How the attack works
Microsoft Sentinel and the Log Analytics workspace under it are Azure resources, and so are their parts. Analytics rules (Microsoft.SecurityInsights/alertRules) produce the alerts, automation rules and rule actions start the response, and data connectors bring the logs in. The workspace stores the data in tables with a retention setting each. Data collection rules and their associations tell the Azure Monitor agent which events to collect from which machine. Microsoft states that the audit trail of Sentinel is the Azure Activity log, where the AzureActivity table includes all actions taken in a Sentinel workspace, such as editing alert rules.
An attacker with a contributor role on the workspace can blind the security team in several ways, and each is one Azure Resource Manager operation. Deleting or editing an analytics rule removes a detection. Deleting a data connector, a data collection rule or its association stops a log source from arriving. Deleting the workspace removes everything at once, though Microsoft keeps a deleted workspace recoverable for 14 days unless it was deleted permanently. The purge and delete data operations remove selected records from a table, and Microsoft calls them destructive and non-reversible. Because all of these are write, delete and action operations, the Activity log records them with their caller. That only helps if the Activity log is also kept somewhere the attacker cannot delete it from.
What an attacker needs
- For Sentinel content: Microsoft Sentinel Contributor, Contributor or Owner on the workspace or its resource group.
- For the workspace and its data: a role with the delete, purge or delete data actions. Microsoft documents that Log Analytics Contributor provides
Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/deleteand the delete data action. - For data collection: a role with the delete actions on data collection rules and on their associations, such as Contributor or Owner on the resource group that holds them.
Impact
Detections stop firing, log sources stop arriving or stored evidence disappears, while the security team still believes the SIEM is watching. A deleted rule or connector hides what the attacker does next. Purged or deleted records and a permanently deleted workspace remove the history that an investigation would need, and they cannot be brought back.
Detection rules
Azure Monitor Data Collection Rule or Association Deleted
Detects a successful deletion of an Azure Monitor data collection rule (Microsoft.Insights/DataCollectionRules/Delete) or of the association that applies a data collection rule to a resource (Microsoft.Insights/DataCollectionRuleAssociations/Delete). A data collection rule defines which data is collected and where it is sent, and an association connects one resource to one rule. Deleting either stops the collection for the machines concerned, for example of their security event logs, while the workspace and its analytics rules stay untouched. The event does not say which data the rule collected, so read that from your deployment code.
title: Azure Monitor Data Collection Rule or Association Deleted
id: 7981d457-6b17-4331-9dfb-9c414c9d3d99
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful deletion of an Azure Monitor data collection rule
(Microsoft.Insights/DataCollectionRules/Delete) or of the association that
applies a data collection rule to a resource
(Microsoft.Insights/DataCollectionRuleAssociations/Delete). A data
collection rule defines which data is collected and where it is sent, and
an association connects one resource to one rule. Deleting either stops
the collection for the machines concerned, for example of their security
event logs, while the workspace and its analytics rules stay untouched.
The event does not say which data the rule collected, so read that from
your deployment code.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/data-collection/data-collection-rule-overview
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/monitor
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue:
- MICROSOFT.INSIGHTS/DATACOLLECTIONRULES/DELETE
- MICROSOFT.INSIGHTS/DATACOLLECTIONRULEASSOCIATIONS/DELETE
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Decommissioning of machines and replacement of a data collection rule by a new one. Azure Monitor experiences and Azure Policy also manage rules and associations on their own. Exclude those identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
level: medium
False positives
- Decommissioning of machines and replacement of a data collection rule by a new one. Azure Monitor experiences and Azure Policy also manage rules and associations on their own. Exclude those identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
Log Analytics Data Purged or Deleted
Detects a successful purge request on a Log Analytics workspace (Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/purge/action) or a delete data request on one of its tables (Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/tables/deleteData/action). Both remove selected records and leave the rest of the workspace in place, and Microsoft describes them as destructive and non-reversible. On a workspace that holds security logs this is how evidence of earlier activity is removed. The rule assumes that these requests are written to the Activity log like other action operations, which is what the Activity log schema describes for the Administrative category. The event does not hold the table filter of the request.
