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Privileged Threat Analytics Event Recorded in the Idira (formerly CyberArk) Vault detection rules

Privileged Threat Analytics found a sign that a privileged account or a Vault user is being misused, such as a credential used without being retrieved or Vault access from an unusual address, and wrote the event to the Vault's audit.

Platform
Idira (formerly CyberArk)
Severity
Medium
Log source
Idira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1078Valid Accounts
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft Sentinel
What an attacker needs
Valid credentials of a privileged account or of a Vault user, obtained in any way, whose use deviates from what PTA has learned for it.
Impact
A privileged account used outside the Vault's control or a Vault user that takes passwords from its Safes, depending on the detection that fired.
Response
Start a password change for the managed account, or disable the Vault user and reset its password and second factor, then review what it did.
Mitigation
Keep PTA's alerts to the Vault enabled, forward the Vault audit to your SIEM and let PTA start a password change on a suspected credential theft.
Vault event codes
460461

How the attack works

Privileged Threat Analytics (PTA) is CyberArk's analytics component. It monitors the use of the privileged accounts that the platform manages, and of accounts it does not manage yet, and looks for signs of abuse. Its documented detections include Suspected credentials theft (a user connects to a machine without first retrieving the credentials from the Vault), Privileged access to the Vault during irregular hours, Excessive access to privileged accounts in the Vault, Privileged access to the Vault from irregular IP, Active dormant Vault user, Suspicious password change (a password changed or reset without the Password Manager) and Suspicious multiple authentication failures to the Vault. Each of them describes a valid account that behaves as if it were in other hands.

PTA sends its alerts to the Vault, and CyberArk states that this feature is enabled automatically. The Vault writes them to its audit as code 460 (Privileged Threat Analytics event for managed account), for which the code table gives the file name in Info1, the name of the anomaly in Info2 and the full event details in Info3, and code 461 (Privileged Threat Analytics event for Vault user), with the full event details in Info3. A SIEM that already receives the Vault audit therefore receives PTA's findings without a second integration. The rule on this page surfaces these records and does not judge them: what was detected is in the event details, and its score is shown in PTA. PTA can also send its own syslog records to a SIEM, with the device product name PTA. That is a different log source, which this page does not read.

What must be collected. The rule reads the Vault's audit records forwarded by syslog in CEF format (SIEM integration, configured in DBParm.ini). The CEF header's Device Event Class ID carries the Vault audit action code. PTA must be installed and must keep sending its alerts to the Vault (send_pta_events_to_pas_enabled), and SyslogMessageCodeFilter must not exclude codes 460 and 461. By default all codes are sent.

What an attacker needs

  • Valid credentials of a privileged account or of a Vault user, obtained in any way. The event is the trace of their use, not of how they were obtained.
  • Nothing that the attacker controls decides whether the record is written. It depends on PTA being installed, receiving its data sources and sending its alerts to the Vault.

Impact

What the attacker gains depends on the detection. A privileged account used without a retrieval from the Vault means the credential is known outside the Vault, with whatever that account can do on its target. Irregular or excessive access to the Vault means a Vault user that is taking passwords from the Safes it can reach. The record itself shows that the vendor's analytics rated the behaviour as abnormal for that account or user.

Detection rules

CyberArk Privileged Threat Analytics Event for a Managed Account or Vault User

Detects an event that CyberArk Privileged Threat Analytics (PTA) wrote to the audit of the CyberArk Digital Vault: audit action codes 460 (Privileged Threat Analytics event for managed account) and 461 (Privileged Threat Analytics event for Vault user). PTA looks for signs that privileged accounts or the platform are being misused, such as a suspected credential theft, access to the Vault from an irregular address or at irregular hours, or excessive access to privileged accounts, and sends its alerts to the Vault, a feature CyberArk describes as enabled automatically. The rule surfaces every such record and does not rate it. The code table gives the file name in Info1 and the name of the anomaly in Info2 of code 460, and the full event details in Info3 of both codes. CyberArk documents no separate field in the Vault record for the score PTA assigned, so read it in PTA. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceIdira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
title: CyberArk Privileged Threat Analytics Event for a Managed Account or Vault User
id: eac2587d-3f00-4ebd-a941-52cbe842e51b
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an event that CyberArk Privileged Threat Analytics (PTA) wrote to
  the audit of the CyberArk Digital Vault: audit action codes 460
  (Privileged Threat Analytics event for managed account) and 461
  (Privileged Threat Analytics event for Vault user). PTA looks for signs
  that privileged accounts or the platform are being misused, such as a
  suspected credential theft, access to the Vault from an irregular address
  or at irregular hours, or excessive access to privileged accounts, and
  sends its alerts to the Vault, a feature CyberArk describes as enabled
  automatically. The rule surfaces every such record and does not rate it.
  The code table gives the file name in Info1 and the name of the anomaly
  in Info2 of code 460, and the full event details in Info3 of both codes.
  CyberArk documents no separate field in the Vault record for the score PTA
  assigned, so read it in PTA. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device
  Event Class
  ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action
  code.
references:
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pta/outbound-sending-pta-alerts-to-vault.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pta/what-does-pta-detect.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1078
logsource:
  product: cyberark
  service: vault
detection:
  selection:
    deviceEventClassId:
      - '460'
      - '461'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Behaviour that is new for an account or user but approved, such as an administrator who works at night during an incident or a migration that retrieves many accounts. Close the event in PTA with the reason.
  - Detections that are not attacks by nature, such as an unmanaged privileged account that PTA found. Read the name of the anomaly before you rate the alert.
  - PTA's own syslog output, if you also collect it, reports the same events a second time under another log source.
level: medium

