How the attack works
Google Workspace and Cloud Identity have two account recovery settings. User account recovery lets users and admins who are not super admins reset a forgotten password themselves through an automated system. Super admin account recovery does the same for super admins. With a setting on, the account holder clicks the forgot password link and Google sends a verification code to the recovery phone number or email address of the account. With it off, the person has to ask an administrator, and a super admin has to ask another super admin or Google support.
The recovery path replaces the password, so it belongs to whoever receives the code. An attacker who has reached a super admin account turns self-service recovery on and sets a recovery email or phone they control on the accounts they want to keep. After the defenders have reset the passwords, the attacker asks for a recovery code and sets a new one. Google warns that removing recovery information is not enough for an account that may be compromised, because the information can still be used for recovery for a period of time after it was removed.
The Admin audit log records ENABLE_NON_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_RECOVERY when the user setting changes, with the organizational unit or group and the old and new value, and TOGGLE_ALLOW_ADMIN_PASSWORD_RESET when the super admin setting changes, with the new value true or false. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive both in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com. Both events are written when a setting is turned on and when it is turned off.
What an attacker needs
- A super admin account. Google requires one for both account recovery settings.
- A recovery email address or phone number on the target account that the attacker controls. An admin with user management rights can set it, and by default users can add their own.
- For the user setting, an organization that does not use single sign-on with a third-party identity provider or Password Sync. Google states that the setting does not apply there.
Impact
Accounts in scope can have their password reset by anyone who receives the recovery code. That gives the attacker a way back into user accounts, and with the super admin setting into super admin accounts, after a password reset has locked them out. The path needs no admin action at the time it is used.
Detection rules
Super Admin Account Recovery Setting Changed in Google Workspace
Detects a change of the super admin account recovery setting of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event TOGGLE_ALLOW_ADMIN_PASSWORD_RESET, rendered as "Allow admin password reset setting changed to {NEW_VALUE}"). With the setting on, a super admin who added recovery options can reset a forgotten password with a verification code sent by text, phone or email, so the recovery phone number and email address of a super admin account become a way into it. Google recommends keeping the setting off in organizations with several super admins. The rule fires on a change in EITHER direction, because the method name does not carry it. The new value is the parameter NEW_VALUE in protoPayload.metadata, documented as true or false. The admin is in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Super Admin Account Recovery Setting Changed in Google Workspace
id: 7c349d64-d550-4ae9-8415-a0932df66a74
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change of the super admin account recovery setting of a Google
Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event
TOGGLE_ALLOW_ADMIN_PASSWORD_RESET, rendered as "Allow admin password
reset setting changed to {NEW_VALUE}"). With the setting on, a super
admin who added recovery options can reset a forgotten password with a
verification code sent by text, phone or email, so the recovery phone
number and email address of a super admin account become a way into it.
Google recommends keeping the setting off in organizations with several
super admins. The rule fires on a change in EITHER direction, because the
method name does not carry it. The new value is the parameter NEW_VALUE
in protoPayload.metadata, documented as true or false. The admin is in
principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity
entry at organization level, which is always written once Google
Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM
only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/allow-super-administrators-to-recover-their-password
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1556
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.toggleAllowAdminPasswordReset
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A super admin who turns self-recovery off as a hardening step, which matches as well.
- A small organization with one super admin that turns the setting on so that the account can be recovered. The setting changes very rarely, so verify every event with the super admin who made it.
level: high
False positives
- A super admin who turns self-recovery off as a hardening step, which matches as well.
- A small organization with one super admin that turns the setting on so that the account can be recovered. The setting changes very rarely, so verify every event with the super admin who made it.
User Account Recovery Setting Changed in Google Workspace
Detects a change of the user account recovery setting of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event ENABLE_NON_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_RECOVERY, rendered as "Enable non-admin user password recovery setting in {ORG_UNIT_NAME} organization changed from {OLD_VALUE} to {NEW_VALUE}"). With the setting on, users and admins who are not super admins can reset a forgotten password themselves with the recovery phone number or email address of the account. Despite its name the event is written for every change of the setting, and Google's reference does not list the values, so read OLD_VALUE and NEW_VALUE in protoPayload.metadata together with ORG_UNIT_NAME and GROUP_EMAIL for the scope. The admin is in principalEmail. Google states that the setting does not apply to organizations that use single sign-on with a third-party identity provider or Password Sync. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: User Account Recovery Setting Changed in Google Workspace
id: 54223aef-c954-46dd-899b-65a75ca7762d
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change of the user account recovery setting of a Google
Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event
ENABLE_NON_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_RECOVERY, rendered as "Enable non-admin
user password recovery setting in {ORG_UNIT_NAME} organization changed
from {OLD_VALUE} to {NEW_VALUE}"). With the setting on, users and admins
who are not super admins can reset a forgotten password themselves with
the recovery phone number or email address of the account. Despite its
name the event is written for every change of the setting, and Google's
reference does not list the values, so read OLD_VALUE and NEW_VALUE in
protoPayload.metadata together with ORG_UNIT_NAME and GROUP_EMAIL for the
scope. The admin is in principalEmail. Google states that the setting
does not apply to organizations that use single sign-on with a
third-party identity provider or Password Sync. The entry reaches Cloud
Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is
always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is
enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are
routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-security-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/set-up-password-recovery-for-users
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1556
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.enableNonAdminUserPasswordRecovery
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A helpdesk project that introduces self-service password reset for one organizational unit after another. Each step is a planned change with a record.
