How the attack works
A bucket in OCI Object Storage is private when it is created, and access to it needs authentication and authorization. Two features open it to callers who have no credentials. A bucket can be made public by enabling read access, after which, in Oracle's words, any user can obtain object metadata, download bucket objects and optionally list the bucket contents. A pre-authenticated request is a unique URL that gives anyone who has it access to a bucket, to the objects under a prefix or to one object, for reading, writing or both. Oracle requires an expiration date for it but sets no limit on how far in the future the date may be.
For an attacker both are ways to take data out through a path that looks like ordinary web traffic and no longer depends on the identity they first compromised. A public bucket needs the permission to update the bucket. A pre-authenticated request needs the permission to manage such requests on the bucket plus the object permissions for the access it grants, and Oracle states that the request is not bound to the creator's sign-in credentials: if those change, the request keeps working. It stops working only when it expires or is deleted, or when its creator is deleted or loses the required permissions. No public incident report was used for this page. It follows what Oracle documents about the two features, and Oracle's Cloud Guard describes abnormal creation of pre-authenticated requests as a technique that could help an attacker exfiltrate data.
Oracle's event list names com.oraclecloud.objectstorage.createbucket and com.oraclecloud.objectstorage.updatebucket, and its reference event for buckets carries the bucket name in data.resourceName and the visibility in data.additionalDetails.publicAccessType, whose documented values are NoPublicAccess, ObjectRead and ObjectReadWithoutList. The list has no event type for pre-authenticated requests. The Audit log still records the API call, and Oracle's Audit reference defines data.eventName as the name of the API operation, so the second rule counts events whose operation name is CreatePreauthenticatedRequest. Reads of the objects themselves are not in these events. They are in the Object Storage service log of the bucket, category read, if someone enabled it. Collection is the same as for the other OCI pages.
What an attacker needs
- For a public bucket, a principal with the
BUCKET_UPDATEpermission on the bucket, orBUCKET_CREATEfor a new one, and a bucket that is not in a security zone. - For a pre-authenticated request, a principal with
PAR_MANAGEon the bucket and the object permissions for the access being granted.
Impact
The objects of the bucket can be read from anywhere without credentials, by anyone who knows the bucket's address or holds the request URL. A pre-authenticated request with write access also lets the holder place objects in the bucket. The exposure lasts until the bucket is made private again or the request expires or is deleted, and it does not show in the sign-in or API activity of any user.
Detection rules
OCI Object Storage Bucket Created or Updated With Public Access
Detects Object Storage bucket create and update events whose data.additionalDetails.publicAccessType is ObjectRead or ObjectReadWithoutList. Oracle documents three values for the visibility of a bucket: NoPublicAccess, the default, and these two, which allow unauthenticated callers to read objects, one of them with listing of the bucket contents. Oracle's reference event for buckets carries the field with the bucket name in data.resourceName and the namespace in data.additionalDetails.namespace. The field shows the bucket's visibility and not a change of it, so the rule also matches an unrelated update of a bucket that is already public. Oracle writes these event types in lower case, and matching is case-insensitive. Check who made the change in data.identity.principalName and what the bucket holds.
title: OCI Object Storage Bucket Created or Updated With Public Access
id: 49ec0754-3db7-4a47-a11e-73918bb6e978
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects Object Storage bucket create and update events whose
data.additionalDetails.publicAccessType is ObjectRead or
ObjectReadWithoutList. Oracle documents three values for the visibility of
a bucket: NoPublicAccess, the default, and these two, which allow
unauthenticated callers to read objects, one of them with listing of the
bucket contents. Oracle's reference event for buckets carries the field
with the bucket name in data.resourceName and the namespace in
data.additionalDetails.namespace. The field shows the bucket's visibility
and not a change of it, so the rule also matches an unrelated update of a
bucket that is already public. Oracle writes these event types in lower
case, and matching is case-insensitive. Check who made the change in
data.identity.principalName and what the bucket holds.
