1. Resources
  2. Detection rules
  3. User Moved to Another Organizational Unit in Google Workspace

User Moved to Another Organizational Unit in Google Workspace detection rules

An attacker with admin rights moves a user, or a whole organizational unit, to a place in the Google Workspace tree with weaker settings. The account loses 2-Step Verification or session rules without any policy being edited.

Platform
Google Cloud
Severity
Medium
Log source
Google Cloud Audit Logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
An admin account with the User management and Organizational unit privileges, and a destination unit with weaker settings or the right to create one.
Impact
The moved accounts take on the settings of the destination unit, which can drop 2-Step Verification enforcement or session rules without a policy change.
Response
Move the account or unit back, confirm that the expected settings apply and review what the account did while the weaker settings were in force.
Mitigation
Enforce security settings at the top-level unit, keep exceptions rare and documented and limit who can move users and organizational units.
API methods
google.admin.AdminService.moveOrgUnitgoogle.admin.AdminService.moveUserToOrgUnit
Threat groups
None listed in MITRE ATT&CK for this technique

How the attack works

Settings in Google Workspace and Cloud Identity are applied through the organizational structure. A user belongs to exactly one organizational unit and inherits its settings, and a child unit inherits from its parent unless a setting is overridden. Google's help pages describe the unit as the scope for 2-Step Verification enforcement, session length, account recovery, password requirements and the services a user can reach. Google's own instruction for giving a single user different settings is to create an organizational unit for just that user.

That makes the tree a way around the policies. An attacker who cannot, or does not want to, change the 2-Step Verification policy moves the target account into a unit where it is not enforced. Moving a whole unit under another parent changes what all of its users inherit. Creating a new unit first and moving one account into it gives the same result with less noise. The security settings pages show no change, because no setting was touched.

The Admin audit log records MOVE_USER_TO_ORG_UNIT with the user, the old unit and the new unit, MOVE_ORG_UNIT with the unit and its new parent, and CREATE_ORG_UNIT with the name of the new unit. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive them in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com. The events do not say which settings differ between the two units. That comparison has to be made in the Admin console.

What an attacker needs

  • An admin account with the appropriate User management and Organizational unit privileges, or a super admin account.
  • A destination unit whose settings are weaker than those of the source, or the right to create one.

Impact

The moved account, or every account of a moved unit, takes on the settings of the destination. Depending on what differs, 2-Step Verification is no longer enforced, sessions last longer, self-service recovery becomes available or a blocked service becomes reachable. The original policies still look intact.

Detection rules

Organizational Unit Moved to Another Parent in Google Workspace

Detects an organizational unit being moved under another parent in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event MOVE_ORG_UNIT, rendered as "{ORG_UNIT_NAME} moved to parent {NEW_VALUE}"). A child unit inherits the settings of its parent unless it overrides them, so the move changes the inherited settings of every user in the unit at once, including 2-Step Verification enforcement and session rules, without any policy being edited. The parameters in protoPayload.metadata name the unit (ORG_UNIT_NAME) and its new parent (NEW_VALUE). The event does not say which settings differ, so compare the old and the new parent in the Admin console. The admin is in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Organizational Unit Moved to Another Parent in Google Workspace
id: 78f965eb-b80f-45f4-b56b-59dba7d575ed
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an organizational unit being moved under another parent in a
  Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event
  MOVE_ORG_UNIT, rendered as "{ORG_UNIT_NAME} moved to parent
  {NEW_VALUE}"). A child unit inherits the settings of its parent unless it
  overrides them, so the move changes the inherited settings of every user
  in the unit at once, including 2-Step Verification enforcement and
  session rules, without any policy being edited. The parameters in
  protoPayload.metadata name the unit (ORG_UNIT_NAME) and its new parent
  (NEW_VALUE). The event does not say which settings differ, so compare the
  old and the new parent in the Admin console. The admin is in
  principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity
  entry at organization level, which is always written once Google
  Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM
  only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-org-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/advanced/move-rename-or-delete-an-organizational-unit
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/advanced/how-the-organizational-structure-works
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1484
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.moveOrgUnit
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - A planned change of the organizational tree, for example after a reorganization. The tree changes rarely, so verify every move against a change record and check the settings the unit inherits afterwards.
level: medium

False positives

  • A planned change of the organizational tree, for example after a reorganization. The tree changes rarely, so verify every move against a change record and check the settings the unit inherits afterwards.

User Moved to Another Organizational Unit in Google Workspace

Detects a user being moved to another organizational unit of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event MOVE_USER_TO_ORG_UNIT, rendered as "{USER_EMAIL} moved from {ORG_UNIT_NAME} to {NEW_VALUE}"). A user belongs to one organizational unit and inherits its settings, so a move replaces the 2-Step Verification enforcement, session length, account recovery and service settings that apply to the account without any policy being edited. The parameters in protoPayload.metadata name the user (USER_EMAIL), the old unit (ORG_UNIT_NAME) and the new unit (NEW_VALUE). The event does not say whether the new unit has weaker settings, and most moves are department changes, so compare the two units in the Admin console. The admin is in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: User Moved to Another Organizational Unit in Google Workspace
id: 9fa1dbb9-79b8-466e-b50d-d40dada77c2a
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a user being moved to another organizational unit of a Google
  Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event
  MOVE_USER_TO_ORG_UNIT, rendered as "{USER_EMAIL} moved from
  {ORG_UNIT_NAME} to {NEW_VALUE}"). A user belongs to one organizational
  unit and inherits its settings, so a move replaces the 2-Step
  Verification enforcement, session length, account recovery and service
  settings that apply to the account without any policy being edited. The
  parameters in protoPayload.metadata name the user (USER_EMAIL), the old
  unit (ORG_UNIT_NAME) and the new unit (NEW_VALUE). The event does not say
  whether the new unit has weaker settings, and most moves are department
  changes, so compare the two units in the Admin console. The admin is in
  principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity
  entry at organization level, which is always written once Google
  Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM
  only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/advanced/move-users-to-an-organizational-unit
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/advanced/how-the-organizational-structure-works
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1484
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.moveUserToOrgUnit
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Department changes, onboarding into the right unit and reorganizations, which are the normal source of this event.
  - Directory synchronization that places users by an attribute of the source directory. Exclude its identity in a filter_* selection on principalEmail, and keep the rule for moves of administrators and moves into units with exceptions.
level: low