title: Log Analytics Data Purged or Deleted
id: b4a2683d-315d-4b83-a418-cf76f9992f9d
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful purge request on a Log Analytics workspace
(Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/purge/action) or a delete data
request on one of its tables
(Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/tables/deleteData/action). Both
remove selected records and leave the rest of the workspace in place, and
Microsoft describes them as destructive and non-reversible. On a workspace
that holds security logs this is how evidence of earlier activity is
removed. The rule assumes that these requests are written to the Activity
log like other action operations, which is what the Activity log schema
describes for the Administrative category. The event does not hold the
table filter of the request.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/personal-data-mgmt
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/delete-log-data
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/monitor
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/fundamentals/activity-log-schema
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue:
- MICROSOFT.OPERATIONALINSIGHTS/WORKSPACES/PURGE/ACTION
- MICROSOFT.OPERATIONALINSIGHTS/WORKSPACES/TABLES/DELETEDATA/ACTION
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Requests to erase personal data, which is the purpose Microsoft gives for the purge operation, and removal of data that was ingested by mistake. These are rare and planned, so match each event to a request and to the table it named.
level: high
False positives
- Requests to erase personal data, which is the purpose Microsoft gives for the purge operation, and removal of data that was ingested by mistake. These are rare and planned, so match each event to a request and to the table it named.
Log Analytics Workspace or Table Deleted
Detects a successful deletion of a Log Analytics workspace (Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/delete) or of a table in a workspace (workspaces/tables/delete). Deleting the workspace removes the logs, and a Microsoft Sentinel instance that runs on it, in one step. Microsoft keeps a workspace recoverable for 14 days unless it was deleted permanently, and does not document that the Activity log event distinguishes the two, so check at once whether it can be recovered. The rule fires for every workspace, including test workspaces, so limit it to the workspaces that hold security data where you can.
title: Log Analytics Workspace or Table Deleted
id: dcaf77eb-baae-4d86-8853-2fbd4364570a
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful deletion of a Log Analytics workspace
(Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/delete) or of a table in a
workspace (workspaces/tables/delete). Deleting the workspace removes the
logs, and a Microsoft Sentinel instance that runs on it, in one step.
Microsoft keeps a workspace recoverable for 14 days unless it was deleted
permanently, and does not document that the Activity log event
distinguishes the two, so check at once whether it can be recovered. The
rule fires for every workspace, including test workspaces, so limit it to
the workspaces that hold security data where you can.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/delete-workspace
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/monitor
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue:
- MICROSOFT.OPERATIONALINSIGHTS/WORKSPACES/DELETE
- MICROSOFT.OPERATIONALINSIGHTS/WORKSPACES/TABLES/DELETE
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Clean-up of test and project workspaces and of custom tables that are no longer used. Exclude the identities of teardown pipelines in a filter_ selection by Caller, or scope the rule to the security workspaces.
level: medium
False positives
- Clean-up of test and project workspaces and of custom tables that are no longer used. Exclude the identities of teardown pipelines in a filter_ selection by Caller, or scope the rule to the security workspaces.
Microsoft Sentinel Analytics or Automation Rule Deleted
Detects a successful deletion of a Microsoft Sentinel analytics rule (Microsoft.SecurityInsights/alertRules/delete), of the response actions of an analytics rule, or of an automation rule. An analytics rule is what turns log data into alerts, and automation rules and rule actions start the response, so a deletion removes a detection or the reaction to it. Microsoft states that the Azure Activity log is the audit trail of Sentinel. The event names the rule by its ID and does not hold the query, so identify the rule from your repository or from the SentinelAudit table.
title: Microsoft Sentinel Analytics or Automation Rule Deleted
id: a51238b9-2167-498d-be7d-b9df66dc1455
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful deletion of a Microsoft Sentinel analytics rule
(Microsoft.SecurityInsights/alertRules/delete), of the response actions of
an analytics rule, or of an automation rule. An analytics rule is what
turns log data into alerts, and automation rules and rule actions start the
response, so a deletion removes a detection or the reaction to it.
