How the attack works
An Enterprise CA has its own configuration, separate from the certificate templates in Active Directory. Its security descriptor decides who holds the Manage CA right (CA administrator) and the Issue and Manage Certificates right (certificate manager). Its policy settings include flags such as EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2, which lets every requester add a subject alternative name to a request. Its audit filter decides which CA operations are written to the Security log.
A principal that should not administer PKI but holds Manage CA (the ESC7 misconfiguration) can use these settings to make the CA exploitable: grant itself the certificate manager right and approve pending requests, turn on the "user specifies SAN" flag (ESC6), or narrow the audit filter before acting. With "Audit Certification Services" enabled and the matching audit filter categories selected on the CA, the CA server logs 4882 (security permissions changed), 4890 (certificate manager settings changed), 4885 (audit filter changed), 4891 (configuration entry changed) and 4892 (property changed) in its own Security log. Two further rules read event 4897, which records a change of the role separation setting, and events 4873 and 4874, which a CA writes when the extensions or attributes of a pending request are changed before it is issued (they need the "Issue and manage certificate requests" category).
What an attacker needs
- The Manage CA right on the certification authority, or local administrator rights on the CA server.
Impact
A CA that issues certificates the attacker can use to authenticate as other accounts, including domain administrators and domain controllers. Certificates issued this way stay valid until they expire or are revoked and are unaffected by password resets.
Detection rules
Certification Authority Configuration or Audit Filter Changed
Detects a change to the audit filter of an AD CS certification authority (4885), to a CA configuration entry (4891) or to a CA property (4892). Configuration entries include the policy module flags that decide whether a requester may supply a subject alternative name, and a narrower audit filter hides later CA operations. Logged in the Security log of the CA server; requires Audit Certification Services and the "Change CA security settings" and "Change CA configuration" categories in the CA's audit filter.
title: Certification Authority Configuration or Audit Filter Changed
id: 9b8a6cbb-3b3a-4b38-a636-28f254b9fdc0
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change to the audit filter of an AD CS certification authority
(4885), to a CA configuration entry (4891) or to a CA property (4892).
Configuration entries include the policy module flags that decide whether a
requester may supply a subject alternative name, and a narrower audit filter
hides later CA operations. Logged in the Security log of the CA server;
requires Audit Certification Services and the "Change CA security settings"
and "Change CA configuration" categories in the CA's audit filter.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-certification-services
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn786423(v=ws.11)
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1649
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4885
- 4891
- 4892
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- CA maintenance by PKI administrators, such as changing CRL publication settings, validity periods or the audit filter itself. Review the changed entry and its new value rather than excluding the administrators.
level: medium
False positives
- CA maintenance by PKI administrators, such as changing CRL publication settings, validity periods or the audit filter itself. Review the changed entry and its new value rather than excluding the administrators.
Certification Authority Permissions or Certificate Manager Settings Changed
Detects a change to the security permissions of an AD CS certification authority (4882) or to its certificate manager restrictions (4890). These settings decide who administers the CA and who can approve certificate requests, so an unexpected change is how a Manage CA right is turned into control of issuance. Logged in the Security log of the CA server; requires Audit Certification Services and the "Change CA security settings" category in the CA's audit filter.
title: Certification Authority Permissions or Certificate Manager Settings Changed
id: f0c760b9-ad1f-4320-964c-bcd76f2fb4bb
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change to the security permissions of an AD CS certification
authority (4882) or to its certificate manager restrictions (4890). These
settings decide who administers the CA and who can approve certificate
requests, so an unexpected change is how a Manage CA right is turned into
control of issuance. Logged in the Security log of the CA server; requires
Audit Certification Services and the "Change CA security settings" category in
the CA's audit filter.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-certification-services
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn786423(v=ws.11)
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1649
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4882
- 4890
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- PKI administrators delegating CA roles or configuring certificate manager restrictions. These changes are rare; match each one to a change record.
level: high
False positives
- PKI administrators delegating CA roles or configuring certificate manager restrictions. These changes are rare; match each one to a change record.
Certification Authority Role Separation Setting Changed
Detects event 4897 (role separation enabled) on an AD CS certification authority, which the CA writes with the new state of the setting. Role separation makes the CA refuse an account that holds more than one CA role, so that the person who administers the CA cannot also approve requests. Microsoft notes that a local administrator of the CA server can always switch it off, which may make an account eligible for rights it should not have, and recommends an alert when the expected configuration changes. The rule matches on the event ID alone, because Microsoft documents the content of the event as message text and not as a named field. Read the state in the event text. Logged in the Security log of the CA server. Requires Audit Certification Services and the "Change CA security settings" category in the CA's audit filter.
title: Certification Authority Role Separation Setting Changed
id: b31fee5d-8977-4cc6-814e-17b01d5fd899
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects event 4897 (role separation enabled) on an AD CS certification
authority, which the CA writes with the new state of the setting. Role
separation makes the CA refuse an account that holds more than one CA role,
so that the person who administers the CA cannot also approve requests.
Microsoft notes that a local administrator of the CA server can always
switch it off, which may make an account eligible for rights it should not
have, and recommends an alert when the expected configuration changes. The
rule matches on the event ID alone, because Microsoft documents the content
of the event as message text and not as a named field. Read the state in
the event text. Logged in the Security log of the CA server. Requires Audit
Certification Services and the "Change CA security settings" category in
the CA's audit filter.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn786423(v=ws.11)
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-cs/secure-delegate-audit-certification-authority
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-certification-services
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1649
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4897
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- PKI administrators who turn role separation on during a hardening project, or off for a documented maintenance task. The setting rarely changes. Match each event to a change record.
level: medium
False positives
- PKI administrators who turn role separation on during a hardening project, or off for a documented maintenance task. The setting rarely changes. Match each event to a change record.
