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AD-Integrated DNS Record Abuse (Wildcard, WPAD) detection rules

Any authenticated user can add names to Active Directory-integrated DNS zones. A wildcard, a WPAD name or a specially encoded host name sends other machines and their authentication to the attacker. Detected as dnsNode creation (5137).

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
High
Log source
Windows Security event log
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Any authenticated domain account, as long as the zone keeps the default permission that lets authenticated users create new names.
Impact
Connections and authentication attempts meant for other hosts reach the attacker, who can attack captured NTLM responses offline or relay the authentication to other services.
Response
Isolate the host that the record points to, disable the account that created the record, and delete the dnsNode object so the name is taken away from the attacker.
Mitigation
Enforce SMB signing, LDAP signing and LDAP channel binding so that relayed authentication is rejected, and limit who can create names in the DNS zones to the groups that need it.
Event IDs
51375136

How the attack works

Active Directory-integrated DNS stores each zone as a dnsZone object and each name in it as a dnsNode object, whose dnsRecord attribute holds the resource records. Access is governed by the access control lists of those objects, and by default any authenticated user can create a new name in a zone. The default exists so that computers can register themselves. It also means that a domain user can add a name that does not exist yet and point it at an address of their choice.

Three kinds of names are useful to an attacker. A wildcard record (*) answers every query for a name that has no record of its own, so mistyped, retired and automatically probed host names all resolve to the attacker. A wpad record is what clients look up to find a web proxy configuration automatically. The Windows DNS server does not answer for that name by default, through its global query block list, but the record shows the intent and works wherever the list has been changed. The third kind is a host name that ends in a block of marshalled target information, an encoded suffix that Windows removes from a server name before it authenticates. A machine that is made to connect to such a name authenticates as if it were connecting to the name in front of the suffix. The reflective relay technique fixed as CVE-2025-33073, and Kerberos relay through DNS, rely on that.

Machines that resolve one of these names connect to the attacker's host and, for protocols such as SMB and HTTP, authenticate to it. The attacker captures that authentication or relays it to another service. The record is the only step that touches Active Directory. With an audit entry (SACL) on the DNS zones, the domain controller logs the creation of the dnsNode object in event 5137 and later changes to its records in event 5136, with the name of the node at the start of the object's distinguished name.

What an attacker needs

  • Any authenticated domain account, as long as the zone keeps the default permission that lets authenticated users create names. No account at all where a zone accepts nonsecure dynamic updates.
  • A name that does not exist in the zone yet. An existing name can be changed only by a principal that the access control list of that name allows.
  • For capture or relay, a host under the attacker's control that the victims can reach, and target services that do not enforce signing or channel binding.

Impact

The attacker receives connections and authentication attempts that were meant for other hosts, across the whole zone in the case of a wildcard. Captured NTLM responses can be attacked offline, and relayed authentication gives access to services as the victim, up to domain controllers and certificate services when a privileged machine is made to authenticate. A WPAD record also lets the attacker act as web proxy for every client that accepts it.

Detection rules

DNS Record Name With Marshalled Target Information Created

Detects the creation (event 5137) of a dnsNode object whose name contains 1UWhRCA, the start of marshalled target information. Windows appends such an encoded block to a server name and removes it again before it authenticates, so a machine that is made to connect to a name of this form authenticates as if it had connected to the name in front of the block. Host names built this way are the DNS records described for the reflective relay technique fixed as CVE-2025-33073 and for Kerberos relay through DNS, and have no legitimate use. The marker comes from the published research by Synacktiv and Google Project Zero, not from Microsoft documentation. The encoded block always starts with the same fixed header, which is what the rule matches. Requires the audit subcategory Audit Directory Service Changes and an audit entry (SACL) on the DNS zones that audits the creation of dnsNode objects.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: DNS Record Name With Marshalled Target Information Created
id: 4e8ccfbe-76e6-4126-b430-423b2cdaf44d
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the creation (event 5137) of a dnsNode object whose name contains
  1UWhRCA, the start of marshalled target information. Windows appends such an
  encoded block to a server name and removes it again before it authenticates,
  so a machine that is made to connect to a name of this form authenticates as
  if it had connected to the name in front of the block. Host names built this
  way are the DNS records described for the reflective relay technique fixed as
  CVE-2025-33073 and for Kerberos relay through DNS, and have no legitimate
  use. The marker comes from the published research by Synacktiv and Google
  Project Zero, not from Microsoft documentation. The encoded block always
  starts with the same fixed header, which is what the rule matches. Requires
  the audit subcategory Audit Directory Service Changes and an audit entry
  (SACL) on the DNS zones that audits the creation of dnsNode objects.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001/
  - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-33073
  - https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
  - https://projectzero.google/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5137
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1557.001
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5137
    ObjectClass: dnsNode
    ObjectDN|contains: '1UWhRCA'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Authorized penetration tests and security assessments that register such a name. No administrative task creates one.
level: high

