How the attack works
A storage account is protected by settings on the account itself. The public network access setting and the firewall rules decide which networks may reach the public endpoint, with a default action of allow or deny. allowBlobPublicAccess decides whether containers may be opened for anonymous read at all, and allowSharedKeyAccess decides whether the account keys and the SAS tokens signed with them are accepted. All of them are properties of the account and are changed with one control-plane operation, Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/write. The anonymous access level of a single container can be set through Resource Manager as well (Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/write), and it only has an effect when the account allows anonymous access.
Two Microsoft incident reports describe attackers who changed these settings as preparation. Storm-0501 (report of August 2025) exposed storage accounts that were not reachable remotely to the internet and to its own infrastructure by using the public access features, through the Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/write operation, and then stole the access keys. Storm-2949 (report of May 2026) changed the network access configuration of storage accounts with the same operation, which opened them to a closed set of the actor's own IP addresses, then retrieved the keys and downloaded large volumes of data. The Azure Activity log records the write with its caller. It does not record which property changed, so the same event stands for a new tag and for an account opened to the internet. The rules on this page therefore match every update and are meant for review together with the state of the account.
What an attacker needs
- A role with
Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/writeon the account: Owner, Contributor or Storage Account Contributor. - For data access after the change: the account keys, a SAS token or a data role. The same roles can list the keys, which is a separate attack page in this library.
Impact
The network boundary around the data is gone for the addresses the attacker chose, or for everyone. Combined with the account keys, the attacker reads, copies and deletes the blobs, files, queues and tables of the account from outside. With anonymous access enabled on the account and on a container, anybody who knows the address can read the container without credentials.
Detection rules
Blob Container Created or Updated Through Resource Manager
Detects a successful create or update of a blob container through Azure Resource Manager (Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/write). The anonymous access level of a container can be set this way, and Microsoft documents that a container opened for anonymous access can be read by any client when the storage account allows anonymous access. The rule matches on the operation alone. The event does not say whether the access level changed and the rule matches every container that is created or updated through Resource Manager, so its level is low and it is meant for review. A change of the access level through the data plane of the storage service is not in the Activity log.
title: Blob Container Created or Updated Through Resource Manager
id: d178a73f-166a-462e-a459-1d72d87ae51b
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful create or update of a blob container through Azure
Resource Manager
(Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/write). The
anonymous access level of a container can be set this way, and Microsoft
documents that a container opened for anonymous access can be read by any
client when the storage account allows anonymous access. The rule matches on
the operation alone. The event does not say whether the access level
changed and the rule matches every container that is created or updated
through Resource Manager, so its level is low and it is meant for review.
A change of the access level through the data plane of the storage service
is not in the Activity log.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1686/001/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/storage
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/anonymous-read-access-prevent
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1686.001
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue: MICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/BLOBSERVICES/CONTAINERS/WRITE
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Applications, pipelines and administrators that create containers or change their metadata through Resource Manager. Exclude their identities in a filter_ selection by Caller, or limit the rule to storage accounts that allow anonymous access.
level: low
False positives
- Applications, pipelines and administrators that create containers or change their metadata through Resource Manager. Exclude their identities in a filter_ selection by Caller, or limit the rule to storage accounts that allow anonymous access.
Storage Account Created or Updated (Possible Network or Access Setting Change)
Detects a successful create or update of a storage account (Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/write). The rule exists because the firewall rules, the public network access setting, the anonymous access setting and the Shared Key setting are properties of the account, and Microsoft's reports on Storm-0501 and Storm-2949 name this operation as the one the attackers used to open storage accounts before taking data. The rule matches on the operation alone. The event does not say which property changed and the rule matches every update, tags included, so its level is low and it is meant for review together with the state of the account, not as an alert on its own.
title: Storage Account Created or Updated (Possible Network or Access Setting Change)
id: ba7264bd-0cff-44b8-a9f7-817d74e31186
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful create or update of a storage account
(Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/write). The rule exists because the
firewall rules, the public network access setting, the anonymous access
setting and the Shared Key setting are properties of the account, and
Microsoft's reports on Storm-0501 and Storm-2949 name this operation as the
one the attackers used to open storage accounts before taking data. The rule
matches on the operation alone. The event does not say which property
changed and the rule matches every update, tags included, so its level is
low and it is meant for review together with the state of the account, not
as an alert on its own.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1686/001/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/storage
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-network-security-overview
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/08/27/storm-0501s-evolving-techniques-lead-to-cloud-based-ransomware/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/18/storm-2949-turned-compromised-identity-into-cloud-wide-breach/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1686.001
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue: MICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/WRITE
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Any storage account update, including creation, tags, redundancy and encryption settings.
- Infrastructure-as-code pipelines that redeploy storage accounts on every run. Exclude their deployment identities in a filter_ selection by Caller.
level: low
False positives
- Any storage account update, including creation, tags, redundancy and encryption settings.
- Infrastructure-as-code pipelines that redeploy storage accounts on every run. Exclude their deployment identities in a filter_ selection by Caller.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Storage account update that weakens network or access settings
The write event is the same whatever property changed. The state of the account after the write is what tells a routine update from an exposure. Reading a few properties after each update, and comparing them with the values before, turns a noisy event into a precise one.
