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Mailbox Export or Data Transfer Started by an Admin in Google Workspace detection rules

An attacker with admin rights in Google Workspace requests an export of a user's mailbox or transfers the user's Drive files to an account they control, and collects the data without signing in as the user.

Platform
Google Cloud
Severity
High
Log source
Google Cloud Audit Logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
An admin account that can use the Email Audit API or the data transfer tools, and for a transfer a second account in the same organization.
Impact
The whole mailbox of a chosen user, or ownership of all their Drive files, passes to the attacker without a sign-in as that user.
Response
Secure the admin account that made the request, delete the prepared export, transfer the files back and treat the data as disclosed.
Mitigation
Limit the Data Transfer privilege and the Email Audit API to the administrators who handle offboarding and legal requests, and tie each use to a ticket.
API methods
google.admin.AdminService.createDataTransferRequestgoogle.admin.AdminService.transferDocumentOwnershipgoogle.admin.AdminService.requestMailboxDump

How the attack works

Google Workspace has administrator tools that move a user's data in bulk. The Email Audit API can prepare an export of a mailbox, which Google describes as an encrypted copy of the user's mailbox that the administrator downloads and decrypts into mbox format. The data transfer tools change the owner of everything a user owns in an application, most often all Drive files, to another user of the organization. They are meant for audits, legal requests and for people who leave.

An attacker who holds an admin account can point the same tools at a living target. A mailbox export hands over years of mail in one request, and the request can carry a search query and a date range and include deleted messages. A data transfer makes an account the attacker controls the owner of the target's files, and an owner can then share or copy them. In both cases the attacker does not need the target's password or second factor and does not appear in the target's sign-in history.

The Admin audit log records REQUEST_MAILBOX_DUMP with the user, the date range, the search query and whether deleted mail is included, CREATE_DATA_TRANSFER_REQUEST with the source user, the destination user and the applications, and TRANSFER_DOCUMENT_OWNERSHIP with the original and the new owner. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive them in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com. Google marks the mailbox download of the Email Audit API as deprecated in favour of the Vault export API. Vault exports are written to a different log and are not covered here.

What an attacker needs

  • An admin account. Google states that domain administrators can download mailboxes through the Email Audit API, and that transferring Drive ownership in the Admin console needs the Data Transfer privilege together with the Drive service privilege.
  • For a data transfer, a second account in the same organization to receive the files. Google does not support transfers to or from an external account.

Impact

The whole mailbox of a chosen user, or ownership of all their Drive files, passes to the attacker. Mail often holds credentials, contracts and reset links for other services. Ownership of files lets the new owner share them outside the organization or delete them. Google keeps prepared mailbox export files for three weeks, so a request that went unnoticed can be collected later.

Detection rules

Data Transfer or Drive Ownership Transfer Started by an Admin in Google Workspace

Detects two Admin audit events with which an administrator moves a user's data to another user of a Google Workspace account: a data transfer request created (CREATE_DATA_TRANSFER_REQUEST, rendered as "Data transfer request created from {USER_EMAIL} to {DESTINATION_USER_EMAIL} for apps {APPLICATION_NAME}") and the owner of documents changed (TRANSFER_DOCUMENT_OWNERSHIP, rendered as "Owner of documents changed from {USER_EMAIL} to {NEW_VALUE}"). The receiving account becomes the owner of the files and can then share, copy or delete them. An attacker with an admin account uses a transfer to take the Drive of a chosen user into an account they control. Google states that both accounts must be in the organization. The parameters are in protoPayload.metadata and the admin in principalEmail. Transfers are routine when people leave, so the rule fires on every one. Compare the source user with your offboarding records. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Data Transfer or Drive Ownership Transfer Started by an Admin in Google Workspace
id: 9c38c4d2-2f4b-4904-bb25-e0b9ccc89246
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects two Admin audit events with which an administrator moves a user's
  data to another user of a Google Workspace account: a data transfer
  request created (CREATE_DATA_TRANSFER_REQUEST, rendered as "Data transfer
  request created from {USER_EMAIL} to {DESTINATION_USER_EMAIL} for apps
  {APPLICATION_NAME}") and the owner of documents changed
  (TRANSFER_DOCUMENT_OWNERSHIP, rendered as "Owner of documents changed from
  {USER_EMAIL} to {NEW_VALUE}"). The receiving account becomes the owner of
  the files and can then share, copy or delete them. An attacker with an
  admin account uses a transfer to take the Drive of a chosen user into an
  account they control. Google states that both accounts must be in the
  organization. The parameters are in protoPayload.metadata and the admin in
  principalEmail. Transfers are routine when people leave, so the rule
  fires on every one. Compare the source user with your offboarding
  records. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at
  organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data
  sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the
  organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-docs-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/transfer-drive-files-to-a-new-owner-as-an-admin
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1530
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.admin.AdminService.createDataTransferRequest
      - google.admin.AdminService.transferDocumentOwnership
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Offboarding, in which the files of a leaver are transferred to a manager or a shared account, usually together with a suspension or deletion of the user. Exclude the identity of an offboarding automation by principalEmail in a filter_* selection, and review transfers whose source user is still active.
level: medium

