How the attack works
Google Workspace and Cloud Identity have two session controls. Google session control sets the web session length, the time after which a user of Gmail, Drive and the other Google web services has to sign in again. The default is 14 days, and Google states that if the session is set to never expire, users never have to sign in again. Google Cloud session control sets a reauthentication policy for the Google Cloud console, the Cloud SDK and apps that need Google Cloud scopes, with a frequency between 1 and 24 hours and a password or a security key as the method. Both can be set for one organizational unit.
A short session limits how long a stolen session cookie or an unattended browser is useful. An attacker with the Security Settings privilege removes that limit. They lengthen the web session, or switch reauthentication off for the organizational unit that holds the account they use. No account, password or 2-Step Verification setting changes, so the users notice nothing.
The Admin audit log records CHANGE_SESSION_LENGTH with the old and the new value, and SESSION_CONTROL_SETTINGS_CHANGE with the application the setting applies to (REAUTH_APPLICATION, with the documented values ADMIN_CONSOLE and CLOUD_ADMIN_TOOLS), the old and the new setting and the organizational unit. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive both in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com. Google does not document the format of the session length values, so the rules report every change and the analyst reads the direction from the entry.
What an attacker needs
- An admin account with the Security Settings privilege, or a super admin account.
- For the web session length, an edition that offers Google session control. Google lists the supported editions on its help page.
Impact
Sessions in the affected organizational unit last longer or are never asked to reauthenticate. A session the attacker took over, in the browser or in the Google Cloud command line, stays usable without the password and the second factor. The change also widens the window for every later session theft in that unit.
Detection rules
Session Control Reauthentication Setting Changed in Google Workspace
Detects a change of the session control settings of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event SESSION_CONTROL_SETTINGS_CHANGE, rendered as "Session Control Settings updated for {REAUTH_APPLICATION} from {REAUTH_SETTING_OLD} to {REAUTH_SETTING_NEW}"). The parameter REAUTH_APPLICATION names what the setting applies to, with the documented values ADMIN_CONSOLE and CLOUD_ADMIN_TOOLS, and ORG_UNIT_NAME names the organizational unit. Google's reference lists the setting values INHERIT and NEVER, where NEVER means that reauthentication is never required. The rule fires on ANY change, including one that makes reauthentication stricter, because the method name does not carry the direction. Read the parameters in protoPayload.metadata. The admin is in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Session Control Reauthentication Setting Changed in Google Workspace
id: e0a5601d-f6cb-4fec-9e30-56351f97e56a
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change of the session control settings of a Google Workspace or
Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event SESSION_CONTROL_SETTINGS_CHANGE,
rendered as "Session Control Settings updated for {REAUTH_APPLICATION}
from {REAUTH_SETTING_OLD} to {REAUTH_SETTING_NEW}"). The parameter
REAUTH_APPLICATION names what the setting applies to, with the documented
values ADMIN_CONSOLE and CLOUD_ADMIN_TOOLS, and ORG_UNIT_NAME names the
organizational unit. Google's reference lists the setting values INHERIT
and NEVER, where NEVER means that reauthentication is never required. The
rule fires on ANY change, including one that makes reauthentication
stricter, because the method name does not carry the direction. Read the
parameters in protoPayload.metadata. The admin is in principalEmail. The
entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization
level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with
Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the
organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-security-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/set-session-length-for-google-cloud-services
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1556
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.sessionControlSettingsChange
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A change that introduces or tightens reauthentication matches as well, for example the rollout of a reauthentication policy for Google Cloud.
- An administrator who relaxes the policy for one organizational unit because an app cannot reauthenticate, which Google's help page describes. Verify the change against a change record and check that the unit holds only the accounts it was meant for.
level: medium
False positives
- A change that introduces or tightens reauthentication matches as well, for example the rollout of a reauthentication policy for Google Cloud.
- An administrator who relaxes the policy for one organizational unit because an app cannot reauthenticate, which Google's help page describes. Verify the change against a change record and check that the unit holds only the accounts it was meant for.
