How the attack works
Google Cloud allow policies accept principals from outside the organization unless an organization policy forbids it: personal Google accounts (user:name@gmail.com), external groups and service accounts, and the special principals allUsers (anyone on the internet) and allAuthenticatedUsers (anyone signed in with a Google account).
Attackers who can change an allow policy add such a principal to keep access that does not depend on the organization's directory, or to expose a resource publicly. The change is an ordinary SetIamPolicy call, and the policy delta in the Admin Activity entry names the new member. The Owner role on a project is the exception: a user outside the organization cannot receive it through SetIamPolicy and has to be invited from the Google Cloud console and accept the invitation. The invitation is recorded under the method name InsertProjectOwnershipInvite, which a separate rule on this page reads.
What an attacker needs
setIamPolicyon the organization, a folder, a project or an individual resource.- Domain restricted sharing not enforced on that resource.
Impact
Access from an identity the organization cannot disable, suspend or force to re-authenticate. A public principal exposes the resource to anyone, depending on the role granted.
Detection rules
Role Granted to a Personal Google Account in Google Cloud
Detects SetIamPolicy calls whose policy delta adds a binding for a consumer Google account (gmail.com or googlemail.com) (Admin Activity audit log). Consumer accounts are outside the organization's control and are a common persistence choice. Covers services that record the change in serviceData.policyDelta, such as Cloud Resource Manager.
title: Role Granted to a Personal Google Account in Google Cloud
id: e4cf3079-21c7-47ea-abd5-afdd22a76727
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects SetIamPolicy calls whose policy delta adds a binding for a consumer
Google account (gmail.com or googlemail.com) (Admin Activity audit log).
Consumer accounts are outside the organization's control and are a common
persistence choice. Covers services that record the change in
serviceData.policyDelta, such as Cloud Resource Manager.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/review-iam-policy-history
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/findings/threats/iam-anomalous-grant
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.methodName|endswith: SetIamPolicy
protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas|contains: '"ADD"'
selection_member:
protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas|contains:
- '@gmail.com'
- '@googlemail.com'
condition: selection and selection_member
falsepositives:
- Contractors or test projects that still use personal accounts; move them to managed identities. Add other consumer or partner domains you do not own to selection_member.
level: medium
False positives
- Contractors or test projects that still use personal accounts; move them to managed identities. Add other consumer or partner domains you do not own to selection_member.
Role Granted to allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers in Google Cloud
Detects SetIamPolicy calls whose policy delta adds a binding for allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers (Admin Activity audit log). The rule relies on the service recording the change in serviceData.policyDelta, as Cloud Resource Manager does for projects, folders and organizations. Cloud Storage bucket policy changes (storage.setIamPermissions) are not covered by this rule.
title: Role Granted to allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers in Google Cloud
id: 43c79617-a505-4d06-b04f-4112f95ce17b
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects SetIamPolicy calls whose policy delta adds a binding for allUsers or
allAuthenticatedUsers (Admin Activity audit log). The rule relies on the
service recording the change in serviceData.policyDelta, as Cloud Resource
Manager does for projects, folders and organizations. Cloud Storage bucket
policy changes (storage.setIamPermissions) are not covered by this rule.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/principal-identifiers
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/understanding-audit-logs
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.methodName|endswith: SetIamPolicy
protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas|contains: '"ADD"'
selection_member:
protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas|contains:
- allUsers
- allAuthenticatedUsers
condition: selection and selection_member
falsepositives:
- Resources that are published on purpose, such as public images or datasets; exclude them by protoPayload.resourceName in a filter_* selection.
level: high
False positives
- Resources that are published on purpose, such as public images or datasets; exclude them by protoPayload.resourceName in a filter_* selection.