references:
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Object/Tasks/managingbuckets.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Object/Tasks/managingbuckets_topic-To_change_the_visibility_of_a_bucket.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1530
logsource:
product: oci
service: audit
detection:
selection:
eventType:
- com.oraclecloud.objectstorage.createbucket
- com.oraclecloud.objectstorage.updatebucket
data.additionalDetails.publicAccessType:
- ObjectRead
- ObjectReadWithoutList
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Buckets that are public on purpose, such as static website content or public downloads, and every later update of such a bucket. Keep a list of the approved public buckets and exclude them by data.resourceName in a filter_* selection.
level: medium
False positives
- Buckets that are public on purpose, such as static website content or public downloads, and every later update of such a bucket. Keep a list of the approved public buckets and exclude them by data.resourceName in a filter_* selection.
Many OCI Pre-Authenticated Requests Created by One Principal
Counts, per calling principal (data.identity.principalName), the pre-authenticated requests it created in Object Storage. Ten or more within 15 minutes is more than someone sharing a file and fits the preparation of a bulk download: request URLs give anyone who holds them access to a bucket or its objects without credentials, and Oracle's Cloud Guard describes abnormal creation of such requests as something that could help an attacker exfiltrate data. Oracle's list of event types has no entry for pre-authenticated requests, so the base event matches the API operation name CreatePreauthenticatedRequest in data.eventName, which Oracle's Audit reference defines as the name of the operation. Confirm with one test request that your events carry this name. The count and the window are starting points to tune. A single request for all objects of a bucket is enough to take everything, and this count does not see it: review the requests of sensitive buckets as well.
Fires when one data.identity.principalName has at least 10 matching events within 15 minutes.
title: OCI Pre-Authenticated Request Created (Burst Base Event)
id: 94037a96-9d6d-41c8-be4f-5c40ca827cd4
name: oci_pre_authenticated_request_created
status: experimental
description: >-
Base event of the threshold rule in this file. An Audit log event whose
data.eventName is CreatePreauthenticatedRequest, the Object Storage API
operation that creates a pre-authenticated request.
logsource:
product: oci
service: audit
detection:
selection:
data.eventName: CreatePreauthenticatedRequest
condition: selection
level: low
---
title: Many OCI Pre-Authenticated Requests Created by One Principal
id: 3e69bf8e-5209-4543-953d-a981094a8eb7
status: experimental
description: >-
Counts, per calling principal (data.identity.principalName), the
pre-authenticated requests it created in Object Storage. Ten or more within
15 minutes is more than someone sharing a file and fits the preparation of
a bulk download: request URLs give anyone who holds them access to a bucket
or its objects without credentials, and Oracle's Cloud Guard describes
abnormal creation of such requests as something that could help an attacker
exfiltrate data. Oracle's list of event types has no entry for
pre-authenticated requests, so the base event matches the API operation
name CreatePreauthenticatedRequest in data.eventName, which Oracle's Audit
reference defines as the name of the operation. Confirm with one test
request that your events carry this name. The count and the window are
starting points to tune. A single request for all objects of a bucket is
enough to take everything, and this count does not see it: review the
requests of sensitive buckets as well.
references:
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Object/Tasks/usingpreauthenticatedrequests.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Object/Tasks/usingpreauthenticatedrequests_topic-To_create_a_preauthenticated_request_for_all_objects_in_a_bucket.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Audit/Reference/logeventreference.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/cloud-guard/using/detect-recipes.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1530
correlation:
type: event_count
rules:
- oci_pre_authenticated_request_created
group-by:
- data.identity.principalName
timespan: 15m
condition:
gte: 10
falsepositives:
- Applications that hand out download or upload links by creating a pre-authenticated request per file, and backup or integration jobs that do the same. Exclude their service users or instance principals.
