How the attack works
Google Workspace and Cloud Identity come with prebuilt administrator roles, and a super admin can add custom roles. A custom role is a named set of administrator privileges, such as managing users, resetting passwords, changing security settings or managing groups. The privileges decide which controls the holder sees in the Admin console and which calls the holder may make to the Admin API. Google allows up to 750 custom roles per organization.
Defenders watch for new super admins. A custom role is a quieter way to keep control. An attacker who holds a super admin account creates a role with an ordinary name, gives it the privileges that matter and assigns it to a second account, which then survives the recovery of the super admin. The attacker can also add privileges to a role that is already assigned. Everyone who holds that role gains the new privileges at once, and no assignment event is written. Renaming a role can make a powerful role look harmless in the list.
The Admin audit log records each step. CREATE_ROLE is written when a role is created, ADD_PRIVILEGE when a privilege is added to a role, with the privilege in PRIVILEGE_NAME and the role in ROLE_NAME, UPDATE_ROLE when a role is updated and RENAME_ROLE when it gets a new name. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive them in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com, with method names such as google.admin.AdminService.createRole. The assignment of a role to a user is a separate event and has its own page (Administrator Role Assigned in Google Workspace).
What an attacker needs
- Control of a super admin account. Google's help states that creating a role, editing its privileges and deleting it in the Admin console require being signed in as a super administrator.
- For persistence, a second account the attacker controls, to which the role is then assigned.
Impact
An account that is not a super admin, and may not be known as an administrator at all, holds the privileges the attacker chose. With user management privileges that is the power to reset passwords and change the security settings of ordinary users. Google states that a user with a custom admin role can never make changes to another administrator account, so the role does not replace a super admin. It does keep a way back in to the users and settings below that level after the super admin account has been secured.
Detection rules
Custom Admin Role Created in Google Workspace
Detects the creation of an administrator role in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event CREATE_ROLE, rendered as "New role {ROLE_NAME} created"). A custom role is a named set of administrator privileges that a super admin defines. An attacker who holds a super admin account creates one to give a second account wide control without making it a super admin. The role name is in the event parameter ROLE_NAME in protoPayload.metadata and the admin in principalEmail. The role has no effect until it is assigned, which is a separate event (ASSIGN_ROLE). The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Custom Admin Role Created in Google Workspace
id: 9c99f576-96a0-4288-9b5e-5bd285099254
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the creation of an administrator role in a Google Workspace or
Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event CREATE_ROLE, rendered as "New
role {ROLE_NAME} created"). A custom role is a named set of administrator
privileges that a super admin defines. An attacker who holds a super admin
account creates one to give a second account wide control without making
it a super admin. The role name is in the event parameter ROLE_NAME in
protoPayload.metadata and the admin in principalEmail. The role has no
effect until it is assigned, which is a separate event (ASSIGN_ROLE). The
entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization
level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with
Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the
organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-delegated-admin-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/create-edit-and-delete-custom-admin-roles
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.createRole
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned delegation of administration by the identity team. New admin roles are rare in most organizations, so verify each one against a change record and check which privileges it received and who was assigned to it.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned delegation of administration by the identity team. New admin roles are rare in most organizations, so verify each one against a change record and check which privileges it received and who was assigned to it.
Privilege Added to an Admin Role, or Role Updated or Renamed in Google Workspace
Detects three Admin audit events that change an existing administrator role of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account: a privilege added to a role (ADD_PRIVILEGE, rendered as "New privilege {PRIVILEGE_NAME} created under role {ROLE_NAME}"), a role updated (UPDATE_ROLE) and a role renamed (RENAME_ROLE, with the old name in ROLE_NAME and the new one in NEW_VALUE). A privilege added to a role that is already assigned gives every holder of the role that privilege at once, and no assignment event is written. A rename can make a powerful role look harmless. The parameters are in protoPayload.metadata and the admin in principalEmail. Google's reference does not say whether creating a role with several privileges also writes one ADD_PRIVILEGE entry per privilege, so expect these entries next to a role creation as well. Removing a privilege is a different event (REMOVE_PRIVILEGE) and does not match. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Privilege Added to an Admin Role, or Role Updated or Renamed in Google Workspace
id: 507d0a81-f728-46a9-a535-48170fb90baf
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects three Admin audit events that change an existing administrator
role of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account: a privilege added to
a role (ADD_PRIVILEGE, rendered as "New privilege {PRIVILEGE_NAME} created
under role {ROLE_NAME}"), a role updated (UPDATE_ROLE) and a role renamed
(RENAME_ROLE, with the old name in ROLE_NAME and the new one in
NEW_VALUE). A privilege added to a role that is already assigned gives
every holder of the role that privilege at once, and no assignment event
is written. A rename can make a powerful role look harmless. The
parameters are in protoPayload.metadata and the admin in principalEmail.
