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Account Recovery Email or Phone Changed in Google Workspace detection rules

An attacker changes the recovery email address or phone number of a Google Workspace account, as the user or as an admin, so that recovery codes and security notices for the account go to them.

Platform
Google Cloud
Severity
Medium
Log source
Google Cloud Audit Logs
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1098Account Manipulation
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
A signed-in session of the target user where users may add recovery details, or an admin account with the User management privilege.
Impact
Recovery codes and security notices for the account go to the attacker, who can reset the password again where self-service recovery applies.
Response
Restore or remove the recovery details, reset the password and sign-in cookies and review the account's 2-Step Verification methods.
Mitigation
Enforce 2-Step Verification and keep self-service account recovery off for administrators and other privileged users.
API methods
google.login.LoginService.recoveryEmailEditgoogle.login.LoginService.recoveryPhoneEditgoogle.login.LoginService.recoverySecretQaEditgoogle.admin.AdminService.addRecoveryEmailgoogle.admin.AdminService.addRecoveryPhonegoogle.admin.AdminService.changeRecoveryEmailgoogle.admin.AdminService.changeRecoveryPhone

How the attack works

A managed Google account can carry a recovery email address and a recovery phone number. Google states what they are used for. They receive the code that lets a locked-out user sign in, they help the user prove that the account is theirs, and Google uses them to tell the user about suspicious activity. Where self-service account recovery is on, they also receive the instructions to reset a forgotten password. By default users can add their own recovery details, and an administrator with user management rights can set them for any user on the user's security page.

Whoever controls the recovery details controls the way back into the account. An attacker who has a session of the user replaces the recovery address or number with their own. After the password has been reset, they can ask for a recovery code, and the notices that would warn the owner go to the attacker instead. An attacker who holds a helpdesk admin account can do the same for a user they have never signed in as.

The Admin audit log records ADD_RECOVERY_EMAIL, ADD_RECOVERY_PHONE, CHANGE_RECOVERY_EMAIL and CHANGE_RECOVERY_PHONE when an admin sets the details, with the user in USER_EMAIL. The Login audit log records recovery_email_edit, recovery_phone_edit and recovery_secret_qa_edit when the account holder changes them. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive the first group as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com and the second as Data Access entries of login.googleapis.com, both at organization level. None of the events carries the new address or number.

What an attacker needs

  • A signed-in session of the target user, in an organization that lets users add recovery details, which is the default.
  • Or an admin account with the appropriate User management privilege, which can set recovery details for a user in the Admin console.

Impact

Recovery codes and Google's security notices for the account go to the attacker. Where self-service recovery applies to the account, the attacker can reset its password after the defenders have changed it. The owner loses the same means of getting the account back.

Detection rules

Account Recovery Details Changed by the User in Google Workspace

Detects the holder of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account changing its recovery email address, recovery phone number or recovery secret question (Login audit events recovery_email_edit, recovery_phone_edit and recovery_secret_qa_edit, rendered for example as "{actor} has changed Account recovery email"). An attacker who has a session of the user replaces the recovery details so that recovery codes and security notices go to them. The account is in principalEmail and the source address in requestMetadata.callerIp. Google documents no parameters for these events, so the new value is not in the log. Users change recovery details as part of normal account care, which is why the level is low. The value of the rule is in combination with an unusual sign-in before it or a password change after it. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Data Access entries of login.googleapis.com at organization level only when Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level Data Access logs are routed to it.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Account Recovery Details Changed by the User in Google Workspace
id: 70345ca8-25b9-48bf-b01e-ef2e27ea0210
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the holder of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account
  changing its recovery email address, recovery phone number or recovery
  secret question (Login audit events recovery_email_edit,
  recovery_phone_edit and recovery_secret_qa_edit, rendered for example as
  "{actor} has changed Account recovery email"). An attacker who has a
  session of the user replaces the recovery details so that recovery codes
  and security notices go to them. The account is in principalEmail and
  the source address in requestMetadata.callerIp. Google documents no
  parameters for these events, so the new value is not in the log. Users
  change recovery details as part of normal account care, which is why the
  level is low. The value of the rule is in combination with an unusual
  sign-in before it or a password change after it. The entries reach Cloud
  Audit Logs as Data Access entries of login.googleapis.com at organization
  level only when Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is
  enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level Data Access
  logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/login
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/allow-users-to-add-password-recovery-details
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: login.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.login.LoginService.recoveryEmailEdit
      - google.login.LoginService.recoveryPhoneEdit
      - google.login.LoginService.recoverySecretQaEdit
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Users who add or update their own recovery details, for example after a new phone number or during onboarding, which is the normal source of this event.
  - To reduce the volume, keep the rule for administrators and other privileged accounts with a selection on principalEmail, and use the detection logic of the attack page for everyone else.
level: low

