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Self-Service Password Reset Abuse detection rules

An attacker who controls a user's phone number or mailbox answers the self-service password reset challenge and sets a new password without knowing the old one. Microsoft Entra ID logs every step of the reset flow.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
Medium
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID audit logs
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1098Account Manipulation
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
The user name of an account enabled for self-service password reset, and control of enough of its reset methods, such as the phone number or alternate email.
Impact
A password of the attacker's choice for the account, with the user locked out, and the on-premises password as well where password writeback is configured.
Response
Reset the password as an administrator, revoke the sessions of the account, and remove the phone number or email address that was used for the reset.
Mitigation
Require two authentication methods for a reset, and prefer the Microsoft Authenticator app and OATH tokens over SMS, voice calls and email.
Audit activities
Self-service password reset flow activity progressBlocked from self-service password reset

How the attack works

Self-service password reset (SSPR) lets a user who forgot the password set a new one without the help desk. The user opens the reset portal, enters the user ID, passes a CAPTCHA and then proves who they are with the authentication methods the tenant allows for reset, such as a code sent by SMS, a voice call, a one-time passcode by email or the Microsoft Authenticator app. The tenant decides whether one method or two are required. Nothing in the flow asks for the old password.

That makes the reset methods a way into the account. Whoever receives the user's text messages or reads the mailbox behind the alternate email address can answer the challenge and choose the new password. Where the tenant requires only one method, a single code is enough. Microsoft is retiring security questions for SSPR in March 2027 because they are often guessable or susceptible to social engineering. Where password writeback is configured, the new password is also written to on-premises Active Directory.

Microsoft Entra ID writes the flow to the audit log under the Self-service Password Management service. Self-service password reset flow activity progress is written for each step, with success or failure. Reset password (self-service) records the reset itself. Blocked from self-service password reset is written when a user tried to reset a password, use a specific gate or validate a phone number more than five total times in 24 hours, after which the user is throttled for 24 hours. A legitimate reset and a hostile one write the same activities, so the rules on this page read the signs of trying: the block, and many failed steps in a short time.

What an attacker needs

  • The user name of an account that is enabled for self-service password reset.
  • Control of enough of the account's reset methods to meet the policy, for example the phone number or the alternate email address.
  • For accounts with a Microsoft Entra administrator role, two methods. Microsoft enforces a two-gate reset policy for administrators that cannot be changed.

Impact

A password of the attacker's choice for the account, and the user locked out of it. If the same phone number also serves as the account's MFA method, the attacker holds both factors. With password writeback the on-premises password changes too. Where MFA depends on something the attacker does not have, the new password is the first factor for further attacks.

Detection rules

Many Self-Service Password Reset Steps Failed Within an Hour

Counts failed steps of the self-service password reset flow in the whole tenant. Microsoft writes "Self-service password reset flow activity progress" for each step of a reset, such as passing an authentication gate, with the status success or failure. Somebody who walks through the reset flow for several accounts, to find the ones whose challenge they can answer, fails many steps in a short time and stays under the limit of five attempts per user that produces the block activity. The rule fires at 10 or more failed steps within one hour. The count is for the tenant and not per user, because the audit log mapping has no single field for the target user, so read TargetResources in the matching events to see how many accounts were tried. The threshold and the window are starting points.

Fires when one OperationName has at least 10 matching events within 1 hour.

Threshold ruleLevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Self-Service Password Reset Step Failed (Threshold Base Event)
id: 8a5ebdd7-54a3-46f7-ade1-44938b9a0b88
name: entra_sspr_flow_step_failed
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. A step of the self-service
  password reset flow failed. Microsoft documents that the activity
  "Self-service password reset flow activity progress" is written for each
  step a user proceeds through, with the status failure when the step failed.
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection_step:
    OperationName: Self-service password reset flow activity progress
  selection_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: all of selection_*
level: low
---
title: Many Self-Service Password Reset Steps Failed Within an Hour
id: 07627ae8-9ab4-47fa-9ba7-a04d58e96a34
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts failed steps of the self-service password reset flow in the whole
  tenant. Microsoft writes "Self-service password reset flow activity
  progress" for each step of a reset, such as passing an authentication gate,
  with the status success or failure. Somebody who walks through the reset
  flow for several accounts, to find the ones whose challenge they can
  answer, fails many steps in a short time and stays under the limit of five
  attempts per user that produces the block activity. The rule fires at 10
  or more failed steps within one hour. The count is for the tenant and not
  per user, because the audit log mapping has no single field for the target
  user, so read TargetResources in the matching events to see how many
  accounts were tried. The threshold and the window are starting points.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-sspr-reporting
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1098
correlation:
  type: event_count
  rules:
    - entra_sspr_flow_step_failed
  group-by:
    - OperationName
  timespan: 1h
  condition:
    gte: 10
falsepositives:
  - Large tenants, in which many users fail a reset step in the same hour on an ordinary day, above all after a password expiry or on the first morning after a holiday. Measure the normal number of failed steps per hour and raise the threshold above it.
  - A rollout of self-service password reset or a change of the allowed methods, after which users try methods they have not registered.
  - The values of 10 failed steps and one hour are starting points, not tested limits.
level: low

False positives

  • Large tenants, in which many users fail a reset step in the same hour on an ordinary day, above all after a password expiry or on the first morning after a holiday. Measure the normal number of failed steps per hour and raise the threshold above it.
  • A rollout of self-service password reset or a change of the allowed methods, after which users try methods they have not registered.
  • The values of 10 failed steps and one hour are starting points, not tested limits.

