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Custom Admin Role Created or Privileges Added in Google Workspace detection rules

An attacker with super admin rights in Google Workspace creates a custom admin role or adds privileges to an existing one, so that an account that does not look like an administrator keeps wide control of the organization.

Platform
Google Cloud
Severity
High
Log source
Google Cloud Audit Logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Control of a super admin account, which Google requires for creating or editing admin roles, and a second account to hold the role.
Impact
An account that is not a super admin keeps the privileges the attacker chose, such as resetting user passwords and changing security settings.
Response
Unassign the role from accounts that should not hold it, remove the added privileges or delete the role, and secure the super admin account that made the change.
Mitigation
Keep super admins few and protected with security keys, and require multi-party approval for role management where your edition offers it.
API methods
google.admin.AdminService.createRolegoogle.admin.AdminService.addPrivilegegoogle.admin.AdminService.updateRolegoogle.admin.AdminService.renameRole

How the attack works

Google Workspace and Cloud Identity come with prebuilt administrator roles, and a super admin can add custom roles. A custom role is a named set of administrator privileges, such as managing users, resetting passwords, changing security settings or managing groups. The privileges decide which controls the holder sees in the Admin console and which calls the holder may make to the Admin API. Google allows up to 750 custom roles per organization.

Defenders watch for new super admins. A custom role is a quieter way to keep control. An attacker who holds a super admin account creates a role with an ordinary name, gives it the privileges that matter and assigns it to a second account, which then survives the recovery of the super admin. The attacker can also add privileges to a role that is already assigned. Everyone who holds that role gains the new privileges at once, and no assignment event is written. Renaming a role can make a powerful role look harmless in the list.

The Admin audit log records each step. CREATE_ROLE is written when a role is created, ADD_PRIVILEGE when a privilege is added to a role, with the privilege in PRIVILEGE_NAME and the role in ROLE_NAME, UPDATE_ROLE when a role is updated and RENAME_ROLE when it gets a new name. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive them in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com, with method names such as google.admin.AdminService.createRole. The assignment of a role to a user is a separate event and has its own page (Administrator Role Assigned in Google Workspace).

What an attacker needs

  • Control of a super admin account. Google's help states that creating a role, editing its privileges and deleting it in the Admin console require being signed in as a super administrator.
  • For persistence, a second account the attacker controls, to which the role is then assigned.

Impact

An account that is not a super admin, and may not be known as an administrator at all, holds the privileges the attacker chose. With user management privileges that is the power to reset passwords and change the security settings of ordinary users. Google states that a user with a custom admin role can never make changes to another administrator account, so the role does not replace a super admin. It does keep a way back in to the users and settings below that level after the super admin account has been secured.

Detection rules

Custom Admin Role Created in Google Workspace

Detects the creation of an administrator role in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event CREATE_ROLE, rendered as "New role {ROLE_NAME} created"). A custom role is a named set of administrator privileges that a super admin defines. An attacker who holds a super admin account creates one to give a second account wide control without making it a super admin. The role name is in the event parameter ROLE_NAME in protoPayload.metadata and the admin in principalEmail. The role has no effect until it is assigned, which is a separate event (ASSIGN_ROLE). The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Custom Admin Role Created in Google Workspace
id: 9c99f576-96a0-4288-9b5e-5bd285099254
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the creation of an administrator role in a Google Workspace or
  Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event CREATE_ROLE, rendered as "New
  role {ROLE_NAME} created"). A custom role is a named set of administrator
  privileges that a super admin defines. An attacker who holds a super admin
  account creates one to give a second account wide control without making
  it a super admin. The role name is in the event parameter ROLE_NAME in
  protoPayload.metadata and the admin in principalEmail. The role has no
  effect until it is assigned, which is a separate event (ASSIGN_ROLE). The
  entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization
  level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with
  Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the
  organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-delegated-admin-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/create-edit-and-delete-custom-admin-roles
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.createRole
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned delegation of administration by the identity team. New admin roles are rare in most organizations, so verify each one against a change record and check which privileges it received and who was assigned to it.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned delegation of administration by the identity team. New admin roles are rare in most organizations, so verify each one against a change record and check which privileges it received and who was assigned to it.

Privilege Added to an Admin Role, or Role Updated or Renamed in Google Workspace

Detects three Admin audit events that change an existing administrator role of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account: a privilege added to a role (ADD_PRIVILEGE, rendered as "New privilege {PRIVILEGE_NAME} created under role {ROLE_NAME}"), a role updated (UPDATE_ROLE) and a role renamed (RENAME_ROLE, with the old name in ROLE_NAME and the new one in NEW_VALUE). A privilege added to a role that is already assigned gives every holder of the role that privilege at once, and no assignment event is written. A rename can make a powerful role look harmless. The parameters are in protoPayload.metadata and the admin in principalEmail. Google's reference does not say whether creating a role with several privileges also writes one ADD_PRIVILEGE entry per privilege, so expect these entries next to a role creation as well. Removing a privilege is a different event (REMOVE_PRIVILEGE) and does not match. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Privilege Added to an Admin Role, or Role Updated or Renamed in Google Workspace
id: 507d0a81-f728-46a9-a535-48170fb90baf
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects three Admin audit events that change an existing administrator
  role of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account: a privilege added to
  a role (ADD_PRIVILEGE, rendered as "New privilege {PRIVILEGE_NAME} created
  under role {ROLE_NAME}"), a role updated (UPDATE_ROLE) and a role renamed
  (RENAME_ROLE, with the old name in ROLE_NAME and the new one in
  NEW_VALUE). A privilege added to a role that is already assigned gives
  every holder of the role that privilege at once, and no assignment event
  is written. A rename can make a powerful role look harmless. The
  parameters are in protoPayload.metadata and the admin in principalEmail.
  Google's reference does not say whether creating a role with several
  privileges also writes one ADD_PRIVILEGE entry per privilege, so expect
  these entries next to a role creation as well. Removing a privilege is a
  different event (REMOVE_PRIVILEGE) and does not match. The entries reach
  Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which
  are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is
  enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are
  routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-delegated-admin-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/create-edit-and-delete-custom-admin-roles
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.admin.AdminService.addPrivilege
      - google.admin.AdminService.updateRole
      - google.admin.AdminService.renameRole
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Maintenance of custom roles by the identity team, for example a privilege added for a new Google service. These changes are infrequent. Read PRIVILEGE_NAME and ROLE_NAME, check who holds the role and verify the change against a change record.
level: medium