False positives

  • Offboarding, in which the files of a leaver are transferred to a manager or a shared account, usually together with a suspension or deletion of the user. Exclude the identity of an offboarding automation by principalEmail in a filter_* selection, and review transfers whose source user is still active.

Mailbox Export Requested for a User by an Admin in Google Workspace

Detects an administrator requesting an export of a user's mailbox in a Google Workspace account (Admin audit event REQUEST_MAILBOX_DUMP, rendered as "Requested mailbox dump for {USER_EMAIL}"). The request is made through the Email Audit API. Google describes the result as an encrypted copy of the user's mailbox that the administrator downloads and decrypts into mbox format, and states that the files are kept for three weeks. An attacker with an admin account obtains a whole mailbox this way without signing in as the user. The user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata. SEARCH_QUERY_FOR_DUMP, BEGIN_DATE_TIME, END_DATE_TIME, EMAIL_EXPORT_INCLUDE_DELETED and EMAIL_EXPORT_PACKAGE_CONTENT describe what was requested. The admin is in principalEmail. Google marks this part of the API as deprecated in favour of the Vault export API, so in many organizations the event should be rare. Vault exports are not written to this log and do not match. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Mailbox Export Requested for a User by an Admin in Google Workspace
id: 32f4bb02-2cd5-4b7c-8431-e037c139206f
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an administrator requesting an export of a user's mailbox in a
  Google Workspace account (Admin audit event REQUEST_MAILBOX_DUMP, rendered
  as "Requested mailbox dump for {USER_EMAIL}"). The request is made through
  the Email Audit API. Google describes the result as an encrypted copy of
  the user's mailbox that the administrator downloads and decrypts into
  mbox format, and states that the files are kept for three weeks. An
  attacker with an admin account obtains a whole mailbox this way without
  signing in as the user. The user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL in
  protoPayload.metadata. SEARCH_QUERY_FOR_DUMP, BEGIN_DATE_TIME,
  END_DATE_TIME, EMAIL_EXPORT_INCLUDE_DELETED and
  EMAIL_EXPORT_PACKAGE_CONTENT describe what was requested. The admin is in
  principalEmail. Google marks this part of the API as deprecated in favour
  of the Vault export API, so in many organizations the event should be
  rare. Vault exports are not written to this log and do not match. The
  entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization
  level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with
  Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the
  organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/email-audit/download-mailbox
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1114.002
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.requestMailboxDump
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Exports for legal requests, investigations and the archiving of a leaver's mailbox, and backup or archiving products that still use the Email Audit API. Verify each event against a request from legal or human resources, and exclude a known archiving identity by principalEmail in a filter_* selection.
level: high

False positives

  • Exports for legal requests, investigations and the archiving of a leaver's mailbox, and backup or archiving products that still use the Email Audit API. Verify each event against a request from legal or human resources, and exclude a known archiving identity by principalEmail in a filter_* selection.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Data transfer from a user who is not being offboarded

Detection hypothesisJoins two logs

Google's instructions for a bulk transfer start with suspending the current owner, and most transfers belong to an offboarding in which the user is suspended or deleted. A transfer from a user for whom neither event exists is taken from someone who is still working.

