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Logon With the Idira (formerly CyberArk) Built-in Administrator or Master User detection rules

A logon to the Digital Vault as the built-in Administrator or the Master user. Both hold complete control of the Vault and are meant for setup, break-glass and recovery, so every logon deserves a look.

Platform
Idira (formerly CyberArk)
Severity
High
Log source
Idira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft Sentinel
What an attacker needs
The password of the built-in Administrator, or the Master password together with the recovery private key and access to the Vault server terminal.
Impact
Complete control of the Vault, including creating users, opening Safes, changing the Master Policy and retrieving the privileged accounts of every system the Vault manages.
Response
Change the built-in Administrator's password at once, reverse what the session changed, and start a password change for every account retrieved in the session.
Mitigation
Administer the Vault with named accounts, and keep the built-in Administrator's password and the Master password with its recovery private key in a physical safe.
Vault event codes
41021031047

How the attack works

The CyberArk Digital Vault creates predefined users at installation. Administrator sits at the top of the user hierarchy with every Vault authorization and can create and manage users at any level. Master has all Safe member authorizations on every Safe except authorizing password requests, cannot be removed from any Safe, and is used for full recovery; CyberArk documents that it can log on only from the Vault server terminal and only with the recovery private key. An attacker who holds either account controls the Vault and every credential stored in it, and attackers favour built-in accounts because nobody owns them personally.

CyberArk's security fundamentals tell customers to store these credentials in a physical safe and to monitor and alert on logins as Administrator or Master. In a well run deployment such logons are rare and tied to a change or a recovery exercise. A second rule reads failed logons of the same two users: code 4 (User Authentication Failure) and codes 102, 103 and 104 (logon refused because of a time limit, an expired user or a disabled user). A failed attempt on an account that nobody should be using deserves the same look as a logon.

What must be collected. The rule reads the Vault's audit records forwarded by syslog in CEF format (SIEM integration, configured in DBParm.ini). The CEF header's Device Event Class ID carries the Vault audit action code (7 is Logon) and the extension key suser carries the issuer, the Vault user who performed the action. SyslogMessageCodeFilter must not exclude code 7. Privilege Cloud forwards the same audit records through the Secure Tunnel.

What an attacker needs

  • The password of the built-in Administrator, or the Master password together with the recovery private key and access to the Vault server terminal.
  • Network access to the Vault from a station the user is allowed to log on from.

Impact

Complete control of the Vault: creating users and granting them authorizations, opening Safes, changing the Master Policy and retrieving the privileged accounts of every system the Vault manages. What that reaches outside the Vault depends on what is stored, for example domain administrator or cloud administrator accounts.

Detection rules

CyberArk Vault Logon Failed for the Built-in Administrator or Master User

Detects a failed logon to the CyberArk Digital Vault as the built-in Administrator or the Master user: audit action code 4 (User Authentication Failure) and codes 102, 103 and 104 (Logon Failed, with the reasons User Time Limit Restriction, User Has Expired and User Is Disabled). The code table flags all four as unauthorized operations. CyberArk's sample audit record for code 4 carries the user who tried to log on as the issuer; the rule assumes the same for codes 102 to 104, for which CyberArk publishes no sample, so confirm it with one test before relying on those three codes. CyberArk's list of codes recommended for monitoring names code 4 User Authentication without the word Failure, while the code table and the sample record describe a failed authentication. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code; suser is the issuer.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceIdira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
title: CyberArk Vault Logon Failed for the Built-in Administrator or Master User
id: 804be83a-d8a0-4473-8198-faf8028ea76f
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a failed logon to the CyberArk Digital Vault as the built-in
  Administrator or the Master user: audit action code 4 (User Authentication
  Failure) and codes 102, 103 and 104 (Logon Failed, with the reasons User
  Time Limit Restriction, User Has Expired and User Is Disabled). The code
  table flags all four as unauthorized operations. CyberArk's sample audit
  record for code 4 carries the user who tried to log on as the issuer; the
  rule assumes the same for codes 102 to 104, for which CyberArk publishes no
  sample, so confirm it with one test before relying on those three codes.
  CyberArk's list of codes recommended for monitoring names code 4 User
  Authentication without the word Failure, while the code table and the
  sample record describe a failed authentication. deviceEventClassId is the
  CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator
  fills with the Vault audit action code; suser is the issuer.
references:
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/create-custom-xsl-translator-file.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/security/security%20fundamentals-introduction.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1078.001
logsource:
  product: cyberark
  service: vault
detection:
  selection:
    deviceEventClassId:
      - '4'
      - '102'
      - '103'
      - '104'
    suser:
      - Administrator
      - Master
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - A mistyped password during approved installation, upgrade or recovery work with these accounts. Match the alert to a change record.
  - Scripts or integrations that still try to log on as Administrator with an old password. Move them to named accounts instead of excluding them.
level: medium

