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Teams App Published to the Organization Catalog or Organization Settings Changed detection rules

An attacker with Teams administration rights uploads a custom app to the organization's app catalog, or changes the organization-wide Teams settings for bots, apps and channel email, to keep a foothold in the place where staff talk.

Platform
Microsoft 365
Severity
Medium
Log source
Microsoft 365 unified audit log (Microsoft Teams)
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft Sentinel
What an attacker needs
An account that can administer Teams, because a custom app uploaded by a Teams or Global Administrator needs no approval to reach the organization.
Impact
An attacker-controlled app inside teams and chats that reads what its permissions cover and stays after the administrator account is recovered.
Response
Block the app and delete it from the organization's catalog, review the teams it was installed in and restore the organization-wide settings.
Mitigation
Keep Teams administration on few protected accounts, review the custom apps in the catalog and restrict which users may upload or install apps.
Operations
AppPublishedToCatalogAppUpdatedInCatalogTeamsTenantSettingChanged
Threat groups
None listed in MITRE ATT&CK for this technique

How the attack works

Microsoft Teams runs apps next to the conversations: bots, tabs, connectors and message extensions. An organization can have custom apps of its own, which Microsoft describes as apps that are available only within the tenant and not on the Teams store. Microsoft documents several ways to bring one in, and one of them needs nobody's approval: a Global or Teams administrator uploads the app package in the Teams admin center or the Teams client, and the app is available to the entire organization. Once an app is added to a team, the consent for its resource-specific permissions is granted in that step, and Microsoft states that such consent lets an app access and modify the information of that team or chat.

An attacker who holds a Teams administrator account can use this as persistence. A custom app in the catalog looks like something the organization built, users find it under the apps built for the organization, and a bot or tab from it sits inside teams and chats after the administrator account is recovered. The organization-wide settings matter for the same reason. They decide whether bots may be used, whether custom bots may be side-loaded, whether members may add extensions and tabs, and whether people can send email into a channel.

Microsoft's audit log reference documents the operations involved. AppPublishedToCatalog is written when an app is added to the catalog and AppUpdatedInCatalog when an app in the catalog is updated. TeamsTenantSettingChanged is written when a global administrator changes an organization-wide Teams setting in the Microsoft 365 admin center, and the list of settings Microsoft gives for it includes bots, side loading of bots, extensions or tabs and channel email. The rules on this page read these three operations. Changes made in the Teams admin center or with PowerShell are written as TeamsAdminAction, which covers every administrative change in Teams and is too broad for a rule here.

What an attacker needs

  • An account that can administer Teams, such as a Teams Administrator or a Global Administrator. Microsoft documents that these administrators can upload a custom app for the entire organization without approval.
  • For the app to reach data, users or owners who add it to their teams and chats, or an administrator who installs it for them.

Impact

An app under the attacker's control inside the organization's Teams. Added to a team or a chat, it can read and change what its resource-specific permissions cover there, present tabs and cards to users under a name that looks internal, and stay in place after the account that published it is locked. Loosened organization settings widen what users can add themselves, and channel email opens channels to messages from outside.