User Invited as Project Owner in Google Cloud
Detects an invitation to own a Google Cloud project (method name InsertProjectOwnershipInvite). Google documents that a user outside the organization cannot be granted the Owner role through setIamPolicy: the user has to be invited from the Google Cloud console and has to accept the invitation. Event Threat Detection reports the same method as the sub-rule external_member_invited_to_policy of its IAM Anomalous Grant finding, with high severity. The rule matches every ownership invitation and does not read the invited address, so confirm who was invited. Google's audit logging pages do not list this method under a service name, which is why the rule matches the method name alone.
title: User Invited as Project Owner in Google Cloud
id: 3f259619-13b7-4471-8d85-9fb2d164e421
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects an invitation to own a Google Cloud project (method name
InsertProjectOwnershipInvite). Google documents that a user outside the
organization cannot be granted the Owner role through setIamPolicy: the
user has to be invited from the Google Cloud console and has to accept the
invitation. Event Threat Detection reports the same method as the sub-rule
external_member_invited_to_policy of its IAM Anomalous Grant finding, with
high severity. The rule matches every ownership invitation and does not
read the invited address, so confirm who was invited. Google's audit
logging pages do not list this method under a service name, which is why
the rule matches the method name alone.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/resource-manager/reference/rest/v3/projects/setIamPolicy
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/concepts-event-threat-detection-overview
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/findings/threats/iam-anomalous-grant
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/findings/threats/account-has-leaked-credentials
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.methodName|endswith: InsertProjectOwnershipInvite
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Projects that are not part of an organization, where Google requires the console for every Owner grant. Move such projects into the organization, or exclude them by protoPayload.resourceName in a filter_* selection.
- A planned handover of a project to a partner or customer. Ownership invitations are rare, so confirm each one with the caller.
level: high
False positives
- Projects that are not part of an organization, where Google requires the console for every Owner grant. Move such projects into the organization, or exclude them by protoPayload.resourceName in a filter_* selection.
- A planned handover of a project to a partner or customer. Ownership invitations are rare, so confirm each one with the caller.
Triage
- Identify the member and role in bindingDeltas and the resource in protoPayload.resourceName.
- Check whether the external account belongs to a known partner or contractor; consumer accounts on production resources are rarely approved.
- Remove unexplained bindings and review the external principal's activity, which appears under its principalEmail in later audit entries.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Remove the binding for the external or public principal from the allow policy where it was added. The allow policy is the only lever, because the organization cannot disable, suspend or force a new sign-in for an account it does not manage.
- Search the allow policies of the whole organization for the same member, and for other external or public principals added by the same caller. An attacker who could set one policy may have set several.
- Contain the identity that made the grant. Remove its
setIamPolicyrights and treat its credentials as compromised until the grant is explained. - For
allUsersorallAuthenticatedUsers, treat the resource as exposed for the whole time the binding existed. Work out from the granted role what could be read or changed, and rotate credentials that were stored there. - Look for persistence created through the granted role, such as service account keys, further bindings and impersonation rights on service accounts, and remove it. Removing the first binding does not undo any of that.
Mitigation
- Enforce domain restricted sharing (
iam.managed.allowedPolicyMembersor the legacyiam.allowedPolicyMemberDomains) at the organization node, with exceptions only for resources that are meant to be public. - Enforce
constraints/storage.publicAccessPreventionfor Cloud Storage. - Search existing allow policies for external and public principals (for example with Cloud Asset Inventory) and remove the ones nobody owns.
Frequently asked questions
Do these rules cover a Cloud Storage bucket that was made public?
No. The two rules for policy bindings rely on the service recording the change in `serviceData.policyDelta`, as Cloud Resource Manager does for projects, folders and organizations. Cloud Storage bucket policy changes (`storage.setIamPermissions`) are not covered. For buckets, the organization policy `constraints/storage.publicAccessPrevention` prevents public access in the first place.
What is the difference between allUsers and allAuthenticatedUsers?
`allUsers` is anyone on the internet. `allAuthenticatedUsers` is anyone who is signed in with a Google account, which includes personal accounts that have nothing to do with your organization. Neither limits access to your own users, so a binding for either one makes the resource public to the extent of the granted role.
Why does the personal account rule look only for gmail.com and googlemail.com?
Those are the consumer Google account domains, which no organization controls and which are a common choice for persistence. The rule cannot know which other domains you do not own. Add consumer or partner domains outside your organization to the member selection, otherwise a grant to such an account is not matched.