False positives

  • Behaviour that is new for an account or user but approved, such as an administrator who works at night during an incident or a migration that retrieves many accounts. Close the event in PTA with the reason.
  • Detections that are not attacks by nature, such as an unmanaged privileged account that PTA found. Read the name of the anomaly before you rate the alert.
  • PTA's own syslog output, if you also collect it, reports the same events a second time under another log source.

Triage

  • Read the name of the anomaly, which the code table gives in Info2 of code 460, and the event details in Info3 of both codes.
  • Open the event on the Security Events page of the web portal and read its score, what happened and the recommendation. CyberArk rates scores of 70 to 100 as high, 30 to 69 as medium and 0 to 29 as low.
  • Identify the managed account or the Vault user, and whether it is a Tier 0 account or a member of Vault Admins.
  • For a suspected credential theft, find the machine where the account was used and the last retrieval or session for that account in the Vault's audit.
  • For Vault access from an unusual address, at unusual hours or in excess, ask the owner of the user and list what the user retrieved (codes 295 and 428).
  • Check on the event whether a remediation was started, and whether it finished.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. For a managed account, start a password change through the Central Policy Manager, or confirm that the change PTA started has completed.
  2. For a Vault user, disable the user and end its sessions, and reset its password and second factor before it is enabled again.
  3. For suspicious activity in a privileged session that is still open, suspend or terminate the session from the monitoring page.
  4. Review what the account or the user did since the first event, on the target systems and in the Vault, and start a password change for every account it retrieved.
  5. Close the event in PTA with a reason once it is handled, so that open events stay meaningful.

Mitigation

  • Keep PTA's alerts to the Vault enabled and forward the Vault audit to your SIEM, so that every PTA event also reaches the place where your alerts are handled.
  • Give PTA the data sources its detections need. CyberArk lists the required sensor for each detection, such as the Vault, SIEM or UNIX logs and Active Directory.
  • Configure PTA's remediation so that it starts a password change through the Central Policy Manager when it identifies a suspected credential theft.
  • Require multi-factor authentication for all users and administrators of the Vault, as CyberArk's security fundamentals do, so that a stolen password is not enough to log on.

Frequently asked questions

Which Privileged Threat Analytics detections reach the Vault's audit?

CyberArk states that PTA sends its alerts to the Vault and names two events for them: 460 for a managed account and 461 for a Vault user. The documentation does not list which detection is written under which code. For code 460 the code table gives the name of the anomaly in Info2, and both codes carry the full event details in Info3, so the record itself says what was detected.

Is this the same as sending PTA's own syslog records to the SIEM?

No. PTA can send its detected incidents straight to a SIEM as syslog messages in its own CEF or LEEF format, identified by the device vendor name CyberArk and the device product name PTA. The rule on this page reads the Vault's audit, where the same findings arrive as codes 460 and 461. If you collect both, expect each event twice.

Why does the rule have one level for every PTA event?

The Vault's audit code is the same for every anomaly, and CyberArk documents no separate field in the Vault record for the score that PTA assigns. The rule therefore reports every event at medium. Use the score in PTA to set the priority: CyberArk rates 70 to 100 as high severity, 30 to 69 as medium and 0 to 29 as low.

Why are there no such records although PTA is installed?

Three things can stop them. The property send_pta_events_to_pas_enabled on the PTA server may be set to False, the code filter of the Vault's syslog output may leave out codes 460 and 461, or PTA may be configured to send only the first occurrence of an event that repeats, which the parameter enable_outbound_upon_aggregation_anomalies controls.

References

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