Detection rules

Teams App Published or Updated in the Organization Catalog

Detects the unified audit log operations AppPublishedToCatalog and AppUpdatedInCatalog of Microsoft Teams. Microsoft documents the first as an app being added to the catalog and the second as an app being updated in the catalog. The catalog holds the custom apps of the organization. Microsoft states that a custom app uploaded by a Global or Teams administrator is available to the entire organization and that no approval is required, and that an administrator updates a custom app by uploading a new version. An attacker with a Teams administrator account can therefore place an app of their own in front of every user, or replace the package of an app people already trust. The rule matches the operation names. The administrator is in UserId. The rule does not read which app was published, so identify it in the event and in the Teams admin center.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft 365 unified audit log (Microsoft Teams)
title: Teams App Published or Updated in the Organization Catalog
id: 498c0222-3557-44f0-8d3b-2a8da03e28c0
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the unified audit log operations AppPublishedToCatalog and
  AppUpdatedInCatalog of Microsoft Teams. Microsoft documents the first as an
  app being added to the catalog and the second as an app being updated in
  the catalog. The catalog holds the custom apps of the organization.
  Microsoft states that a custom app uploaded by a Global or Teams
  administrator is available to the entire organization and that no approval
  is required, and that an administrator updates a custom app by uploading a
  new version. An attacker with a Teams administrator account can therefore
  place an app of their own in front of every user, or replace the package of
  an app people already trust. The rule matches the operation names. The
  administrator is in UserId. The rule does not read which app was
  published, so identify it in the event and in the Teams admin center.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities#teams-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/teams-custom-app-policies-and-settings
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office/office-365-management-api/office-365-management-activity-api-schema#microsoft-teams-schema
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1671/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1671
logsource:
  product: m365
  service: teams
detection:
  selection:
    Operation:
      - AppPublishedToCatalog
      - AppUpdatedInCatalog
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Developers and administrators who publish or update the organization's own apps. The events are rare, so match each one to the owner of the app and to a release.
  - Custom apps that users submitted and an administrator approved. Check who submitted the app and who approved it.
level: medium

False positives

  • Developers and administrators who publish or update the organization's own apps. The events are rare, so match each one to the owner of the app and to a release.
  • Custom apps that users submitted and an administrator approved. Check who submitted the app and who approved it.

Organization-Wide Teams Setting Changed

Detects the unified audit log operation TeamsTenantSettingChanged. Microsoft documents that it is logged when a global administrator changes an organization-wide Teams setting in the Microsoft 365 admin center, and lists the settings it covers. Among them are whether team members may use bots, which individual bots are enabled, the side loading of bots, whether members may add extensions or tabs, and whether users can send email messages to a channel. The same operation is written for settings without security weight, such as animated images, and the rule matches the operation name only, so it is rated low. Microsoft's schema documents the fields Name, OldValue and NewValue for settings events. Read them in the event to see what changed. Microsoft is moving Teams settings from the Microsoft 365 admin center to the Teams admin center, where changes are logged under another operation, so this rule sees only part of the settings.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft 365 unified audit log (Microsoft Teams)
title: Organization-Wide Teams Setting Changed
id: 32be84b8-b920-489f-83cf-1879f3b18c70
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the unified audit log operation TeamsTenantSettingChanged.
  Microsoft documents that it is logged when a global administrator changes
  an organization-wide Teams setting in the Microsoft 365 admin center, and
  lists the settings it covers. Among them are whether team members may use
  bots, which individual bots are enabled, the side loading of bots, whether
  members may add extensions or tabs, and whether users can send email
  messages to a channel. The same operation is written for settings without
  security weight, such as animated images, and the rule matches the
  operation name only, so it is rated low. Microsoft's schema documents the
  fields Name, OldValue and NewValue for settings events. Read them in the
  event to see what changed. Microsoft is moving Teams settings from the
  Microsoft 365 admin center to the Teams admin center, where changes are
  logged under another operation, so this rule sees only part of the
  settings.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities#teams-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-teams-audit-log-events
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office/office-365-management-api/office-365-management-activity-api-schema#microsoft-teams-schema
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1671/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1671
logsource:
  product: m365
  service: teams
detection:
  selection:
    Operation: TeamsTenantSettingChanged
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned changes of the organization's Teams settings by the administrators who own the service. Organization-wide settings change rarely, so confirm each event with a change record.
level: low

False positives

  • Planned changes of the organization's Teams settings by the administrators who own the service. Organization-wide settings change rarely, so confirm each event with a change record.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

App published to the catalog, then installed or added to teams by the same account

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

A developer publishes an app and the owners of teams decide whether to use it. An attacker does both: the account that puts the app into the catalog also installs it or adds its bot to teams within hours, to reach conversations before anyone reviews the app.

  1. Unified audit log, Teams records: Operation equal to AppPublishedToCatalog or AppUpdatedInCatalog. Take UserId and the time.
  2. Within 24 hours: Operation equal to AppInstalled or BotAddedToTeam with the same UserId. AddOnName names the add-on and TeamName the team.
  3. Alert when both exist, and raise the priority with the number of different teams.

