How the attack works
The root user is created with the account and has unrestricted access to every resource and setting, including billing, account closure and the few tasks that only root can perform. AWS recommends using it only for those tasks, so in a well-run account root activity is rare and every occurrence should be explainable.
Attackers reach root through a phished or reused root password without MFA, through root access keys left in code or old automation, or through the account's e-mail recovery flow. CloudTrail records root activity with userIdentity.type set to Root and an ARN ending in :root. Requests that an AWS service makes on the account's behalf carry userIdentity.invokedBy or have eventType AwsServiceEvent; the CIS benchmark filter for root usage excludes both, and so does this rule. A second rule reads PasswordRecoveryRequested, the event AWS tells account owners to look for when a root password reset link arrives that nobody asked for. It shows that the recovery flow was started for the account, not that the password was changed.
What an attacker needs
- The root user's password (with its MFA device, if one is registered) or a root access key.
Impact
Complete control of the account: the attacker can create administrators and access keys, delete trails and detectors, change billing and contact details, and lock the legitimate owners out. Service control policies still apply to the root user of member accounts.
Detection rules
Root User Password Recovery Requested
Detects the PasswordRecoveryRequested event, which CloudTrail records when the "Forgot your password?" flow is started for the root user of the account. AWS tells account owners to review these events when a password reset link arrives that nobody asked for. The event shows that a reset was requested. It does not show that the password was changed, which needs access to the root user's mailbox. The rule matches on the event name alone, because AWS documents the name of the event and publishes no example record for it.
title: Root User Password Recovery Requested
id: 9de7f099-ac41-47d5-9ee8-e9b94ed070d0
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the PasswordRecoveryRequested event, which CloudTrail records when
the "Forgot your password?" flow is started for the root user of the
account. AWS tells account owners to review these events when a password
reset link arrives that nobody asked for. The event shows that a reset was
requested. It does not show that the password was changed, which needs
access to the root user's mailbox. The rule matches on the event name
alone, because AWS documents the name of the event and publishes no example
record for it.
references:
- https://repost.aws/knowledge-center/reset-root-user-password-aws-account
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reset-root-password.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventName: PasswordRecoveryRequested
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- An account owner who has forgotten the root password, and planned tests of the break-glass procedure. Confirm with the owners of the root mailbox that they asked for the reset.
level: medium
False positives
- An account owner who has forgotten the root password, and planned tests of the break-glass procedure. Confirm with the owners of the root mailbox that they asked for the reset.
AWS Root User Activity
Detects any CloudTrail event made by the AWS account root user, excluding requests that an AWS service made on the account's behalf (invokedBy present or eventType AwsServiceEvent). This follows the CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark metric filter for root usage. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: AWS Root User Activity
id: 5f508ee1-c657-47d4-a8b2-edbcadaf31a5
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects any CloudTrail event made by the AWS account root user, excluding
requests that an AWS service made on the account's behalf (invokedBy present
or eventType AwsServiceEvent). This follows the CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark
metric filter for root usage.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-controls.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-user-identity.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
userIdentity.type: Root
filter_invoked_by_service:
userIdentity.invokedBy|exists: true
filter_service_event:
eventType: AwsServiceEvent
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Planned root-only tasks (for example changing account settings or closing the account) and privileged tasks run through sts:AssumeRoot from the management account or the IAM delegated administrator account; document them and suppress by session, not by source.
level: high
False positives
- Planned root-only tasks (for example changing account settings or closing the account) and privileged tasks run through sts:AssumeRoot from the management account or the IAM delegated administrator account; document them and suppress by session, not by source.
Triage
- Confirm with the account owner whether a planned root-only task was in progress, and check the source IP address and user agent.
- Check additionalEventData.MFAUsed on the ConsoleLogin event and whether an access key (userIdentity.accessKeyId) was used instead of the console.
- In member accounts with centralized root access, match the activity to an sts:AssumeRoot call in the management account or the IAM delegated administrator account (the session's userIdentity.accessKeyId equals responseElements.credentials.accessKeyId of that call); otherwise treat it as a credential compromise and review every action in the session.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Change the root user password from a trusted device and check the MFA devices of the root user. Remove any device the owners do not hold and register a new one.
- Delete the root access keys. IAM policies and permissions boundaries cannot restrict the root user, so removing the credential is the control you have inside the account.
- Verify the root e-mail address, the contact details and the billing settings of the account, and correct what was changed.
- Review every action of the root session and remove what it created, such as administrators, access keys and roles. Restore trails and detectors that were deleted or stopped.
- Confirm that root activity has stopped. In a member account with centralized root access, every later root event should match an
sts:AssumeRootcall.
Mitigation
- Register phishing-resistant MFA for the root user, delete root access keys, and keep the credentials in a controlled break-glass process.
- In AWS Organizations, enable centralized root access to remove member-account root credentials, and use an SCP that denies root user actions in member accounts.
- Keep the account's root e-mail address on a monitored, access-controlled mailbox.
Frequently asked questions
Why does the rule ignore some events that carry the root identity?
Requests that an AWS service makes on the account's behalf can appear with the root identity although nobody signed in as root. They carry `userIdentity.invokedBy` or have the event type `AwsServiceEvent`. The CIS benchmark filter for root usage excludes both, and so does this rule.
Do service control policies stop the root user?
In member accounts, yes. Service control policies still apply to the root user of member accounts, which is why an SCP that denies root user actions there works as a guardrail. IAM policies and permissions boundaries do not restrict the root user.
How do I tell a centralized root access session from someone signing in as root?
With centralized root access, a privileged task in a member account starts with an `sts:AssumeRoot` call in the management account or in the IAM delegated administrator account. The access key ID of the root session in the member account equals the one in the response of that call. Root activity that matches no such call is a use of root credentials.