
user being unarchived (UNARCHIVE_USER) in a Google Workspace or Cloud
Identity account. A suspended or archived account cannot sign in but
keeps its data. Once it is reactivated the user can sign in and reach
all services and data again, and an unarchived user returns to the
previous status. The account is the parameter USER_EMAIL in
protoPayload.metadata and the admin is in principalEmail. Reactivation is
common, so the finding is an account that belongs to a leaver, or one
that the security team or Google suspended shortly before. Google's
reference does not say whether a bulk reactivation with a CSV file writes
this event for each user. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin
Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once
Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the
SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/restore-a-suspended-user
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/archive-former-employee-accounts
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName:
- google.admin.AdminService.unsuspendUser
- google.admin.AdminService.unarchiveUser
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Employees who return from leave, accounts suspended by mistake and accounts that Google suspended automatically and the helpdesk reactivates after checking with the user.
- Directory synchronization that reactivates accounts when the source directory enables them. Exclude its identity in a filter_* selection on principalEmail.
level: low
False positives
- Employees who return from leave, accounts suspended by mistake and accounts that Google suspended automatically and the helpdesk reactivates after checking with the user.
- Directory synchronization that reactivates accounts when the source directory enables them. Exclude its identity in a filter_* selection on principalEmail.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Account suspended by Google for suspected compromise and reactivated by an admin
When Google disables an account because it looks compromised or its password is known to someone else, the safe way back includes a password reset. An admin who only reactivates the account hands it back to whoever had the password. The pattern also shows an attacker who uses a second admin account to undo the suspension.
- Google disables an account:
google.login.LoginService.accountDisabledHijackedoraccountDisabledPasswordLeakoflogin.googleapis.com. The account is in the event parameteraffected_email_address. - Within 7 days an admin reactivates it:
google.admin.AdminService.unsuspendUserofadmin.googleapis.comwhose parameterUSER_EMAILis the same address. - Check for a
google.admin.AdminService.changePasswordentry with the sameUSER_EMAILbetween the two. Raise the reactivation when there is none.
Eventsgoogle.login.LoginService.accountDisabledHijackedgoogle.login.LoginService.accountDisabledPasswordLeakgoogle.admin.AdminService.unsuspendUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.changePassword
LimitsThe first step needs the Login audit log, which arrives as Data Access entries. A helpdesk that reactivates first and resets the password a minute later matches until the order is fixed. A user who changes the password themselves after reactivation is not seen by the last step. The 7 days are a starting point.
Triage
- Read USER_EMAIL in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata and find out whose account it is and why it was closed. Use the offboarding record, an incident ticket or the suspension reason on the user's page.
- Identify the admin who restored it (principalEmail) and confirm the request through a second channel.
- Check whether the account was suspended by Google or by the security team shortly before, and whether its password was reset in between.
- Review the sign-ins of the restored account after the event, with their source addresses, in the Login audit log.
- Check which admin roles, group memberships and Google Cloud roles the account holds now.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Suspend the account again and reset its password and sign-in cookies, so that the person who had it reactivated cannot keep using it.
- Remove the admin roles, group memberships and Google Cloud IAM bindings of the account if it belongs to someone who has left.
- Secure the admin account that restored it. Reset its password, reset its sign-in cookies and review its 2-Step Verification methods and admin roles.
- Review what the restored account did after the event, including mail forwarding, file sharing, app access and data transfers, and undo it.
- Review what else the same admin changed in the period.
Mitigation
- Remove admin roles, group memberships and Google Cloud IAM bindings when an account is suspended for offboarding, so that a reactivated account starts with nothing.
- Reset the password and the sign-in cookies of an account before it is suspended for security reasons, so that reactivation alone does not hand it back to whoever knew the password.
- Give the User management privilege to few administrators and keep super admins few.
- Delete the accounts of leavers after the retention period instead of leaving them suspended for years.
- Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM.
Frequently asked questions
Why would an attacker restore an old account instead of creating a new one?
A restored account does not look new. It has a history, a name colleagues know, group memberships and shared files, and Google states that a restored user gets access to all their previous services and data. The owner has usually left and will not see a sign-in notice. No public incident report describes this step at the level of the audit event, so the page rests on what Google documents the three actions to do.
Can a deleted Google Workspace account come back with its data?
Yes, for 20 days. Google states that a user account, including an administrator account, can be restored up to 20 days after it was deleted, and that after 20 days the data is gone. Restoring needs a super admin and an available license. Google adds that the change usually takes up to 24 hours to take effect.
Does the rule fire when Google lifts a suspension by itself?
Google's reference describes the event only as the user followed by unsuspended and does not say which actor is recorded when a user clears an automatic suspension by passing a verification. Read `principalEmail` in each entry. An entry whose actor is an administrator is the case this page is about.
Does a bulk reactivation with a CSV file write one event per user?
Google documents that suspended users can be restored in bulk with a CSV file or through the Admin SDK. Its event reference does not say whether that path writes an `UNSUSPEND_USER` event for each user. Test it in your own tenant, and review bulk upload events (`USERS_BULK_UPLOAD`) as well.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098: Account Manipulation
- Restore a suspended user
- Restore a recently deleted user
- Archive former employee accounts
- Suspend a user temporarily
- Audit logs for Google Workspace (Cloud Audit Logs)
- Admin audit events: user settings (UNSUSPEND_USER, UNDELETE_USER, UNARCHIVE_USER)
- Login audit events (account_disabled_hijacked, account_disabled_password_leak)