How the attack works
IAM users with a console password and the root user sign in through AWS Sign-In. When no MFA device is registered, or a policy does not force one, the password alone grants a console session with the identity's full permissions. Stolen IAM user passwords are a common first step in cloud intrusions because they work from anywhere and look like normal use.
Every sign-in is recorded as a ConsoleLogin event from signin.amazonaws.com. A successful single-factor sign-in has responseElements.ConsoleLogin set to Success and additionalEventData.MFAUsed set to No. Federated users (SAML, OIDC, IAM Identity Center) also show MFAUsed No, because MFA happens at their identity provider, so the rules look only at IAMUser and Root identities. IAM Identity Center records its own sign-in separately: a UserAuthentication event from signin.amazonaws.com lists every verified credential type in additionalEventData.CredentialType, so the value PASSWORD alone is a sign-in to the access portal without a second factor. A third rule reads that event.
What an attacker needs
- The console password of an IAM user or the root user that has no MFA requirement.
Impact
Interactive console access with the identity's permissions. For administrators or the root user this is full account control; for other users it is a foothold for discovery and privilege escalation.
Detection rules
IAM User Console Sign-in Without MFA
Detects successful AWS Management Console sign-ins by IAM users that did not use MFA (ConsoleLogin where MFAUsed is not Yes, as in the CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark filter). Federated identities are excluded by matching userIdentity.type IAMUser, because their MFA happens at the identity provider and CloudTrail records MFAUsed No for them.
title: IAM User Console Sign-in Without MFA
id: 9abea8ef-32c6-419c-910c-4074387b07a0
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects successful AWS Management Console sign-ins by IAM users that did not
use MFA (ConsoleLogin where MFAUsed is not Yes, as in the CIS AWS Foundations
Benchmark filter). Federated identities are excluded by matching
userIdentity.type IAMUser, because their MFA happens at the identity provider
and CloudTrail records MFAUsed No for them.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-controls.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: signin.amazonaws.com
eventName: ConsoleLogin
userIdentity.type: IAMUser
responseElements.ConsoleLogin: Success
mfa_used:
additionalEventData.MFAUsed: 'Yes'
condition: selection and not mfa_used
falsepositives:
- IAM users who have not enrolled MFA yet; treat each as a finding to fix rather than allow-listing it.
level: medium
False positives
- IAM users who have not enrolled MFA yet; treat each as a finding to fix rather than allow-listing it.
IAM Identity Center Sign-In with a Password Only
Detects IAM Identity Center sign-ins that were completed with a password and no second factor. AWS documents that Identity Center writes a UserAuthentication event from signin.amazonaws.com only when the user has completed all required credential challenges, and that the event lists every credential type that was verified in additionalEventData.CredentialType. In AWS's example of a password-only sign-in the value is PASSWORD. A sign-in with an authenticator app, a security key or an email one-time password carries more than that one value, and a sign-in through an external identity provider carries EXTERNAL_IDP, so neither matches. The rule applies to organizations whose Identity Center users authenticate at Identity Center itself (the Identity Center directory or a connected Active Directory). With an external identity provider the password and the second factor are checked there and this event cannot show them. Since 14 July 2025 the user is identified by userIdentity.onBehalfOf.userId and not by a user name.
title: IAM Identity Center Sign-In with a Password Only
id: ad02cf6d-28e3-4d3d-b12d-4fb164f431cd
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects IAM Identity Center sign-ins that were completed with a password
and no second factor. AWS documents that Identity Center writes a
UserAuthentication event from signin.amazonaws.com only when the user has
completed all required credential challenges, and that the event lists
every credential type that was verified in additionalEventData.CredentialType.
In AWS's example of a password-only sign-in the value is PASSWORD. A
sign-in with an authenticator app, a security key or an email one-time
password carries more than that one value, and a sign-in through an
external identity provider carries EXTERNAL_IDP, so neither matches. The
rule applies to organizations whose Identity Center users authenticate at
Identity Center itself (the Identity Center directory or a connected
Active Directory). With an external identity provider the password and
the second factor are checked there and this event cannot show them.
Since 14 July 2025 the user is identified by userIdentity.onBehalfOf.userId
and not by a user name.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/understanding-sign-in-events.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sign-in-events-examples.html
- https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/modifications-to-aws-cloudtrail-event-data-of-iam-identity-center/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: signin.amazonaws.com
eventName: UserAuthentication
additionalEventData.CredentialType: PASSWORD
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Identity Center configurations that ask for MFA only when the sign-in context changes, or never. Every sign-in without a prompt then matches, which is the finding. Change the MFA setting to always prompt, and use the rule to confirm that no password-only sign-ins remain.
level: medium
False positives
- Identity Center configurations that ask for MFA only when the sign-in context changes, or never. Every sign-in without a prompt then matches, which is the finding. Change the MFA setting to always prompt, and use the rule to confirm that no password-only sign-ins remain.
Root User Console Sign-in Without MFA
Detects successful AWS Management Console sign-ins by the account root user without MFA (ConsoleLogin, userIdentity.type Root, MFAUsed not Yes).
title: Root User Console Sign-in Without MFA
id: 892184ae-a2f3-4332-aab5-326d8eed8cb6
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects successful AWS Management Console sign-ins by the account root user
without MFA (ConsoleLogin, userIdentity.type Root, MFAUsed not Yes).