False positives

  • Authorized penetration tests and security assessments that register such a name. No administrative task creates one.

Wildcard DNS Record Created or Changed in an AD-Integrated Zone

Detects a dnsNode object named * (the wildcard) that is created (event 5137) or receives a new value of its dnsRecord attribute (event 5136, Value Added) in an Active Directory-integrated DNS zone. A wildcard record answers every query for a name that has no record of its own, so whoever controls it receives the connections and the authentication of machines that look up mistyped, retired or automatically probed names. The second event covers a node that already exists, for example one left behind after its records were deleted, which is changed and not created when a record is added. The node name is the first component of ObjectDN. It is matched with a regular expression because the name is the asterisk character itself. Requires the audit subcategory Audit Directory Service Changes and an audit entry (SACL) on the DNS zones that audits the creation of dnsNode objects and writes to them.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Wildcard DNS Record Created or Changed in an AD-Integrated Zone
id: c722aa26-ba63-4cb7-8c64-08a7dbba77b7
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a dnsNode object named * (the wildcard) that is created (event 5137)
  or receives a new value of its dnsRecord attribute (event 5136, Value Added)
  in an Active Directory-integrated DNS zone. A wildcard record answers every
  query for a name that has no record of its own, so whoever controls it
  receives the connections and the authentication of machines that look up
  mistyped, retired or automatically probed names. The second event covers a
  node that already exists, for example one left behind after its records were
  deleted, which is changed and not created when a record is added. The node
  name is the first component of ObjectDN. It is matched with a regular
  expression because the name is the asterisk character itself. Requires the
  audit subcategory Audit Directory Service Changes and an audit entry (SACL)
  on the DNS zones that audits the creation of dnsNode objects and writes to
  them.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5137
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/networking/dns/zone-types
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/c-dnsnode
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-dnsrecord
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1557.001
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection_created:
    EventID: 5137
    ObjectClass: dnsNode
  selection_changed:
    EventID: 5136
    ObjectClass: dnsNode
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: dnsRecord
    OperationType:
      - '%%14674'
      - 'Value Added'
  name_wildcard:
    ObjectDN|re|i: '^DC=\*,'
  condition: 1 of selection_* and name_wildcard
falsepositives:
  - An administrator who creates or maintains a wildcard on purpose, either because the organization uses one or to reserve the name so that nobody else can register it. Check the writer and the address in the record, and exclude the DNS administration accounts by SubjectUserName if this is routine.
  - The DNS server refreshing the time stamp of a wildcard record that was registered dynamically, which rewrites dnsRecord under the account of the domain controller.
level: high

False positives

  • An administrator who creates or maintains a wildcard on purpose, either because the organization uses one or to reserve the name so that nobody else can register it. Check the writer and the address in the record, and exclude the DNS administration accounts by SubjectUserName if this is routine.
  • The DNS server refreshing the time stamp of a wildcard record that was registered dynamically, which rewrites dnsRecord under the account of the domain controller.