Microsoft states that the Azure Activity log is the audit trail of
Sentinel. The event names the rule by its ID and does not hold the query,
so identify the rule from your repository or from the SentinelAudit table.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/audit-sentinel-data
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/monitor-analytics-rule-integrity
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/security
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue:
- MICROSOFT.SECURITYINSIGHTS/ALERTRULES/DELETE
- MICROSOFT.SECURITYINSIGHTS/ALERTRULES/ACTIONS/DELETE
- MICROSOFT.SECURITYINSIGHTS/AUTOMATIONRULES/DELETE
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Detection engineers who retire or replace rules, and content pipelines that delete and recreate rules on each deployment. Exclude the pipeline identity in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed, and review deletions by anyone else.
level: medium
False positives
- Detection engineers who retire or replace rules, and content pipelines that delete and recreate rules on each deployment. Exclude the pipeline identity in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed, and review deletions by anyone else.
Microsoft Sentinel Analytics Rule Created or Updated
Detects a successful create or update of a Microsoft Sentinel analytics rule (Microsoft.SecurityInsights/alertRules/write), the operation that Microsoft's own auditing guidance uses to find edits of alert rules. An update can disable a rule or change its query, its threshold or its exclusions so that it no longer fires, which removes a detection without a deletion. The rule matches on the event only, because the Activity log does not hold the rule content, so it also fires on every legitimate change. Use it for review of unexpected callers and compare the rule with its previous version.
title: Microsoft Sentinel Analytics Rule Created or Updated
id: b03c695b-7808-4f54-8913-da4f373f46da
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful create or update of a Microsoft Sentinel analytics
rule (Microsoft.SecurityInsights/alertRules/write), the operation that
Microsoft's own auditing guidance uses to find edits of alert rules. An
update can disable a rule or change its query, its threshold or its
exclusions so that it no longer fires, which removes a detection without a
deletion. The rule matches on the event only, because the Activity log does
not hold the rule content, so it also fires on every legitimate change. Use
it for review of unexpected callers and compare the rule with its previous
version.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/audit-sentinel-data
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/monitor-analytics-rule-integrity
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/security
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue: MICROSOFT.SECURITYINSIGHTS/ALERTRULES/WRITE
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Detection engineers who tune rules and content pipelines that deploy them. Exclude their identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
- Bulk deployments, for example when a set of rules is rolled out to a new workspace or updated from a repository.
level: low
False positives
- Detection engineers who tune rules and content pipelines that deploy them. Exclude their identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
- Bulk deployments, for example when a set of rules is rolled out to a new workspace or updated from a repository.
Microsoft Sentinel Data Connector Deleted or Sentinel Removed From a Workspace
Detects a successful deletion of a Microsoft Sentinel data connector (Microsoft.SecurityInsights/dataConnectors/delete) or of the Sentinel onboarding state of a workspace (Microsoft.SecurityInsights/onboardingStates/delete), which is the operation behind removing Sentinel from a Log Analytics workspace. A deleted connector stops a log source from arriving, so the rules that read it stay silent without being touched. Removing Sentinel from the workspace ends detection altogether. The event names the connector by its ID, so look up which source it was.
title: Microsoft Sentinel Data Connector Deleted or Sentinel Removed From a Workspace
id: 341f1750-331a-4bab-96ba-f64ab0473e3c
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful deletion of a Microsoft Sentinel data connector
(Microsoft.SecurityInsights/dataConnectors/delete) or of the Sentinel
onboarding state of a workspace
(Microsoft.SecurityInsights/onboardingStates/delete), which is the
operation behind removing Sentinel from a Log Analytics workspace. A
deleted connector stops a log source from arriving, so the rules that read
it stay silent without being touched. Removing Sentinel from the workspace
ends detection altogether. The event names the connector by its ID, so
look up which source it was.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/audit-sentinel-data
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securityinsights/sentinel-onboarding-states/delete
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/offboard
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/security
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue:
- MICROSOFT.SECURITYINSIGHTS/DATACONNECTORS/DELETE
- MICROSOFT.SECURITYINSIGHTS/ONBOARDINGSTATES/DELETE
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Replacement of a connector by a newer version of the same connector, and the planned retirement of a log source or of a whole workspace. Match each event to a change record and confirm that the data still arrives.
level: medium
False positives
- Replacement of a connector by a newer version of the same connector, and the planned retirement of a log source or of a whole workspace. Match each event to a change record and confirm that the data still arrives.