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: signin.amazonaws.com
eventName: ConsoleLogin
userIdentity.type: Root
responseElements.ConsoleLogin: Success
mfa_used:
additionalEventData.MFAUsed: 'Yes'
condition: selection and not mfa_used
falsepositives:
- None expected; the root user should always have MFA registered.
level: high
False positives
- None expected; the root user should always have MFA registered.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Password-only console sign-in from an address the identity has not used before
A password-only sign-in is a weakness wherever it happens, but an attacker with a phished or guessed password signs in from somewhere the user never worked. Comparing each password-only sign-in with the history of the same identity separates the weakness, which needs fixing, from the incident, which needs a response now.
- Collect
ConsoleLoginevents fromsignin.amazonaws.comwithresponseElements.ConsoleLoginSuccess andadditionalEventData.MFAUsedNo, foruserIdentity.typeIAMUser or Root. - Keep, for each identity (
userIdentity.arn, or the account inrecipientAccountIdfor the root user), thesourceIPAddressvalues of its sign-ins over at least 30 days, with the network and country from your own address lookup. - Alert when the address, its network or its country is new for the identity, and raise the priority when failed
ConsoleLoginevents for the same identity came shortly before.
EventsConsoleLogin
LimitsTravel, a new internet provider, a new VPN exit and mobile networks give genuine users new addresses. A first sign-in has no history to compare with. CloudTrail carries no location, so networks and countries come from your own lookup of the address. The 30 days are a starting point.
One identity signs in from distant places at once, or one sign-in session is used from two addresses
GuardDuty raises ConsoleLoginSuccess.B when the same IAM user signs in successfully in several geographic locations around the same time. Two people holding one password, or a console session taken from the user's browser, look like this. AWS also logs the ARN of the sign-in session on the API calls made in it, so the same check works for one session that is used from two addresses.
- Collect successful
ConsoleLoginevents and keep, per identity (userIdentity.arn), the time andsourceIPAddressof each. - Alert when two sign-ins of one identity come from addresses whose locations are too far apart to travel between in the time that separates them, using your own address lookup.
- For the API calls made in console sessions, read
userIdentity.sessionContext.signInSessionArnand alert when calls of one sign-in session come from more than onesourceIPAddresswithin a short time, for example 10 minutes.
EventsConsoleLogin
LimitsVPN and proxy services, mobile networks and dual IPv4 and IPv6 connections give one person addresses in several places. signInSessionArn is a recent field that is not on every event, so check that it is filled in before relying on it. The travel speed and the 10 minute window are starting points.
Triage
- Check the user (userIdentity.userName or arn) against the list of identities that are allowed to sign in without MFA; there should be none.
- Review the source IP address, geolocation and user agent against the user's history, and look for failed ConsoleLogin events just before.
- Review what the session did next; if the sign-in is not recognized, reset the password, register MFA and revoke active sessions.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Reset the password of the IAM user and revoke its active console sessions in the same step. IAM does this with an inline policy on the user that denies requests made with credentials issued before that time, so a session that is already open stops working.
- Deactivate the access keys of the user until their owner has confirmed them, and remove the access keys, users, roles and login profiles that were created during the session.
- If the sign-in was by the root user, change the root password, check which MFA devices and access keys the root user has, and verify the contact details of the account.
- Register an MFA device together with the owner before the identity signs in again, or remove its console password if the person can use federated access.
- Follow the next sign-ins of the identity in CloudTrail and confirm that
MFAUsedis now Yes.
Mitigation
- Register MFA for every IAM user with a console password and for the root user, and deny actions without aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent for IAM users.
- Move people to IAM Identity Center or federation with MFA at the identity provider, and remove IAM user console passwords.
- Remove console passwords that are not used, and enforce a strong account password policy.
Frequently asked questions
Why do federated users show MFAUsed No although they signed in with MFA?
For SAML, OIDC and IAM Identity Center users the second factor is checked at their identity provider and not at AWS Sign-In. CloudTrail therefore records `MFAUsed` No on their `ConsoleLogin` events. The `ConsoleLogin` rules look only at the identity types IAMUser and Root, where the value describes what happened at AWS Sign-In. For users who authenticate at IAM Identity Center itself, a third rule reads the `UserAuthentication` event, which lists the credential types that were verified.
Does a match mean that the account is compromised?
Not by itself. The rule reports a successful sign-in with a password only, which a legitimate user without an MFA device also produces. It is a weakness to fix in every case. It becomes an incident when the source address, the time, or what the session did next does not fit the user.
Does this rule say anything about access keys used without MFA?
No. It reads `ConsoleLogin` events from `signin.amazonaws.com` only. API calls signed with an access key do not pass through the console sign-in and do not produce that event, so the use of access keys needs its own review.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1078.004: Cloud Accounts
- AWS Management Console sign-in events
- Security Hub CSPM [CloudWatch.3]: metric filter for console sign-in without MFA
- Manage passwords for IAM users (revoke active console sessions)
- CloudTrail userIdentity element (signInSessionArn)
- GuardDuty IAM finding types (UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ConsoleLoginSuccess.B)