Extension or Attributes of a Pending Certificate Request Changed
Detects a change to a certificate request that is waiting in the queue of an AD CS certification authority: an extension of the request was changed (4873) or one or more of its attributes were changed (4874). Only a holder of the Issue and Manage Certificates right can do this, and it is how a certificate manager turns a harmless pending request into one that names another identity or another purpose before issuing it. Microsoft rates both events as medium and notes that they may indicate tampering with a request where the CA does not use this function, and its guidance for pending requests says not to correct a request with a certificate manager action but to require a new one. The rule matches on the event IDs alone, because Microsoft documents the content of the events (Request ID, the extension name or the attributes) as message text and not as named fields, so the level is one step lower. Logged in the Security log of the CA server. Requires Audit Certification Services and the "Issue and manage certificate requests" category in the CA's audit filter.
title: Extension or Attributes of a Pending Certificate Request Changed
id: 54f54d83-82f6-4b0a-94bc-b381b1802fa8
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change to a certificate request that is waiting in the queue of an
AD CS certification authority: an extension of the request was changed
(4873) or one or more of its attributes were changed (4874). Only a holder
of the Issue and Manage Certificates right can do this, and it is how a
certificate manager turns a harmless pending request into one that names
another identity or another purpose before issuing it. Microsoft rates both
events as medium and notes that they may indicate tampering with a request
where the CA does not use this function, and its guidance for pending
requests says not to correct a request with a certificate manager action
but to require a new one. The rule matches on the event IDs alone, because
Microsoft documents the content of the events (Request ID, the extension
name or the attributes) as message text and not as named fields, so the
level is one step lower. Logged in the Security log of the CA server.
Requires Audit Certification Services and the "Issue and manage certificate
requests" category in the CA's audit filter.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn786423(v=ws.11)
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-certification-services
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-cs/review-dispose-pending-certificate-requests
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1649
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4873
- 4874
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A certificate manager who adds a missing extension or attribute to a pending request on purpose. Microsoft advises against this practice. Match each event to the request ID and to the person who approved the change.
level: medium
False positives
- A certificate manager who adds a missing extension or attribute to a pending request on purpose. Microsoft advises against this practice. Match each event to the request ID and to the person who approved the change.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Pending request changed by a certificate manager and then issued
A request that waits for approval was checked against its template when it arrived. A certificate manager who changes its extensions or attributes afterwards and then issues it obtains a certificate that no template would have allowed. The three events share the request ID, so the chain can be followed for one request.
- A request is set to pending: event 4889 on the CA. Keep the Request ID and the Requester from the event.
- The same Request ID appears in event 4873 (an extension changed, with the name of the extension) or event 4874 (attributes changed, with the attributes).
- The same Request ID is then issued: event 4887. Read the Subject of the issued certificate and compare it with the Requester of the first step.
Events4889487348744887
LimitsA certificate manager who repairs a request for a colleague produces the same chain, so the changed extension or attribute and the subject decide. All four events need the "Issue and manage certificate requests" category in the CA's audit filter. Microsoft documents their content as message text, so check how your collector names the request ID before building the join.
Triage
- Identify the CA server (the computer that logged the event) and who was logged on to it or connected to it when the change was made (4624 on the CA server).
- For 4882, read the new permissions in the event and look for a principal that gained Manage CA or Issue and Manage Certificates. For 4891, read Node, Entry and Value; a change to the policy module EditFlags entry needs immediate review.
- For 4885, compare the new filter value with the baseline; a filter that drops categories hides later operations.
- Review certificates issued after the change (4886, 4887) and requests approved by a certificate manager, and revoke any that were not expected.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Remove the principal that gained Manage CA or Issue and Manage Certificates from the CA's security settings, and disable that account until it has been investigated.
- Restore the CA's audit filter to all categories early, so that the rest of the response is logged.
- Return the policy module flags and the certificate manager restrictions to their approved values. If
EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2was turned on, turn it off again. - Deny the pending requests that have no legitimate owner, and revoke every certificate that was issued or approved while the changed setting was in effect and cannot be tied to a legitimate request. Resetting the passwords of the accounts those certificates name does not invalidate them.
- Compare the CA's permissions, configuration and audit filter with the baseline, and find out how the account obtained the Manage CA right or local administrator rights on the CA server.
Mitigation
- Restrict Manage CA and Issue and Manage Certificates to PKI administrators and remove these rights from broad groups.
- Keep
EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2turned off on every Enterprise CA. - Treat CA servers as Tier 0 and limit local administrators on them.
- Enable "Audit Certification Services" on CA servers, select all categories in the CA's audit filter (Auditing tab of the CA properties) and forward the CA's Security log.
Frequently asked questions
Why are events 4882 to 4892 missing although Audit Certification Services is enabled?
The audit subcategory is only half of the requirement. Each CA has its own audit filter, on the Auditing tab of the CA properties, and writes these events only for the categories selected there. Permission and configuration changes need "Change CA security settings" and "Change CA configuration". The events go to the Security log of the CA server, not of a domain controller, so that log has to be forwarded.
Does event 4891 always mean that the SAN flag was turned on?
No. Event 4891 is written for any changed configuration entry of the CA, including routine maintenance such as CRL publication settings or validity periods. Read Node, Entry and Value in the event. A change to the EditFlags entry of the policy module is the one that can enable `EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2` and needs immediate review.
How is a CA configuration change different from a certificate template change?
Templates are objects in Active Directory, and a change to one can be logged by a domain controller as event 5136. The configuration of the CA, its permissions and its audit filter belong to the CA itself. Changes to them are logged only in the Security log of the CA server, as events 4882, 4885, 4890, 4891 and 4892. Monitoring domain controllers alone does not show them.