How the attack works
Intune has its own role-based access control, separate from Microsoft Entra roles. A role (built-in or custom) is a set of permissions; a role assignment gives it to the members of one or more security groups (the admin groups) over the users and devices in its scope groups, optionally limited by scope tags. Role assignments and custom roles can be changed by the Intune Administrator and Global Administrator directory roles, by the Intune Role Administrator role, by any custom role with the Roles permissions, and by an application holding DeviceManagementRBAC.ReadWrite.All.
An attacker with one of these rights does not need a new account. Adding a group they control as an admin group, switching the scope to All devices, or adding Device configurations, Mobile apps or Remote tasks permissions to an existing custom role gives them the power to run scripts, deploy apps and wipe devices under an identity that looks like routine helpdesk staff. The rules read the Intune audit log, which reaches a SIEM only after an Intune diagnostic setting (category AuditLogs) sends it to a Log Analytics workspace or an event hub. Membership changes of the admin groups themselves are Microsoft Entra audit events, not Intune ones.
What an attacker needs
- Control of an identity with the Intune Role Administrator role, a custom role with Roles permissions, the Intune Administrator or Global Administrator role, or an application with
DeviceManagementRBAC.ReadWrite.All. - No Multi Admin Approval access policy for role-based access control, or a second compromised approver.
Impact
Durable administrative access to Intune that survives the cleanup of the account used to create it. Depending on the permissions and scope granted, the new holders can run code as SYSTEM on managed Windows devices, deploy apps, change security configuration, and wipe or retire devices.
Detection rules
Intune Role Assignment Created or Updated
Detects a successful create or update of an Intune role assignment, the object that gives a role to admin groups over scope groups and scope tags. Microsoft does not publish the list of OperationName values, so the rule matches the Microsoft Graph resource type (roleAssignment, also the end of deviceAndAppManagementRoleAssignment) inside the name and leaves out deletions. Confirmed from the sample events of Splunk Threat Research: a name is an action followed by a Graph resource type, for example Patch DeviceManagementConfigurationPolicy. Inferred: that role assignment events carry this resource type name; no Microsoft or Splunk sample shows one, so confirm the name in your tenant. Changes to who is a member of an admin group are Microsoft Entra audit events and are not seen by this rule.
title: Intune Role Assignment Created or Updated
id: 8f9dd2e5-929c-47e8-91a4-c44ac9eeefaa
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful create or update of an Intune role assignment, the
object that gives a role to admin groups over scope groups and scope tags.
Microsoft does not publish the list of OperationName values, so the rule
matches the Microsoft Graph resource type (roleAssignment, also the end of
deviceAndAppManagementRoleAssignment) inside the name and leaves out
deletions. Confirmed from the sample events of Splunk Threat Research: a
name is an action followed by a Graph resource type, for example Patch
DeviceManagementConfigurationPolicy. Inferred: that role assignment events
carry this resource type name; no Microsoft or Splunk sample shows one, so
confirm the name in your tenant. Changes to who is a member of an admin
group are
Microsoft Entra audit events and are not seen by this rule.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/fundamentals/role-based-access-control/assign-role
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/intune-rbac-deviceandappmanagementroleassignment
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/governance/integrate-azure-monitor
- https://research.splunk.com/cloud/3c49e5ed-625c-408c-a2c7-8e2b524efb2c/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: intune
service: audit
detection:
selection:
OperationName|contains: RoleAssignment
ResultType: Success
filter_delete:
OperationName|startswith: Delete
condition: selection and not filter_delete
falsepositives:
- Planned changes to Intune administration, for example onboarding a support team; confirm a change record.
- Role assignments are rare events in most tenants; if a provisioning tool creates them, filter its identity.
level: high
False positives
- Planned changes to Intune administration, for example onboarding a support team; confirm a change record.
- Role assignments are rare events in most tenants; if a provisioning tool creates them, filter its identity.
Intune Custom Role Created or Permissions Changed
Detects a successful create or update of an Intune role definition. Built-in roles cannot be edited, so the event is a new custom role or a change to the permissions of an existing one, which silently changes what every group assigned to it can do. Microsoft does not publish the list of OperationName values, so the rule matches the Microsoft Graph resource type (roleDefinition) inside the name and leaves out deletions. Confirmed from the sample events of Splunk Threat Research: a name is an action followed by a Graph resource type, for example Patch DeviceManagementConfigurationPolicy. Inferred: that role events carry this resource type name; no Microsoft or Splunk sample shows one, so confirm the name in your tenant.
title: Intune Custom Role Created or Permissions Changed
id: 2425c898-d532-4f68-b744-a09a09adb372
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful create or update of an Intune role definition. Built-in
roles cannot be edited, so the event is a new custom role or a change to the
permissions of an existing one, which silently changes what every group
assigned to it can do. Microsoft does not publish the list of OperationName
values, so the rule matches the Microsoft Graph resource type
(roleDefinition) inside the name and leaves out deletions. Confirmed from
the sample events of Splunk Threat Research: a name is an action followed by
a Graph resource type, for example Patch DeviceManagementConfigurationPolicy.
