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Rogue Certificate Authority Added for Certificate-Based Authentication detection rules

An attacker uploads their own certificate authority to the tenant's trust store for Microsoft Entra certificate-based authentication, then signs in as other users with certificates they issue themselves.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
Critical
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID audit logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Privileged Authentication Administrator or Global Administrator, and certificate-based authentication enabled for the target accounts or the rights to enable it.
Impact
Sign-in as any user in scope of certificate-based authentication, including administrators, without their password, until the CA is found and removed.
Response
Remove the rogue certificate authority from the trust store, then revoke the sessions of every account that signed in with a certificate since it was added.
Mitigation
Keep Privileged Authentication Administrator and Global Administrator on a few cloud-only, PIM-managed accounts, and alert on every change to the trust store.
Audit activities
Set Company InformationCreate CertificateAuthorityEntityUpdate CertificateAuthorityEntityRestore CertificateAuthorityEntityAdd CertificateBasedAuthConfigurationUpdate CertificateBasedAuthConfiguration
Threat groups
FIN13Salt Typhoon

How the attack works

Microsoft Entra certificate-based authentication (CBA) lets users sign in with an X.509 certificate instead of a password. The tenant decides which issuers to accept by uploading certificate authorities (CAs) to a trust store: the newer PKI-based store, managed by Privileged Authentication Administrators, or the classic store, managed by Global Administrators. Microsoft states the consequence plainly: adding CAs to the configuration allows certificates issued by those CAs to authenticate any user in Microsoft Entra ID. Username bindings then map a certificate field to a user, by default the Principal Name in the certificate to userPrincipalName, and authentication bindings decide whether a certificate counts as single-factor or multifactor authentication.

An attacker with the right role adds a CA whose private key they hold. If CBA is enabled for the accounts they want (or they can enable it in the authentication methods policy), they issue a certificate that names the target user and sign in as that user, with multifactor authentication satisfied wherever the binding rules grant it. The backdoor does not depend on any password or registered method. Changes to the PKI-based store are logged by Core Directory in the CertificateAuthorityEntity and CertificateBasedAuthConfiguration categories. Security researchers report that an upload to the classic store appears as Set Company Information with the modified property TrustedCAsForPasswordlessAuth.

What an attacker needs

  • A compromised identity with Privileged Authentication Administrator or Global Administrator (PKI-based store; Microsoft's Graph API reference also lists Authentication Administrator for creating these objects) or Global Administrator (classic store), or an application with a Microsoft Graph permission that can write the trust store.
  • Certificate-based authentication enabled for the target accounts, or Authentication Policy Administrator rights to enable it and set the binding rules.

Impact

Sign-in as any user in scope of certificate-based authentication, including administrators, without their password and with MFA satisfied where the bindings allow it. The trust persists until the CA is found and removed, and it survives password resets and MFA re-registration of every affected account.

Detection rules

Trusted Certificate Authorities Changed in the Classic Entra Trust Store

Detects a change to the classic trust store for Microsoft Entra certificate-based authentication. Based on published security research, not on Microsoft's audit reference: the change is reported to appear as the Core Directory activity Set Company Information with the modified property TrustedCAsForPasswordlessAuth. Confirm the event shape in your own tenant before relying on the rule.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Trusted Certificate Authorities Changed in the Classic Entra Trust Store
id: b4388890-a400-4f99-af45-7be5b6842c46
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a change to the classic trust store for Microsoft Entra
  certificate-based authentication. Based on published security research, not
  on Microsoft's audit reference: the change is reported to appear as the Core
  Directory activity Set Company Information with the modified property
  TrustedCAsForPasswordlessAuth. Confirm the event shape in your own tenant
  before relying on the rule.
references:
  - https://specterops.io/blog/2022/12/21/passwordless-persistence-and-privilege-escalation-in-azure/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-configure-certificate-authorities
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1556
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName: Set Company Information
    TargetResources|contains: TrustedCAsForPasswordlessAuth
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Planned changes to the trusted CAs by a Global Administrator, including removal of expired CAs; match each event to a change record.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned changes to the trusted CAs by a Global Administrator, including removal of expired CAs; match each event to a change record.

Certificate Authority or PKI Added or Changed in the Entra Trust Store

Detects a certificate authority or a PKI container being created, updated or restored in the PKI-based trust store used by Microsoft Entra certificate-based authentication. Certificates issued by a trusted CA can authenticate users, so every addition should match a planned PKI change.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Certificate Authority or PKI Added or Changed in the Entra Trust Store
id: fc54f97c-3ae0-46ee-832e-c2de41f692ce
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a certificate authority or a PKI container being created, updated or
  restored in the PKI-based trust store used by Microsoft Entra
  certificate-based authentication. Certificates issued by a trusted CA can
  authenticate users, so every addition should match a planned PKI change.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-certificate-based-authentication
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1556
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName:
      - Create CertificateAuthorityEntity
      - Update CertificateAuthorityEntity
      - Restore CertificateAuthorityEntity
      - Add CertificateBasedAuthConfiguration
      - Update CertificateBasedAuthConfiguration
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Planned onboarding or renewal of your own issuing and root CAs, and the migration from the classic store to the PKI-based store; match each event to a change record and to your PKI inventory.
level: high

False positives

  • Planned onboarding or renewal of your own issuing and root CAs, and the migration from the classic store to the PKI-based store; match each event to a change record and to your PKI inventory.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Certificate authority added, then certificate-based authentication enabled or widened by the same actor

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

A rogue certificate authority is of no use while certificate-based authentication is off for the target accounts. An attacker therefore adds the CA and then enables the method, widens its target groups or changes the binding rules so that a certificate counts as multifactor authentication. Both changes by one actor within a short time are the complete setup of the backdoor.

