How the attack works
A domain controller works with two lists of certification authorities. Its Windows certificate store says which CAs it trusts at all, for example for TLS. The NTAuth store of the forest says which CAs may issue certificates that are used to sign in. CVE-2025-26647 is the gap between the two. Microsoft describes it as a case in which the CA that issued a sign-in certificate is trusted but is not in the NTAuth store, and the account has an explicit mapping (by subject key identifier) in its altSecurityIdentities attribute. A certificate from any CA the domain controller trusted could then be used to sign in as that account, although the CA was never approved for sign-in.
Microsoft closed the gap in steps. With the updates released on or after April 8, 2025 the Key Distribution Center (KDC) checks the chain against the NTAuth store in Audit mode: the sign-in still succeeds, and the domain controller writes event 45 to its System log with the user and the subject, issuer, serial number and thumbprint of the certificate. In Enforcement mode, which is the default since the updates of July 2025, the request is denied and the KDC logs the older, general event 21 for a client certificate that is not valid. Updates from October 2025 no longer support the registry value that switched the check back to Audit mode or off.
Event 45 therefore records a sign-in that worked with a certificate from outside the NTAuth store, and event 21 a certificate sign-in that was refused. This page differs from Certificate Authentication With a Weak or Mismatched Mapping, whose events 39 to 41 are about how a certificate is tied to an account, not about which CA issued it. It also differs from NTAuth Store or PKI Trust Object Changed: an attacker who adds their CA to the store passes this check, and only the directory change shows it.
What an attacker needs
- A certificate with its private key from a CA that the domain controllers trust but that is not in the NTAuth store, for example a CA that was set up for another purpose.
- An explicit mapping on the target account that the certificate matches, or the right to write one (see Explicit Certificate Mapping Written to an Account).
- A domain controller that does not enforce the check. It is missing the April 2025 or later updates, or it is still in Audit mode or has the check switched off.
Impact
The attacker signs in as the mapped account without its password. For a privileged account that is an elevation of privilege up to control of the domain, and the access does not end with a password reset because it rests on the certificate and the mapping.
Detection rules
KDC Accepted a Certificate That Does Not Chain to the NTAuth Store
Detects event 45 of the Kerberos Key Distribution Center in the System log of a domain controller. The KDC writes it when it encounters a client certificate that is valid but does not chain to a root in the NTAuth store. It is the audit event of the protections for CVE-2025-26647: in Audit mode the authentication request is allowed and this warning is logged, so each event is a sign-in that succeeded with a certificate from a CA that was not approved for sign-in. The event lists the user and the subject, issuer, serial number and thumbprint of the certificate. Microsoft names two cases that may be ignored: Windows Hello for Business sign-ins whose subject and issuer have the form of a SID, an identifier, login.windows.net, the tenant ID and the user principal name, and computer accounts whose subject and issuer are the same computer with the serial number 0 1. Microsoft's article gives the labels of the event text and not the names of the event data fields, so the rule matches the event ID and the provider only and these cases have to be separated in triage. The event exists on domain controllers with the updates released on or after April 8, 2025.
title: KDC Accepted a Certificate That Does Not Chain to the NTAuth Store
id: 06ec0220-6945-46da-a86a-8a83f585968f
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects event 45 of the Kerberos Key Distribution Center in the System log
of a domain controller. The KDC writes it when it encounters a client
certificate that is valid but does not chain to a root in the NTAuth store.