Several Kinds of Sentinel Content, Log Data or Collection Removed by One Caller
Counts, per Caller, how many different removal operations it completed against Microsoft Sentinel content, Log Analytics data and Azure Monitor data collection. Maintenance touches one kind of object at a time: a rule is retired or a connector is replaced. Three or more different operations within 60 minutes, for example analytics rules, a data connector and data collection rules, mean that one identity is taking the monitoring apart. The count and the window are starting points to tune.
Fires when one Caller has at least 3 different OperationNameValue values within 60 minutes.
title: Sentinel Content, Log Data or Collection Removed (Threshold Base Event)
id: a700101f-dfd3-4ebd-8a08-35ce99a14107
name: azure_siem_content_or_log_data_removed
status: experimental
description: >-
Base event of the threshold rule in this file. A successful deletion of a
Microsoft Sentinel analytics rule, rule action, automation rule or data
connector, the removal of Sentinel from a workspace, the deletion of a Log
Analytics workspace or table, a purge or delete data request, or the
deletion of a data collection rule or association.
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue:
- MICROSOFT.SECURITYINSIGHTS/ALERTRULES/DELETE
- MICROSOFT.SECURITYINSIGHTS/ALERTRULES/ACTIONS/DELETE
- MICROSOFT.SECURITYINSIGHTS/AUTOMATIONRULES/DELETE
- MICROSOFT.SECURITYINSIGHTS/DATACONNECTORS/DELETE
- MICROSOFT.SECURITYINSIGHTS/ONBOARDINGSTATES/DELETE
- MICROSOFT.OPERATIONALINSIGHTS/WORKSPACES/DELETE
- MICROSOFT.OPERATIONALINSIGHTS/WORKSPACES/TABLES/DELETE
- MICROSOFT.OPERATIONALINSIGHTS/WORKSPACES/PURGE/ACTION
- MICROSOFT.OPERATIONALINSIGHTS/WORKSPACES/TABLES/DELETEDATA/ACTION
- MICROSOFT.INSIGHTS/DATACOLLECTIONRULES/DELETE
- MICROSOFT.INSIGHTS/DATACOLLECTIONRULEASSOCIATIONS/DELETE
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
level: low
---
title: Several Kinds of Sentinel Content, Log Data or Collection Removed by One Caller
id: 392f5a41-5283-4c84-8182-bf6ab5e863b1
status: experimental
description: >-
Counts, per Caller, how many different removal operations it completed
against Microsoft Sentinel content, Log Analytics data and Azure Monitor
data collection. Maintenance touches one kind of object at a time: a rule
is retired or a connector is replaced. Three or more different operations
within 60 minutes, for example analytics rules, a data connector and data
collection rules, mean that one identity is taking the monitoring apart.
The count and the window are starting points to tune.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/audit-sentinel-data
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/security
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/monitor
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
correlation:
type: value_count
rules:
- azure_siem_content_or_log_data_removed
group-by:
- Caller
timespan: 60m
condition:
field: OperationNameValue
gte: 3
falsepositives:
- Teardown of a test workspace and migration to a new workspace, where rules, connectors and collection rules are removed together. Match the burst to a change record and exclude the migration identity by Caller.
- The values of 3 different operations and 60 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure what your own maintenance produces and adjust both.
level: high
False positives
- Teardown of a test workspace and migration to a new workspace, where rules, connectors and collection rules are removed together. Match the burst to a change record and exclude the migration identity by Caller.
- The values of 3 different operations and 60 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure what your own maintenance produces and adjust both.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
A log source stops arriving after a connector or data collection rule was deleted
The deletion event shows intent, the missing data shows effect. A table that received events every hour and receives none after a data connector, a data collection rule or an association was deleted confirms that the deletion removed a log source and tells you from when the gap runs.
- In the Azure Activity log, find a successful
MICROSOFT.SECURITYINSIGHTS/DATACONNECTORS/DELETE,MICROSOFT.INSIGHTS/DATACOLLECTIONRULES/DELETEorMICROSOFT.INSIGHTS/DATACOLLECTIONRULEASSOCIATIONS/DELETE. Keep theCaller, the time and the resource ID. - For each table the connector or rule fed, compare the number of records per hour in the 24 hours before the event with the hours after it.