  1. Take each google.admin.AdminService.createDataTransferRequest or transferDocumentOwnership entry and read the source user from the event parameter USER_EMAIL.
  2. Look for a google.admin.AdminService.suspendUser, deleteUser or archiveUser entry with the same USER_EMAIL in the 7 days before and the 7 days after.
  3. Raise the transfer when none exists, with the receiving account from DESTINATION_USER_EMAIL or NEW_VALUE and the admin from authenticationInfo.principalEmail.

Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.createDataTransferRequestgoogle.admin.AdminService.transferDocumentOwnershipgoogle.admin.AdminService.suspendUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.deleteUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.archiveUser

LimitsTransfers for people who change teams or go on leave match as well, so each one needs its ticket. Users who were suspended by a directory sync long before the transfer fall outside the window. The 7 days are a starting point.

Triage

  • Read the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata. USER_EMAIL is the user whose data is taken. For a transfer, DESTINATION_USER_EMAIL or NEW_VALUE is the receiving account and APPLICATION_NAME lists the applications.
  • For a mailbox export, read SEARCH_QUERY_FOR_DUMP, BEGIN_DATE_TIME, END_DATE_TIME and EMAIL_EXPORT_INCLUDE_DELETED to see what was asked for.
  • Look for the reason. Offboarding leaves a suspension or deletion of the source user and a ticket. A legal request leaves a record with legal. An active executive whose data moves without either is an incident.
  • Check the receiving account. See who owns it, when it was created, whether the admin who started the transfer controls it and what it did with the files afterwards.
  • Identify the admin who made the request (principalEmail), confirm it with that person through a second channel and check the recent sign-ins of that account.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Secure the admin account that made the request. Reset its password, reset its sign-in cookies so that existing sessions end, and review its 2-Step Verification methods and admin roles.
  2. Delete a prepared mailbox export that should not exist. Google keeps the files for three weeks unless they are deleted, and deleting one is recorded as its own audit event.
  3. Transfer the files back to their owner, or to an account you trust if the owner is gone, and review in the Drive audit log what the receiving account shared, downloaded or deleted in the meantime.
  4. Secure the receiving account. Suspend it if it was created for the purpose, or reset its password and sign-in cookies.
  5. Treat the exported mail and the transferred files as disclosed, and act on what they contained, such as credentials, reset links and personal data.

Mitigation

  • Give the Data Transfer privilege and access to the Email Audit API only to the administrators who handle offboarding and legal requests, and keep super admins few.
  • Tie every export and transfer to a ticket from legal, human resources or the data owner, so that an event without one stands out.
  • Follow Google's guidance to suspend the current owner before a bulk transfer. A transfer from an account that is still active then becomes a signal.
  • Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM.

Frequently asked questions

Is anyone told when an admin transfers a user's Drive files to a new owner?

Yes. Google states that when a bulk transfer completes, the new owner, the previous owner and the admin who started the transfer get a confirmation email. A user who receives such a message without having left a team or a project has a reason to report it. The audit entry does not wait for that message, so the detection can be earlier than the email.

Can a data transfer move files to an account outside the organization?

No. Google states that the current owner and the proposed owner must both be in the organization, and that it does not support direct transfer of ownership to or from an external account. An attacker therefore needs an internal account to receive the files. Sharing them outside afterwards is a separate step that the Drive audit log records.

How long does a requested mailbox export stay available?

Google states that it retains the encrypted mailbox files for three weeks and deletes them after that, and that an administrator can delete them earlier. The files are encrypted with a public key that was uploaded for the domain and are read in mbox format once decrypted. A request therefore remains useful to whoever holds the matching private key for weeks.

Is every data transfer between two users a sign of an attack?

No. Transfers are a routine part of offboarding, and Google's own instructions for deleting a user start with transferring the data. What separates an attack is a source user who is still active and was not told, a receiving account with no business reason to own the files, and an admin who does not normally handle offboarding.

References

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