Web Session Length Changed in Google Workspace
Detects a change of the web session length of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event CHANGE_SESSION_LENGTH, rendered as "Session length has been changed from {OLD_VALUE} to {NEW_VALUE}"). The session length is the time after which a user of Google web services has to sign in again. The default is 14 days, and Google states that with a session that never expires users never have to sign in again. The rule fires on a change in EITHER direction, because the method name does not carry it and Google's reference does not document the format of the values. Read OLD_VALUE and NEW_VALUE in protoPayload.metadata. The admin is in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Web Session Length Changed in Google Workspace
id: 4b917139-5087-493c-9ce8-9e951552e397
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change of the web session length of a Google Workspace or Cloud
Identity account (Admin audit event CHANGE_SESSION_LENGTH, rendered as
"Session length has been changed from {OLD_VALUE} to {NEW_VALUE}"). The
session length is the time after which a user of Google web services has
to sign in again. The default is 14 days, and Google states that with a
session that never expires users never have to sign in again. The rule
fires on a change in EITHER direction, because the method name does not
carry it and Google's reference does not document the format of the
values. Read OLD_VALUE and NEW_VALUE in protoPayload.metadata. The admin
is in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin
Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google
Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM
only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-security-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/set-session-length-for-google-services
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1556
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.changeSessionLength
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A change that shortens the session matches as well, for example during a hardening project.
- The security team adjusting the session length for one organizational unit after user complaints. The setting changes rarely, so verify every event with the admin who made it and compare the new value with your record.
level: medium
False positives
- A change that shortens the session matches as well, for example during a hardening project.
- The security team adjusting the session length for one organizational unit after user complaints. The setting changes rarely, so verify every event with the admin who made it and compare the new value with your record.
Triage
- For a session length change, read OLD_VALUE and NEW_VALUE in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata and decide whether the session became longer.
- For a session control change, read REAUTH_APPLICATION, REAUTH_SETTING_OLD, REAUTH_SETTING_NEW and ORG_UNIT_NAME. The documented value NEVER as the new setting means that reauthentication is no longer required.
- Identify the admin who made the change (principalEmail), confirm it with that person through a second channel and check the recent sign-ins of that account.
- Find out which users are in the affected organizational unit. A unit that holds administrators, or one account that was moved there shortly before, deserves more attention.
- Look for other security settings the same admin changed around that time, such as 2-Step Verification, Context-Aware Access or account recovery.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Set the session length and the reauthentication policy back to the recorded values for the affected organizational unit.
- Reset the sign-in cookies of the users in scope, because Google states that a changed session length applies only after a user signs out and signs in again.
- Secure the admin account that made the change. Reset its password, reset its sign-in cookies and review its 2-Step Verification methods and admin roles.
- Review the activity of the accounts in the affected unit for the time the control was weakened, in Workspace and in Google Cloud.
- Review what else the same admin changed and undo what was not approved.
Mitigation
- Turn on multi-party approval for Google session control where your edition offers it, so that a change needs a second administrator.
- Give the Security Settings privilege only to the administrators who own authentication policy, and keep super admins few.
- Keep a record of the session length and the reauthentication policy of each organizational unit and compare the Admin console with it regularly.
- Use short sessions and a security key as the reauthentication method for administrators and for users with privileged roles in Google Cloud.
- Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM.
Frequently asked questions
Does the rule show whether the session became longer or shorter?
No. The event is written for every change of the session length, and the method name does not carry the direction. The old and the new value are in the event parameters `OLD_VALUE` and `NEW_VALUE` in `protoPayload.metadata`. Google's reference does not document their format, so read them in the entry and compare them with the setting in the Admin console.
Does a longer session length extend sessions that already exist?
Google states that when the session length changes, users need to sign out and sign in again for the new setting to take effect, and that the previous length stays in effect until then. A longer value therefore helps an attacker from the next sign-in on. Resetting a user's sign-in cookies forces that sign-in, which is why the response includes it after the value is restored.
Which sessions do these settings not control?
Google states that session lengths are not enforced on native mobile apps, on apps that authenticate with OAuth or on ChromeOS, and that the session of the Admin console itself is fixed at one hour. With a third-party identity provider, a Google session can be renewed without a new sign-in while the provider's own session is still valid.
Do these events need Data Access audit logs?
No. They are Admin audit events, which reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries. Google states that these are written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled. They are stored at organization level, so the SIEM needs the organization's logs and not only those of the projects.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1556: Modify Authentication Process
- Set session length for Google services
- Set session length for Google Cloud services
- Audit logs for Google Workspace (Cloud Audit Logs)
- Admin audit events: security settings (CHANGE_SESSION_LENGTH, SESSION_CONTROL_SETTINGS_CHANGE)
- Multi-party approval for sensitive actions
- Manage a user's security settings (reset sign-in cookies)