False positives

  • Users who add or update their own recovery details, for example after a new phone number or during onboarding, which is the normal source of this event.
  • To reduce the volume, keep the rule for administrators and other privileged accounts with a selection on principalEmail, and use the detection logic of the attack page for everyone else.

Recovery Email or Phone Set for a User by an Admin in Google Workspace

Detects an administrator adding or changing the recovery email address or recovery phone number of a user in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit events ADD_RECOVERY_EMAIL, ADD_RECOVERY_PHONE, CHANGE_RECOVERY_EMAIL and CHANGE_RECOVERY_PHONE, rendered for example as "Recovery email changed for {USER_EMAIL}"). The recovery details receive the code for a locked-out user and, where self-service account recovery is on, the instructions to reset the password, so an admin who sets them to an address of their own can take the account over. The user is the parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin is in principalEmail. The events do not carry the new address or number. Read it on the user's security page. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Recovery Email or Phone Set for a User by an Admin in Google Workspace
id: 4d1e053e-4412-4643-adbc-591c435d9c6d
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an administrator adding or changing the recovery email address or
  recovery phone number of a user in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity
  account (Admin audit events ADD_RECOVERY_EMAIL, ADD_RECOVERY_PHONE,
  CHANGE_RECOVERY_EMAIL and CHANGE_RECOVERY_PHONE, rendered for example as
  "Recovery email changed for {USER_EMAIL}"). The recovery details receive
  the code for a locked-out user and, where self-service account recovery
  is on, the instructions to reset the password, so an admin who sets them
  to an address of their own can take the account over. The user is the
  parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin is in
  principalEmail. The events do not carry the new address or number. Read
  it on the user's security page. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as
  Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written
  once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and
  reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/add-recovery-information-for-admins-and-users
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.admin.AdminService.addRecoveryEmail
      - google.admin.AdminService.addRecoveryPhone
      - google.admin.AdminService.changeRecoveryEmail
      - google.admin.AdminService.changeRecoveryPhone
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Helpdesk staff who add recovery details for a locked-out user or during onboarding, which Google's help page describes. Match each change with a ticket, and treat changes on administrators and executives as high priority.
  - Provisioning that fills the recovery details of new accounts. Exclude its identity in a filter_* selection on principalEmail.
level: medium

False positives

  • Helpdesk staff who add recovery details for a locked-out user or during onboarding, which Google's help page describes. Match each change with a ticket, and treat changes on administrators and executives as high priority.
  • Provisioning that fills the recovery details of new accounts. Exclude its identity in a filter_* selection on principalEmail.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Recovery details changed after a sign-in that Google marked as suspicious

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

A user who updates a recovery phone number from the usual device is routine. The same change in a session that began with a sign-in Google itself found unusual is what an account takeover looks like, because securing the way back is one of the first things an attacker does.

  1. A sign-in succeeds with unusual characteristics: google.login.LoginService.loginSuccess of login.googleapis.com whose event parameter is_suspicious is true. Keep authenticationInfo.principalEmail and requestMetadata.callerIp.
  2. Within 24 hours the same account writes google.login.LoginService.recoveryEmailEdit, recoveryPhoneEdit or recoverySecretQaEdit.
  3. Raise it with higher priority when the callerIp of the change is the address of the suspicious sign-in.