EventsAppPublishedToCatalogAppUpdatedInCatalogAppInstalledBotAddedToTeam

LimitsAn administrator who rolls out an approved app to a pilot team does the same, so confirm the rollout. The 24 hours are a starting point. Installation by other accounts, for example users who were asked to add the app, is not linked to the publisher by this hypothesis.

Teams administrative action by an account that has not administered Teams before

Detection hypothesisNeeds a baseline

Teams is administered by a small group. The operation TeamsAdminAction is too broad to alert on, but an account that performs it for the first time is either a new administrator or a compromised account with a Teams role changing settings such as external access.

  1. Build the list of accounts in UserId that wrote Operation equal to TeamsAdminAction in the last 90 days.
  2. For each new TeamsAdminAction record, check whether its UserId is on the list.
  3. Alert when it is not, and review what the account changed in the Teams admin center.

EventsTeamsAdminAction

LimitsNew staff and automation accounts that are given a Teams role appear once. The baseline is empty until 90 days of records exist, and the 90 days are a starting point. It does not see a change made by a usual administrator whose account was taken over.

Triage

  • Identify the administrator in UserId and the object in ObjectId. For an app, find it in the Teams admin center and read its publisher, its permissions and where it is installed.
  • For a setting change, read which setting changed and its old and new value. Microsoft's schema has the fields Name, OldValue and NewValue for settings events.
  • Ask the team that owns Teams for the change record. Custom apps and organization settings change rarely and on request.
  • Look for the app being installed or a bot being added to teams after the event (AppInstalled, BotAddedToTeam), and for who did it.
  • Review the sign-in behind the administrator's session, and the other Teams administrative actions of the same account (TeamsAdminAction).

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Block the app in the Teams admin center and delete it from the organization's catalog, so that it stops working in the teams and chats it was added to.
  2. List the teams and chats in which the app was installed, and review what its permissions allowed it to read or change there.
  3. Restore the organization-wide settings to the recorded values.
  4. Revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of the administrator account that made the change, and remove its role until the account is cleared.
  5. Check the app registrations and enterprise applications in Microsoft Entra ID for an application that belongs to the Teams app, and remove its permissions and credentials.

Mitigation

  • Keep the Teams Administrator and Global Administrator roles on few accounts, eligible through Privileged Identity Management and protected with phishing-resistant MFA.
  • Review the custom apps in the organization's catalog regularly, with their publishers, their permissions and the teams they are installed in, and remove the ones nobody owns.
  • Restrict which users may upload custom apps and which apps users may install, with the app policies and settings Microsoft provides for Teams administrators.
  • Keep channel email, bots and side loading limited to what the organization uses, and record the intended organization-wide settings so that a change can be compared.
  • Turn on auditing and send the Teams records of the unified audit log to your SIEM.

Frequently asked questions

Can a custom app really reach the whole organization without anyone approving it?

When an administrator uploads it, yes. Microsoft's table of upload methods says that a custom app uploaded by a Global or Teams administrator is available to the entire organization and that no approval is required. An app that an ordinary user submits is available to the organization only after an administrator approves it.

Do the rules show which app was published or which setting was changed?

Not by themselves. They match the operation names. Microsoft's schema for Teams audit records documents fields for the name of an add-on and for the name, old value and new value of a changed setting, but the rules do not read them because those fields are not part of the field mapping used here. Read them in the event when a rule fires.

Why is there no rule for changes made in the Teams admin center?

Microsoft logs those as TeamsAdminAction and describes the operation as any update, addition or deletion of Teams settings or configurations through admin tools such as PowerShell, the admin center or the API. That is every administrative change in Teams, so a rule on the operation alone would fire constantly. The detection logic on this page uses it with a baseline instead.

Is there a public incident report for this technique?

No public incident report describes this at the audit event level. The page is based on what Microsoft documents about custom apps in Teams, about the permissions an app receives when it is added to a team, and about the audit operations that record the catalog and the organization-wide settings.

References

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