How the attack works
NTLM proves that a client knows a password, but by itself it does not prove which server the client meant to talk to. An attacker who receives a victim's NTLM authentication can pass the messages on to a different server while the exchange is still running, and that server signs the attacker in as the victim. No password is cracked and nothing is stolen from the victim's machine.
The attacker first needs the victim to authenticate to a machine the attacker controls. Name resolution poisoning on the local network does that for users; Authentication Coercion does it for servers, including domain controllers, by making them connect on request.
The relay only works against services that accept NTLM without tying the authentication to the connection: SMB without signing, LDAP without signing and channel binding, and HTTP services without Extended Protection for Authentication, such as AD CS web enrollment. Where those protections are required, the forwarded authentication is rejected.
On the target server the result is an ordinary successful NTLM network logon by the victim account, coming from the attacker's address. Computers normally authenticate to domain services with Kerberos, so an NTLM network logon by a computer account, above all by a domain controller's account, stands out.
With NTLM auditing enabled, the domain controller that validates the authentication also writes event 8004 to the NTLM operational log, with the account, the workstation and the member server it came through. A rule on this page matches that event for computer accounts, which shows the logon from the domain controller's side even when the target server's log is not collected. Servers with enhanced NTLM auditing (Windows Server 2025, and Windows Server 2022 and 2019 with the updates released on or after October 13, 2026) also write event 4023 to that log when an incoming NTLM authentication arrives with weakened protection, such as without channel binding or without a message integrity check. Another rule on this page matches it as a low-level sign of an authentication that was not tied to its connection.
What an attacker needs
- A position to receive the victim's authentication: the same network segment (name resolution poisoning), or any domain account that can make a server authenticate (coercion).
- A target service that accepts NTLM and does not require signing, channel binding or Extended Protection for Authentication.
Impact
The attacker acts on the target with the victim's rights. If the victim is a domain controller's computer account and the target is a certificate authority's web enrollment service or the directory itself, the result is control of the domain. For an ordinary user or server the result is that account's access: file shares, directory changes the account may make, or code execution where the account is a local administrator.
Detection rules
Computer Account Logged On Over the Network With NTLM
Detects a successful network logon (4624, logon type 3) by a computer account that used NTLM. Domain-joined computers authenticate to domain services with Kerberos, so NTLM by a computer account is uncommon, and it is what a relayed authentication of a coerced server looks like on the target. Collect the event from domain controllers, certificate authorities and other Tier 0 servers first. Compare IpAddress with the real address of the computer named in TargetUserName. Requires Audit Logon.
title: Computer Account Logged On Over the Network With NTLM
id: fcef6765-580a-45b9-ac0e-3cc8652e45b5
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful network logon (4624, logon type 3) by a computer account
that used NTLM. Domain-joined computers authenticate to domain services with
Kerberos, so NTLM by a computer account is uncommon, and it is what a relayed
authentication of a coerced server looks like on the target. Collect the
event from domain controllers, certificate authorities and other Tier 0
servers first. Compare IpAddress with the real address of the computer named
in TargetUserName. Requires Audit Logon.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1557.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 3
AuthenticationPackageName: NTLM
TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Computers that reach a server by IP address or by a name without a service principal name, which makes Windows fall back to NTLM. Fix the name or SPN, or exclude the pair by TargetUserName and IpAddress.
- Clustered or appliance-based services and older non-Windows systems that authenticate with a computer account over NTLM. Exclude them by IpAddress once verified.
level: medium
False positives
- Computers that reach a server by IP address or by a name without a service principal name, which makes Windows fall back to NTLM. Fix the name or SPN, or exclude the pair by TargetUserName and IpAddress.
- Clustered or appliance-based services and older non-Windows systems that authenticate with a computer account over NTLM. Exclude them by IpAddress once verified.