WPAD DNS Record Created or Changed in an AD-Integrated Zone

Detects a dnsNode object named wpad that is created (event 5137) or receives a new value of its dnsRecord attribute (event 5136, Value Added) in an Active Directory-integrated DNS zone. Clients look up that name to find a web proxy configuration automatically, so whoever controls the record can place a proxy in front of them and collect the authentication they send to it. The Windows DNS server does not answer for wpad while the name is on its global query block list, which is the default. The record still shows the intent, and it works on servers where the list was changed. The node name is the first component of ObjectDN. Requires the audit subcategory Audit Directory Service Changes and an audit entry (SACL) on the DNS zones that audits the creation of dnsNode objects and writes to them.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: WPAD DNS Record Created or Changed in an AD-Integrated Zone
id: 8abbce79-a339-4833-b33c-fa8cee074ac8
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a dnsNode object named wpad that is created (event 5137) or receives
  a new value of its dnsRecord attribute (event 5136, Value Added) in an Active
  Directory-integrated DNS zone. Clients look up that name to find a web proxy
  configuration automatically, so whoever controls the record can place a proxy
  in front of them and collect the authentication they send to it. The Windows
  DNS server does not answer for wpad while the name is on its global query
  block list, which is the default. The record still shows the intent, and it
  works on servers where the list was changed. The node name is the first
  component of ObjectDN. Requires the audit subcategory Audit Directory Service
  Changes and an audit entry (SACL) on the DNS zones that audits the creation
  of dnsNode objects and writes to them.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5137
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/dnsserver/set-dnsserverglobalqueryblocklist
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/networking/dns/zone-types
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1557.001
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection_created:
    EventID: 5137
    ObjectClass: dnsNode
    ObjectDN|startswith: 'DC=wpad,'
  selection_changed:
    EventID: 5136
    ObjectClass: dnsNode
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: dnsRecord
    OperationType:
      - '%%14674'
      - 'Value Added'
    ObjectDN|startswith: 'DC=wpad,'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Organizations that use web proxy auto-discovery and maintain the wpad record themselves, and administrators who create the name to reserve it. Check the writer and the address in the record, and exclude the DNS administration accounts by SubjectUserName if this is routine.
level: medium

False positives

  • Organizations that use web proxy auto-discovery and maintain the wpad record themselves, and administrators who create the name to reserve it. Check the writer and the address in the record, and exclude the DNS administration accounts by SubjectUserName if this is routine.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

DNS record created for a host name that a service principal name still references

Detection hypothesisNeeds your own lists

An SPN that names a host without a DNS record is left behind when a server is retired or a name is mistyped. Any authenticated user can create the missing name and point it at a machine of their own, which was the starting point of the Kerberos reflection fixed as CVE-2025-58726. The new name looks like any other registration until it is compared with the SPNs in the directory.

  1. A name is created in an AD-integrated zone: event 5137 with ObjectClass dnsNode. The name is the first component of ObjectDN and the zone is the second. Keep SubjectUserName.
  2. Build the host name from the two and compare it with the host part of the servicePrincipalName values in your own export of the directory.
  3. A match is the finding when the account that holds the SPN is not the account that created the name. Raise the priority when SubjectUserName is a user account and not a computer account.
  4. Resolve the new name and check whether the address belongs to the host the SPN was meant for.

Events5137

LimitsThe SPN export has to be current. Computers that register their own name match their own SPNs, which the comparison of the two accounts removes, and a DHCP server that registers names for its clients needs its own exception. Event 5137 needs an auditing entry on the DNS zones.

DNS name created by a user account and removed again within the hour

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

A name added only to catch or relay authentication is needed for minutes. Attackers remove it once the victims have connected, so that a later look at the zone shows nothing. Computers keep the names they register, and administrators rarely create a name and delete it the same hour. A name created by a user account and deleted or tombstoned shortly after is that clean-up.

  1. A name is created in an AD-integrated zone by an account that is not a computer account: event 5137 with ObjectClass dnsNode and a SubjectUserName that does not end in $. Keep ObjectGUID, ObjectDN and the time.
  2. Within 60 minutes, a starting value, the same object is deleted (event 5141 with the same ObjectGUID), or its records are removed: event 5136 on the same ObjectDN with AttributeLDAPDisplayName dnsRecord and OperationType Value Deleted, or with dNSTombstoned set to TRUE.
  3. Between the two events, search servers and domain controllers for network logons (4624, logon type 3) and Kerberos service ticket requests from the address the record pointed to.