- A super admin who turns the setting off after an incident, which matches as well.
level: medium
False positives
- A helpdesk project that introduces self-service password reset for one organizational unit after another. Each step is a planned change with a record.
- A super admin who turns the setting off after an incident, which matches as well.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Self-service recovery turned on and recovery details set soon after
The setting alone gives nothing. It becomes a way in when an account in scope also has a recovery email address or phone number the attacker controls. A recovery setting change that is followed by new recovery details on a privileged account shows both halves of the path.
- An account recovery setting changes:
google.admin.AdminService.enableNonAdminUserPasswordRecoveryorgoogle.admin.AdminService.toggleAllowAdminPasswordResetofadmin.googleapis.com. Note the admin inauthenticationInfo.principalEmailand the parameterNEW_VALUE. - Within 7 days an admin sets recovery details:
google.admin.AdminService.changeRecoveryEmail,changeRecoveryPhone,addRecoveryEmailoraddRecoveryPhone, with the account in the parameterUSER_EMAIL. - Or the account holder sets them:
google.login.LoginService.recoveryEmailEditorrecoveryPhoneEditoflogin.googleapis.com, with the account inauthenticationInfo.principalEmail. - Raise it when the account is a super admin or another privileged account from your own list, or when the same admin made both changes.
Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.toggleAllowAdminPasswordResetgoogle.admin.AdminService.enableNonAdminUserPasswordRecoverygoogle.admin.AdminService.changeRecoveryEmailgoogle.login.LoginService.recoveryEmailEdit
LimitsA real rollout of self-service recovery asks every user to add recovery details and matches for all of them, which is why the last step needs your list of privileged accounts. The events do not carry the new address or number. Recovery details that were set before the setting changed are not found. The 7 days are a starting point.
Triage
- Read NEW_VALUE in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata. For the super admin setting Google documents the values true and false. For the user setting also read OLD_VALUE, ORG_UNIT_NAME and GROUP_EMAIL to see the direction and the scope.
- Identify the super admin who made the change (principalEmail), confirm it with that person through a second channel and check the recent sign-ins of that account.
- Search the Admin audit log for recovery information set by an admin around the change, the methods changeRecoveryEmail, changeRecoveryPhone, addRecoveryEmail and addRecoveryPhone, and read USER_EMAIL of each.
- Search the Login audit log for recoveryEmailEdit and recoveryPhoneEdit entries of privileged accounts after the change.
- Check whether a password of an account in scope changed afterwards without an administrator resetting it (google.login.LoginService.passwordEdit).
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Set both account recovery settings back to the recorded state for every organizational unit and group that was changed.
- Review the recovery email address and phone number of every super admin and of the accounts in the affected unit, and remove what the owner does not recognize.
- For accounts whose recovery information was changed, reset the password, reset the sign-in cookies and keep self-service recovery off for them, because Google states that removed recovery information can still be used for a time.
- Secure the super admin account that made the change. Reset its password, reset its sign-in cookies and review its 2-Step Verification methods.
- Review what else the same admin changed, such as 2-Step Verification settings, session length and admin roles.
Mitigation
- Keep super admin account recovery off and have several super admins who can reset each other's passwords, which is what Google recommends for organizations with multiple super admins.
- Turn on multi-party approval for account recovery settings where your edition offers it, so that a change needs a second super admin.
- Decide per organizational unit whether users may recover their accounts themselves, and keep it off for administrators and other privileged users.
- Review the recovery email addresses and phone numbers of privileged accounts regularly and remove the ones the owner does not recognize.
- Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM.
Frequently asked questions
Why does this setting matter when the attacker is already a super admin?
Because it outlasts the session that changed it. A password reset removes an attacker who holds a password. It does not remove a recovery email address or phone number they added. With self-service recovery on, the holder of that address or number asks Google for a code and sets a new password without any administrator being involved.
Does the rule show whether recovery was turned on or off?
No. Both events are written in both directions. The new value is in the event parameter `NEW_VALUE` in `protoPayload.metadata`. For the super admin setting Google documents it as true or false. For the user setting Google documents an old and a new value without listing them, so read both in the entry. A setting that was turned on is the case to investigate.
Does 2-Step Verification stop a password reset through account recovery?
It narrows the path. Google states that users who have 2-Step Verification enabled can use only a recovery email address to reset their password, not a phone number. The page does not say that the reset is refused. Treat a recovery email address the owner does not recognize as a way into the account.
Is removing the recovery information enough once an account is suspected?
No. Google states that for an account that may be compromised, removing the recovery information is not enough, since it can still be used for recovery for a period of time after being removed. Google's advice is to change the password and turn off non-admin password recovery, or to suspend the account.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1556: Modify Authentication Process
- Set up password recovery for users
- Allow super administrators to recover their password
- Add recovery information for admins and users
- Allow users to add password recovery details
- Audit logs for Google Workspace (Cloud Audit Logs)
- Admin audit events: security settings (ENABLE_NON_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_RECOVERY)
- Admin audit events: domain settings (TOGGLE_ALLOW_ADMIN_PASSWORD_RESET)
- Admin audit events: user settings (recovery email and phone events)
- Login audit events (recovery_email_edit, recovery_phone_edit, password_edit)
- Multi-party approval for sensitive actions
- Security best practices for administrator accounts