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Console Sign-in Without MFA detection rules

An IAM user or the root user signs in to the AWS Management Console with only a password, which is all an attacker with a phished, guessed or reused password needs.

Platform
AWS
Severity
Medium
Log source
AWS CloudTrail
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
The console password of an IAM user or the root user that has no MFA device registered or no policy that forces one.
Impact
Interactive console access with the identity's permissions, which is full account control for administrators or the root user and a foothold for other users.
Response
Reset the password of the IAM user and revoke its active console sessions in the same step, then deactivate its access keys until their owner has confirmed them.
Mitigation
Register MFA for the root user and every IAM user with a console password, and move people to IAM Identity Center or federation with MFA at the identity provider.
CloudTrail events
ConsoleLoginUserAuthentication

How the attack works

IAM users with a console password and the root user sign in through AWS Sign-In. When no MFA device is registered, or a policy does not force one, the password alone grants a console session with the identity's full permissions. Stolen IAM user passwords are a common first step in cloud intrusions because they work from anywhere and look like normal use.

Every sign-in is recorded as a ConsoleLogin event from signin.amazonaws.com. A successful single-factor sign-in has responseElements.ConsoleLogin set to Success and additionalEventData.MFAUsed set to No. Federated users (SAML, OIDC, IAM Identity Center) also show MFAUsed No, because MFA happens at their identity provider, so the rules look only at IAMUser and Root identities. IAM Identity Center records its own sign-in separately: a UserAuthentication event from signin.amazonaws.com lists every verified credential type in additionalEventData.CredentialType, so the value PASSWORD alone is a sign-in to the access portal without a second factor. A third rule reads that event.

What an attacker needs

  • The console password of an IAM user or the root user that has no MFA requirement.

Impact

Interactive console access with the identity's permissions. For administrators or the root user this is full account control; for other users it is a foothold for discovery and privilege escalation.

Detection rules

IAM User Console Sign-in Without MFA

Detects successful AWS Management Console sign-ins by IAM users that did not use MFA (ConsoleLogin where MFAUsed is not Yes, as in the CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark filter). Federated identities are excluded by matching userIdentity.type IAMUser, because their MFA happens at the identity provider and CloudTrail records MFAUsed No for them.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: IAM User Console Sign-in Without MFA
id: 9abea8ef-32c6-419c-910c-4074387b07a0
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects successful AWS Management Console sign-ins by IAM users that did not
  use MFA (ConsoleLogin where MFAUsed is not Yes, as in the CIS AWS Foundations
  Benchmark filter). Federated identities are excluded by matching
  userIdentity.type IAMUser, because their MFA happens at the identity provider
  and CloudTrail records MFAUsed No for them.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-controls.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: signin.amazonaws.com
    eventName: ConsoleLogin
    userIdentity.type: IAMUser
    responseElements.ConsoleLogin: Success
  mfa_used:
    additionalEventData.MFAUsed: 'Yes'
  condition: selection and not mfa_used
falsepositives:
  - IAM users who have not enrolled MFA yet; treat each as a finding to fix rather than allow-listing it.
level: medium

False positives

  • IAM users who have not enrolled MFA yet; treat each as a finding to fix rather than allow-listing it.

IAM Identity Center Sign-In with a Password Only

Detects IAM Identity Center sign-ins that were completed with a password and no second factor. AWS documents that Identity Center writes a UserAuthentication event from signin.amazonaws.com only when the user has completed all required credential challenges, and that the event lists every credential type that was verified in additionalEventData.CredentialType. In AWS's example of a password-only sign-in the value is PASSWORD. A sign-in with an authenticator app, a security key or an email one-time password carries more than that one value, and a sign-in through an external identity provider carries EXTERNAL_IDP, so neither matches. The rule applies to organizations whose Identity Center users authenticate at Identity Center itself (the Identity Center directory or a connected Active Directory). With an external identity provider the password and the second factor are checked there and this event cannot show them. Since 14 July 2025 the user is identified by userIdentity.onBehalfOf.userId and not by a user name.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: IAM Identity Center Sign-In with a Password Only
id: ad02cf6d-28e3-4d3d-b12d-4fb164f431cd
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects IAM Identity Center sign-ins that were completed with a password
  and no second factor. AWS documents that Identity Center writes a
  UserAuthentication event from signin.amazonaws.com only when the user has
  completed all required credential challenges, and that the event lists
  every credential type that was verified in additionalEventData.CredentialType.
  In AWS's example of a password-only sign-in the value is PASSWORD. A
  sign-in with an authenticator app, a security key or an email one-time
  password carries more than that one value, and a sign-in through an
  external identity provider carries EXTERNAL_IDP, so neither matches. The
  rule applies to organizations whose Identity Center users authenticate at
  Identity Center itself (the Identity Center directory or a connected
  Active Directory). With an external identity provider the password and
  the second factor are checked there and this event cannot show them.
  Since 14 July 2025 the user is identified by userIdentity.onBehalfOf.userId
  and not by a user name.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/understanding-sign-in-events.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sign-in-events-examples.html
  - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/modifications-to-aws-cloudtrail-event-data-of-iam-identity-center/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: signin.amazonaws.com
    eventName: UserAuthentication
    additionalEventData.CredentialType: PASSWORD
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Identity Center configurations that ask for MFA only when the sign-in context changes, or never. Every sign-in without a prompt then matches, which is the finding. Change the MFA setting to always prompt, and use the rule to confirm that no password-only sign-ins remain.
level: medium

False positives

  • Identity Center configurations that ask for MFA only when the sign-in context changes, or never. Every sign-in without a prompt then matches, which is the finding. Change the MFA setting to always prompt, and use the rule to confirm that no password-only sign-ins remain.