  1. Audit log: Create CertificateAuthorityEntity, Add CertificateBasedAuthConfiguration, Update CertificateBasedAuthConfiguration, or Set Company Information with TrustedCAsForPasswordlessAuth in TargetResources. Take the actor in InitiatedBy.
  2. Audit log, within 24 hours before or after: Authentication Methods Policy Update by the same actor.
  3. Read the old and new values in the modified properties of the policy update, and raise the priority when the certificate method was enabled, its target groups widened or its authentication binding moved to multifactor.
  4. Alert on the pair and confirm it against a PKI change record.

EventsCreate CertificateAuthorityEntityAdd CertificateBasedAuthConfigurationUpdate CertificateBasedAuthConfigurationSet Company InformationAuthentication Methods Policy Update

LimitsA planned rollout of certificate-based authentication makes exactly these two changes, so match the pair to a change record. Microsoft does not document the modified property names of the policy update; read them in your own events. Two actors working together, or changes days apart, are not matched. The 24 hours are a starting point.

First certificate sign-ins of privileged accounts after a trust store change

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsNeeds a baselineNeeds your own lists

Accounts that sign in with certificates from the organization's PKI have done so before. A privileged account that signs in with a certificate for the first time in the days after a certificate authority was added is what a certificate from that new authority looks like when it is used.

  1. Audit log: one of the trust store activities the rules on this page read. Take its time.
  2. Sign-in log, the following 14 days: successful sign-ins (ResultType 0) whose additional details carry the certificate fields Microsoft lists for certificate-based authentication, such as User certificate subject name and User certificate binding.
  3. Keep the accounts that had no such sign-in in the 90 days before the change, starting with the members of privileged roles from your own list.
  4. Compare the certificate subject name of the sign-in with the certificates your PKI issued to that account.

LimitsMicrosoft documents the certificate fields as they appear in the Additional Details of a sign-in in the admin center, not as columns of the exported log, so check where your export carries them before relying on this. A user who receives a smart card for the first time matches as well. The 14 and 90 days are starting points.

Triage

  • Identify the CA that was added or changed (TargetResources) and the actor (InitiatedBy); compare its subject and key identifier with the CAs your PKI team operates.
  • Check whether the authentication methods policy was changed around the same time to enable certificate-based authentication, widen its target groups or raise its protection level.
  • Review sign-ins that used a certificate after the change, especially for privileged accounts and accounts that never used one before.
  • If unauthorized, remove the CA, revert the policy change, revoke sessions for the accounts that signed in with a certificate and investigate the actor.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Remove the rogue certificate authority from the trust store, PKI-based or classic. Until then every certificate it issues is accepted.
  2. Reverse the related changes in the authentication methods policy. Disable certificate-based authentication if it was not in use, or restore its target groups and binding rules.
  3. Revoke the sessions of every account that signed in with a certificate since the CA was added, administrators first.
  4. Revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of the identity that added the CA, and remove its Privileged Authentication Administrator or Global Administrator role.
  5. Review what was done as the accounts that signed in with a certificate, and remove the persistence left behind.
  6. Compare every CA in both trust stores with your PKI inventory. If you do not use certificate-based authentication, confirm that the stores are empty.

Mitigation

  • Keep Privileged Authentication Administrator, Authentication Policy Administrator and Global Administrator on a small number of cloud-only, PIM-managed accounts.
  • If you do not use certificate-based authentication, keep the method disabled and the trust stores empty, and alert on any CA being added.
  • If you use it, enable it only for the groups that hold certificates, require high-affinity username bindings so that only a specific certificate can authenticate a user, and review the trusted CAs against your PKI inventory.
  • Alert on every change to the trust store and to the certificate-based authentication settings in the authentication methods policy.

Frequently asked questions

What ends the access once a rogue CA is trusted?

Removing the CA from the trust store. The backdoor does not depend on any password or registered method, so password resets and MFA re-registration of the affected accounts change nothing. Certificates issued by the rogue CA are accepted until it is removed.

We do not use certificate-based authentication, so are we still exposed?

Yes, if an attacker reaches the right roles. They can add a CA to the trust store and, with Authentication Policy Administrator rights, enable the method and set the binding rules. Keep the method disabled and the trust stores empty, and alert on any CA being added.

How far can the classic trust store rule be trusted?

It is based on published security research, not on Microsoft's audit reference. The change is reported to appear as `Set Company Information` with the modified property `TrustedCAsForPasswordlessAuth`. Confirm the shape of the event in your own tenant before you rely on it. Changes to the PKI-based store are logged in documented categories.

Can a certificate from the rogue CA satisfy MFA?

That depends on the authentication binding rules, which decide whether a certificate counts as single-factor or multifactor authentication. Where the rules grant multifactor, the attacker signs in with MFA satisfied. Review the binding rules whenever a CA is added.

References

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