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User Password Reset by an Admin in Google Workspace detection rules

An attacker in a Google Workspace admin session sets a new password for another user and signs in as that user. No stolen password is needed, and the same accounts sign in to Google Cloud.

Platform
Google Cloud
Severity
High
Log source
Google Cloud Audit Logs
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1098Account Manipulation
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Control of an admin account with the reset password privilege, or of a super admin account when the target is another administrator.
Impact
The attacker signs in as the target with a password of their own choosing and reads its data or uses its IAM roles in Google Cloud.
Response
Secure the admin account that made the reset, then reset the affected user's password again with the owner verified and reset the sign-in cookies.
Mitigation
Enforce 2-Step Verification for every user and give the reset password privilege only to the helpdesk roles that need it.
API methods
google.admin.AdminService.viewTempPasswordgoogle.admin.AdminService.changePasswordOnNextLogingoogle.admin.AdminService.changePassword

How the attack works

An administrator of Google Workspace or Cloud Identity can reset the password of a user from the Admin console or through the Directory API. The admin either lets Google generate a password or types one, can preview it and copy it, and decides whether the user must change it at the next sign-in. Google's help states that an admin needs the reset password privilege for this, and super admin privileges to reset the password of another administrator.

For an attacker who controls an admin account, this is the shortest way into other accounts. They set a password they know, leave the change requirement off and sign in as the user. The target can be a person whose mailbox or files they want, or an account that holds IAM roles in Google Cloud, because the same identity signs in there. Google's help also notes that changing a user's password grants access to a session that is locked because the user cannot pass a login challenge, so the reset removes that check as well. The rightful owner is locked out until someone notices.

The Admin audit log records CHANGE_PASSWORD when a password is changed for a user, CHANGE_PASSWORD_ON_NEXT_LOGIN when the requirement to change the password at the next sign-in is changed, with the old and the new value, and VIEW_TEMP_PASSWORD when an admin views a user's temporary password. Each names the affected user in USER_EMAIL. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive these events in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com. Resets are everyday helpdesk work, so the event alone proves little. Who made it, for whom, and what that account did next carry the meaning.

What an attacker needs

  • Control of an admin account whose role holds the reset password privilege, or of a super admin account when the target is another administrator.
  • A target that signs in with a Google password. Where 2-Step Verification is on for the target, the attacker also needs a way past the second factor.

Impact

The attacker signs in as the target with a password of their own choosing and reads its mail and files, or uses its IAM roles in Google Cloud. A super admin who is the attacker can take over other administrators in the same manner. The owner can no longer sign in with the password they know. Google tells admins to reset the user's sign-in cookies after a reset, so a second reset by the defenders is not enough on its own to end a session the attacker opened.

Detection rules

Temporary Password Viewed or Password Change Requirement Changed by an Admin in Google Workspace

Detects two Admin audit events that surround a password reset in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account: an admin viewed the temporary password of a user (VIEW_TEMP_PASSWORD, rendered as "Temporary password for user {USER_EMAIL} viewed by the admin"), and the requirement to change the password at the next sign-in was changed for a user (CHANGE_PASSWORD_ON_NEXT_LOGIN, with OLD_VALUE and NEW_VALUE of true or false). An admin who views a user's temporary password knows a password that opens the account. A change requirement switched to false keeps a password the admin set valid, where normally the user would replace it at once. The rule fires on ANY change of the requirement, because the method name does not carry the direction, so read NEW_VALUE in the event parameters (protoPayload.metadata). Google's reference gives the event names and messages but does not say which Admin console control writes the view event, so the rule is written on the event names alone and at a low level. The affected user is in USER_EMAIL and the admin in principalEmail. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Temporary Password Viewed or Password Change Requirement Changed by an Admin in Google Workspace
id: 57f74156-3e8d-4ead-9b86-ccac3b0864a8
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects two Admin audit events that surround a password reset in a Google
  Workspace or Cloud Identity account: an admin viewed the temporary
  password of a user (VIEW_TEMP_PASSWORD, rendered as "Temporary password
  for user {USER_EMAIL} viewed by the admin"), and the requirement to change
  the password at the next sign-in was changed for a user
  (CHANGE_PASSWORD_ON_NEXT_LOGIN, with OLD_VALUE and NEW_VALUE of true or
  false). An admin who views a user's temporary password knows a password
  that opens the account. A change requirement switched to false keeps a
  password the admin set valid, where normally the user would replace it at
  once. The rule fires on ANY change of the requirement, because the method
  name does not carry the direction, so read NEW_VALUE in the event
  parameters (protoPayload.metadata). Google's reference gives the event
  names and messages but does not say which Admin console control writes
  the view event, so the rule is written on the event names alone and at a
  low level. The affected user is in USER_EMAIL and the admin in
  principalEmail. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity
  entries at organization level, which are always written once Google
  Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM
  only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/reset-a-users-password
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.admin.AdminService.viewTempPassword
      - google.admin.AdminService.changePasswordOnNextLogin
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Helpdesk staff who read a generated password to a user over the phone, and resets where the change requirement is switched on. Both are routine. Use the rule together with the password change rule of this page, and look at requirements switched to false and at targets that are administrators.
level: low