- The values of 10 requests and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure what your own applications produce and adjust both.
level: medium
False positives
- Applications that hand out download or upload links by creating a pre-authenticated request per file, and backup or integration jobs that do the same. Exclude their service users or instance principals.
- The values of 10 requests and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure what your own applications produce and adjust both.
Triage
- Identify who made the change (data.identity.principalName), from where (data.identity.ipAddress) and with which client (data.identity.userAgent).
- Read the bucket in data.resourceName, its namespace in data.additionalDetails.namespace and the compartment in data.compartmentName, and find out what the bucket holds and who owns it.
- For a bucket event, check whether the bucket was already public before. The rule also matches an unrelated update of a bucket that has been public for a long time.
- For pre-authenticated requests, list the requests of the bucket and read their target, access type and expiration date. A request for all objects with a far expiration date is the worst case.
- If the read service log of the bucket is enabled, search it for requests from unknown addresses after the change.
- If the change is not approved, make the bucket private or delete the requests, and review what else the same principal did.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Close the exposure first. Set the bucket's visibility back to private and delete every pre-authenticated request that nobody can account for, which Oracle states revokes the access it gave.
- Find out what was exposed and for how long, from the object list of the bucket and the time between the change and its reversal, and use the read service log where it exists to see what was fetched.
- Treat secrets that were stored in the exposed objects as compromised and rotate them.
- Contain the principal that made the change. Reset its credentials and remove its bucket permissions until its owner is verified.
- Move the bucket's compartment into a security zone or tighten the bucket permissions so that the same change is denied next time.
Mitigation
- Put compartments that hold sensitive buckets in a security zone. Oracle states that buckets in a security zone cannot be public.
- Grant
BUCKET_UPDATEandPAR_MANAGEseparately from everyday object access, to few principals, so that reading data does not imply the right to expose it. - Give pre-authenticated requests short expiration dates and the narrowest target, a single object where possible, and review the existing requests of sensitive buckets on a schedule.
- Enable the read service log on sensitive buckets, so that access through a public bucket or a request URL can be reconstructed afterwards.
- Enable Cloud Guard's detector rules for public buckets and for pre-authenticated requests as a second line next to the Audit log rules.
Frequently asked questions
Does changing a bucket back to private also stop pre-authenticated requests?
No. Oracle states that changing the type of access does not affect existing pre-authenticated requests, and that existing requests still work. Each request has to be deleted, or left to expire. Check the list of requests of the bucket whenever you reverse a public bucket, because an attacker may have created both.
Does disabling the user who created a pre-authenticated request revoke it?
Not reliably. Oracle states that the request is not bound to the creator's sign-in credentials, so changing those does not affect it. The request stops working when the creator is deleted or loses the permissions the request relies on, when it expires, or when it is deleted. Deleting the request is the direct way.
Why does the public bucket rule fire on a bucket that has been public for years?
The rule matches a bucket create or update event whose `data.additionalDetails.publicAccessType` is `ObjectRead` or `ObjectReadWithoutList`. Oracle's reference event shows the field as the bucket's visibility, not as a change of it. Any update of a bucket that is already public therefore matches. Telling a change from an unrelated update needs the previous state, which is a comparison a single-event rule cannot make.
Why does the second rule match an operation name?
Oracle's list of event types has bucket and object events and no entry for pre-authenticated requests. The Audit service records every API call, and Oracle defines `data.eventName` as the name of the API operation that generated the event. Oracle's documentation names the operation `CreatePreauthenticatedRequest`, so the rule counts events with that name per caller.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1530: Data from Cloud Storage
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Services that produce events, Object Storage bucket event types
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Object Storage buckets (public buckets)
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Changing an Object Storage bucket's visibility
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Object Storage pre-authenticated requests
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Creating a pre-authenticated request (CreatePreauthenticatedRequest)
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Contents of an Audit log event
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure Logging: Details for Object Storage (read and write access logs)
- Oracle Cloud Guard: Detector recipe reference (Bucket is public, pre-authenticated requests)