Computer Account Authenticated With NTLM Through a Member Server
Detects event 8004 in the NTLM operational log of a domain controller for an account name that ends in a dollar sign, the form of a computer account name. The event audits an NTLM authentication that a member server passed to the domain controller. It names that server (secure channel name), the account, the domain and the workstation. Domain-joined computers authenticate to domain services with Kerberos, so NTLM by a computer account is uncommon, and it is what a relayed authentication of a coerced server looks like when the target is a member server, such as the web enrollment service of a certificate authority. The domain controller records it even when the Security log of the target server is not collected. The event holds no network address, so on its own it cannot tell a relay from an NTLM fallback. Give priority to the accounts of domain controllers and to Tier 0 servers in the secure channel name, and read the logon event (4624) on the named server for the source address. Requires the policy "Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain" on domain controllers, set to Enable all to cover every account and server. The field names (SChannelName, UserName, DomainName, WorkstationName, SChannelType) are those of the event template that ships with Windows. Microsoft's documentation gives the labels of the event text only.
title: Computer Account Authenticated With NTLM Through a Member Server
id: 3096ab96-b1b4-4bf5-bd7b-cf4b39645d79
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects event 8004 in the NTLM operational log of a domain controller for an
account name that ends in a dollar sign, the form of a computer account
name. The event audits an NTLM authentication that a member server passed
to the domain controller. It names that server (secure channel name), the
account, the domain and the workstation. Domain-joined computers
authenticate to domain services with Kerberos, so NTLM by a computer account
is uncommon, and it is what a relayed authentication of a coerced server
looks like when the target is a member server, such as the web enrollment
service of a certificate authority. The domain controller records it even
when the Security log of the target server is not collected. The event
holds no network address, so on its own it cannot tell a relay from an NTLM
fallback. Give priority to the accounts of domain controllers and to Tier 0
servers in the secure channel name, and read the logon event (4624) on the
named server for the source address. Requires the policy "Network security:
Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain" on domain
controllers, set to Enable all to cover every account and server.
The field names (SChannelName, UserName, DomainName, WorkstationName,
SChannelType) are those of the event template that ships with Windows.
Microsoft's documentation gives the labels of the event text only.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/jj865682(v=ws.10)
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/askds/ntlm-blocking-and-you-application-analysis-and-auditing-methodologies-in-windows-7
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-restrict-ntlm-audit-ntlm-authentication-in-this-domain
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/deploy/configure-windows-event-collection
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1557.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: ntlm
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name|contains: Security-Netlogon
EventID: 8004
UserName|endswith: '$' # "User name" in the event text
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Computers that reach a server by IP address or by a name without a service principal name, which makes Windows fall back to NTLM. Fix the name or SPN, or exclude the pair by UserName and SChannelName.
- Clustered or appliance-based services and older non-Windows systems that authenticate with a computer account over NTLM. Exclude them by UserName once verified.
level: low
False positives
- Computers that reach a server by IP address or by a name without a service principal name, which makes Windows fall back to NTLM. Fix the name or SPN, or exclude the pair by UserName and SChannelName.
- Clustered or appliance-based services and older non-Windows systems that authenticate with a computer account over NTLM. Exclude them by UserName once verified.
Computer Account Obtained a Ticket-Granting Ticket With a Certificate
Detects a successful Kerberos authentication service request (4768) for a computer account that authenticated with a certificate, from a client address other than the domain controller itself. Computers sign in to the domain with their account password, so the certificate fields of event 4768 are normally empty for them. When a relayed NTLM authentication of a computer, above all of a domain controller, is used to enroll a certificate in that computer's name, the next step is a ticket request with that certificate, and this event records it together with the address it came from. The rule tests the Certificate Thumbprint field for a hash value because the event carries an empty value when no certificate was used. Requires Audit Kerberos Authentication Service.
