How the attack works
Azure exports a managed disk by returning a time-limited shared access signature (SAS) link to its contents. The request is Microsoft.Compute/disks/beginGetAccess/action for a disk and Microsoft.Compute/snapshots/beginGetAccess/action for a snapshot. A disk attached to a running virtual machine cannot be downloaded, so the documented route for a live machine is to take a snapshot first and export that, which does not interrupt the machine. A VM restore point holds a snapshot of every attached managed disk and hands out a link in the same way, through Microsoft.Compute/restorePointCollections/restorePoints/diskRestorePoints/beginGetAccess/action for one disk and .../restorePoints/retrieveSasUris/action for the restore point with its SAS URIs.
Attackers who hold Contributor, a disk backup or snapshot role, or a custom role with these actions use the export to read a machine's data without signing in to it or running anything on it: credential stores, application secrets and, on a domain controller, the directory database. Nothing happens inside the guest, so host-based detection sees nothing. The request for the link is an Azure Resource Manager operation recorded in the Activity log with its caller; the download itself is made with the link and carries no identity.
What an attacker needs
Microsoft.Compute/disks/beginGetAccess/actionorMicrosoft.Compute/snapshots/beginGetAccess/actionon the disk or snapshot (Owner, Contributor, Disk Snapshot Contributor, Disk Backup Reader, Disk Restore Operator or a custom role).- For a disk attached to a running VM,
Microsoft.Compute/snapshots/writeas well, to take the snapshot that is exported.
Impact
An offline copy of everything on the disk. For Tier 0 servers this is equivalent to credential theft at scale; for other machines it exposes service account secrets, keys and data without any sign-in to the machine.
Detection rules
Azure Managed Disk or Snapshot Export Link Requested
Detects a successful request for the SAS URI of an Azure managed disk or snapshot, which lets the holder of the link download the whole virtual hard disk. Backup and migration services make the same call, so baseline their identities and alert on other callers and on Tier 0 disks.
title: Azure Managed Disk or Snapshot Export Link Requested
id: 64f6d776-2cb2-4843-9a78-7960ff861bc2
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful request for the SAS URI of an Azure managed disk or
snapshot, which lets the holder of the link download the whole virtual hard
disk. Backup and migration services make the same call, so baseline their
identities and alert on other callers and on Tier 0 disks.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/disks-restrict-import-export-overview
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/download-vhd
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/compute
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1530
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue:
- MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/DISKS/BEGINGETACCESS/ACTION
- MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/SNAPSHOTS/BEGINGETACCESS/ACTION
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Backup vault identities that perform disk backup (the Disk Backup Reader and Disk Snapshot Contributor roles exist for them), and migration or image-building tooling that exports disks; exclude those identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
- Administrators moving a disk between regions, subscriptions or tenants; correlate with change records.
level: medium
False positives
- Backup vault identities that perform disk backup (the Disk Backup Reader and Disk Snapshot Contributor roles exist for them), and migration or image-building tooling that exports disks; exclude those identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
- Administrators moving a disk between regions, subscriptions or tenants; correlate with change records.
Azure VM Restore Point SAS URI Requested
Detects a successful request for the SAS URI of a disk inside an Azure VM restore point, or for the properties of a restore point together with its blob SAS URIs. A VM restore point holds snapshots of the disks of a virtual machine, so the link lets its holder download a disk without touching the disk or snapshot resources that the companion rule watches. Backup and disaster recovery products that are built on restore points make the same calls, so baseline their identities and alert on other callers and on Tier 0 machines.
title: Azure VM Restore Point SAS URI Requested
id: 4c9a2515-c527-4567-b09f-af23db1192f7
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful request for the SAS URI of a disk inside an Azure VM
restore point, or for the properties of a restore point together with its
blob SAS URIs. A VM restore point holds snapshots of the disks of a virtual
machine, so the link lets its holder download a disk without touching the
disk or snapshot resources that the companion rule watches. Backup and
disaster recovery products that are built on restore points make the same
calls, so baseline their identities and alert on other callers and on
Tier 0 machines.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/manage-restore-points
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/virtual-machines-create-restore-points
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/compute
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1530
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue:
- MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/RESTOREPOINTCOLLECTIONS/RESTOREPOINTS/DISKRESTOREPOINTS/BEGINGETACCESS/ACTION
- MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/RESTOREPOINTCOLLECTIONS/RESTOREPOINTS/RETRIEVESASURIS/ACTION
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Backup, replication and disaster recovery products that copy the disks of a restore point. Exclude their identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
- Administrators who copy a restore point to another region or subscription. Correlate with change records.
level: medium
False positives
- Backup, replication and disaster recovery products that copy the disks of a restore point. Exclude their identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
- Administrators who copy a restore point to another region or subscription. Correlate with change records.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Snapshot or restore point created, exported and deleted by the same caller
A disk that is attached to a running machine cannot be downloaded, so an attacker takes a snapshot or a restore point first, requests its link and deletes it afterwards to leave nothing behind. Creation, export and deletion of the same object by one caller within a short time is not how backup products work, because they keep what they create for a retention period.
