How the attack works
Microsoft Entra Connect Health monitors the on-premises identity infrastructure. Agents on AD FS servers, synchronization servers and domain controllers send health and usage data to the service. The agent for AD FS also sends sign-in events. Microsoft Entra ID shows them in its sign-in report next to cloud sign-ins, can stream them to Log Analytics, and builds reports such as bad password attempts and risky IP addresses from them. Every monitored server is registered as a server instance, also called a service member, of a Connect Health service.
Registration is an Azure Resource Manager operation of the Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService resource provider. Microsoft documents Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/servicemembers/action as the operation that creates or updates a server instance in a service. By default Global Administrators and Hybrid Identity Administrators can register agents, and so can identities that were given access to Connect Health through its role-based access control. An attacker who holds such an identity registers a server instance that matches no real server. Microsoft's own Sentinel detection for this operation describes the result: a fake server instance can be used to spoof AD FS sign-in logs, and no on-premises AD FS server has to be compromised.
Forged records undermine what an investigation can trust. They can invent activity for a user, bury real events and make the reports and alerts that are built on AD FS data misleading. The registration itself is an administrative event in the Azure Activity log under the operation above.
What an attacker needs
- An identity that can register a Connect Health agent, which by default means a Global Administrator or a Hybrid Identity Administrator, or an identity granted access to Connect Health through its role-based access control.
Impact
False sign-in and health data in the tenant, presented by Microsoft Entra ID as if it came from the organization's own federation servers. The attacker gains no access to resources this way. The damage is to detection and response, because analysts, reports and alerts work with records that are not real.
Detection rules
Server Instance Added to a Microsoft Entra Connect Health Service
Detects the successful Azure Resource Manager operation that creates or updates a server instance (service member) in a Microsoft Entra Connect Health service, such as an AD FS farm or a synchronization service. A server registered there reports health data and, for AD FS, sign-in events that Microsoft Entra ID shows in its sign-in logs. Microsoft publishes a Sentinel analytics rule on the same operation, read from the AzureActivity table and narrowed to resource IDs that contain AdFederationService, because a fake server instance can be used to spoof AD FS sign-in logs.
title: Server Instance Added to a Microsoft Entra Connect Health Service
id: 29190db0-18da-4bcf-8b60-2cf3f37da6a8
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the successful Azure Resource Manager operation that creates or
updates a server instance (service member) in a Microsoft Entra Connect
Health service, such as an AD FS farm or a synchronization service. A
server registered there reports health data and, for AD FS, sign-in events
that Microsoft Entra ID shows in its sign-in logs. Microsoft publishes a
Sentinel analytics rule on the same operation, read from the AzureActivity
table and narrowed to resource IDs that contain AdFederationService, because
a fake server instance can be used to spoof AD FS sign-in logs.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/identity
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-health-ad-fs-sign-in
- https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Azure%20Activity/Analytic%20Rules/AADHybridHealthADFSNewServer.yaml
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1578
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue: MICROSOFT.ADHYBRIDHEALTHSERVICE/SERVICES/SERVICEMEMBERS/ACTION
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Installing, upgrading or registering again the Connect Health agent on a federation, proxy or synchronization server, and installing Microsoft Entra Connect, which registers its own health agent. Match the event to the server work planned for that day and to the administrator who did it.
level: medium
False positives
- Installing, upgrading or registering again the Connect Health agent on a federation, proxy or synchronization server, and installing Microsoft Entra Connect, which registers its own health agent. Match the event to the server work planned for that day and to the administrator who did it.
Triage
- Identify the Caller and the caller IP address, and read the service and the server instance in the resource ID of the event. A resource ID that contains AdFederationService belongs to an AD FS service.
- Check whether a federation or synchronization server was installed, rebuilt or had its agent registered again at that time.
- Open the service in the Connect Health portal and compare its servers with the servers the organization runs.
- Look for a service instance created shortly before the event or deleted after it (
Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/writeandMicrosoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/delete). - If the server is not yours, delete it from Connect Health, treat AD FS sign-in records from that period as unreliable, and review the sign-ins and other changes of the caller.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Contain the caller. It holds Global Administrator, Hybrid Identity Administrator or access to Connect Health, so revoke its sessions, reset its credentials and authentication methods, and remove the role until the sign-in is explained.
- Check whether the caller gave any identity access in the role-based access control of Connect Health, and remove those grants so the server cannot be registered again.
- Mark the period from the registration to the deletion in your SIEM and case records. AD FS sign-in records, bad password attempts and risky IP reports from that period need confirmation from the security logs of your own federation servers before they are used as evidence.
- Go back over the alerts and investigations that were opened or closed on the basis of AD FS sign-in data from that period, and repeat the ones that depended on it.
- Confirm that the servers listed in each Connect Health service match the servers you run, and that the agents on your real servers still report.
Mitigation
- Keep the Global Administrator and Hybrid Identity Administrator roles on a small number of accounts protected with phishing-resistant MFA and Privileged Identity Management.
- Review who has access in the role-based access control of Connect Health, for all service instances and for each service instance, and remove assignments that are not needed.
- Review the services and servers listed in Connect Health regularly and delete every server and service instance that is not one of your own.
- Collect the Azure Activity log centrally and alert on operations of the
Microsoft.ADHybridHealthServiceresource provider.
Frequently asked questions
Does a fake server instance in Connect Health give the attacker access to our resources?
No. The attacker gains no access to resources this way. The damage is to detection and response, because sign-in and health data that Microsoft Entra ID presents as coming from your own federation servers can be made up. Analysts, reports and alerts then work with records that are not real.
Does the attacker have to compromise one of our AD FS servers first?
No. Registration is an Azure Resource Manager operation that needs an identity allowed to register a Connect Health agent, by default a Global Administrator or a Hybrid Identity Administrator. No on-premises AD FS server has to be compromised for a fake server instance to report sign-in events.
Why does the rule fire when we install or upgrade Microsoft Entra Connect?
Installing Microsoft Entra Connect registers its own health agent, and installing, upgrading or registering again the Connect Health agent on a federation, proxy or synchronization server uses the same operation. Match the event to the server work planned for that day and to the administrator who did it.
How can we limit the alert to AD FS services?
Read the resource ID of the event. A resource ID that contains AdFederationService belongs to an AD FS service, and Microsoft's Sentinel analytics rule narrows the same operation to those resource IDs. The rule on this page matches a server instance added to any Connect Health service.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1578: Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
- Azure permissions for Identity (Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService)
- AD FS sign-ins in Microsoft Entra ID with Connect Health
- Install the Microsoft Entra Connect Health agents (who can register an agent)
- Microsoft Entra Connect Health operations (role-based access control, deleting a server or service instance)
- Microsoft Entra Connect Health agents for AD FS (bad password attempts and risky IP reports)
- Microsoft Sentinel analytics rule: Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS New Server