title: Computer Account Obtained a Ticket-Granting Ticket With a Certificate
id: a89956f9-284b-4018-be14-aa2ca013f760
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful Kerberos authentication service request (4768) for a
computer account that authenticated with a certificate, from a client address
other than the domain controller itself. Computers sign in to the domain with
their account password, so the certificate fields of event 4768 are normally
empty for them. When a relayed NTLM authentication of a computer, above all of
a domain controller, is used to enroll a certificate in that computer's name,
the next step is a ticket request with that certificate, and this event
records it together with the address it came from. The rule tests the
Certificate Thumbprint field for a hash value because the event carries an
empty value when no certificate was used. Requires Audit Kerberos
Authentication Service.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1557.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4768
Status: '0x0'
TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
CertThumbprint|re: '[0-9A-Fa-f]{40}'
filter_loopback:
IpAddress: '::1'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Computers or appliances that are configured to sign in to the domain with a certificate. They are rare. Baseline them and exclude by TargetUserName and CertIssuerName.
level: high
False positives
- Computers or appliances that are configured to sign in to the domain with a certificate. They are rare. Baseline them and exclude by TargetUserName and CertIssuerName.
Server Accepted NTLM Without Its Relay Protections (Enhanced NTLM Auditing)
Detects event 4023 in the NTLM operational log (Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational) of a server. Enhanced NTLM auditing writes an event for every incoming NTLM authentication ("A remote client is using NTLM to authenticate to this workstation") and uses the Warning-level ID 4023, in place of the Information-level 4022, when it sees a downgrade of NTLM security: NTLMv1 was used, Extended Protection for Authentication is marked as not supported or insecure, or an NTLM security feature such as the message integrity check (MIC) was not used. Channel binding, service binding and the MIC are what tie an NTLM authentication to the connection and the service it was meant for, so an authentication that arrives without them is one that could have been forwarded from somewhere else. The event text names the account, the client machine and its IP address, the process that received the authentication, the channel binding, service binding and MIC status and whether the authentication succeeded. The event does not say that a relay took place. Collect it from domain controllers, certificate authorities and other Tier 0 servers first, and compare the client IP address with the real address of the account's computer. Microsoft documents the labels of the event text and not the names of the event data fields, so the rule matches the event ID and the provider only. Microsoft's article names the event source NTLM. The provider that Windows registers for the event is Microsoft-Windows-NTLM, and the rule matches that name. The event exists on Windows 11 version 24H2 and later and Windows Server 2025, and with the updates released on or after October 13, 2026 on Windows Server 2022 and 2019. It is enabled by default and controlled by the policy "NTLM Enhanced Logging".
title: Server Accepted NTLM Without Its Relay Protections (Enhanced NTLM Auditing)
id: bea41304-e584-493e-a014-bd6d0b9ef9a4
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects event 4023 in the NTLM operational log
(Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational) of a server. Enhanced NTLM auditing
writes an event for every incoming NTLM authentication ("A remote client is
using NTLM to authenticate to this workstation") and uses the Warning-level
ID 4023, in place of the Information-level 4022, when it sees a downgrade of
NTLM security: NTLMv1 was used, Extended Protection for Authentication is
marked as not supported or insecure, or an NTLM security feature such as the
message integrity check (MIC) was not used. Channel binding, service binding
and the MIC are what tie an NTLM authentication to the connection and the
service it was meant for, so an authentication that arrives without them is
one that could have been forwarded from somewhere else. The event text names
the account, the client machine and its IP address, the process that
received the authentication, the channel binding, service binding and MIC
status and whether the authentication succeeded. The event does not say
that a relay took place. Collect it from domain controllers, certificate
authorities and other Tier 0 servers first, and compare the client IP
address with the real address of the account's computer. Microsoft
documents the labels of the event text and not the names of the event data
fields, so the rule matches the event ID and the provider only. Microsoft's
article names the event source NTLM. The provider that Windows registers
for the event is Microsoft-Windows-NTLM, and the rule matches that name. The
event exists on Windows 11 version 24H2 and later and Windows Server 2025, and
with the updates released on or after October 13, 2026 on Windows Server
2022 and 2019. It is enabled by default and controlled by the policy "NTLM
Enhanced Logging".
references:
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/servicing/os/windows/2025/07/overview-of-ntlm-auditing-enhancements-in-windows-11-version-24h2-and-windows-server-2025
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1557.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: ntlm
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name|contains: Windows-NTLM
EventID: 4023
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Clients and applications that do not support channel binding or the message integrity check, and services on the server that do not ask for Extended Protection. On a server with many such clients the event is frequent. Baseline it per server and review new client addresses and privileged or computer accounts first.