It is the audit event of the protections for CVE-2025-26647: in Audit mode
the authentication request is allowed and this warning is logged, so each
event is a sign-in that succeeded with a certificate from a CA that was not
approved for sign-in. The event lists the user and the subject, issuer,
serial number and thumbprint of the certificate. Microsoft names two cases
that may be ignored: Windows Hello for Business sign-ins whose subject and
issuer have the form of a SID, an identifier, login.windows.net, the tenant
ID and the user principal name, and computer accounts whose subject and
issuer are the same computer with the serial number 0 1. Microsoft's
article gives the labels of the event text and not the names of the event
data fields, so the rule matches the event ID and the provider only and
these cases have to be separated in triage. The event exists on domain
controllers with the updates released on or after April 8, 2025.
references:
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/servicing/os/windows/docs/2025/03/protections-for-cve-2025-26647-kerberos-authentication
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1649
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name|contains: Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center
EventID: 45
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Self-signed certificates of Windows Hello for Business in key trust mode and of machine public key authentication, which Microsoft says may be ignored when they match the documented subject and issuer formats.
- Users and devices whose sign-in certificates come from a CA of the organization that was never published to the NTAuth store. Publish the CA if it is meant to issue sign-in certificates, or move the users to one that is.
level: medium
False positives
- Self-signed certificates of Windows Hello for Business in key trust mode and of machine public key authentication, which Microsoft says may be ignored when they match the documented subject and issuer formats.
- Users and devices whose sign-in certificates come from a CA of the organization that was never published to the NTAuth store. Publish the CA if it is meant to issue sign-in certificates, or move the users to one that is.
KDC Rejected a Client Certificate as Not Valid
Detects event 21 of the Kerberos Key Distribution Center in the System log of a domain controller: the client certificate for a user is not valid and resulted in a failed smart card logon. Under the Enforcement mode of the protections for CVE-2025-26647 this is the event a domain controller logs when it denies a sign-in with a valid certificate that does not chain to a CA in the NTAuth store. In that case the chain status in the event says that a CA certificate is not trusted by the policy provider. Microsoft calls event 21 a generic, legacy event that may be logged for several reasons, so the rule is kept at a low level. It shows that a certificate sign-in was attempted and refused, and for which user. Microsoft's article gives the event text and not the names of the event data fields, so the rule matches the event ID and the provider only. Collect the System log of every domain controller.
title: KDC Rejected a Client Certificate as Not Valid
id: 4e20d362-a41b-41dc-b535-5f0a38cb33e3
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects event 21 of the Kerberos Key Distribution Center in the System log
of a domain controller: the client certificate for a user is not valid and
resulted in a failed smart card logon. Under the Enforcement mode of the
protections for CVE-2025-26647 this is the event a domain controller logs
when it denies a sign-in with a valid certificate that does not chain to a
CA in the NTAuth store. In that case the chain status in the event says
that a CA certificate is not trusted by the policy provider. Microsoft
calls event 21 a generic, legacy event that may be logged for several
reasons, so the rule is kept at a low level. It shows that a certificate
sign-in was attempted and refused, and for which user. Microsoft's article
gives the event text and not the names of the event data fields, so the
rule matches the event ID and the provider only. Collect the System log of
every domain controller.
references:
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/servicing/os/windows/docs/2025/03/protections-for-cve-2025-26647-kerberos-authentication
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1649
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name|contains: Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center
EventID: 21
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Other certificate problems that the same event reports, and the self-signed certificates of Windows Hello for Business in key trust mode and of machine public key authentication, for which Microsoft documented a known issue after the April 2025 updates. Read the user and the chain status in the event.
level: low
False positives
- Other certificate problems that the same event reports, and the self-signed certificates of Windows Hello for Business in key trust mode and of machine public key authentication, for which Microsoft documented a known issue after the April 2025 updates. Read the user and the chain status in the event.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Ticket issued with a certificate whose issuer is not one of your sign-in CAs
The System log events exist only on updated domain controllers. The Security log records the issuer of every certificate that was used to obtain a ticket, on any domain controller. Microsoft recommends watching that field for a CA that is not from your PKI or not authorized to issue sign-in certificates. A ticket from such an issuer is the same finding as event 45, seen from the Security log.
- Write down the names of the CAs that are meant to issue sign-in certificates, which are the CAs published in the NTAuth store of the forest.