False positives

  • Maintenance of custom roles by the identity team, for example a privilege added for a new Google service. These changes are infrequent. Read PRIVILEGE_NAME and ROLE_NAME, check who holds the role and verify the change against a change record.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Role created, given privileges and assigned by one admin within a short time

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

A role that is planned by the identity team is created once and assigned later, often by someone else. An attacker who builds a role as a way back in does everything in one session. The same admin creates the role, adds privileges and assigns it to a user within minutes.

  1. A google.admin.AdminService.createRole entry. Note the role in the event parameter ROLE_NAME and the admin in authenticationInfo.principalEmail.
  2. Within 60 minutes, google.admin.AdminService.addPrivilege entries by the same admin for the same ROLE_NAME. The privileges are in PRIVILEGE_NAME.
  3. Within the same 60 minutes, a google.admin.AdminService.assignRole entry for the same ROLE_NAME. The user who receives the role is in USER_EMAIL.

Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.createRolegoogle.admin.AdminService.addPrivilegegoogle.admin.AdminService.assignRole

LimitsAn administrator who sets up delegated administration in one sitting produces the same sequence, so the role name, the privileges and the recipient decide. The 60 minutes are a starting point. An attacker who waits between the steps, or who adds privileges to an existing role, does not match.

Triage

  • Read the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata. ROLE_NAME names the role and PRIVILEGE_NAME the privilege that was added. For a rename, ROLE_NAME is the old name and NEW_VALUE the new one.
  • Identify the admin who made the change (principalEmail) and confirm it with that person through a second channel. Check the recent sign-ins of that account.
  • Find out who holds the role. Look for google.admin.AdminService.assignRole entries with the same ROLE_NAME, and open the role on the Admin roles page to see the assigned admins.
  • Judge the privileges. User management, security settings, groups and Admin API privileges on a role with an unremarkable name, or on a role held by many helpdesk accounts, need an explanation.
  • Review what else the same admin changed around that time, such as role assignments, domain-wide delegation, single sign-on and 2-Step Verification settings.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Unassign the role from every account that should not hold it, then remove the added privileges or delete the role. Google's help states that a role can be deleted only after its admins are unassigned.
  2. Secure the super admin account that made the change. Reset its password, reset its sign-in cookies so that existing sessions end, and review its 2-Step Verification methods.
  3. Treat every account that held the role as an administrator for the time it held it. Review its actions in the Admin audit log by principalEmail and reverse what was not approved.
  4. Reset the passwords and review the second factors of users whose passwords or security settings were changed by those accounts.
  5. Compare all admin roles and their assignments with your record, because the same super admin session may have changed more than one role.

Mitigation

  • Keep super admins few, on separate accounts used only for super admin tasks, with security keys or passkeys for 2-Step Verification.
  • Turn on multi-party approval for role management where your edition offers it. Changes to role assignments and to the privileges of existing custom roles then need the approval of a second super admin, in the Admin console and through the API.
  • Keep a record of the custom roles and of the privileges each one should hold, and compare the Admin roles page with it regularly.
  • Review which accounts hold each admin role, including custom roles with few holders, as part of access reviews.
  • Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM.

Frequently asked questions

Who can create or edit a custom admin role in Google Workspace?

Google's help states that you must be signed in as a super administrator to create a custom role, to edit its privileges and to delete it in the Admin console. The events on this page therefore come from a super admin account or from something that acts as one. An unexpected event points at a compromised super admin, which is why the response starts with that account.

Does creating a custom admin role give anyone access?

Not by itself. A new role has no effect until it is assigned to a user, and the assignment is a separate audit event, `ASSIGN_ROLE`. Adding a privilege to a role that is already assigned is different. Every holder of the role gains the privilege at once and no assignment event is written, so the `ADD_PRIVILEGE` entry is the only trace.

Can a custom admin role be as powerful as a super admin?

No. Google states that, regardless of the privileges selected, a user with a custom admin role can never make changes to another administrator account. Resetting the password of another administrator also needs super admin privileges. A custom role can still hold wide control over ordinary users, groups, services and security settings, which is enough to take over user accounts and to return later.

Does multi-party approval cover changes to admin roles?

In the editions that offer it, multi-party approval has a setting for role management in the Admin console and one for the API. Google describes both as requiring approval by a super admin for changes to role assignments and for updates to the privileges of existing custom roles. Check on the multi-party approval page of your Admin console which actions are covered in your edition.

References

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