How the attack works
NTLMv1 builds its challenge-response with DES, so a captured response can be reduced to the account's NT hash quickly, especially when the attacker controls the server challenge. It also lacks the protections NTLMv2 adds against replay and relay. Attackers who can make a machine authenticate to them, for example through name-resolution poisoning or forced authentication, gain far more from a host that still sends NTLMv1.
Whether NTLMv1 is used depends on the LAN Manager authentication level of the client and of the domain controller that validates the logon. Each successful NTLM logon is logged in event 4624 on the computer that was accessed, and the "Package Name (NTLM only)" field (LmPackageName) shows NTLM V1, NTLM V2 or LM. On Windows Server 2025, and on Windows Server 2022 and 2019 with the updates released on or after October 13, 2026, enhanced NTLM auditing also lets a domain controller record the NTLM version of the authentications that member servers forward to it. A second rule on this page matches its Warning-level events (4031 and 4033), which Microsoft uses for NTLMv1 and for other downgrades of NTLM security.
What an attacker needs
- Clients or domain controllers whose LAN Manager authentication level still allows NTLMv1 or LM.
- A way to capture or relay the authentication, such as a position on the network or a coerced connection.
Impact
A captured NTLMv1 response from a user or computer account can be turned into that account's NT hash, which is then usable for pass-the-hash or, for a domain controller's machine account, for DCSync. Continued NTLMv1 use is also a compliance finding.
Detection rules
Domain Controller Logged a Weakened NTLM Authentication (Enhanced NTLM Auditing)
Detects the Warning-level events of enhanced NTLM auditing that a domain controller writes to the NTLM operational log (Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational) when it processes a forwarded NTLM authentication: 4033 when the client account and the server are in the domain of the domain controller, and 4031 for the cross-domain case logged in the domain of the client account. Microsoft writes each of these audit logs under two event IDs and uses the Warning one for a downgrade of NTLM security: NTLMv1 was used, Extended Protection for Authentication is marked as not supported or insecure, or an NTLM security feature such as the message integrity check (MIC) was not used. The ordinary NTLMv2 case is logged as 4032 or 4030 and is not matched. The event text names the client account, the client machine, the server and the NTLM version, so a domain controller shows NTLMv1 for the whole domain without the Security log of every member server. Microsoft documents the labels of the event text and not the names of the event data fields, so the rule matches the event IDs and the provider only. Read the NTLM Version line of the event to separate NTLMv1 from the other downgrades. The events exist on Windows Server 2025 and, with the updates released on or after October 13, 2026, on Windows Server 2022 and 2019. They are enabled by default and controlled by the policy "Log Enhanced Domain-wide NTLM Logs".
title: Domain Controller Logged a Weakened NTLM Authentication (Enhanced NTLM Auditing)
id: 5736fe8d-d614-492b-9e84-a7b66cf78740
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the Warning-level events of enhanced NTLM auditing that a domain
controller writes to the NTLM operational log
(Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational) when it processes a forwarded NTLM
authentication: 4033 when the client account and the server are in the
domain of the domain controller, and 4031 for the cross-domain case logged
in the domain of the client account. Microsoft writes each of these audit
logs under two event IDs and uses the Warning one for a downgrade of NTLM
security: NTLMv1 was used, Extended Protection for Authentication is marked
as not supported or insecure, or an NTLM security feature such as the
message integrity check (MIC) was not used. The ordinary NTLMv2 case is
logged as 4032 or 4030 and is not matched. The event text names the client
account, the client machine, the server and the NTLM version, so a domain
controller shows NTLMv1 for the whole domain without the Security log of
every member server. Microsoft documents the labels of the event text and
not the names of the event data fields, so the rule matches the event IDs
and the provider only. Read the NTLM Version line of the event to separate
NTLMv1 from the other downgrades. The events exist on Windows Server 2025
and, with the updates released on or after October 13, 2026, on Windows
Server 2022 and 2019. They are enabled by default and controlled by the
policy "Log Enhanced Domain-wide NTLM Logs".
references:
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/servicing/os/windows/2025/07/overview-of-ntlm-auditing-enhancements-in-windows-11-version-24h2-and-windows-server-2025
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/audit-domain-controller-ntlmv1
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1557.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: ntlm
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name|contains: Security-Netlogon
EventID:
- 4031
- 4033
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legacy devices and applications that still send NTLMv1 or do not support the message integrity check or channel binding, such as printers, NAS appliances and old SMB clients. The event names the client machine and the server. Exclude known pairs in your SIEM while their migration is tracked.
- The Warning level covers more than NTLMv1. An NTLMv2 authentication without Extended Protection or without a MIC is logged the same way, so read the NTLM Version line before treating an event as NTLMv1.
level: low
False positives
- Legacy devices and applications that still send NTLMv1 or do not support the message integrity check or channel binding, such as printers, NAS appliances and old SMB clients. The event names the client machine and the server. Exclude known pairs in your SIEM while their migration is tracked.
