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IAM Deny Policy or Principal Access Boundary Changed or Deleted in Google Cloud detection rules

An attacker deletes or loosens a deny policy, or removes a principal access boundary policy or its binding, so that roles an identity already holds are no longer held back by the guardrail that blocked their use.

Platform
Google Cloud
Severity
Medium
Log source
Google Cloud Audit Logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
The Deny Admin role or the Principal Access Boundary Policy Admin role, which carry the permissions to update, delete or unbind these policies.
Impact
Permissions that existing role bindings grant become usable for the principals the guardrail covered, usually as preparation for the attacker's next step.
Response
Recreate the deleted deny policy, boundary policy or binding from its reviewed definition first, then remove the admin role from the identity that made the change.
Mitigation
Grant Deny Admin and Principal Access Boundary Policy Admin at organization level only, to a few identities that do not hold the roles these policies restrain.
API methods
google.iam.v3.PrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicies.UpdatePrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicygoogle.iam.v3.PrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicies.DeletePrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicygoogle.iam.v3beta.PrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicies.UpdatePrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicygoogle.iam.v3beta.PrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicies.DeletePrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicygoogle.iam.v3.PolicyBindings.UpdatePolicyBindinggoogle.iam.v3.PolicyBindings.DeletePolicyBindinggoogle.iam.v3beta.PolicyBindings.UpdatePolicyBindinggoogle.iam.v3beta.PolicyBindings.DeletePolicyBindinggoogle.iam.v2.Policies.DeletePolicygoogle.iam.v2beta.Policies.DeletePolicygoogle.iam.v2alpha.Policies.DeletePolicygoogle.iam.v2.Policies.UpdatePolicyand 2 more in the rules below
Threat groups
None listed in MITRE ATT&CK for this technique

How the attack works

Deny policies and principal access boundary policies are the IAM guardrails that override role grants. A deny policy is attached to an organization, folder or project and lists principals that cannot use certain permissions, whatever roles they hold, because IAM checks deny policies before allow policies. A principal access boundary policy lists the resources a set of principals is eligible to access, and it is applied to a principal set through a policy binding.

An attacker who can manage these policies removes the guardrail instead of acquiring a new role: delete the deny policy, edit its rules or exceptions, delete the boundary policy, or delete the binding that applies it. No allow policy changes, so detections that watch role grants stay silent, yet permissions the identity already held start to work. The IAM API writes each of these as an Admin Activity entry: google.iam.v2.Policies.UpdatePolicy and DeletePolicy for deny policies, google.iam.v3.PrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicies.UpdatePrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicy and DeletePrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicy for boundary policies, and google.iam.v3.PolicyBindings.UpdatePolicyBinding and DeletePolicyBinding for bindings.

What an attacker needs

  • iam.denypolicies.update or iam.denypolicies.delete, which the Deny Admin role (roles/iam.denyAdmin) contains; Google's guide grants that role on the organization. Or
  • iam.principalaccessboundarypolicies.update, delete or unbind, which the Principal Access Boundary Policy Admin role (roles/iam.principalAccessBoundaryAdmin) contains, together with the policy binding permission on the principal set when a binding is changed.

Impact

Permissions that existing role bindings grant become usable for the principals the guardrail covered: on every resource below the deny policy's attachment point, or for every principal in the bound set. It is usually preparation for the next step, such as changing IAM policies, deleting protected resources or reaching resources outside the boundary.

Detection rules

Principal Access Boundary Policy or Binding Changed or Deleted in Google Cloud

Detects the update or deletion of a principal access boundary policy, and the update or deletion of a policy binding, which is what applies such a policy to a principal set (IAM v3 and v3beta method names; Admin Activity audit log). Deleting the policy or its binding lifts the boundary for the principals it covered. Updates that tighten a policy also match. The methods are long-running operations and can write a start and a completion entry.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Principal Access Boundary Policy or Binding Changed or Deleted in Google Cloud
id: ccd4a89a-e5f9-406c-8deb-40922b63a98b
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the update or deletion of a principal access boundary policy, and the
  update or deletion of a policy binding, which is what applies such a policy
  to a principal set (IAM v3 and v3beta method names; Admin Activity audit
  log). Deleting the policy or its binding lifts the boundary for the principals
  it covered. Updates that tighten a policy also match. The methods are
  long-running operations and can write a start and a completion entry.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/audit-logging
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/principal-access-boundary-policies
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1484
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: iam.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.iam.v3.PrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicies.UpdatePrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicy
      - google.iam.v3.PrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicies.DeletePrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicy
      - google.iam.v3beta.PrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicies.UpdatePrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicy
      - google.iam.v3beta.PrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicies.DeletePrincipalAccessBoundaryPolicy
      - google.iam.v3.PolicyBindings.UpdatePolicyBinding
      - google.iam.v3.PolicyBindings.DeletePolicyBinding
      - google.iam.v3beta.PolicyBindings.UpdatePolicyBinding
      - google.iam.v3beta.PolicyBindings.DeletePolicyBinding
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned changes to boundary policies and their bindings by the cloud platform team or its policy pipeline; exclude the pipeline identity by principalEmail.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned changes to boundary policies and their bindings by the cloud platform team or its policy pipeline; exclude the pipeline identity by principalEmail.