False positives

  • A mistyped password during approved installation, upgrade or recovery work with these accounts. Match the alert to a change record.
  • Scripts or integrations that still try to log on as Administrator with an old password. Move them to named accounts instead of excluding them.

CyberArk Vault Logon by the Built-in Administrator or Master User

Detects a logon to the CyberArk Digital Vault (audit action code 7, Logon) by the built-in Administrator or the Master user. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code; suser is the issuer, the Vault user who performed the action.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceIdira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
title: CyberArk Vault Logon by the Built-in Administrator or Master User
id: 7fc3c24a-c6d3-4938-801b-4ef6bf444d52
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a logon to the CyberArk Digital Vault (audit action code 7, Logon)
  by the built-in Administrator or the Master user. deviceEventClassId is the
  CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills
  with the Vault audit action code; suser is the issuer, the Vault user who
  performed the action.
references:
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/security/security%20fundamentals-introduction.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1078.001
logsource:
  product: cyberark
  service: vault
detection:
  selection:
    deviceEventClassId: '7'
    suser:
      - Administrator
      - Master
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Installation, upgrade and recovery work that is carried out with these accounts; match each alert to a change record.
  - Scripts or integrations that still log on as Administrator; move them to named accounts rather than excluding them.
level: high

False positives

  • Installation, upgrade and recovery work that is carried out with these accounts; match each alert to a change record.
  • Scripts or integrations that still log on as Administrator; move them to named accounts rather than excluding them.

Triage

  • Read the station address in the audit record and compare it with the Vault server console and your administration hosts. A Master logon from anywhere other than the server terminal should not be possible.
  • Look for an approved change, a recovery exercise or a break-glass record that explains the logon, and confirm with the people who hold the sealed credentials.
  • List what the account did next, especially users, group members, Safe members, directory maps and Master Policy changes, and password retrievals.
  • If nobody can explain it, change the account's password, check the custody of the Master key, and review every change the session made.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Change the password of the built-in Administrator at once and return the new value to physical custody that needs more than one person. Establish who opened the sealed copies.
  2. For a Master logon, find out who had access to the Vault server terminal and to the Master folder, because that logon needs both. Treat the recovery private key as copied until proven otherwise and take its replacement up with the vendor.
  3. Reverse what the session changed. Remove the users, group members, Safe members and directory maps it added, and restore the Master Policy rules it altered.
  4. Start a password change for every account whose password or SSH key was retrieved in the session, beginning with domain and cloud administrator accounts.
  5. Watch for further logons by either account and confirm that each remaining use is tied to a change or a recovery record.

Mitigation

  • Administer the Vault with named accounts, and keep the built-in Administrator's password in a physical safe with copies in two or more locations and access that requires more than one person, as CyberArk's security fundamentals require.
  • Store the Master password and the recovery private key (the Master folder) in a physical safe, not on the Vault server.
  • Require multi-factor authentication for all users and administrators of the Vault.
  • Forward the Vault audit to your SIEM and alert on every logon as Administrator or Master.

Frequently asked questions

What does a Master logon tell me that an Administrator logon does not?

CyberArk documents that the Master user can log on only from the Vault server terminal and only with the recovery private key. A Master logon therefore means that someone had the server console and the key at the same time. Outside a recovery exercise that points to a failure of physical custody, not only to a stolen password.

What has to be configured before the Vault reports these logons?

The Vault must forward its audit records by syslog in CEF format, the SIEM integration that is configured in `DBParm.ini`. `SyslogMessageCodeFilter` must not exclude action code 7, Logon, or the failure codes 4, 102, 103 and 104 that the second rule reads. Privilege Cloud forwards the same audit records through the Secure Tunnel.

Should a script that logs on as Administrator be excluded from the rule?

No. Move the script or integration to a named account and keep the rule free of exceptions. An exclusion for the built-in Administrator would hide the very logon an attacker makes with that account. Installation, upgrade and recovery work is better matched to a change record.

References

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