Inferred: that role events carry this resource type name; no Microsoft or
Splunk sample shows one, so confirm the name in your tenant.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/fundamentals/role-based-access-control/create-custom-role
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/governance/integrate-azure-monitor
- https://research.splunk.com/cloud/3c49e5ed-625c-408c-a2c7-8e2b524efb2c/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: intune
service: audit
detection:
selection:
OperationName|contains: RoleDefinition
ResultType: Success
filter_delete:
OperationName|startswith: Delete
condition: selection and not filter_delete
falsepositives:
- Planned design or revision of custom roles by the Intune owners; confirm a change record and compare the permissions before and after.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned design or revision of custom roles by the Intune owners; confirm a change record and compare the permissions before and after.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Account added to an Intune admin group, then Intune changes by that account
An attacker does not need to touch an Intune role assignment if a group that already holds one accepts a new member. That addition is a Microsoft Entra event and the rules on this page do not see it. Joining it with the Intune audit log shows the new member using the role, such as deploying scripts or apps or wiping devices, soon after the addition.
- Keep your own list of the admin groups of every Intune role assignment, from the Admin permissions view or the assignments themselves.
- Microsoft Entra audit log:
Add member to groupwhere the group inTargetResourcesis on that list. Keep the member's user principal name and the actor inInitiatedBy. - Intune audit log within 24 hours: successful records (
ResultTypeSuccess) whoseIdentityis the new member, in particular those the rules on the script, app, wipe and compliance policy pages match. - Alert when the new member changes anything in Intune in that window, and raise the priority when
InitiatedByis not an owner of the group.
EventsAdd member to group
LimitsOnboarding of service desk or endpoint staff produces the same pair. Activations through Privileged Identity Management for Groups may be logged differently from a direct addition, and nested groups hide the member. Microsoft does not describe the Identity column of the Intune audit log, so confirm that it holds the user principal name. The 24 hours are a starting point.
Triage
- Identify the actor (Identity, and Actor in Properties) and the role or assignment changed (TargetDisplayNames and TargetObjectIds in Properties).
- Read the modified properties in Properties.Targets, or open the assignment in the admin center, to see which admin groups, scope groups and scope tags it has now.
- List the members of the admin groups and check Microsoft Entra audit logs for recent additions to them.
- Review what the new holders did afterwards in the Intune audit log (scripts, apps, device actions); if unauthorized, remove the assignment and revoke their sessions.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Contain the actor. Revoke the sessions of the account, or disable the application and remove its credentials, and take away its Roles permissions or
DeviceManagementRBAC.ReadWrite.All. - Restore the assignment or custom role to its approved state. Remove added admin groups, set the scope groups and scope tags back, and remove permissions that were added to the custom role.
- Remove unexplained members from the admin groups in Microsoft Entra ID. An attacker's account can stay in a group that a restored assignment still uses.
- Reverse what the new holders did with the role, such as scripts, app assignments, configuration changes and device actions. Treat devices that ran their scripts or apps as compromised.
- After cleanup, compare all Intune role assignments and custom roles, including their scope, with the approved list.
Mitigation
- Create a Multi Admin Approval access policy for Role-based access control after the other policies and the approver group are in place; Microsoft warns that enabling it first can lock you out of the role changes the approval process itself needs.
- Keep Intune Role Administrator and the Roles permissions to a few named administrators, eligible through PIM for Groups rather than permanently active.
- Use role-assignable groups as admin groups, so that only Privileged Role Administrator, Global Administrator and the group owners can change their membership.
- Review role assignments, their scope groups and scope tags on a schedule with the Roles by permission and Admin permissions views.
Frequently asked questions
Does the rule see someone being added to an admin group?
No. Membership changes of the admin groups are Microsoft Entra audit events, not Intune ones. An account added to a group that already holds an Intune role gains the role without any change in Intune. Monitor those groups in the Microsoft Entra audit log, and use role-assignable groups as admin groups.
Why does an Intune role not show up among Microsoft Entra role assignments?
Intune has its own role-based access control, separate from Microsoft Entra roles. An Intune role is given through a role assignment to the members of security groups, over the users and devices in its scope groups. A review of Microsoft Entra roles therefore does not list who holds script, app or wipe rights through Intune roles.
Can an attacker edit a built-in Intune role?
No. Built-in roles cannot be edited, so an event on a role definition is a new custom role or a change to the permissions of an existing one. Such a change silently alters what every group assigned to that role can do, without a new role assignment.
Why should the access policy for role-based access control be created last?
Microsoft warns that enabling it first can lock you out of the role changes that the approval process itself needs. Put the other access policies and the approver group in place first, then protect role-based access control. Until then, keep alerting on every role assignment and role change.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098.003: Additional Cloud Roles
- Microsoft Learn: Role-based access control (RBAC) with Microsoft Intune
- Microsoft Learn: Assign Microsoft Intune roles for role-based access control
- Microsoft Learn: Use access policies to require multi admin approval
- Microsoft Learn: Use audit logs to track and monitor events in Microsoft Intune
- Microsoft Entra audit log activities (GroupManagement: Add member to group)
- Azure Monitor Logs reference: IntuneAuditLogs