User Blocked From Self-Service Password Reset After Repeated Attempts

Detects the audit activity "Blocked from self-service password reset" of the Self-service Password Management service. Microsoft documents that it indicates a user tried to reset a password, use a specific gate or validate a phone number more than five total times in 24 hours, and that the user is then throttled from further resets, authentication methods and phone number validations for the next 24 hours. The reset flow does not ask for the old password, so repeated failed attempts are what somebody produces who is trying to pass the challenge for an account that is not theirs. Microsoft documents the actor and the target of the activity as the same user, so the account that was tried is in TargetResources.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: User Blocked From Self-Service Password Reset After Repeated Attempts
id: b73ba4ed-aec7-4fb2-98d5-67c6d1176b49
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the audit activity "Blocked from self-service password reset" of
  the Self-service Password Management service. Microsoft documents that it
  indicates a user tried to reset a password, use a specific gate or validate
  a phone number more than five total times in 24 hours, and that the user is
  then throttled from further resets, authentication methods and phone number
  validations for the next 24 hours. The reset flow does not ask for the old
  password, so repeated failed attempts are what somebody produces who is
  trying to pass the challenge for an account that is not theirs. Microsoft
  documents the actor and the target of the activity as the same user, so
  the account that was tried is in TargetResources.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-sspr-reporting
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName: Blocked from self-service password reset
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Users who struggle with the reset flow, for example with an old phone number on the account or mistyped codes. Ask the user through another channel whether the attempts were theirs.
level: medium

False positives

  • Users who struggle with the reset flow, for example with an old phone number on the account or mistyped codes. Ask the user through another channel whether the attempts were theirs.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Failed reset steps for a user followed by a successful self-service reset

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

A user who forgot the password usually passes the reset challenge at the first or second try. Somebody who does not hold the user's methods fails several steps first, for example wrong codes or a wrong phone number, and succeeds once they have talked a code out of the user or taken over the number.

  1. Audit log: Self-service password reset flow activity progress with Result failure. Take the user from TargetResources and count three or more within one hour.
  2. Within the next 24 hours: Reset password (self-service) with Result success for the same user.
  3. Alert on the pair, and raise the priority when the user holds an administrator role.

EventsSelf-service password reset flow activity progressReset password (self-service)

LimitsA user who mistypes codes and then gets it right looks the same. Microsoft documents the status reasons of the flow steps as a table that the audit reference does not reproduce, so the step that failed has to be read from ResultReason in your own data. The three failures and the two windows are starting points.

Self-service reset followed by a new authentication method or a new sign-in address

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsJoins two logsNeeds a baseline

After a hostile reset the attacker signs in from their own network and often registers an authentication method of their own to keep the account. The owner who reset a forgotten password signs in from the usual place and changes nothing else.

  1. Audit log: Reset password (self-service) with Result success. Take the user from TargetResources.
  2. Within one hour, audit log: User registered security info for the same user.
  3. Or within one hour, sign-in log: a successful sign-in of that UserPrincipalName from an IPAddress the user did not use in the previous 30 days.
  4. Alert when either follows the reset.

EventsReset password (self-service)User registered security info

LimitsA user who lost their phone resets the password and registers the new phone on the same day, often from home. The sign-in comparison needs 30 days of sign-in history for the user. The windows are starting points.

Triage

  • Identify the user in TargetResources. For these activities Microsoft documents the actor and the target as the same user.
  • Ask the user, through a channel other than the account's mail or phone, whether they tried to reset the password.
  • Read the flow progress activities of the user before the event, with Result and ResultReason, to see which steps were tried and which failed.
  • Check whether a Reset password (self-service) activity followed, and whether the account then signed in from an unfamiliar address or registered a new authentication method.
  • Check which reset methods the account has and whether a phone number or email address on it changed recently.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Reset the password of the account as an administrator, hand it to the user through a verified channel, and revoke the sessions of the account.
  2. Remove the phone number or email address that was used for the reset from the account until the user confirms they control it.
  3. Remove authentication methods that were registered after the reset, and undo what the account did in that time, such as inbox rules and application consent.
  4. Where password writeback is in use, treat the on-premises account as taken over as well and review its activity.
  5. Raise the number of methods required for a reset to two if it was one.

Mitigation

  • Require two authentication methods for a reset instead of one.
  • Prefer the Microsoft Authenticator app and OATH tokens over SMS, voice calls and email for reset, and stop using security questions before Microsoft retires them.
  • Keep the phone numbers and alternate email addresses on user accounts current. Microsoft notes that correct but unverified data on an account, such as a phone number, can still be used to reset the password.
  • Enable self-service password reset for a group of users who need it when not everybody does.
  • Send the audit log to your SIEM and alert on the block activity.

Frequently asked questions

Can someone reset a password without knowing the old one?

Yes. That is the purpose of self-service password reset. The flow asks for the user ID, a CAPTCHA and the authentication methods the tenant allows for reset, such as a code by SMS, voice call or email, or the Microsoft Authenticator app. It never asks for the old password, so whoever controls enough of those methods can set a new one.

What does the activity "Blocked from self-service password reset" mean?

Microsoft writes it when a user tried to reset a password, use a specific gate or validate a phone number more than five total times in 24 hours. The user is then throttled from further reset attempts for the next 24 hours. It is either a user who struggles with the flow or somebody else who is trying to get through it.

Are administrator accounts protected differently?

Yes. Microsoft enforces a two-gate password reset policy for accounts with Microsoft Entra administrator roles. It requires two pieces of authentication data, prohibits security questions and cannot be changed by the tenant. It can therefore differ from the policy the tenant set for its users.

Do these rules detect a successful hostile reset?

Not on their own. A successful reset is written as Reset password (self-service) whether the user or an attacker did it. The rules read the attempts that fail. Tying a reset to failed steps before it, or to a new sign-in address or a new authentication method after it, needs more than one event and is described under Detection logic.

References

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