- Legacy devices that still send NTLMv1. They are covered on the NTLMv1 Authentication page.
level: low
False positives
- Clients and applications that do not support channel binding or the message integrity check, and services on the server that do not ask for Extended Protection. On a server with many such clients the event is frequent. Baseline it per server and review new client addresses and privileged or computer accounts first.
- Legacy devices that still send NTLMv1. They are covered on the NTLMv1 Authentication page.
LDAP Bind Without Signing or Over a Clear Text Connection
Detects event 2889 in the Directory Service log of a domain controller. It is written when a client performs a SASL bind (Negotiate, Kerberos, NTLM or Digest) without requesting signing, or a simple bind over a connection that is not protected by TLS. The event names the client IP address, the identity the client authenticated as and the binding type (0 for a SASL bind without signing, 1 for a simple bind). An NTLM authentication that is relayed to LDAP arrives as a bind without signing, so on a domain controller that does not require signing this event records the relay next to every legacy client. Look for an identity that does not belong to the client address, above all a computer account or a privileged account. The event is logged only while the "16 LDAP Interface Events" diagnostic level is 2 or higher.
title: LDAP Bind Without Signing or Over a Clear Text Connection
id: 166a2d4a-a76f-4253-bae3-dfb1be939608
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects event 2889 in the Directory Service log of a domain controller. It
is written when a client performs a SASL bind (Negotiate, Kerberos, NTLM or
Digest) without requesting signing, or a simple bind over a connection that
is not protected by TLS. The event names the client IP address, the identity
the client authenticated as and the binding type (0 for a SASL bind without
signing, 1 for a simple bind). An NTLM authentication that is relayed to
LDAP arrives as a bind without signing, so on a domain controller that does
not require signing this event records the relay next to every legacy
client. Look for an identity that does not belong to the client address,
above all a computer account or a privileged account. The event is logged
only while the "16 LDAP Interface Events" diagnostic level is 2 or higher.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/active-directory/enable-ldap-signing-in-windows-server
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/ldap-signing
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/2020-2023-and-2024-ldap-channel-binding-and-ldap-signing-requirements-for-windows-kb4520412-ef185fb8-00f7-167d-744c-f299a66fc00a
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-15
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1557.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: directory-service
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name|contains: DomainService
EventID: 2889
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Applications, appliances and scripts that were never configured to sign their LDAP session or to use TLS. Microsoft expects them and recommends fixing these clients before signing is required. Exclude what remains by the client address in the event.
level: low
False positives
- Applications, appliances and scripts that were never configured to sign their LDAP session or to use TLS. Microsoft expects them and recommends fixing these clients before signing is required. Exclude what remains by the client address in the event.
LDAP Bind Over TLS Without a Valid Channel Binding Token
Detects the LDAP channel binding audit events in the Directory Service log of a domain controller. Event 3074 says that a client performed an LDAP bind over SSL/TLS and would have failed the channel binding token validation if the domain controller enforced it. Event 3075 says that the client provided no channel binding information and that the bind will be rejected once validation is enforced. In both cases the domain controller accepted a bind that was not tied to its TLS connection, which is the gap a relay to LDAP over TLS uses. Microsoft added the events to find such clients before enforcement. They name the client IP address, the identity, whether the client supports channel binding and the audit result flags. They exist on Windows Server 2022 with the August 2023 or later updates, on Windows Server 2019 with the October 2023 or later updates and on Windows Server 2025, need the "16 LDAP Interface Events" diagnostic level 2, and according to Microsoft are generated only when the channel binding policy is When supported or Always.