False positives

  • Helpdesk staff who read a generated password to a user over the phone, and resets where the change requirement is switched on. Both are routine. Use the rule together with the password change rule of this page, and look at requirements switched to false and at targets that are administrators.

User Password Changed by an Admin in Google Workspace

Detects an administrator changing the password of a user of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event CHANGE_PASSWORD, rendered as "Password changed for {USER_EMAIL}"). An attacker in an admin session sets a password they know and signs in as the user. The affected user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin in principalEmail. The event does not say whether the target is an administrator, so the rule fires for every user. A password change that a user makes in their own account is a different event (Login audit event password_edit) and does not match. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: User Password Changed by an Admin in Google Workspace
id: a4fbcb03-46d2-45ed-831e-76c675d85b48
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an administrator changing the password of a user of a Google
  Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event CHANGE_PASSWORD,
  rendered as "Password changed for {USER_EMAIL}"). An attacker in an admin
  session sets a password they know and signs in as the user. The affected
  user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the
  admin in principalEmail. The event does not say whether the target is an
  administrator, so the rule fires for every user. A password change that a
  user makes in their own account is a different event (Login audit event
  password_edit) and does not match. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as
  an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written
  once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and
  reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/reset-a-users-password
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.changePassword
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Helpdesk resets for users who forgot their password. Confirm each one against a ticket, and give priority to targets that are administrators or hold IAM roles in Google Cloud.
  - Tools that synchronize passwords from another directory and provisioning tools that set passwords through the Directory API. They act under one known admin or service identity. Exclude that identity by principalEmail in a filter_* selection and review resets by anyone else.
level: medium

False positives

  • Helpdesk resets for users who forgot their password. Confirm each one against a ticket, and give priority to targets that are administrators or hold IAM roles in Google Cloud.
  • Tools that synchronize passwords from another directory and provisioning tools that set passwords through the Directory API. They act under one known admin or service identity. Exclude that identity by principalEmail in a filter_* selection and review resets by anyone else.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Password reset whose target is an administrator

Detection hypothesisNeeds your own lists

A reset of an ordinary user is routine. A reset of an account that holds an admin role is rare, needs a super admin and hands over that account's privileges. The audit event does not say whether the target is an administrator, so the rule cannot tell the two apart. Your list of administrators can.

  1. Keep a list of the accounts that hold an admin role. It can be built from google.admin.AdminService.assignRole and unassignRole entries, where the user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL, or exported from the Admin roles page.
  2. Take each google.admin.AdminService.changePassword entry and compare its USER_EMAIL with the list.
  3. Raise the matches with high priority, with the acting admin from authenticationInfo.principalEmail.

Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.changePasswordgoogle.admin.AdminService.assignRolegoogle.admin.AdminService.unassignRole

LimitsA list built only from audit entries misses roles assigned before the logs begin, so start from an export of the current role assignments. Accounts that hold IAM roles in Google Cloud without a Workspace admin role need a second list.