False positives

  • Department changes, onboarding into the right unit and reorganizations, which are the normal source of this event.
  • Directory synchronization that places users by an attribute of the source directory. Exclude its identity in a filter_* selection on principalEmail, and keep the rule for moves of administrators and moves into units with exceptions.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

User moved to another organizational unit and moved back shortly after

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

An attacker who needs weaker settings for one action, such as a sign-in without 2-Step Verification, moves the account, acts and moves it back so that the user list looks unchanged. Two moves of one user that cancel each other within a short time have no administrative reason.

  1. A user is moved: google.admin.AdminService.moveUserToOrgUnit of admin.googleapis.com. Keep the parameters USER_EMAIL, ORG_UNIT_NAME (old unit) and NEW_VALUE (new unit).
  2. Within 24 hours a second entry of the same method has the same USER_EMAIL, and its NEW_VALUE is the ORG_UNIT_NAME of the first.
  3. Review the sign-ins and the security setting changes of that account between the two entries.

Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.moveUserToOrgUnit

LimitsAn admin who corrects a mistaken move produces the same pair, usually within minutes and with no activity of the account in between. An attacker who leaves the account in the weaker unit is not found by this pattern. The 24 hours are a starting point.

Organizational unit created and a user moved into it soon after

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsNeeds your own lists

A unit that holds one account can carry settings made for that account alone. Google describes this as the way to change settings for a single user. When a new unit receives a user right after it was created, and the user is an administrator or another privileged account, the unit may exist to take that account out of a policy.

  1. A unit is created: google.admin.AdminService.createOrgUnit of admin.googleapis.com. Keep the parameter ORG_UNIT_NAME and the admin in authenticationInfo.principalEmail.
  2. Within 7 days a google.admin.AdminService.moveUserToOrgUnit entry has a NEW_VALUE that names the new unit. Compare the name with the end of the path.
  3. Raise it when the moved USER_EMAIL is on your list of administrators and privileged accounts, or when few accounts were moved into the unit.

Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.createOrgUnitgoogle.admin.AdminService.moveUserToOrgUnit

LimitsReorganizations create units and fill them, normally with many users. Google documents the unit name in one event and the new unit of the user in the other without stating that both use the same form, so test the comparison with a unit you create yourself. The 7 days are a starting point.

Triage

  • For a user move, read USER_EMAIL, ORG_UNIT_NAME (the old unit) and NEW_VALUE (the new unit) in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata. For a unit move, ORG_UNIT_NAME is the unit and NEW_VALUE its new parent.
  • Compare the security settings of the two units in the Admin console. Check 2-Step Verification enforcement, session control, account recovery, password requirements, Context-Aware Access assignments and app access.
  • Identify the admin who made the move (principalEmail) and confirm it against a request, such as a department change.
  • Check whether the destination unit was created shortly before (createOrgUnit) and how many accounts it holds.
  • Review what the moved account did after the move. Look at its sign-ins, changes to its 2-Step Verification and password, and whether it was moved back.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Move the account or the unit back to where it belongs and confirm in the Admin console that the expected settings apply again.
  2. Check the moved accounts for what the weaker settings allowed. Review 2-Step Verification enrollment, recovery details, sign-ins and sessions, and reset the passwords and sign-in cookies of accounts that were used in that time.
  3. Delete an organizational unit that was created for the bypass, or bring its settings in line with the rest of the tree.
  4. Secure the admin account that made the move. Reset its password, reset its sign-in cookies and review its admin roles.
  5. Review what else the same admin changed in the period.

Mitigation

  • Apply security settings such as 2-Step Verification enforcement at the top-level organizational unit and make exceptions rare, documented and time-limited, so that few places in the tree are weaker than the rest.
  • Give the Organizational unit and User management privileges only to the administrators who need them, and scope delegated admin roles to the units they manage.
  • Review the organizational tree and the settings each unit overrides regularly, and remove units that exist for one account without a recorded reason.
  • Keep administrators in a unit of their own with the strictest settings and alert on every move out of it.
  • Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM.

Frequently asked questions

Why does moving a user change their security settings?

Because settings are attached to organizational units and not to users. Google states that a user belongs to only one organizational unit and inherits that unit's settings. 2-Step Verification enforcement, session length, account recovery and password requirements can each be set per unit. A move replaces the whole set of inherited settings at once.

Does the event show whether the new organizational unit has weaker settings?

No. The event names the user, the old unit and the new unit. It does not carry the settings of either. Whether the move weakened anything depends on which settings the two units override, and that has to be compared in the Admin console. Most moves are department changes and weaken nothing.

Are settings applied through groups affected by a move?

Not by the move itself. Google lets some settings be applied to a configuration group and states that group settings override organizational units. A user who gets a setting through such a group keeps it after a move. The events on this page do not show group membership, so check the user's groups as part of triage.

References

We respect your privacy

We use cookies to keep this site secure and working properly. With your permission, we also use optional cookies to understand usage and improve the experience. Cookie Policy

You can change your choice at any time.