title: LDAP Bind Over TLS Without a Valid Channel Binding Token
id: cf4d3146-ee4b-4fe1-8919-062a6307bdb9
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the LDAP channel binding audit events in the Directory Service log
of a domain controller. Event 3074 says that a client performed an LDAP bind
over SSL/TLS and would have failed the channel binding token validation if
the domain controller enforced it. Event 3075 says that the client provided
no channel binding information and that the bind will be rejected once
validation is enforced. In both cases the domain controller accepted a bind
that was not tied to its TLS connection, which is the gap a relay to LDAP
over TLS uses. Microsoft added the events to find such clients before
enforcement. They name the client IP address, the identity, whether the
client supports channel binding and the audit result flags. They exist on
Windows Server 2022 with the August 2023 or later updates, on Windows Server
2019 with the October 2023 or later updates and on Windows Server 2025, need
the "16 LDAP Interface Events" diagnostic level 2, and according to
Microsoft are generated only when the channel binding policy is When
supported or Always.
references:
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/2020-2023-and-2024-ldap-channel-binding-and-ldap-signing-requirements-for-windows-kb4520412-ef185fb8-00f7-167d-744c-f299a66fc00a
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/ldap-channel-binding
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/get-started/whats-new-windows-server-2025
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-15
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1557.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: directory-service
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name|contains: DomainService
EventID:
- 3074
- 3075
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Clients and appliances that do not support channel binding yet. These are the clients the audit events are meant to find. Update them, then exclude what remains by the client address in the event.
level: low
False positives
- Clients and appliances that do not support channel binding yet. These are the clients the audit events are meant to find. Update them, then exclude what remains by the client address in the event.
LDAP Bind Over TLS Failed Channel Binding Token Validation
Detects event 3039 in the Directory Service log of a domain controller. A client performed an LDAP bind over SSL/TLS and failed the validation of the channel binding token (CBT). The domain controller writes the event when "Domain controller: LDAP server channel binding token requirements" is set to When supported or Always and the client sent an improperly formatted token, sent no token although it is capable of channel binding, or sent no token while the policy is Always. A channel binding token ties the authentication to the TLS connection it was made on, so an authentication that is forwarded over another TLS connection fails this check. The event names the client IP address and the identity the client authenticated as. It is logged only while the "16 LDAP Interface Events" diagnostic level is 2 or higher.
title: LDAP Bind Over TLS Failed Channel Binding Token Validation
id: 5b55a4ce-1801-4d89-ad59-8171dcc5bcba
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects event 3039 in the Directory Service log of a domain controller. A
client performed an LDAP bind over SSL/TLS and failed the validation of the
channel binding token (CBT). The domain controller writes the event when
"Domain controller: LDAP server channel binding token requirements" is set
to When supported or Always and the client sent an improperly formatted
token, sent no token although it is capable of channel binding, or sent no
token while the policy is Always. A channel binding token ties the
authentication to the TLS connection it was made on, so an authentication
that is forwarded over another TLS connection fails this check. The event
names the client IP address and the identity the client authenticated as.
It is logged only while the "16 LDAP Interface Events" diagnostic level is
2 or higher.
references:
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/2020-2023-and-2024-ldap-channel-binding-and-ldap-signing-requirements-for-windows-kb4520412-ef185fb8-00f7-167d-744c-f299a66fc00a
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/ldap-channel-binding
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-15
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1557.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: directory-service
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name|contains: DomainService
EventID: 3039
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Clients that use LDAP over TLS without support for channel binding, or with Extended Protection for Authentication turned off on the client. Update or reconfigure the client, then exclude what remains by the client address in the event.
level: medium
False positives
- Clients that use LDAP over TLS without support for channel binding, or with Extended Protection for Authentication turned off on the client. Update or reconfigure the client, then exclude what remains by the client address in the event.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Computer account signed in over NTLM from an address that is not its own
A relayed authentication arrives from the attacker's machine and not from the computer whose account it is. The logon event names both the account and the source address, so a computer account that signs in from an address which does not belong to that computer is the relay itself. The comparison needs your own inventory of names and addresses, which is why it is not a rule.