Password reset followed by a sign-in of that user from an unfamiliar address

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsNeeds a baseline

After a helpdesk reset the user signs in from where they always work. After a reset made to take the account over, the next sign-in comes from the attacker, and it may come from the same address as the admin session that made the reset.

  1. A google.admin.AdminService.changePassword entry. Note the user in USER_EMAIL, the admin in authenticationInfo.principalEmail and, where the entry carries it, the address in requestMetadata.callerIp.
  2. Within 24 hours, a google.login.LoginService.loginSuccess entry of login.googleapis.com whose authenticationInfo.principalEmail is that user.
  3. Compare the requestMetadata.callerIp of the sign-in with the addresses that user signed in from in the past 30 days, and with the address of the admin entry.

Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.changePasswordgoogle.login.LoginService.loginSuccess

LimitsUsers who travel or use a new device after a reset match as well. Google's example of a Login audit entry shows callerIp, but whether Admin audit entries always carry it is not stated, so the comparison with the admin's address may not be possible. The 24 hours and 30 days are starting points.

Triage

  • Read USER_EMAIL in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata and compare it with the admin in principalEmail. Check whether the affected user holds an admin role in Workspace or IAM roles in Google Cloud.
  • Look for a helpdesk ticket or a request from the user, and confirm with the user through a second channel that they asked for the reset.
  • For the change requirement event, read NEW_VALUE and OLD_VALUE. A requirement switched to false right after a reset means the password the admin set stays valid.
  • Review the sign-ins of the affected account after the reset (google.login.LoginService.loginSuccess of login.googleapis.com) for a device or location the user does not use, and for the admin's own address.
  • Check what else the admin did to the same user, such as turning off 2-Step Verification, generating backup codes or changing recovery information.
  • Check the admin account itself. Review its recent sign-ins and whether it reset several users in a short time.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Secure the admin account that made the reset. Reset its password, reset its sign-in cookies so that existing sessions end, and review its 2-Step Verification methods and its admin roles.
  2. Reset the password of each affected user again with the owner verified in person or by phone, require a change at the next sign-in and reset the user's sign-in cookies.
  3. Review the second factors of each affected account. Remove security keys the owner does not recognise and generate new backup codes, which invalidates the old ones.
  4. Establish what was done as the affected user while the attacker held the account, from the audit logs of the services it used and, for accounts with IAM roles, from the Google Cloud audit logs.
  5. Reverse changes made through the affected accounts, such as mail forwarding, app access, role bindings and new credentials.

Mitigation

  • Enforce 2-Step Verification for every user, with security keys or passkeys for administrators, so that a new password alone does not open the account.
  • Give the reset password privilege only to the helpdesk roles that need it, limited to the organizational units they serve, and keep super admins few.
  • Use single sign-on with your identity provider for users where you can, so that the Google password is not what opens their accounts. Super admins still sign in to the Admin console with their Google password.
  • Have the helpdesk verify the requester through a second channel before every reset, and always leave the change requirement at the next sign-in on.
  • Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM.

Frequently asked questions

Is every password reset by an admin in Google Workspace suspicious?

No. Resets are everyday helpdesk work, and tools that synchronize passwords from another directory set passwords through the same API. The event matters when nobody asked for it, when the target is an administrator or an account with IAM roles in Google Cloud, when the requirement to change the password at the next sign-in was left off, or when a sign-in from an unfamiliar place follows.

Who can reset the password of an administrator in Google Workspace?

Google's help states that resetting the password of another administrator requires super admin privileges. An admin with only the reset password privilege can reset ordinary users. An unexpected reset of an administrator's password therefore points to a super admin account, and the investigation should start with that account.

Does 2-Step Verification protect an account after an admin reset its password?

It helps, because the new password alone no longer opens the account. It is not a complete answer. An admin with user management privileges can also generate backup codes for a user, and where 2-Step Verification is not enforced can turn it off for that user. Look for those events for the same user around the reset.

Why reset the sign-in cookies after resetting a password?

Google's help says to reset the user's sign-in cookies after a password reset, and that doing so prevents signing in with the old password. Resetting the cookies signs the user out of the Google Account on all devices and browsers. Do both when you take an account back, so that a session the attacker opened does not outlive the new password.

References

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