Eventsgoogle.login.LoginService.loginSuccessgoogle.login.LoginService.recoveryEmailEditgoogle.login.LoginService.recoveryPhoneEdit

LimitsA user who travels and tidies up account settings from a hotel matches. Google documents is_suspicious as a sign-in with unusual characteristics, such as an unfamiliar IP address, and not as a verdict. An attacker whose sign-in does not look unusual to Google is not found. The 24 hours are a starting point.

Admin sets recovery details for a user and the user's password changes soon after

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsJoins two logs

An admin account with user management rights can take over a user without resetting the password openly. It sets a recovery address it controls and then recovers the account as the user. The log shows an admin recovery change followed by a password change made by the account holder, with no admin password reset in between.

  1. An admin sets recovery details: google.admin.AdminService.changeRecoveryEmail, changeRecoveryPhone, addRecoveryEmail or addRecoveryPhone of admin.googleapis.com. Keep the parameter USER_EMAIL and the admin in authenticationInfo.principalEmail.
  2. Within 24 hours a google.login.LoginService.passwordEdit entry of login.googleapis.com has that address as authenticationInfo.principalEmail.
  3. Check that no google.admin.AdminService.changePassword entry for the same USER_EMAIL lies between the two, and raise the pair.

Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.changeRecoveryEmailgoogle.admin.AdminService.addRecoveryEmailgoogle.login.LoginService.passwordEdit

LimitsA helpdesk that adds a recovery address so that a locked-out user can reset the password is the same sequence with a ticket behind it. Google's reference describes the password event only as the actor changing the account password and does not say whether a reset through recovery writes it, so test that path in your own tenant. The 24 hours are a starting point.

Triage

  • Identify the account. For the admin events it is USER_EMAIL in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata, for the Login audit events it is principalEmail.
  • Ask the account owner through a channel other than the account itself whether they changed their recovery details, and compare the details shown on the user's security page with what the owner states.
  • For an admin event, identify the admin (principalEmail) and the helpdesk ticket behind the change.
  • Review the sign-ins of the account before the change for new addresses, countries or devices, and for sign-ins Google marked as suspicious.
  • Check what followed. Look for a password change by the user (google.login.LoginService.passwordEdit), a new 2-Step Verification enrollment or passkey, and mail forwarding.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Replace the recovery details with the owner's real ones, or remove them, on the user's security page.
  2. Reset the password and the sign-in cookies of the account, and keep self-service recovery off for it, because Google states that removed recovery information can still be used for recovery for a period of time.
  3. Review the 2-Step Verification methods, passkeys and backup codes of the account and remove what the owner does not recognize.
  4. Review what the account did while the attacker had it, including mail forwarding, app access and file sharing.
  5. If an admin account set the details, secure that account as well and review the other users it touched.

Mitigation

  • Enforce 2-Step Verification. Google states that users who have it enabled can use only a recovery email address to reset their password.
  • Keep self-service account recovery off for administrators and other privileged users, so that changed recovery details do not lead to a password reset.
  • Decide whether users may add their own recovery details. The Recovery information setting in the Admin console controls email and phone separately per organizational unit.
  • Give the User management privilege to few administrators and review helpdesk actions on privileged accounts.
  • Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs, including the Data Access log with the Login audit events, to the SIEM.

Frequently asked questions

Does the audit log show the new recovery email address or phone number?

No. Google's reference documents one parameter for the admin events, the primary email address of the user, and none for the Login audit events. The log shows that the details changed, for whom and by whom. The current values are on the user's security page in the Admin console.

Can changed recovery details lead to a password reset?

Only where self-service account recovery applies to the account. Google has one setting for users and admins who are not super admins and another for super admins. With the setting on, a person who clicks the forgot password link receives recovery instructions at the recovery phone number or email address. Google states that the user setting does not apply in organizations that use single sign-on with a third-party identity provider.

Why does the user rule have a low level?

Because users set and update recovery details as part of normal account care, and Google turns the option on by default. One event means little. It becomes a finding when the account is privileged, when the change follows an unusual sign-in or when a password change follows it, which is what the detection logic on this page describes.

References

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