- Keep a current table of computer names and their addresses, from DNS, DHCP or the asset inventory, with the domain controllers and other Tier 0 servers marked.
- Find event 4624 with
LogonType3 andAuthenticationPackageNameNTLM whoseTargetUserNameends with a dollar sign. - Look up the computer named in
TargetUserNameand compare its addresses withIpAddressof the event. A mismatch is the finding.WorkstationNameis reported by the client and only supports it. - Give the highest priority to the accounts of domain controllers and to events logged on certificate authorities and domain controllers.
Events4624
LimitsAddress translation, load balancers, multihomed servers and clusters make a computer appear from an address that is not in the table. Dynamic addresses age quickly, so the table has to be valid for the time of the event. A relay to a server whose Security log is not collected is not seen at all.
Triage
- Compare IpAddress and WorkstationName in the event with the real address and name of the account's computer. A logon by
SERVER01$from an address that is not SERVER01's is the relay. - If the account is a domain controller's, treat it as urgent and check what the session did next (certificates issued to that account, directory changes, replication requests).
- Look on the victim machine's side for the coercion or poisoning that started it (inbound RPC calls just before the logon).
- Check the target for the missing protection (SMB signing, LDAP signing and channel binding, Extended Protection) and close it.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Block and isolate the address the relayed logon came from (IpAddress in the event). That system is under the attacker's control, whoever owns it.
- Restrict the service that accepted the relay until the protection it lacked is enforced.
- Reverse what the relayed session did on the target. Revoke certificates that were enrolled in the victim's name, and undo directory changes such as delegation settings, key credentials, group memberships and new accounts.
- If the account of a domain controller was relayed and a certificate or directory replication followed, handle it as a domain compromise.
- Stop the trigger. Disable the service on the victim that was used to make it authenticate, or remove the poisoning host from the network segment.
- Verify with a search for further NTLM network logons of computer accounts from addresses that are not their own.
Mitigation
- Require SMB signing on domain controllers and servers, so a relayed SMB session cannot be used.
- Require LDAP signing and LDAP channel binding on domain controllers. Turn on the LDAP channel binding audit events (3074 and 3075) first to find clients that would fail.
- Enable Extended Protection for Authentication on AD CS web enrollment and other HTTP services that accept NTLM, or turn NTLM off on them.
- Reduce NTLM where Kerberos works. Audit NTLM use first, then restrict it, starting with domain controllers and other Tier 0 servers.
- Remove the ways to make servers authenticate on request (see Authentication Coercion), such as the Print Spooler service on domain controllers.
Frequently asked questions
Do I have to reset the password of the account that was relayed?
The relay does not reveal the password, and nothing is stolen from the victim's machine. What the attacker keeps is whatever the session produced, for example a certificate issued in the victim's name or a change in the directory. Find and reverse those first, because a password reset alone leaves them in place.
Why does the target server log a successful logon and not an error?
The victim's authentication is real. The attacker only forwards its messages to another server while the exchange is still running, so that server sees a correct NTLM authentication and signs the attacker in as the victim. What differs is the source, since the logon comes from the attacker's address and not from the victim's computer.
Is every NTLM network logon by a computer account a relay?
No. Windows falls back to NTLM when a server is reached by IP address or by a name without a service principal name, and some clustered services, appliances and older non-Windows systems authenticate that way. Compare IpAddress with the real address of the computer named in the event. A match points to a fallback, a mismatch to a relay.
Does this page detect the relay of a user's authentication?
Not directly. The logon rules on this page match computer accounts, because a computer that uses NTLM or signs in with a certificate stands out. A relayed user logon looks like an ordinary NTLM network logon of that user from another address, and no rule here separates it. Signing, channel binding and Extended Protection for Authentication reject the relay for users and computers alike.