Events5137514151364624

LimitsAdministrators who test a record and remove it produce the same pair. A name that is left in place is caught by the single-event rules instead. The events need the auditing entry on the DNS zones described above, and the 60 minutes are a starting point.

Triage

  • Read the node name at the start of ObjectDN and the zone that follows it. A wildcard, wpad, or a host name followed by a long run of the letter A is not a normal host registration.
  • Identify the creator (SubjectUserName). Computers register their own names with their computer account, and administrators use known accounts. An ordinary user account that creates a name is the pattern to worry about.
  • Resolve the name against the DNS server and check where it points. An address that belongs to a workstation, or to no known server, confirms the suspicion.
  • Look for authentication that followed. Search servers and domain controllers for NTLM network logons (4624, logon type 3) and Kerberos service ticket requests that come from the address in the record.
  • Remove the record, restrict the name, and check the hosts that resolved it for forced authentication around the same time.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Isolate the host that the record points to, and disable the account that created the record until it has been investigated.
  2. Take the name away from the attacker. Delete the dnsNode object, and for a wildcard or wpad name have an administrator create it again with a restricted access control list, so that the same account cannot register it a second time.
  3. List the machines and users that connected to the address in the record while it existed. Reset the passwords of the user accounts whose NTLM responses were sent there, because captured responses can be attacked offline.
  4. For authentication that was relayed, review what was done on the target service in the victim's name. A privileged machine account relayed to a domain controller or to certificate services turns this into a domain-level incident.
  5. Search the DNS zones for other names created by the same account, and confirm that the removed name no longer resolves to the attacker's address.

Mitigation

  • Install the June 2025 security updates, which address CVE-2025-33073, on all Windows machines, and enforce SMB signing so that relayed SMB authentication is rejected.
  • Enforce LDAP signing, LDAP channel binding and Extended Protection for Authentication on services that accept NTLM, so that a relayed authentication has nowhere to land.
  • Reserve the names an attacker would want, such as wpad, in the way Microsoft describes for reserving names. An administrator creates the name and limits its access control list, so that nobody else can register it.
  • Review the access control lists of the zones. Where clients do not need to register themselves, or a DHCP server does it for them, replace the entry that lets all authenticated users create names with one for the groups that need it.
  • Keep the DNS global query block list enabled with wpad and isatap on every DNS server, and set the zones to accept secure dynamic updates only.
  • Add an audit entry (SACL) for Everyone on the DNS zones that audits the creation of dnsNode objects and writes to them, in the DomainDnsZones and ForestDnsZones partitions and under CN=MicrosoftDNS,CN=System, and enable the audit subcategory Audit Directory Service Changes on domain controllers.

Frequently asked questions

Why is nothing logged when someone creates a wildcard record in our DNS zones?

Events 5137 and 5136 are written only for objects that an audit entry (SACL) covers. The DNS zones need an entry that audits the creation of dnsNode objects and writes to them, in the DomainDnsZones and ForestDnsZones partitions and under CN=MicrosoftDNS,CN=System, and domain controllers need the audit subcategory Audit Directory Service Changes. Without both, the record is created silently.

Is a wpad record still a problem when the DNS global query block list is enabled?

While `wpad` is on the global query block list, which is the default, the Windows DNS server does not answer for the name, so clients of that server are not redirected. The record still shows that someone tried, and it starts to work on any DNS server where the list was changed. Find out who created it and remove it.

Which benign activity creates or changes these DNS names?

An administrator may maintain a wildcard or a `wpad` record on purpose, or create the name only to reserve it so that nobody else can register it. The DNS server also rewrites the record of a dynamically registered wildcard when it refreshes the time stamp, under the account of the domain controller. No administrative task creates a name that contains marshalled target information.

References

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