- The Warning level covers more than NTLMv1. An NTLMv2 authentication without Extended Protection or without a MIC is logged the same way, so read the NTLM Version line before treating an event as NTLMv1.
Successful Logon Using NTLMv1 or LM
Detects a successful NTLM logon (4624) whose LAN Manager sub-package (LmPackageName) is NTLM V1 or LM. Anonymous logons are excluded because Windows records sessions without NTLMv2 key material, including anonymous ones, as NTLMv1. Collect 4624 from member servers and workstations as well as domain controllers: the event is written on the computer that was accessed. Requires Audit Logon.
title: Successful Logon Using NTLMv1 or LM
id: 72e823a0-0d74-4fb4-9d27-dd8a980025a5
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful NTLM logon (4624) whose LAN Manager sub-package
(LmPackageName) is NTLM V1 or LM. Anonymous logons are excluded because
Windows records sessions without NTLMv2 key material, including anonymous
ones, as NTLMv1. Collect 4624 from member servers and workstations as well as
domain controllers: the event is written on the computer that was accessed.
Requires Audit Logon.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/audit-domain-controller-ntlmv1
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1557.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4624
AuthenticationPackageName: NTLM
LmPackageName:
- NTLM V1
- LM
filter_anonymous:
TargetUserSid: S-1-5-7
condition: selection and not filter_anonymous
falsepositives:
- Legacy devices and applications (printers, NAS appliances, old Unix SMB clients) that still use NTLMv1. Exclude them by WorkstationName or IpAddress while their migration is tracked.
- Logons without session key material are logged as NTLMv1 even when NTLMv2 was negotiated; check KeyLength before escalating.
level: medium
False positives
- Legacy devices and applications (printers, NAS appliances, old Unix SMB clients) that still use NTLMv1. Exclude them by WorkstationName or IpAddress while their migration is tracked.
- Logons without session key material are logged as NTLMv1 even when NTLMv2 was negotiated; check KeyLength before escalating.
Triage
- Identify the client (WorkstationName, IpAddress) and the account (TargetUserName); a single legacy device or application usually explains repeated events.
- Treat NTLMv1 from a domain controller or other Tier 0 machine account, or a sudden appearance from a host that used NTLMv2 before, as a possible downgrade or coercion attempt.
- Microsoft notes that sessions without NTLMv2 key material are recorded as NTLMv1. Check KeyLength and confirm with the NTLM operational log or a network capture before acting on a single event.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Reset the password of the account whose NTLMv1 response was exposed. For a computer account that means resetting the machine account password of that computer.
- Find the system the client was made to authenticate to and isolate it. That is where the response was captured.
- Raise the LAN Manager authentication level on the affected client now, without waiting for the wider migration, so that it stops sending NTLMv1.
- If the account belongs to a domain controller, check for directory replication requested with it and handle a positive result as described for DCSync.
- Review the logons of the affected account since the event for NTLM logons from hosts it does not use, and confirm in event 4624 that the client now shows NTLM V2.
Mitigation
- Audit NTLMv1 use (event 4624 on servers and domain controllers, and the NTLM operational log) and migrate the remaining clients and applications.
- Set "Network security - LAN Manager authentication level" to "Send NTLMv2 response only. Refuse LM & NTLM" (LmCompatibilityLevel 5) on domain controllers, then on all systems.
- Reduce NTLM use overall in favour of Kerberos, and require SMB and LDAP signing so that relayed sessions are rejected.
Frequently asked questions
Why does event 4624 show NTLM V1 for a client that is configured for NTLMv2?
Microsoft notes that sessions without NTLMv2 key material are recorded as NTLMv1, anonymous sessions among them. The rule excludes anonymous logons for that reason. For a single unexpected event, check KeyLength and confirm with the NTLM operational log or a network capture before acting.
On which computers do I have to collect event 4624 to find NTLMv1?
On the computers that are accessed. The event is written where the logon happens, so member servers and workstations matter as much as domain controllers. A collection limited to domain controllers shows only the NTLMv1 logons to the domain controllers themselves.
Is an NTLMv1 logon an attack or a hygiene finding?
Usually it comes from a legacy device or application, such as a printer, a NAS appliance or an old SMB client, and the finding is the exposure. Treat it as a possible attack when the account belongs to a domain controller or another Tier 0 machine, or when a host that used NTLMv2 before suddenly sends NTLMv1.
Which setting decides whether NTLMv1 is used at all?
The LAN Manager authentication level of the client and of the domain controller that validates the logon. With level 5, Send NTLMv2 response only and refuse LM and NTLM, a domain controller no longer accepts NTLMv1. Audit the current use first, because the remaining legacy clients stop working at that point.