- In the Azure Activity log, a snapshot or restore point is created:
OperationNameValueMICROSOFT.COMPUTE/SNAPSHOTS/WRITEorMICROSOFT.COMPUTE/RESTOREPOINTCOLLECTIONS/RESTOREPOINTS/WRITE, status Success. Keep theCallerand the resource ID of the event. - Within 24 hours the same
Callerrequests a link for the same resource ID:MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/SNAPSHOTS/BEGINGETACCESS/ACTION, or for a restore point.../RESTOREPOINTS/DISKRESTOREPOINTS/BEGINGETACCESS/ACTIONor.../RESTOREPOINTS/RETRIEVESASURIS/ACTION. - Within the following 24 hours the same
Callerdeletes it:MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/SNAPSHOTS/DELETE,MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/RESTOREPOINTCOLLECTIONS/RESTOREPOINTS/DELETEorMICROSOFT.COMPUTE/RESTOREPOINTCOLLECTIONS/DELETE. - Raise the priority when the source disk belongs to a domain controller or another Tier 0 machine in your own inventory.
EventsMICROSOFT.COMPUTE/SNAPSHOTS/WRITEMICROSOFT.COMPUTE/SNAPSHOTS/BEGINGETACCESS/ACTIONMICROSOFT.COMPUTE/SNAPSHOTS/DELETEMICROSOFT.COMPUTE/RESTOREPOINTCOLLECTIONS/RESTOREPOINTS/WRITEMICROSOFT.COMPUTE/RESTOREPOINTCOLLECTIONS/RESTOREPOINTS/DELETE
LimitsImage-building and migration pipelines create, export and delete a snapshot in one run, so their identities have to be excluded by name. The two windows of 24 hours are starting points. An attacker who leaves the snapshot in place, or deletes it with another identity, does not match and is only seen by the single-event rules.
Triage
- Identify the Caller and the disk, snapshot or restore point from the event, and which virtual machine it belongs to.
- Decide whether the caller is a known backup, migration or image-building identity acting on its usual schedule; an export by a person, or of a Tier 0 disk, needs an explanation.
- Look for a snapshot of the same disk created shortly before by the same caller, and for the snapshot being deleted afterwards.
- If the export is unexplained, revoke the link (end access on the disk or snapshot) and treat every credential on the disk as exposed.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Remove the caller's access to disks and snapshots, revoke its sessions and rotate its credentials. Revoking the link does not stop the caller from requesting a new one.
- Delete the snapshots the caller created once you have recorded them for the investigation, and set the network access policy of the disk and its remaining snapshots to DenyAll while you investigate.
- For a domain controller disk, handle the event as theft of the Active Directory database. Reset the passwords of administrative and service accounts, and reset the krbtgt password twice as Microsoft's procedure describes.
- For other machines, rotate what was stored on the disk, such as local administrator and service account passwords, application secrets, keys and certificates. Review their use since the time of the export.
- Check the Activity log for the same request on other disks and snapshots by this caller, and for snapshots it created and deleted in the same period.
Mitigation
- Set the network access policy of sensitive disks and snapshots to DenyAll, or allow export only through a disk access resource and private link.
- Require Microsoft Entra authentication for export (data access authentication mode) where your backup product supports it.
- Give operators custom roles without the beginGetAccess actions and snapshot write, and keep Tier 0 disks in scopes where only Tier 0 administrators and their backup identities hold them.
- Use encryption inside the guest for Tier 0 volumes where your requirements call for it, and protect the keys like the disks.
Frequently asked questions
Can we see whether the disk was actually downloaded?
Not from the Activity log. It records the request for the download link with its caller, while the download itself is made with the link and carries no identity. Once a link was issued to a caller you cannot explain, treat the contents of the disk as copied.
Why did endpoint detection on the virtual machine see nothing?
Nothing happens inside the guest. The export reads the disk or a snapshot of it through Azure, without a sign-in to the machine and without running anything on it. The only trace is the Azure Resource Manager operation in the Activity log.
The disk was attached to a running machine. Could it still be exported?
Not directly, because a disk attached to a running virtual machine cannot be downloaded. The documented route is to take a snapshot and export that, which does not interrupt the machine. Look for a snapshot of the disk created shortly before the export by the same caller, and for its deletion afterwards.
How do we separate backup jobs from an attacker's export?
Backup vault identities and migration or image-building tools make the same call, so baseline them by caller and schedule and exclude them once confirmed. An export by a person, by an identity that never did it before, or of a Tier 0 disk needs an explanation.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1530: Data from Cloud Storage
- Restrict managed disks from being imported or exported
- Download a Windows VHD from Azure
- Azure permissions for Compute
- Manage VM restore points
- Overview of VM restore points
- Azure Activity Log event schema
- Active Directory Forest Recovery: Reset the krbtgt password