How the attack works
Google Workspace and Cloud Identity administration is granted through admin roles: the prebuilt Super Admin role, other prebuilt roles such as User Management Admin, and custom roles. Super admins control every user, setting and security policy of the account, and they can always grant themselves access to the Google Cloud organization that belongs to it. Assigning admin roles in the Admin console requires a super admin.
After taking over a super admin, attackers assign the role to another account: a new user, a dormant one or one whose password they reset. The second admin survives the cleanup of the first. Google Workspace records the change in its Admin audit log as ASSIGN_ROLE, with the role name and the user. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive the entry in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level, with service name admin.googleapis.com and method name google.admin.AdminService.assignRole. The Admin audit log has two more events for admin rights given to a user, GRANT_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE and GRANT_DELEGATED_ADMIN_PRIVILEGES, which arrive as grantAdminPrivilege and grantDelegatedAdminPrivileges and have a rule of their own on this page.
What an attacker needs
- A super admin account.
- No second approver; with multi-party approval turned on for admin role management, another admin must approve the assignment.
Impact
With Super Admin, full control of the Workspace or Cloud Identity account (users, passwords, 2-Step Verification, single sign-on, domain-wide delegation) and a path to Organization Administrator in Google Cloud. Narrower roles still allow password resets or group changes that lead further.
Detection rules
Admin Privileges Granted to a User in Google Workspace
Detects the two Admin audit events with which Google Workspace and Cloud Identity record admin privileges being given to a user outside the role assignment event: GRANT_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE ("Admin privileges granted to" a user) and GRANT_DELEGATED_ADMIN_PRIVILEGES (a user "assigned" delegated admin privileges, with the privilege in NEW_VALUE). Google's reference lists them next to ASSIGN_ROLE without saying when each one is written, so a SIEM that watches only the role assignment event can miss a grant. The user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the admin who made the change in principalEmail. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Admin Privileges Granted to a User in Google Workspace
id: 607abae1-d4a3-4993-a224-8795dda4eedf
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the two Admin audit events with which Google Workspace and Cloud
Identity record admin privileges being given to a user outside the role
assignment event: GRANT_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE ("Admin privileges granted to" a
user) and GRANT_DELEGATED_ADMIN_PRIVILEGES (a user "assigned" delegated
admin privileges, with the privilege in NEW_VALUE). Google's reference
lists them next to ASSIGN_ROLE without saying when each one is written, so
a SIEM that watches only the role assignment event can miss a grant. The
user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the
admin who made the change in principalEmail. The entries reach Cloud Audit
Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always
written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled,
and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/alertcenter/reference/alert-types
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName:
- google.admin.AdminService.grantAdminPrivilege
- google.admin.AdminService.grantDelegatedAdminPrivileges
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned onboarding of administrators and delegation of administration. Google does not document whether one change writes these events together with the role assignment event, so the same change may raise two alerts. Grants of admin privileges are infrequent, and each one should be verified with the admin who made it.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned onboarding of administrators and delegation of administration. Google does not document whether one change writes these events together with the role assignment event, so the same change may raise two alerts. Grants of admin privileges are infrequent, and each one should be verified with the admin who made it.
Administrator Role Assigned to a User in Google Workspace
Detects the assignment of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity admin role to a user (Admin audit event ASSIGN_ROLE). The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level only when Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it. The rule matches every admin role; the role name is in protoPayload.metadata, where _SEED_ADMIN_ROLE is Super Admin.
title: Administrator Role Assigned to a User in Google Workspace
id: 8785a4ff-47c3-471a-a8a4-407b2c2296c0
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the assignment of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity admin role to
a user (Admin audit event ASSIGN_ROLE). The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as
an Admin Activity entry at organization level only when Google Workspace data
sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the
organization-level logs are routed to it. The rule matches every admin role;
the role name is in protoPayload.metadata, where _SEED_ADMIN_ROLE is Super
Admin.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-delegated-admin-settings
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/directory/v1/guides/manage-roles
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.assignRole
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned delegation of administration, onboarding of administrators and time-bound role assignments. Admin role assignments are infrequent; verify each one, and treat Super Admin assignments as high severity.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned delegation of administration, onboarding of administrators and time-bound role assignments. Admin role assignments are infrequent; verify each one, and treat Super Admin assignments as high severity.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Admin role given to an account that was created or had its password reset shortly before
An attacker in a super admin session does not promote an account they cannot use. They create a user, or reset the password of a dormant one, and then give it the role. Either event followed by an admin role or privilege for the same user, from the same admin, is a second way in being built.
- A user is created or gets a new password:
google.admin.AdminService.createUserorgoogle.admin.AdminService.changePasswordfromadmin.googleapis.com. The user is in the event parameterUSER_EMAILinprotoPayload.metadataand the admin inauthenticationInfo.principalEmail. - Within 24 hours the same
USER_EMAILappears ingoogle.admin.AdminService.assignRole,grantAdminPrivilegeorgrantDelegatedAdminPrivileges. - Compare the two callers and read
ROLE_NAMEof the role assignment. The same admin for both steps and the role_SEED_ADMIN_ROLEis the strongest form of the pattern.
Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.createUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.changePasswordgoogle.admin.AdminService.assignRolegoogle.admin.AdminService.grantAdminPrivilegegoogle.admin.AdminService.grantDelegatedAdminPrivileges
LimitsOnboarding a new administrator is the same sequence, so the result needs a check against the people who were meant to become admins. The 24 hours are a starting point. An attacker who promotes an account they already control without touching its password is not matched and is left to the single-event rules.
Admin role assigned, used and removed again within a short time
An attacker in a super admin session can give an account they control an admin role only for as long as it is needed, so that a later review of the role list shows nothing. An assignment, admin actions by the new holder and the removal of the role within hours is that pattern, and the actions in between are what the role was for.
- A
google.admin.AdminService.assignRoleorgrantAdminPrivilegeentry ofadmin.googleapis.com. Keep the event parametersUSER_EMAILandROLE_NAMEinprotoPayload.metadataand the admin inauthenticationInfo.principalEmail. - Within 24 hours, a
google.admin.AdminService.unassignRoleorrevokeAdminPrivilegeentry with the sameUSER_EMAIL. - Between the two, collect the
admin.googleapis.comentries whoseauthenticationInfo.principalEmailis thatUSER_EMAIL. Raise the pair when there are any, with the highest priority for_SEED_ADMIN_ROLE, and read what those entries changed.
Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.assignRolegoogle.admin.AdminService.grantAdminPrivilegegoogle.admin.AdminService.unassignRolegoogle.admin.AdminService.revokeAdminPrivilege
LimitsAccess processes that give a helpdesk or project member a role for one task and take it back afterwards look the same, so compare with their requests. An attacker who keeps the role, or who removes it days later, is left to the single-event rules. The 24 hours are a starting point.
Triage
- Read the role and the user in protoPayload.metadata (event parameters ROLE_NAME and USER_EMAIL). The role name
_SEED_ADMIN_ROLEis the prebuilt Super Admin role. - Confirm the assignment with the caller (principalEmail) through a second channel, and check that caller's recent sign-ins.
- Check the new admin's age, recent password resets and sign-ins, and what it did after the assignment.
- Unassign unexplained roles and review domain-wide delegation, single sign-on and recovery settings for other changes by the same caller.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Unassign the admin role from the account that received it, and suspend that account until its ownership is clear.
- Secure the super admin that made the assignment. Reset its password, end its sessions and review its 2-Step Verification methods and recovery options from a session you trust.
- Compare every account that holds an admin role with the list you expect. An attacker who assigned one role may have assigned several, including custom roles.
- Undo what the two accounts changed while they held admin rights, such as password resets of other users, domain-wide delegation grants and changes to single sign-on or 2-Step Verification settings.
- Review the allow policy of the linked Google Cloud organization for bindings added by either account, because a super admin can always grant themselves access to it.
Mitigation
- Keep super admins few, on separate accounts with security keys or passkeys, and review admin role assignments regularly.
- Turn on multi-party approval for admin role management.
- Share Workspace audit logs with Google Cloud and route the organization-level logs to the SIEM.
Frequently asked questions
Why does a Google Workspace admin role matter for Google Cloud security?
Super admins control every user, setting and security policy of the Workspace or Cloud Identity account, and they can always grant themselves access to the Google Cloud organization that belongs to it. A second super admin is therefore also a path to Organization Administrator in Google Cloud. Narrower admin roles still allow password resets or group changes that lead further.
How do I recognise a Super Admin assignment in the event?
The role assignment rule matches every admin role, so the role has to be read from the event. The role name is in the event parameter `ROLE_NAME` in `protoPayload.metadata`, and the value `_SEED_ADMIN_ROLE` is the prebuilt Super Admin role. The user who received it is in `USER_EMAIL`. Treat a Super Admin assignment as high severity.
What has to be configured before these events reach the SIEM?
Two things. The organization has to share Google Workspace data with Google Cloud, which makes the Admin audit event appear in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level. The organization-level logs then have to be routed to the SIEM. A sink that exports only the logs of projects does not include these entries.
Can one compromised super admin be kept from creating another?
Yes, with multi-party approval for admin role management. When it is turned on, another admin has to approve an admin role assignment. Without it a single super admin can assign the role alone, which is the situation this attack relies on.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098.003: Additional Cloud Roles
- Audit logs for Google Workspace (Cloud Audit Logs)
- Admin audit events: delegated admin settings (ASSIGN_ROLE)
- Admin audit events: user settings (GRANT_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE, GRANT_DELEGATED_ADMIN_PRIVILEGES, CREATE_USER, CHANGE_PASSWORD)
- Assign specific admin roles
- Directory API: manage roles
- Super administrator account best practices (Google Cloud)