- In the Azure Activity log, find
MICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/WRITEwith status Success. Keep theCallerand the resource ID of the account. - Read the account properties
publicNetworkAccess,networkAclswith itsdefaultActionand IP rules,allowBlobPublicAccessandallowSharedKeyAccess. - Compare them with the last values you recorded for the account, or with the resource change history that Azure keeps for the resource.
- Flag a default action that became Allow, new IP rules, public network access that became Enabled, and
allowBlobPublicAccessorallowSharedKeyAccessthat became true.
EventsMICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/WRITE
LimitsIt needs a job that reads the account after the event and a store of earlier values. A setting that is changed and changed back between two reads is missed unless the change history is used. A new IP rule is not malicious in itself, so the addresses have to be checked against the ones your organization uses.
Storage account updated and its keys or SAS listed by the same caller shortly after
Opening the network is preparation and listing the keys is collection. Microsoft's reports on Storm-0501 and Storm-2949 describe both steps on the same accounts. An update of an account followed by a key or SAS listing on that account by the same caller is the two steps in order.
- In the Azure Activity log, find
MICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/WRITEwith status Success. Keep theCallerand the resource ID of the account. - Within 60 minutes, find
MICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/LISTKEYS/ACTION,MICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/LISTACCOUNTSAS/ACTIONorMICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/LISTSERVICESAS/ACTIONby the sameCalleron the same account. - Give priority to callers that do this on several accounts within the same day.
EventsMICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/WRITEMICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/LISTKEYS/ACTIONMICROSOFT.STORAGE/STORAGEACCOUNTS/LISTACCOUNTSAS/ACTION
LimitsA deployment that creates an account and reads its connection string in the same run looks the same, so pipeline identities have to be excluded by name. The 60 minutes are a starting point. An attacker who uses two identities for the two steps does not match.
Triage
- Identify the Caller, the caller's IP address and the storage account, and whether this identity updates this account routinely.
- Open the event in the Azure portal and read its Change history tab, which shows the properties that changed around the time of the operation, or query the resource changes for the account.
- Compare the current public network access setting, the firewall rules, the anonymous access setting and the Shared Key setting with the approved state.
- Look for key or SAS listing operations on the same account by the same caller shortly after the update.
- If resource logs of the account are collected, review requests from the addresses that were added to the firewall.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Set the network rules, the public network access setting and the anonymous access setting of the account back to the approved state.
- Contain the caller. Revoke its sessions, rotate its credentials and remove its role on the storage account.
- Regenerate both account keys if they were listed, which also invalidates the SAS tokens signed with them.
- Review the resource logs of the account for reads from the addresses that were allowed, and treat the data as copied if the logs were not collected.
- Check the other storage accounts the caller could write for the same change.
Mitigation
- Enforce the secure settings with Azure Policy in deny mode, such as disallowing anonymous blob access, disabling public network access and disallowing Shared Key access, so that a write that weakens them is refused.
- Use private endpoints and block the public endpoint for accounts that hold sensitive data.
- Limit Owner, Contributor and Storage Account Contributor on storage accounts, and assign them through Privileged Identity Management.
- Disallow Shared Key authorization where clients can use Microsoft Entra ID, so that listed keys and SAS tokens signed with them are not accepted.
- Send the Azure Activity log to your SIEM and keep a record of the approved network and access settings of important accounts.
Frequently asked questions
Does the Activity log show which setting of the storage account was changed?
No. The log records the write to the storage account with its caller and status, and Microsoft does not document the changed properties as part of the event. In the Azure portal the Change history tab of an Activity log event shows changes to the resource around the time of the operation, and the resource changes can be queried. Use one of them during triage.
Why are both rules only low?
Each rule matches every create and update of a storage account or of a container through Resource Manager, including tags and routine deployments. The event cannot separate a harmless update from one that opens the account. The rules give the starting point for a comparison of the account's settings, which the detection logic on this page describes.
Does enabling anonymous access on the account expose its data at once?
No. Microsoft documents two settings. The account setting only permits anonymous access to be configured, and data is not readable anonymously until the anonymous access level of a container is also changed from private. Both steps are control-plane or data-plane writes, and the account-level step is the one the storage account update records.
Why do attackers change the network rules when they already have a privileged role?
A role in Azure Resource Manager does not put the attacker's machine inside the network that the account trusts. Microsoft's reports on Storm-0501 and Storm-2949 both describe the same order, which is to open the account to the attacker's own addresses or to the internet first and to take the keys and the data after that.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1686.001: Disable or Modify System Firewall: Cloud Firewall
- Azure Storage network security overview
- Remediate anonymous read access for blob data
- Prevent Shared Key authorization for an Azure Storage account
- Storage resource provider REST API: Storage Accounts - Update
- Azure permissions for Storage
- Activity log in Azure Monitor
- Microsoft Security Blog: Storm-0501's evolving techniques lead to cloud-based ransomware
- Microsoft Security Blog: How Storm-2949 turned a compromised identity into a cloud-wide breach