- Report the tables whose volume fell to zero or far below their usual level, with the time of the last record.
EventsMICROSOFT.SECURITYINSIGHTS/DATACONNECTORS/DELETEMICROSOFT.INSIGHTS/DATACOLLECTIONRULES/DELETEMICROSOFT.INSIGHTS/DATACOLLECTIONRULEASSOCIATIONS/DELETE
LimitsWhich table a connector or a data collection rule fed is not in the event, so the mapping has to be kept by the reader. Quiet sources and decommissioned machines also stop sending. The 24 hours are a starting point. A source that was replaced by a new connector shows a gap only if the replacement failed.
Triage
- Identify the Caller, the caller's IP address and the object from the resource ID of the event, and whether this identity is part of the team that maintains the SIEM.
- For a rule, find out which detection it was, and check the
SentinelAudittable or your rule repository for its last content. The Activity log names the rule by its ID and does not hold the query. - For a connector or a data collection rule, check which tables stopped receiving data and since when.
- For a purge or a delete data request, find out which table it targeted and which time range and filter it used, by asking the caller and by comparing record counts with a second copy of the data.
- Review what the same caller did in the tenant before and after the event, using a log copy outside the affected workspace.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Recover a deleted workspace within the 14 day soft-delete period, and restore deleted rules, automation rules and connectors from the repository or from an export.
- Contain the caller. Revoke its sessions, rotate its credentials and remove its roles on the workspace until the change is explained.
- Create the deleted data collection rules and associations again, and confirm that every expected log source is arriving.
- Treat the period between the first change and the restoration as unmonitored. Review it with the logs that were kept elsewhere, such as the Activity log export and the source systems themselves.
- Record which data was purged or deleted, because it cannot be recovered, and state that gap in the incident record.
Mitigation
- Keep the Sentinel workspace in a dedicated subscription or resource group, and limit Owner, Contributor, Microsoft Sentinel Contributor and Log Analytics Contributor there to the security team.
- Put a delete lock on the workspace, and watch for the removal of that lock.
- Manage analytics rules, automation rules and connectors as code, so that a deleted or changed rule is restored by the next deployment and the difference is visible.
- Export the Azure Activity log of the subscription that holds the workspace to a second destination that the workspace administrators cannot change, for example a storage account with an immutability policy in another subscription.
- Enable the health and audit feature of Sentinel, which writes rule changes to the
SentinelAudittable, and alert when an expected log source stops arriving.
Frequently asked questions
Where does Microsoft Sentinel record changes to its own rules?
Microsoft states that Sentinel's audit logs are maintained in the Azure Activity log, and that the AzureActivity table includes all actions taken in a Sentinel workspace. Operation names start with MICROSOFT.SECURITYINSIGHTS. The health and audit feature adds the SentinelAudit table, which is stored in the same workspace as everything else.
Can a deleted Log Analytics workspace be recovered?
Usually. Microsoft documents that a workspace is deleted into a soft-delete state by default and can be recovered within 14 days. A permanent deletion cannot be reversed. Both use the same delete permission, and Microsoft does not document that the Activity log event distinguishes them, so check at once whether the workspace can still be recovered.
Why is purged data treated differently from a deleted workspace?
Microsoft describes the purge and delete data operations as destructive and non-reversible. They remove selected records from a table and leave the rest, so the workspace looks intact while the events an investigator needs are gone. There is no soft-delete period for them. Legitimate use is rare, mostly for personal data requests.
Does the rule on analytics rule updates show what was changed?
No. The Activity log event names the rule and the caller, and an update looks the same whether the rule was disabled, its query was changed or only its description was edited. Use that rule for review of unexpected callers, and compare the rule with its version in your repository or in the SentinelAudit table.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1685: Disable or Modify Tools
- Audit Microsoft Sentinel queries and activities
- Auditing and health monitoring in Microsoft Sentinel
- Roles and permissions in Microsoft Sentinel
- Delete and recover a Log Analytics workspace
- Export, delete, or purge personal data in Azure Monitor Logs
- Delete data from a Log Analytics workspace by using the Delete Data API
- Data collection rules in Azure Monitor
- Azure permissions for Security
- Azure permissions for Monitor
- Azure Activity Log event schema