- Find event 4768 with result code 0x0 in which
CertIssuerNameis not empty and is not on that list. - Read
TargetUserName,TargetSid,CertSerialNumber,CertThumbprintandIpAddressof those events. - Check
altSecurityIdentitiesof the account for the mapping that made the certificate match, and look for the write (event 5136 on that attribute).
Events47685136
LimitsThe event holds only the name of the issuer, and an attacker can give their CA the name of one of yours. The self-signed certificates that Microsoft describes for event 45 (Windows Hello for Business, machine public key sign-in) can show issuers that are not CAs and have to be excluded by their pattern. The list of CAs has to come from your own PKI.
Triage
- Read the user and the certificate subject, issuer, serial number and thumbprint in event 45.
- Rule out the two cases Microsoft says may be ignored. One is a Windows Hello for Business sign-in whose certificate subject and issuer have the form of a SID, an identifier, login.windows.net, the tenant ID and the user principal name. The other is a computer account whose certificate subject and issuer are the same computer and whose serial number is 0 1.
- Identify the issuing CA. A CA of your own that is missing from the NTAuth store is a configuration gap. A CA nobody knows is the finding.
- Look at
altSecurityIdentitiesof the account for the mapping the certificate matched, and find out who wrote it and when (event 5136). - Event 45 means the sign-in succeeded, so review what the account did afterwards. For event 21, read the user and the chain status in the event, because the event is also written for other certificate problems.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Remove the explicit mapping that let the certificate match the account, and disable or reset the account that wrote it.
- Treat the account that was signed in to as compromised, end its sessions and review its activity since the first event.
- Move the domain controllers to Enforcement, by installing the current updates or setting the registry value to 2 where it is still honored, once the legitimate cases are resolved.
- If the certificate came from a CA of your own, revoke it there and find out how the attacker was able to enroll it.
- Search the System log of every domain controller for further events 45 with the same issuer or thumbprint.
Mitigation
- Install the current updates on every domain controller. The updates from July 2025 enforce the NTAuth check by default, and those from October 2025 remove the option to weaken it.
- On domain controllers that still honor the
AllowNtAuthPolicyBypassregistry value, do not leave it at 0 (off) or 1 (Audit mode) longer than the migration needs. - Resolve every event 45. Move the affected users and devices to certificates from a CA in the NTAuth store, and publish a CA to the store only when it is meant to issue sign-in certificates.
- Review the explicit mappings in
altSecurityIdentities, above all on privileged accounts, and remove those nobody can explain. - Collect the System log of every domain controller.
Frequently asked questions
Does KDC event 45 mean that the sign-in was blocked?
No. Event 45 is the audit event. The domain controller found a valid certificate that does not chain to a CA in the NTAuth store and still allowed the request. In Enforcement mode the request is denied and the KDC logs event 21 for a client certificate that is not valid.
Which events 45 can be ignored?
Microsoft names two. Windows Hello for Business sign-ins whose certificate subject and issuer have the format of a SID, an identifier, login.windows.net, the tenant ID and the user principal name. And machine sign-ins with a public key in which the user is a computer account, subject and issuer are the same computer and the serial number is 0 1.
Why does event 21 appear when all our CAs are in the NTAuth store?
Event 21 is an older, general event for a client certificate that was not accepted for smart card logon. Microsoft states that it can be logged for several reasons, and a chain that does not reach the NTAuth store is only one of them. Read the chain status in the event before drawing a conclusion.
How does this differ from KDC events 39 to 41?
Events 39 to 41 report how a certificate is tied to an account, that is a missing strong mapping or a SID that does not match. Events 45 and 21 on this page report which CA issued the certificate. A certificate can pass one check and fail the other.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1649: Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
- KB5057784: Protections for CVE-2025-26647 (Kerberos Authentication), KDC events 45 and 21
- How to import third-party certification authority (CA) certificates into the Enterprise NTAuth store
- Event 4768: A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested
- Event 5136: A directory service object was modified