Root User Console Sign-in Without MFA

Detects successful AWS Management Console sign-ins by the account root user without MFA (ConsoleLogin, userIdentity.type Root, MFAUsed not Yes).

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: Root User Console Sign-in Without MFA
id: 892184ae-a2f3-4332-aab5-326d8eed8cb6
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects successful AWS Management Console sign-ins by the account root user
  without MFA (ConsoleLogin, userIdentity.type Root, MFAUsed not Yes).
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: signin.amazonaws.com
    eventName: ConsoleLogin
    userIdentity.type: Root
    responseElements.ConsoleLogin: Success
  mfa_used:
    additionalEventData.MFAUsed: 'Yes'
  condition: selection and not mfa_used
falsepositives:
  - None expected; the root user should always have MFA registered.
level: high

False positives

  • None expected; the root user should always have MFA registered.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Password-only console sign-in from an address the identity has not used before

Detection hypothesisNeeds a baseline

A password-only sign-in is a weakness wherever it happens, but an attacker with a phished or guessed password signs in from somewhere the user never worked. Comparing each password-only sign-in with the history of the same identity separates the weakness, which needs fixing, from the incident, which needs a response now.

  1. Collect ConsoleLogin events from signin.amazonaws.com with responseElements.ConsoleLogin Success and additionalEventData.MFAUsed No, for userIdentity.type IAMUser or Root.
  2. Keep, for each identity (userIdentity.arn, or the account in recipientAccountId for the root user), the sourceIPAddress values of its sign-ins over at least 30 days, with the network and country from your own address lookup.
  3. Alert when the address, its network or its country is new for the identity, and raise the priority when failed ConsoleLogin events for the same identity came shortly before.

EventsConsoleLogin

LimitsTravel, a new internet provider, a new VPN exit and mobile networks give genuine users new addresses. A first sign-in has no history to compare with. CloudTrail carries no location, so networks and countries come from your own lookup of the address. The 30 days are a starting point.

One identity signs in from distant places at once, or one sign-in session is used from two addresses

Detection hypothesisCompares with an earlier valueJoins two logs

GuardDuty raises ConsoleLoginSuccess.B when the same IAM user signs in successfully in several geographic locations around the same time. Two people holding one password, or a console session taken from the user's browser, look like this. AWS also logs the ARN of the sign-in session on the API calls made in it, so the same check works for one session that is used from two addresses.

  1. Collect successful ConsoleLogin events and keep, per identity (userIdentity.arn), the time and sourceIPAddress of each.
  2. Alert when two sign-ins of one identity come from addresses whose locations are too far apart to travel between in the time that separates them, using your own address lookup.
  3. For the API calls made in console sessions, read userIdentity.sessionContext.signInSessionArn and alert when calls of one sign-in session come from more than one sourceIPAddress within a short time, for example 10 minutes.

EventsConsoleLogin

LimitsVPN and proxy services, mobile networks and dual IPv4 and IPv6 connections give one person addresses in several places. signInSessionArn is a recent field that is not on every event, so check that it is filled in before relying on it. The travel speed and the 10 minute window are starting points.

Triage

  • Check the user (userIdentity.userName or arn) against the list of identities that are allowed to sign in without MFA; there should be none.
  • Review the source IP address, geolocation and user agent against the user's history, and look for failed ConsoleLogin events just before.
  • Review what the session did next; if the sign-in is not recognized, reset the password, register MFA and revoke active sessions.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Reset the password of the IAM user and revoke its active console sessions in the same step. IAM does this with an inline policy on the user that denies requests made with credentials issued before that time, so a session that is already open stops working.
  2. Deactivate the access keys of the user until their owner has confirmed them, and remove the access keys, users, roles and login profiles that were created during the session.
  3. If the sign-in was by the root user, change the root password, check which MFA devices and access keys the root user has, and verify the contact details of the account.
  4. Register an MFA device together with the owner before the identity signs in again, or remove its console password if the person can use federated access.
  5. Follow the next sign-ins of the identity in CloudTrail and confirm that MFAUsed is now Yes.

Mitigation

  • Register MFA for every IAM user with a console password and for the root user, and deny actions without aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent for IAM users.
  • Move people to IAM Identity Center or federation with MFA at the identity provider, and remove IAM user console passwords.
  • Remove console passwords that are not used, and enforce a strong account password policy.

Frequently asked questions

Why do federated users show MFAUsed No although they signed in with MFA?

For SAML, OIDC and IAM Identity Center users the second factor is checked at their identity provider and not at AWS Sign-In. CloudTrail therefore records `MFAUsed` No on their `ConsoleLogin` events. The `ConsoleLogin` rules look only at the identity types IAMUser and Root, where the value describes what happened at AWS Sign-In. For users who authenticate at IAM Identity Center itself, a third rule reads the `UserAuthentication` event, which lists the credential types that were verified.

Does a match mean that the account is compromised?

Not by itself. The rule reports a successful sign-in with a password only, which a legitimate user without an MFA device also produces. It is a weakness to fix in every case. It becomes an incident when the source address, the time, or what the session did next does not fit the user.

Does this rule say anything about access keys used without MFA?

No. It reads `ConsoleLogin` events from `signin.amazonaws.com` only. API calls signed with an access key do not pass through the console sign-in and do not produce that event, so the use of access keys needs its own review.

References

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