Google's reference does not say whether creating a role with several
privileges also writes one ADD_PRIVILEGE entry per privilege, so expect
these entries next to a role creation as well. Removing a privilege is a
different event (REMOVE_PRIVILEGE) and does not match. The entries reach
Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which
are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is
enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are
routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-delegated-admin-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/create-edit-and-delete-custom-admin-roles
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName:
- google.admin.AdminService.addPrivilege
- google.admin.AdminService.updateRole
- google.admin.AdminService.renameRole
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Maintenance of custom roles by the identity team, for example a privilege added for a new Google service. These changes are infrequent. Read PRIVILEGE_NAME and ROLE_NAME, check who holds the role and verify the change against a change record.
level: medium
False positives
- Maintenance of custom roles by the identity team, for example a privilege added for a new Google service. These changes are infrequent. Read PRIVILEGE_NAME and ROLE_NAME, check who holds the role and verify the change against a change record.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Role created, given privileges and assigned by one admin within a short time
A role that is planned by the identity team is created once and assigned later, often by someone else. An attacker who builds a role as a way back in does everything in one session. The same admin creates the role, adds privileges and assigns it to a user within minutes.
- A
google.admin.AdminService.createRoleentry. Note the role in the event parameterROLE_NAMEand the admin inauthenticationInfo.principalEmail. - Within 60 minutes,
google.admin.AdminService.addPrivilegeentries by the same admin for the sameROLE_NAME. The privileges are inPRIVILEGE_NAME. - Within the same 60 minutes, a
google.admin.AdminService.assignRoleentry for the sameROLE_NAME. The user who receives the role is inUSER_EMAIL.
Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.createRolegoogle.admin.AdminService.addPrivilegegoogle.admin.AdminService.assignRole
LimitsAn administrator who sets up delegated administration in one sitting produces the same sequence, so the role name, the privileges and the recipient decide. The 60 minutes are a starting point. An attacker who waits between the steps, or who adds privileges to an existing role, does not match.
Triage
- Read the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata. ROLE_NAME names the role and PRIVILEGE_NAME the privilege that was added. For a rename, ROLE_NAME is the old name and NEW_VALUE the new one.
- Identify the admin who made the change (principalEmail) and confirm it with that person through a second channel. Check the recent sign-ins of that account.
- Find out who holds the role. Look for google.admin.AdminService.assignRole entries with the same ROLE_NAME, and open the role on the Admin roles page to see the assigned admins.
- Judge the privileges. User management, security settings, groups and Admin API privileges on a role with an unremarkable name, or on a role held by many helpdesk accounts, need an explanation.
- Review what else the same admin changed around that time, such as role assignments, domain-wide delegation, single sign-on and 2-Step Verification settings.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Unassign the role from every account that should not hold it, then remove the added privileges or delete the role. Google's help states that a role can be deleted only after its admins are unassigned.
- Secure the super admin account that made the change. Reset its password, reset its sign-in cookies so that existing sessions end, and review its 2-Step Verification methods.
- Treat every account that held the role as an administrator for the time it held it. Review its actions in the Admin audit log by principalEmail and reverse what was not approved.
- Reset the passwords and review the second factors of users whose passwords or security settings were changed by those accounts.
- Compare all admin roles and their assignments with your record, because the same super admin session may have changed more than one role.
Mitigation
- Keep super admins few, on separate accounts used only for super admin tasks, with security keys or passkeys for 2-Step Verification.
- Turn on multi-party approval for role management where your edition offers it. Changes to role assignments and to the privileges of existing custom roles then need the approval of a second super admin, in the Admin console and through the API.
- Keep a record of the custom roles and of the privileges each one should hold, and compare the Admin roles page with it regularly.
- Review which accounts hold each admin role, including custom roles with few holders, as part of access reviews.
- Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM.
Frequently asked questions
Who can create or edit a custom admin role in Google Workspace?
Google's help states that you must be signed in as a super administrator to create a custom role, to edit its privileges and to delete it in the Admin console. The events on this page therefore come from a super admin account or from something that acts as one. An unexpected event points at a compromised super admin, which is why the response starts with that account.
Does creating a custom admin role give anyone access?
Not by itself. A new role has no effect until it is assigned to a user, and the assignment is a separate audit event, `ASSIGN_ROLE`. Adding a privilege to a role that is already assigned is different. Every holder of the role gains the privilege at once and no assignment event is written, so the `ADD_PRIVILEGE` entry is the only trace.
Can a custom admin role be as powerful as a super admin?
No. Google states that, regardless of the privileges selected, a user with a custom admin role can never make changes to another administrator account. Resetting the password of another administrator also needs super admin privileges. A custom role can still hold wide control over ordinary users, groups, services and security settings, which is enough to take over user accounts and to return later.
Does multi-party approval cover changes to admin roles?
In the editions that offer it, multi-party approval has a setting for role management in the Admin console and one for the API. Google describes both as requiring approval by a super admin for changes to role assignments and for updates to the privileges of existing custom roles. Check on the multi-party approval page of your Admin console which actions are covered in your edition.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098.003: Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles
- Create, edit, and delete custom admin roles
- Administrator privilege definitions
- Audit logs for Google Workspace (Cloud Audit Logs)
- Admin audit events: delegated admin settings (CREATE_ROLE, ADD_PRIVILEGE, UPDATE_ROLE, RENAME_ROLE)
- Multi-party approval for sensitive actions
- Reset a user's password (resetting another administrator's password)
- Security best practices for administrator accounts