IAM Deny Policy Deleted in Google Cloud

Detects the deletion of a policy through the IAM v2 Policies API, the API that manages deny policies (v2, v2beta and v2alpha method names; Admin Activity audit log). Deleting a deny policy lifts its deny rules for every resource below its attachment point. The method is a long-running operation and can write a start and a completion entry.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: IAM Deny Policy Deleted in Google Cloud
id: 2947a860-99d5-450e-a2fd-327668c65e3b
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the deletion of a policy through the IAM v2 Policies API, the API
  that manages deny policies (v2, v2beta and v2alpha method names; Admin
  Activity audit log). Deleting a deny policy lifts its deny rules for every
  resource below its attachment point. The method is a long-running operation
  and can write a start and a completion entry.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/audit-logging
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/deny-overview
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1484
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: iam.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.iam.v2.Policies.DeletePolicy
      - google.iam.v2beta.Policies.DeletePolicy
      - google.iam.v2alpha.Policies.DeletePolicy
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned retirement or replacement of a deny policy by the cloud platform team or its policy pipeline; exclude the pipeline identity by principalEmail.
level: high

False positives

  • Planned retirement or replacement of a deny policy by the cloud platform team or its policy pipeline; exclude the pipeline identity by principalEmail.

IAM Deny Policy Updated in Google Cloud

Detects an update to a policy through the IAM v2 Policies API, the API that manages deny policies (v2, v2beta and v2alpha method names; Admin Activity audit log). An update can remove deny rules or add exceptions; the rule does not tell a loosened policy from a tightened one, so compare the new rules with the previous version. The method is a long-running operation and can write a start and a completion entry.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: IAM Deny Policy Updated in Google Cloud
id: 3efca9b6-e684-46e4-b2e6-860f12593e5b
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an update to a policy through the IAM v2 Policies API, the API that
  manages deny policies (v2, v2beta and v2alpha method names; Admin Activity
  audit log). An update can remove deny rules or add exceptions; the rule does
  not tell a loosened policy from a tightened one, so compare the new rules
  with the previous version. The method is a long-running operation and can
  write a start and a completion entry.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/audit-logging
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/deny-overview
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1484
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: iam.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.iam.v2.Policies.UpdatePolicy
      - google.iam.v2beta.Policies.UpdatePolicy
      - google.iam.v2alpha.Policies.UpdatePolicy
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned changes to deny rules, including ones that tighten the policy, made by the cloud platform team or its policy pipeline; exclude the pipeline identity by principalEmail.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned changes to deny rules, including ones that tighten the policy, made by the cloud platform team or its policy pipeline; exclude the pipeline identity by principalEmail.

Triage

  • Read protoPayload.resourceName. Deny policies are named policies/, the URL-encoded attachment point, /denypolicies/ and the policy ID; boundary policies and bindings carry principalAccessBoundaryPolicies/ or policyBindings/ in their name.
  • For an update, compare the new rules with the previous version of the policy; a change that tightens the policy also matches.
  • Confirm the change with the owner of the guardrail, and review what the principals it covered did afterwards.
  • These methods are long-running operations and can write a start and a completion entry for one change.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Put the guardrail back first. Recreate the deleted deny policy, boundary policy or policy binding, or restore the previous rules, from the reviewed definition in your policy repository.
  2. Remove Deny Admin or Principal Access Boundary Policy Admin from the identity that made the change, and contain that identity if it was compromised.
  3. Work out which principals and which permissions the guardrail held back. Those principals could use the permissions from the time of the change until the guardrail was restored.
  4. Review the Admin Activity logs of those principals for that period and undo what the lifted guardrail allowed, such as allow policy changes and deleted resources.
  5. After the restore, confirm that the deny policy is attached to the same organization, folder or project as before, and that the boundary policy is bound to the same principal set.

Mitigation

  • Grant Deny Admin and Principal Access Boundary Policy Admin at organization level only, to a few identities that do not hold the roles these policies restrain.
  • Manage deny and boundary policies as code with reviewed changes, and treat changes made outside that pipeline as incidents.
  • Keep the role grants underneath least privileged, so that removing a guardrail frees little.

Frequently asked questions

Why did no role grant alert fire although an identity gained usable permissions?

Nothing was granted. The identity already held the roles, and a deny policy or a principal access boundary policy was holding them back. Deleting or loosening that policy changes no allow policy, so rules that watch `SetIamPolicy` stay silent. The only record is the Admin Activity entry of the IAM API for the policy or binding change.

Can the update rule tell a loosened deny policy from a tightened one?

No. An update can remove deny rules, add exceptions or make the policy stricter, and the method name is the same in each case. Compare the new rules with the previous version of the policy before acting. The delete rule needs no such comparison, because a deleted deny policy lifts its rules for every resource below its attachment point.

Why are there two alerts for one deny policy change?

The methods that change deny policies, principal access boundary policies and policy bindings are long-running operations. They can write one Admin Activity entry when the operation starts and another when it completes. Entries with the same resource name and caller a short time apart describe one change.

What is the difference between deleting a boundary policy and deleting its binding?

A principal access boundary policy lists the resources a set of principals is eligible to access, and a policy binding is what applies it to a principal set. Deleting either one lifts the boundary for the principals it covered. Deleting only the binding is the quieter change, because the policy itself still exists.

References

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